The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

Endnotes

[2] For the major contributions, see the entries Barta 1983;Kosary 1978; Kubinyi. These could be augmented by many titles, e.g., from thejournal Jelenkor, 11 (1976) which, besides Perjes 1976d brought articles by Barta,Vilmos Farago, Dezso Kereszturi Istvan Nemeskurty and Laszlo Vekerdi, or thereview of the 2d ed. of Nemeskurty 1966 by Szakaly in Valosag 12 (1969).

[3] Perjes 1975.

[4] Bardossy 1943.

[5] For the following see Gafgen 1974, Harsanyi 1969, 1977, June 1972. Kaufmann1982; Kirsch 1977; Klaus-Libscher 1976; Simon 1974.

[6] This interpretation is most coherently argued by the German economic historian,Wemer Sombart (1921). A critique of this view is offered by Eucken (1940) 232sqq.

[7] Jahns 1889-91:1 190.

[8] Machiavelli 1833, Anhang 252-3.

[9] Ibid., 113.

[10] Savorgnano 1620, 39.

[11] Montecuccoli 1899, 1: 52, 82-4, 2: 206, 253-7, 273.

[12] Zrinyi 1976. Cf. also Perjes 1976.

[13] Gafgen 1974, 100; Kirsch 1977, 1: 72, 118, 139, 2: 169; Simon 1969, 304;Klaus-Libscher 1976, 1: 211; Thomas 1978, 1: 38, 73.

[14] Coles 1968, 69-77.

[15] On the supply system of Constantinople see Inalcik 1973 145; CEH 1967, 156.The Ottoman Empire was usually an exporter of cereals, Jorga 1908/11, 1:458, 2: 15;Kretschmayr 1920 2: 33, 34; Braudel 1966, 1: 221, 535.

[16] Inalcik 1973, 105.

[17] Lhotsky 1971, 60.

[18] Babinger 1935, 20, 403.

[19] Brandi 1939, 359.

[20] Venice was for the Ottomans oculus totius Occidentis, Gollner 1968, 7; Torok 1926,178; Vaughan 1954, 87.

[21] Vaughan 1954, 49.

[22] Kuppelwieser 1899, 141; Vaughan 1954, 87.

[23] Thury 1896, 1: 174.

[24] Burgio 1926, 92. In 1522 spies of the Ottoman Empire were arrested in Buda; seeArtner 1926, 73.

[25] Szeremi 1979, 203.

[26] Inalcik 1973, 180; Kaldy-Nagy 1974, 62-3; Hess 1982.

[27] Thury 1896, 1: 191, 193.

[28] For the following, see Braudel 1966; CEH 1967; Magelhaes-Godinho 1969; Inalcik1973; Kaldy-Nagy 1974; Pach 1963, 1968, 1985; Hegyi-Zimanyi 1986.

[29] Magelhaes-Godinho 1969, 753.

[30] Inalcik 1973, 34.

[31] Braudel 1966, 1: 170 sqq.

[32] Elekes 1952, 216 sqq.

[33] Vaughan 1954, 110.

[34] Ibid. 207.

[35] Brandi 1939; Inalcik 1973; Lapeyre 1967; Mattingly 1962.

[36] Thury 1896 1: 199 sqq.; Ferdi and Djeladzade also wrote about the coronation ofthe emperor, ibid. 2: 86, 91, 192, 233-4.

[37] Hermann 1961.34 Inalcik 1973, 58.

[38] For the following see Babinger 1935; Enzyklopaedie 1934; Fekete 1944; Hegyi 1985; Hegyi-Zimányi 1986; Inalcik 1977, 1978; Islamoglu-Keyder 1977; Jorga 1908/11; Lybyer 1913; Matuz 1973, 1985; Perjés 1967; Zinkeisen 1854.

[39] Barkan 1958, 30; Inalcik 1977, 73; Káldi-Nagy 1974, 83; Randa 1965; Kovacsics 1963; Magyarország torténete 1985, 282 sqq.

[40] Braudel 1966; CHI 1970, 1: 319; Inalcik 1973, 116, 124-5; Jorga 1908/11, 2: 351;Zinkeisen 1854, 2: 594, 763-7.

[41] Babinger 1935, 500; Jirecek 1889/91, 113.

[42] The diary of Suleyman and Ottoman chronicles contain many data on the bridgeat Eszek; cf. Thury 1896, 1:211, 264, 273, 299, 305, 321-2, 330; 2:49 60, 65, 72-3,132, 134, 151, 170, 362.

[43] Jorga 1908/11, 2: 229; Kaldy-Nagy 1974, 134, 149, 158; CEH 1967, 163; Zinkeisen1854, 2: 317, 403-4, 531-2, 752.

[44] Gyalokay 1926, 196; Kaldy-Nagy 1974, 82.

[45] Perjes 1970, 2.

[46] "Ce seroit un ouvrage trop pénible ... que de vouloire decrire avec exactitude lenombre de ceux que ces Zaims et Timarios menent a la guerre. C'est pourquoi quivoudront prendre connaissance de cette milice, en doivent faire le compte parestimation de plus au moins." Rycaut, 1670, 412.

[47] Barkan 1958, 21, 30; Inalcik 1977, 10-17; Kaldy-Nagy 1974, 72 sqq.; Kaldy-Nagy1986, 181.

[48] Opinions vary as to whether the first 3-4-5,000 aspers were included in the countor not. The difference is significant, because, if that was the case, the number oftimariot sipahi decreased by the number of timar landowners. Rycaut tells us,however, that a zeamet owner with an income of 30,000 aspers had to provide sixsoldiers, and one with an income of 90,000 aspers, eighteen, hence, the first 5,000aspers were not exempted. Inalcik interprets the data in the same way and I aminclined to accept this count. Rycaut 1670, 410; Marsigli 1732, 135; Barkan 1958,21 sqq.; Inaclik 1977, 107 sqq.; Lybyer 1913, 101.

[49] Thury 1896, 1: 41l.

[50] The data ascribed to Ayni Ali and Ali Chaus are quoted after Mutefcieva 1968.

[51] Thury 1896, 1:206-7, 213, 306, 2: 61.

[52] Káldy-Nagy 1986, 18648.

[53] Thury 1896, 2: 81, 412.

[54] Gyalokay 1926, 196-8.

[55] The troops from Asia assembling at Constantinople set out on April 23 andreached the vicinity of Belgrade on June 30; in other words, it took 77 days to covera distance of about 1,000 km. Moreover, a significant portion of the army did notassemble at Constantinople; the troops from the Balkans joined the main bodylater while the soldiers of several sanjaks met up only in the area of Belgrade.Hence these did not cover anything like a distance of 1,000 km.

[56] On the march oft the Ottomans across the Balkans, see Thury 1896 1: 150, 203, 301,2: 11, 58, 147 sqq. On the failure of the supply system during Napoleon's Russiancampaign see Perjes 1963, 1968.

[57] Thury 1896 1: 312, 2:653.

[58] According to the engineer Saint Remy, the "new" type of pontoon introduced in theFrench army towards the end of the seventeenth century could carry a bridge 14feet (about 4.5 meters) wide. According to further data, the military bridges of theperiod were wide enough to allow five infantrymen or three cavalry to pass side byside, roughly the equivalent of 4 meters. According to another observation datingfrom the middle of the sixteenth century the Spaniards built a bridge 4 meterswide across the Schelde. Thury 18961: 262, 312, 2: 49; Szerémi 1979, 198; SaintRémy 1702, 2: 138; Holub 1909, 90; Hailott 1836, 1: 275.

[59] This computation is based on the fact that the length of the column of march ofcavalry in ranks of four entails, in practice, the same number of steps as cavalrymen; that means in our case, 100,000 steps, which correspond to 75 km. But sinceonly three horses were led side by side, the column of march must have been 100km. Cf. the data in Jahns 1889-91; Berger 1930; and Generalstabshandbuch 1914.

[60] Tomori's estimate is in Brodarics 1f;90, 562 (=1908, 34). The number of cannons iscorroborated by Ferdi (Thury 1896 2: 57). On the composition of the artillery andthe technical details I used Solms (as summarized by Jahns 1889-91); cf. alsoDolleczek 1887 and Hoog 1955.

[61] According to the observation of the historian Sinan Chavush, the artillery broughtby the army operating in Hungary in 1543, including "countless cannons, 24,000sacks of gunpowder, tools, and technical equipment" were ferried by boat fromConstantinople to Varna, then transferred onto 1,800 carts and carried to Silistra,whence 54 ships transported the materials to Belgrade. In 1683 the Turkish army,forced to abandon the siege of Vienna in a panic-like flight, left 160 smaller and 10heavier pieces, 8,000 carts of ammunition, 10,000 oxen, 15,000 bisons, and 5,000camels on the battlefield. For Sinan Chavush, sec Thury 189t; 2: 328; on the bootyat Vienna Hayne 1783, 105.

[62] On rations of food and forage and their transport, see Perjes 1963; 1970.

[63] The number of carts or camels that were needed to transport this weight can becalculated as follows. Since the reports about 30,000 camels in the train of thearmy seem relatively reliable, counting with 200 kg per camel, the total weightthey could carry would be 6,000 tons. There remain another 6-7,000 tons for which8-12,000 carts were required if we assume that each cart could transport 600 kg.Since three camels could cross the bridge at Eszék side by side, the 30,000 camelsformed 10,000 ranks and, taking 4 meters per rank, the length of the column wouldbe 4 km. As for the 8-12 000 carts, they would constitute a column 130 to 190 kmlong if we assume 16 meters per cart.

[64] Brodarics 1690, 661-2 (=1908, 34-5).

[65] Good records for the following are available in Suleyman s diary, in KemalPashazade, in Lufti, in Ferdi, in Thury 1896. Useful data can be found in Lybyer1913 and Zinkeisen 1840/5 as well. For additional details. see Perjes 1967.

[66] Thury 1896, 2:58.

[67] In Suleyman's diary the comment "One soldier was decapitated for allowing hishorse to graze in the sown field",or words to that effect, often appears. Thury 1896, 1: 341.

[68] Perjes 1967 contains further details and analysis. On logistics in general cf. Perjes1963 and 1970; van Creveld 1955; Engels 1978.

[69] Thury 1896, 2:46. In 1521, for instance, 10,000 cartloads of oats and flour wereordered to be bought up in the sanjaks of Bulgaria and Serbia, enough to feed70,000 troops for 90 days. In 1566, 12,5(30 tons of cereal were accumulated to feedthe Ottoman forces involved in the siege of Szigetvár, which meant food for about140,000 troops over 90 days. In 1683 about 2,400 tons of cereal were abandonedunder the walls of Vienna by the fleeing Turks, representing rations for 100,000troops over 24 days. At Zenta the booty captured by the Christian forces included12,000 sacks of rice, 2,500 barrels of flour, 556 cartloads of doubletoast (biscuit),and 1,400 cartloads of oats. These supplies would have fed 100,000 troops for awhole month, and 50,000 horses for eight days. Extensive preparations were madeto ensure adequate supplies of meat as well. For instance, in 1S44, the rulers ofWallachia were ordered to provide 40,000 sheep and 3,000 head of cattle. In 1552the inhabitants of the Balkans were ordered to provide 75,000 head of sheep. InJune 1526 Tomori received reports that the Ottoman forces were bringing foodsupplies to last for three months (Mohacs Emlékezete 1976, 90). On the quantity ofcereals stored for a particular campaign, see Káldy-Nagy 1974, 21; 1986, 192-3.On the Vienna booty, see Hayne 183, 103. Tribute in cattle and sheep by theRomanian principalities is discussed in Veinstein 1984, 20 sqq.

[70] Perjes 1967, 359; Káldy-Nagy 1986, 192.

[71] According to Ferdi the orders in 1521 stipulated that "30,000 camels should becollected from Anatolia. ..as well as 10,000 cartloads of wheat and oats, to be loadedonto the camels driven from Anatolia." Thury 1896, 2: 46. Cuspinianus (1841, 20)also mentions 30,000 camels. Imperial Ambassador Ghislain Busbeque, a sharpobserver of Ottoman conditions, was quite right: "there are two things, in myopinion, from which the Turk derives the greatest benefit: among the products itis rice, and among its beasts of burden it is the camel; both are most beneficialwhen it comes to distant undertakings. .. The camel is able to carry the heaviestloads, can easily cope with hunger and thirst. and requires only minimalattention... Each time he goes into war the emperor of the Turks takes severalthousand camels along-over forty thousand of them." Busbeque 1624, 126.

[72] On Ottoman strategy in general see Perjes 1967.

[73] Thury 1896, 1: 109.

[74] Inalcik 1973, 27, 29.

[75] Charriere 1848, 1: 31 sqq. Excerpts from the memorandum were published byZinkeisen 1840/5, 2: 594 sqq. Cf. also Miskolczy 1926, 43-7.

[76] The importance of Belgrade was recognized by Ottoman and Christian expertsalike. Djeladzade writes: "Since the castle of Belgrade is the key to Hungary, it isa strong fortress of the misguided ones...and it has to be taken before all else. Ifhowever, the huge army proceeds towards Budim [that is Buda--G. P.]disregarding this itinerary it is quite possible that the contemptible unbelieverswould assemble at Belgrade and, at the moment of withdrawal bar the way of thearmy of the faithful." Thury 1896, 1: 55, 77, 289; 2: 49, 50. In a letter written afterthe fall of Belgrade King Louis II wrote that the country lay open to the enemy "onland and on water." Kiss 1889, 604. The Hungarian experts stated in front of theGerman Imperial estates gathered in Nurnberg to discuss the military aid to besent to Hungary in 1522 that, after the fall o f Belgrade, neither the Danube nor theSava could constitute an obstacle to Turkish advance (Torok 1926, 164). Theperspective from Venice was identical (Alberi, 1855, 3: 74-75 and Balogh 1920xxxix). Cuspinianus (1841, 18-53) also refers to Belgrade as the key to Hungary.Brodarics (1690, 559: 1908, 10), who states that with the fall of the castles ofBelgrade and Sabac it was no longer possible to hold on to the castles of the Srem,the area between the Danube and Sava rivers , adds: "Quaerestalem hosti aditumin Hungariam patefecerat, ut quoties Savum transire, et in Hungariamirrumpere vellet, apta posset ab eo prohiberi." During the negotiations betweenKing John and the representatives of Charles V in 1537 the Hungarians askedthe Emperor to recapture Belgrade because it would not be possible to defendHungary without it; Bárdossy 1943, 211. Istvánffy(1724, 61-62;1962, 88, 93),entertains similar views regarding Belgrade.

[77] Clausewitz 1976, 87.

[78] Ibid. 71. The German Schwerpunct is correctly translated as 'center of gravity,"not "turning point."

[79] I have pointed out the significance of the range of effective action in Perjes 1967,360, while unaware of Professor William McNeill's (1964, 41, 50) identical thesis.In my essay I established a direct relationship between the Ottoman range ofoperation and Suleyman's policies vis-à-vis Hungary which, at the beginning,were aimed not at annexation but rather to compel a treaty of alliance against theHabsburgs (Perjes 1975). It is most interesting to note that Coles who explicitlydoubts that the Ottoman leaders were guided by rational considerations, describestheir radius of action in clear and precise terms (1968, 103):"The huge size of theTurkish armies posed heavy commissariat problems. Their large cavalry component prohibited winter campaigns because of inadequate supplies Of fodder andthe unsuitability of winter ground conditions for mounted operations. The Turkswere therefore restricted to summer campaigns usually extending from mid April to late October. Hungary, which was normally a 90-100 days' march fromConstantinople, represented the exhaustion point of Ottoman military capacity."Then Coles adds that the border defense organized by the Habsburgs "slowed andfinally stopped the advance Or Ottoman armies which were now campaigning atthe limit of their operational capacity."

[80] Ferenc Szakály (1975, 1976) doubts that the Ottoman leaders recognized thestrategic limits deriving from the range of action and consequently dismisses myassertions regarding Suleyman's policies as unacceptable. He argues that mypoint is disproved by Suleyman's attempt to take Vienna in 1529 which, accordingto my calculations, was beyond the Ottoman range of effective action. Suleymanwaged other wars as well, in far more distant theaters of operation. In fact,Szakály claims, the Ottoman military leaders were unaware of the significance oftheir range of operation. As I have demonstrated above how well-informed andcompetent the Ottoman military leaders were, I need not refute Szakaly'sargument in detail. It is inconceivable that Ottoman leaders were unable to makesimple computations of space, time, and logistics in order to determine their radiusof operation. Presumably even primitive hordes taking off for a hunt or for plunderwere capable of such computations; there can be no doubt that long-distancemerchants, sailors, and soldiers of civilized nations calculated how much time andfood they would need to cover a given distance. (Cf. Engels 1978, passim onAlexander the Great's relevant calculations.) As to the siege of Vienna in 1529 wewill see that it was a campaign with limited aims; the permanent capture Of thecity was not intended. rather it was a matter of imposing certain politicalconditions on Ferdinand of Habsburg. In the case of even more distantcampaigns--Szakály was probably referring to the Persian and Egyptiancampaigns--the Ottoman army was able to operate beyond the theoreticallydetermined range of action and take greater risks from a strategic point of viewbecause it did not have to fear tactical failures, that is, defeat in battle. ThePersian forces, or the Egyptian Mameluke army, not well supplied with fire armsor entirely unacquainted with them, were no match for the Ottomans.

[81] For a detailed discussion of Ottoman tactics and the social conditions that explainOttoman failure to assimilate European tactics, see Perjes 1967 and 1981.

[82] In his description of the first battle of Kosovo, the chronicler Nesri writes: "Whenthe unbelievers, clad in iron and with sword in their hand rush straight forwardslike maddened boars, no one can stop them. They slice in two whomever they canreach. They cannot be separated and turned back."(Thury, 1896, 1: 43.) Accordingto Sead-Eddin "the order of battle of the unbelievers has the solidity of a wall ofmetal...." and he adds, regarding the charge of the knights at Kosovo: "The heroescould not stand their ground in front Of this cataract, and many a stout-heartedsoldier lost his life here." Ibid., 112.) Even in 1526, right before the battle ofMohacs, the Ottomans still worried about a charge of the Hungarian armoredknights. Kemal Pashazade wrote: "These scoundrels of fiery character are coveredin armor from head to foot and if all of them should attack a division in unison,they break through it, no matter how strong it may be, much as a rushing streamtears up the mountainside."(Ibid., 237.) Moreover, as we shall see below, in thefirst phase of the battle the Hungarian knights did disperse the cavalry fromRumelia with their charge, although it should be noted that the Ottomans werepreparing to set up camp and were not ready for battle.

[83] We have data regarding both procedures. Concerning the first battle of Kosovo,Nesri writes: "The ruler spoke to the archers, saying: 'Discharge your arrowsimmediately against the unbelievers, to prevent them from massing their troops,and to make them disperse behind one another like pigs.' " (Thury, 1896, 1: 44.)The maneuver, however, did not bear fruit, as Sead-Eddin relates. The dischargehardly bothered the Christian armored knights, and "they suddenly charged at theleft wing of the troops of the faithful like so many boars pierced by arrows." (Ibid.,115.) The practice of opening the ranks was more effective. An anonymouschronicler writes regarding the second battle Of Kosovo: "The Islamic armyrealized that the unbelievers had the upper hand, and it was not possible toconfront the iron wall directly; hence they avoided the unbelievers by separatinginto two parts, and as soon as the unbelievers penetrated between them, thesoldiers of the faithful rallied behind them and cut them to pieces with theirswords " (Ibid., 24.) According to the chroniclers the same tactics were consideredbefore the battle of Mohacs as well; analyzing the situation however, it seems thatthese tactics were not viable on the occasion . We will deal wit h the issue in detailbelow.

[84] On the evolution of tactics in modern Europe see Király 1982; Rustow 1864 andDelbruck 1929.

[85] In his memoirs dating from the end of the sixteenth century El Akhisari of Bosniamentions that the armament and tactics of the Turkish army were lagging behindthose of Europe. (Kunt 1983, 179.)

[86] It is possible that the ruling stratum, composed of renegades and striving formodernization, as well as the contradiction represented by the conservativeMuslim religious institution, were the explanation of this phenomenon (Lybyer1913, 232). Extremely interesting is the pertinent memorandum Kochu Beyformulated in 1631, in which he criticizes sharply the regular army made up ofrenegades and comes out in favor of the timar owners and the concomitant militaryorganization: "It is thanks to the ziamet owners and the timars that the greatsultans of former times were able to win so many brilliant victories.... Indeed, thisclass of warriors, willing to sacrifice its head and life for the Empire and for thefaith, was a select, outstanding, fearless and obedient army. When these appearedin full numbers in the campaigns and on the battlegrounds there was hardly anyneed for the kapi-kulus, or jnissaries and sipahis from the Porte. There was nota single alien among them; all were soldiers and sons of soldiers who from timeimmemorial were the owners of fields received from the padishah."(Thury 1896, 2:409-410.)

[87] For the following sec Pach 1963. Paulinyi 1972, Szucs 1963.

[88] Brodarics (1690: 559, 1908: 16), when writing about the use of church treasuresfor financing the defense, avers that the treasury was almost emptied by malaadministratio eorum, qui rei publicae praefuerent. Cf.. Kubinyi 1981, 78-9.

[89] Paulinyi 1972, 561.

[90] Paulinyi 1972, 573.

[91] These are figures quoted by the Venetian ambassador Surian(o). cited in Balogh 1929, xvii.

[92] Fraknoi 1899, 314.

[93] Kubinyi 1971, Szakaly 1982.

[94] Rázso 1982.

[95] For the following see above all the CJH 1899; Szalay 1863; Deer 1936; Borossy1971, 1982; Bak 1982; Engel 1982; Hess 1982; Kiraly 1982; Kubinyi 1981, 1982;Razs6 1982; Szakaly 1863.

[96] This was the figure used by most contemporaries; the Venetian ambassador,Massaro, spoke of 60,000 men in 1521 (Artner 1926, 109); in 1522 the Hungariandelegates to the Imperial council at Nurnberg quoted the same figure (Torok 1926,156), and so did those present at a meeting of Louis II, Ferdinand of Habsburg, anda Polish emissary in 1622 (Kubinyi 1981, 85). Istvanffy (1747, 58) must have hadthe same numbers in his head when he spoke of LX amplius miliaria armatorumas the army ex Pannonia sola at the time of Mohacs.

[97] Hermann 1975, 328.

[98] Kubinyi (1981, 94) maintains that the militia did not function as an independentunit, hence faults me for counting them separately. However, Borossy (1971, 19-20) believes that they went to war as a distinct unit and refers to the decretumof 1459 which expressly prohibited the merging of the militia with the banderia.

[99] Machiavelli 1833, 21; Jahns 1889-91, 1:687, 2:1618. I have dealt with this issue inPerjes 1976b, 30.

[100] CJH 1899, Artt. 35, 52, 54: 1522; 19, 20, 41, 42, 44, 45: 1523; 8-14, 17: 1526.

[101] Quoted by Balogh 1929, lxiv.

[102] Hermann 1975, 314.

[103] Fraknoi 1896, 475; Artner 1926, 87; Torok 1926, 160.

[104] Burgio 1926, 56-7, 73, 80; Artner 1926, 98.

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541