The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

Continued Endnotes

[106] Quoted by Szakaly 1975, 65.

[107] Acta Tomiciana s.d., 6:28.

[108] Burgio 1926, 82; Istvanffy 1724, 96.

[109] Torok 1926, 156.

[110] Szeremi 1979, 77, Szalay 1861, 35.

[111] Quoted by Balogh 1929, xiii.

[112] Magyarország Tortenete 1961, 421.

[113] Szakály (1975, 1982) offers a detailed history of the border defense system.

[114] On Belgrade's importance, see above 47.

[115] On the importance of this connection, sce Djelazade, in Thury 1896, 2: 123, 132, 135. Istvánffy (1724: 58-9) writing about the siege of 1521 explains that Suleyman Ahmed ordered the capture of Sabac in order to assure that nemo illinc Taurinum (that is, Belgrade) descendere, ... aut res necesseria importare posset. After taking Sabac the Ottomans built a bridge in order to besiege Belgrade more quickly, to reduce the fighting chance of Louis, were he to come to the castle's rescue, and to frighten those in the fortress (oppidanis eo majorem formidinem incuteret).

[116] See above p. 54-7.

[117] CJH 1899, Art. 16: 1489; Borossy 1971, 23.

[118] On the connection between border defense and light cavalry, see Perjes 1967,where I have discussed these matters in some detail.

[119] Toth 1934.

[120] Quoted by Balogh 1929. xxxii.

[121] Istvanffy 1724, 56, 58; Borossy 1962.

[122] Szentkláray 1895; Kiss 1889; cf. Istvánffy 1724, 76.

[123] The Danubian fleet was composed of two types o vessels: the galley and the sloop.The former had 40 oars, the latter 18. The galleys were mounted with cannon.

[124] Gyalokay 1926, 218.

[125] Burgio 1926, 83, 91. The Hungarian delegates to the 1523 Reichstag emphasizedthat they had plenty of provisions but would not refuse some help from Germany(Torok 1926 156). There is some reference to lack of food in 1526, but onlyconcerning Tomori's troops which were generally poorly supplied (MohacsEmlekezete 1976, 93).

[126] See below, 209sqq.

[127] For the following see above all Szalay 1862; Szabo 1909, 1917; Fraknoi 1896,1899; Bracken 1926 and Hermann 1976.

[128] Hermann 1976 298.

[129] Szekfu (s.d.), 436 .

[130] Szakaly 1875, 43.

[131] Salamon 1886 73.

[132] See above n.2 p. 59.

[133] Fraknoi 1899, 489.

[134] Perjbs 1975, 7.

[135] Ibid. 14. My interpretntion was dismissed by Matuz (1974-75), Szakaly (1975. 1976), Kosary (1978) and Kubinyi (1981).

[136] Hermann (1975: 310) arrived, independently at a conclusion similar to mine.

[137] Horváth 1866, 97.

[138] Thury 1893, 567. Kosary (1978: 184) regards Thury s interpretation an "erroneous assumption."

[139] Fekete 1940, 8-9.

[140] Kaldy-Nagy 1974, 179.

[141] Jorga 1908/113: 20-21.

[142] Inalcik 1973, 29, 35. Szakaly states that all these are the "historian's personal opinions" and supports the "conquest in stages" theory, according to which the Ottoman conquest "pattern" in the Balkans was as follows: 1. incursions undermine the opponent's ability to resist; 2. annihilation of the opponent's armies at decisive battles; 3. obtaining feudal dependency by force; and completely annexing the conquered land or country. He relies on Inalcik's studies, yet it must be noted that Inalcik's book, published in 1973 does not support (or suggest) the "method of conquest" theory. Though Kosary (1978:167) accepts Inalcik's earlier conviction, he does not mention Szakaly's conclusion. Kubinyi (1981) totally agrees with Szakaly's conclusion. Matuz (1985, 50), however, rejects the "conquest in stages" theory, which he calls "absurd".

[143] For the following sec Zinkeisen 1840-5; Jorga 1908/11, Fraknoi 1896; Kaldy-Nagy 1974; Inalcik 1973.

[144] The letter of Pope Leo X to Francis I and Wladislas is published in Charriere 1848-60 1: 7-10.

[145] Balogh 1929, lxiv; Kosary (1978: 63) questions Massaro's account and maintains that Scardona was not the Hungarian s, but the Croatian's emissary, and the Ottoman envoy was sent not by the sultan, but by the Pasha of Bosnia.

[146] Kosáry 1978, 69.

[147] Verancsics 1857, 2: 15.

[148] Thury 1896, 2: 118.

[149] Tubero 1746, Liber XI: 361.

[150] Kosary (1978, 53, 59, 60-61) questions the contentions in the documents published by both Sageundino and Verancsics, and, according to him, Tubero comes closest to the truth.

[151] Kubinyi 1981, 69.

[152] Fraknoi 1899, 170-71.

[153] Torok 1926. 166.

[154] Jorga 1908/11, 2: 341; Artner 1926, 68; Torok 1926. 150; and Kaldy-Nagy 1974, 43.

[155] Kosary 1978, 76.

[156] Ibid., 123-24.

[157] Regarding the three levels of decision in an organization and the pertinent decisions, see Kirsch 1977 3: 51-52, 154-59.

[158] Kubinyi (1981,6849,80) agrees that Suleyman's peace offer was no different from that of Selim's. According to him it was still turned down because of the "war party" mentality of the Hungarians. Indeed, the Hungarians placed all their hope in war to free them from the Ottomans. However, it is also a certainty that they saw foreign support as a prerequisite to the military solution. Hence it is altogether impossible that they reversing the order of events, would first provoke the Porte--and here I agree with Kosáry--and only after doing that would they seek help.

[159] Hermann 1961.

[160] According to Kosary (1978, 67-68) the election of Charles V as Holy Roman Emperor pointed to the eventual division of Europe. He is certainly correct, but this could not have been forseen in 1520.

[161] Charriere 1848, 1: 89-90; Jorga 1908/11, 2: 341; Vaugham 1954, 109; Matuz 1973, 966; Kaldy-Nagy 1974, 35, 53.

[162] Clausewitz 1976, 90.

[163] Perjes 1963b, 1968.

[164] Istvanffy 1724, 56; Thury 1896, 2: 118-19.

[165] Thury 1896, 2: 42.

[166] Ibid., 2: 119.

[167] Ibid., 1: 376.

[168] Ibid., 2: 42.

[169] Ibid., 2: 123.

[170] Ibid., 2: 123. Ferdi and Djeladzade provided valuable information for all this; Thury 1896, 2: 42, 123.

[171] Artner 1926, 151; Kaldy-Nagy (1974, 44) states that "Suleyman's attack was the result of an attitude of growing vengeance, rather than being a well-thought out war plan." Suleyman also lacked a war plan, because "he did not have any practical experience...in directing war on battle-fields of that great a magnitude." In my opinion this assertion is groundless. On the one hand the consensus is that Suleyman was as a man of excellent and exceptional abilities. On the other hand, we must consider the organization's thorough decision-making process: it is impossible to conceive that, at the highest decision-making level of the Ottoman government, the Divan would pass such a subjective motion supporting the hypothetical desire of Suleyman for vengeance, and as far as the planning of military operations is concerned, this was none of Suleyman's business. These matters were handled by vezirs, pashas, and other experts belonging to the lower level of decision-makers. It would be a grave mistake to doubt their expertise.

[172] Istvanffy 1724, 58.

[173] Thury 1896, 1: 288; it is in this manner that Kiss (1889, 622-23) writes about Sabac's importance.

[174] Istvanffy 1724, 59.

[175] Kiss 1889, 524.

[176] Torok 1926, 150.

[177] Sanuto 1878, 209-10

[178] For Transylvanian threats see Kuppelwieser (1899: 203) and Jorga (1908/11, 2: 386).

[179] Sanuto 1878, 223.

[180] Acta Tomiciana s. d., 6: 22.

[181] Thury 1896, 2: 144.

[182] Kiss 1889.

[183] Szakaly 1975, 18.

[184] Szalay 1863; Fraknoi 1896; Jorga 1908/11, 2; Artner 1926; Torok 1926; Inalcik 1973; Kaldy-Nagy 1974.

[185] Alberi 1855, 76.

[186] Acta Tomiciana s.d., 6: 28-30.

[187] Quoted in Lhotsky 1971, 172.

[188] Quoted in Torok 1926, 180.

[189] Quoted in Szalay 1863, 581.

[190] According to Kosary (1978 148-50, 14647) they conferred with the former emissary on the initiative of the Hungarian government. While this is not impossible, it is hard to agree with the interpretation that the new emissary could not have arrived, because diplomatic exchanges between the Hungarians and the Ottomans stopped after the fall of Belgrade.

[191] Kosary (1978, 150) also writes that another reason that a new emissary could not have arrived at Buda was that the government there would have imprisoned him, according to the Venetian ambassador Guidato; I should think so too, but in the statement of Guidato, "qual il Re lhavia fato tenir con custodia"(Sanuto 1878,310) the meaning of "custodia" is not "prison," but "protective custody."

[192] The Ietter is quoted in Lhotsky 1971, 150.

[193] Ibid.

[194] Kubinyi (1981, 86 87) discovered Schneidpock's letter in the Haus-Hof- und Staatsarchiv (Vienna).

[195] Kubinyi (1981, 88) believes Schneidpock when he says that the king and queen did not know about the negotiations and he writes: "The Hungarian diplomats we can reveal--used the matter for blackmail in Rome and Nuremberg." Kosáry (1978, 151) gives no importance to Schneidpock's letter.

[196] Sanuto 1878, 314; Monumenta Vaticana 1884, 106.

[197] Artner 1925, 82, 95.

[198] Ibid., 83.

[199] Acta Tomiciana s.d., 7: 278.

[200] Quoted in Kujani 1908, 324.

[201] Szekfu s.d., 23.

[202] Szalay 1863, 582.

[203] Torok 1923 183.

[204] Bartoniek 1975, 9, 12.

[205] Acta Tomiciana s.d., 7: 278.

[206] Ibid., 290-91.

[207] Ibid., 304.

[208] Hermann 1976, 316.

[209] Ibid., 318.

[210] Ibid., 319 .

[211] Ibid., 320.

[212] Ibid., 325.

[213] Kaldy-Nagy 1974, 62, 64; Hess 1983, 183.

[214] Thury 1896, 1: 199.

[215] Inalcik 1973, 35; Vaugham 1954, 8, 111, 113; Kaldy-Nagy 1974, 5.

[216] Jászay 1846; Szalay 1865; Acsady 1897; Torok 1930; Bardossy 1943; Káldy-Nagy 1974; Barta 1983; Szakaly 1975, 1982 Magyarország tortenete 1986; Erdely Tortenete 1986.

[217] Jaszay 1846, 18; cf. Barta (1983, 100) where a similar statemcnt by Grand Vezir Ibrahim is quoted.

[218] Torok 1930, 17; Bardossy 1943, 11.

[219] Torok 1930, 58-59

[220] As noted in Chapter I

[221] Jaszay 1846, 290-91, 293; Barta 1983, 98 It is significant that, according to the intelligence of the Bavarian envoy to Prague, the Ottoman ambassador asked for free passage across Hungary for Turkish armies in return for peace (Szalay 1861, 24). This proposal was clearly a logical follow-up of the unsuccessful negotiations of 1520 and 1524. The words of the Polish ambassador to Buda tally well with this information "They accepted the Turks as friend and brother" (Jaszas 1846, 291). If we add to this that a new Ottoman envoy was expected in Buda and that King-John did his best to keep the country as unified as possible, we may recognize thatin fact the pre-Mohács concept was taken up anew. Hence, Barta's (1983, 104)assertion on an ' about face in Hungarian-Turkish relations at the turn of1626-27" at which time, according to him "to the good luck of the new Hungariangovernment the Porte's earlier negative attitude was changed," does not makesense. Considering the Ottoman projects of 1520-24 one cannot talk of any "aboutface."

[222] Szalay 1861, 92.

[223] Verancsics 1857, 2: 28. The scene was witnessed by Bishop Statileo, and the--eventual ambassador to Constantinople, the Polish-born Lasky (Szalay 1861, 92-93, Bardossy 1943, 66).

[224] Bárdossy 1943, 70.

[225] By the end of 1526 Venice advised John to come to an agreement with the Porte (Szalay 1861, 76).

[226] Kaldy-Nagy 1974, 135 sqq.

[227] Braudel 1966, 1: 496; Magalhaes-Godinho 1969, 762.

[228] Quoted in Soros 1917, 439.

[229] Ibid.,144.

[230] Thury 1896, 1: 330.

[231] Szeremi 1979, 246.

[232] Thury 1896, 2: 87.

[233] Ibid., 2: 187.

[234] Acsady 1879, 76.

[235] Egyhaz torteneti emlekek a hitujitas korábol [Documents or Church History fromthe Age of the Reformation] (Budapest 1902) 1: 495.

[236] Szeremi 1979, 246-47.

[237] Szalay 1865; one part of this text is published in Bardossy (1943, 69)and the Latin texts are published in Charriere I 1848-60. 1: 172.

[238] Szekfu s.d., 20; emphasis added.

[239] Quoted in Soros 1917, 445.

[240] Szalay 1865, 103; emphasis added.

[241] References as in n. 83, p. 118 above.

[242] Szalay 1861, 114.

[243] Szalay 1866, 104; Torok 1930, 36.

[244] Quoted in Fraknoi 1899, 281.

[245] Acsády 1897, 96.

[246] Hungarian translation of the letter of invitation as published in Bardossy 1943 101-02 .

[247] Szalay 1865, 125.

[248] Magalhaes-Godinho 1969, 753 sqq.; Vaugham 1954, 118 sqq.

[249] Kaldy-Nagy 1974, 99.

[250] Charriere 1848-60, 1: 190.

[251] Ibid., 202.

[252] Bardossy 1943, 140.

[253] Horvath 1866, 33-37.

[254] Thury 1896, 2: 200.

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541