The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

Supreme Command and Strategy

Without exception monographs dealing with the period accuse theruling class of military incompetence. I am convinced, however, thatthis judgment has to be rejected out of hand. Military expertise inthis period was mostly empirical; the importance of theory, of knowledge acquired through books, was minimal. It simply does not makesense to assume that men who practiced soldiering from boyhood on,and whose families had accumulated military experience over several generations, were incompetent. But besides these a prioriconsiderations, written evidence also contradicts the historians, assumption. The army in the Jagellonian age did essentially fulfill itsrole, the general misery and the lack of financial resources notwithstanding. It was able to protect the borders of the country, while themobile forces carried out remarkable feats of arms in smaller andsometimes in more large-scale military ventures. Several foreignobservers, though generally speaking not exactly favorable to theHungarians, had a good opinion of the military. While they weremostly accusing the Hungarians of barbaric crudeness, debauchery,and irresponsible squandering, they did coõáõáõáncede them one virtue:the Hungarians could fight! The papal nuncio, Count Burgio, õáwrotethat: "if Hungary were ruled properly, the Turks would have nomightier enemy." [105] According to the French traveler, Pierre Choque, "this is the nation the Turks fear most." [106] Nor can it be overlooked that military experts were always included in Hungariandelegations sent abroad for the purpose of discussing collaborationwith foreign armies. King Louis recorded in March, 1522, thatmembers of the delegation sent to the Holy Roman Empire had"experience in military matters and were able to discuss and reachdecisions regarding the means of waging war with the Germanprinces." [107] It is not likely that the participants at the Reichstagwould have deigned to discuss military matters with mere dilettantes.

An apparent contradiction is inherent in references in the literature to a shortage in Hungary of military experts; so that in 1526 thecourt had to invite two Austrians, Nicholas Salm and ChristopherFrangepan, as commanders-in-chief. [108] Such an invitation may havebeen sent, but the reason was certainly not that appropriate leaderscould not be found among the Hungarian lords. First of all, there wasthe palatine Istvan Bathori who, as ispan of Temes, was undoubtedly well versed in military matters and would have deserved thecommand as behooving his office. The reason the king did not selecthim was probably his personal unpopularity. (Indeed, when longafter mobilization a secret vote was taken as to who should beappointed commander-in-chief, Bathori received not a single vote.)Istvan Deshazi, who had been delegated to the Imperial diet in 1522,mentioned Bathori, along with Szapolyai, as the most competentman to lead Hungarian armies, "a commander well versed in war." [109]

The other man, Janos Szapolyai, voivode of Transylvania, could nothave been placed at the helm of the troops because, as alreadymentioned, the direction of the Ottoman attack remained unclear fora long time; it might have threatened Transylvania itself. HenceSzapolyai had to remain in his territory. Furthermore, for a longtime it was planned that Szapolyai would break into Turkish territory along with the voivode of \Wallachia; thus he could not havefilled the post of commander-in-chief in Hungary. When the situation cleared up, and Szapolyai was expected to join the main bodyat ToIna, he was indeed elected commander in a secret ballot. EvenSzeremi, who cared for him not in the least, agreed that he wascompetent, and so did the Bavarian ambassador who visited Hungary in 1527 and with whom he discussed the possibility of a greatanti-Ottoman campaign in some detail. [110]

Unfavorable judgments over the abilities of Hungarian leadersdisregard the obvious, namely, that money and a well-equippedarmy are as important for a successful campaign as talent. Forinstance, in 1526, when the Venetian ambassador Suriano reportedthat there "no longer were such brave captains as in the time of KingMatthias, because the king does not make them practice the management of arms...they are ignorant and inexperienced when itcomes to warfare...", he seems oblivious of the fact that the commanders of Matthias had under them well-paid and supplied troopsnot continuously hampered by a shortage of funds and by politicalintrigue. Actually, Suriano admitted that Szapolyai, Bathori--whowas still in Temes at the time--and Janos Korbavai, the ban ofCroatia, were exceptions. [111]

As to the strategy of the war against the Turks, the alternativeswere limited. Offensive moves were out of question because of theeconomic crisis and the generally unfavorable conditions, unless thegovernment received substantial financial aid. The country had tobe satisfied with defense along the line of the border fortificationserected during the preceding centuries. Every country naturallystrives to hold up an attack long before it reaches its frontiers. Thepowerful medieval kingdom of Hungary applied this principle in thewars against the Ottomans at the expense of the weakened Balkanstates, at times by resorting to force, at times by diplomacy. Thekings of Hungary occupied parts of Serbia, Bosnia, and Dalmatiaand erected a line of defense on their territory. Wallachia and Moldavia were frequently won or forced into vassalage, as a protective shield against the Turks. At least in its military aspects, themethod was no different from the one the Habsburgs were to applylater vis-a-vis Hungary. Well before the time Ferdinand of Habsburgwas elected King of Hungary, the principle that Hungary shouldserve as the advance post in the face of the Turks had been workedout in Vienna. [112]

In the early fifteenth century a line of defense was formed at adistance of 50-100 km south of the Hungarian border, stretching allthe way from Belgrade to Klissa. [113] There was a second line to therear, already on Hungarian territory, along the southern border ofTransylvania, through Karansebes and Temesvar, then along theDanube, the Sava, and the Drava. This line of fortification did liveup to expectations, even in the Jagellonian period down to 1521when the Turks captured Belgrade, its keystone and served thecountry well in spite of the fact that the garrisons often went unpaid.But from the moment of the capture of Belgrade, the country becamedefenseless against Ottoman attacks. Hungarians, Turks, and thirdparties were all well aware of this predicament. [114]

Several factors account for the strategic value of Belgrade fromthe Ottoman point of view. First of all, the fortress lay astride themilitary road leading from the valley of the Morava, the natural lineof advance of the army, through Szendro (Smederovo). Since thecastle was erected at the confluence of the Danube and the Sava, itcould control traffic on both rivers. Moreover, from Belgrade it waspossible to dominate the area on the right bank of the Danube, viaEszek, the central portions of the country along the River Tisza, aswell as Transylvania along the River Maros and through the IronGate. Finally, the castle formed a military unit along with that ofSabac, for it ensured free shipping along the Danube and the Sava forthe Ottoman river flotilla, so that land and naval forces couldcollaborate most effectively. [115] More specifically, the Ottomans werevirtually free to ferry their troops into the rear of the Hungarian forces which had penetrated into the region of Srem (Szeremseg),thus jeopardizing the Hungarians, line of supply. Thus the region ofSrem which, until that time, had provided the Hungarians with amost favorable terrain of operations, now turned practically into amousetrap.

After the fall of Belgrade the Hungarians, choices were reduced totwo: to engage the enemy now penetrating unhampered into thecountry in a pitched battle, or to avoid battle. If the first alternativewere chosen there was scarcely any prospect of success because ofthe crying disproportion of forces. From a strictly military point ofview, therefore, the second alternative seemed preferable, all themore so since, according to our discussion above, the Ottoman armyhad only three months to carry out military operations in Hungary.Thus, had the Hungarian army decided not to wage battle in thisperiod, or at least to avoid it for a certain length of time, the enemywould either have had to withdraw without accomplishing its mission or, reaching the end of its range of action, wage battle underdoubtful strategic conditions. Delaying the decisive encounter wouldalso entail fighting it further to the rear. Such a retreat, however,would have meant surrendering a considerable portion of the country to plunder and depredation. It is not difficult to see the enormouseconomic and political liabilities implied in such a choice. The Hungarian government could hardly assume such a sacrifice, especiallysince the nobility of the part of the country exposed to destruction bythe Turks would have objected to such an alternative tooth and nail.Hence the decision to fight a pitched battle against overwhelmingodds.

Branches of Service, Tactics, and Morale

The decisive force of the Hungarian army were its armor-cladknights against which the Turkish light cavalry could not standup. [116] After the dissolution of King Matthias's mercenary army thesearmored knights assumed even greater significance. This explainswhy in the late fifteenth century more than half of the banderialsoldiers had to be heavy cavalry. From 1498 onwards only thosebanderia which were recruited in the southern regions for immediate border defense were allowed to include the same number of lightcavalry as heavy horse. [117]

But since it was expensive to outfit the heavy cavalry, the bulk ofthe army still had to be light cavalry. Moreover, border defensewhere extensive areas had to be protected by small forces and masshad to be compensated for by speed (just as in China, the ByzantineEmpire, or Spain), also required light cavalry. Their elite wasformed by the hussars of Serbian (rac) background. Hungary's lightcavalry before the arrival of the Serbian refugees, provided by theCuman, Jasz, and Szekely contingents, was far from competent inthe raiding tactics needed for the constant fighting along the borders. Hence outsiders, such as Serbs, had to be hired for the purpose.(Nor was this a peculiarly Hungarian solution: China and the Byzantine Empire likewise had to resort to a foreign force of lightcavalry to defend their borders.)[118] Of course, after a while thehussars became assimilated; in fact, as we know, they came to be atypically Hungarian branch of service. In the Jagellonian period theproportion of Serbs within this corps must have still been considerable. The combat value of the hussars--whether Hungarian or Serbian--was rather high. They acquired a European-wide reputationas masters of the raiding warfare carried out day in and day outalong the borders, as attested to by numerous contemporaries. [119]According to the Venetian ambassador Suriano, the Hungarianarmored cavalry was inadequate, but the light cavalry was "the bestin the world." [120] The light cavalry furnished by the noble levy and thepeasants of the local militia was far from being as useful. Indeed, itcould not have been otherwise, for their equipment and trainingwere equally deficient.

The strike capacity of the Hungarian army was extraordinarilyweakened by a lack of significant infantry. The light infantry it hadwas far below the quality of the regular infantry of Western countries, even below that of the janissaries. [121] Most of them were armedonly with bow and arrows, and only the militia from the northernprovinces and the regulars supplied by the towns bore firearms. OnEuropean battlefields in this period, the infantry, equipped partlywith firearms and partly with pikes, was the decisive branch ofservice, and even the cavalry had to adapt to its peculiarities andbase its tactics upon it. Thus Hungarian military organization adjusted relatively well to border skirmishes, but it remained unaffected by the great reforms warfare was undergoing in the \\Test. Thereason for this lag, as we have seen, was lack of funds.

Considering the geography of the Hungarian theater of operations, the Danube flotilla and its sailors were crucial. [122] Their maintasks were to control the waterways, to secure the routes of reinforcement and supply, and, furthermore, to provide support for theland forces. The rapid deterioration of the country's economy maybest be measured by the decline of this branch of service. At the timeof King Matthias their effectives were still around 10,000, but in theJagellonian period they dwindled to 1000. Presumably, the numberof boats declined correspondingly; thus, if there were 360 of themunder Matthias, there could not have been more than 50 at thistime. [123]

Hungarian artillery was very weak. The fortifications were moreor less adequately provided with cannons, but artillery for the fieldarmy had to be supplied partly from the castles, partly with ordnance on loan from abroad. [124]

The provisioning system seems to have functioned adequately.This was hardly surprising, since the country was well off in victuals. Moreover, the rivers, the Danube especially, facilitated transport. Although the papal nuncio Burgio did report, in 1526, that theHungarian army was short of food, this must have applied only to afraction of the troops. Indeed, no other source makes mention of anyserious shortcoming in food supply. [125]

Finally a few words on the discipline and morale of the field troopsand the castle garrisons which formed the backbone of the army. Itseems that the extremely poor discipline of the soldiery, often mentioned in the sources, had something to do with the general conditions in the country, with party strife, and with the rift between thearistocracy and the middle ranks of the nobility. The tumultuousscenes at the diets were mirrored in the army; the lower ranksexpressed their opinions freely, participated in the military councils,and occasionally influenced the councils, decisions by their mutinousbehavior. The general rule of military sociology, that the troops who must confront the enemy on a daily basis and whose bodily integrityand lives are at stake do not trust the general staff, nor anyone "fromthe etappe", became increasingly manifest in this period. The soldiers referred to the military counsellors and the men of the court aswindbags and cowards. [126]

It does not follow from all this that such soldiers did not fight wellor did not fulfill their duties. The garrisons, subjected to constantpressure from the Turks, could not allow themselves to neglectmilitary preparedness, if only for the sake of self-preservation. Athorough knowledge of the handling of weapons was a matter of lifeand death, as was the conscientious execution of all duties. Thesesoldiers showed their mettle in the course of protracted border warsof the period, even under the most adverse conditions. We mayassume that the morale was high, for the troops were eager to entercombat and were quite confident of victory at the eve of the battle ofMohacs. It is not likely that this extreme self-confidence was basedon blind presumption; it seems more likely that it evolved as aconsequence of the successful military raids carried out over severalgeneration s.

Domestic Affairs and Government

In discussing the military power of the Ottoman Empire we paidconsiderable attention to the economic, social, and political institutions behind the armed force. We ought to do the same for Hungary.Unfortunately, however, any such attempt would be futile on thebasis of the present state of our knowledge. [127] As a leading specialistof the period, Zsuzsanna Hermann, has said, Hungarian historiography is a long way from:

providing even a superficial survey of the complex web of contrasts andharmonization of interests behind the actual tragic scene precedingMohacs, or a picture of the constantly shifting alliances of its participants. It is not an easy task to understand even the outline plot of thisfast-paced drama. I must admit, for my own part, that I undertook toprovide a relatively clear chronicle of this drama with more than a littletrepidation. [128]

How much more trepidation is then allowed for someone who did notspend decades researching this very period!

The reason for all this, that we still know so little about thecircumstances surrounding the greatest disaster in our history, isnot merely the scarcity of reliable sources, but also that attitude ofmany authors who start out from the end, the fall of the medievalHungarian state, blame with righteous indignation the "contemptible" ruling class for "wasting the country", and "discover" in that theonly cause for the disaster without ever deeming it necessary tostudy the few surviving sources. The words of Gyula Szekfu, one ofthe outstanding figures of modern Hungarian historiography, aretypical in this regard: "It is completely superfluous to survey thedecisions of the many diets held in these years, for nobody paid heedto whatever measures were adopted to remedy the financial plight ofthe country, to restore the royal estates, or to defend the frontiers." [129]

In the past ten or fifteen years, however, Hungarian historianshave changed their attitudes decisively. Several valuable monographs dealing with the economic, social, political, and militaryaspects of the period have appeared which set aside the moralizingtone and concentrate on the facts. Yet, partly because of the force oftradition, and partly because of ill-conceived didactic and ideologicalconsiderations, some historians still feel prompted to indulge inaccusations even while providing reliable objective data on theevents. The following excerpt from a recent work on Mohacs istypical for such an approach:

The Hungary of Mohacs was paralyzed in the face of the Turkishonslaught, almost unable to defend itself. It follows, of course, that allthose whose task would have been the organization and direction ofdefense are to be held responsible. The leaders of the Hungarian state,those who had a say in directing the fate of the country, made themselves culpable of unpardonable ommissions against the country inwhich they were born, in which they lived, and in which they hoped tofind a more restful, more sensible end than the one that awaitedthem .... As a consequence of a long series of irresponsible moves theysucceeded in dispatching. . .the Hungarian medieval state into perditionand collapse. [130]

Hungarian historical literature is rich in prescriptions about theruling class that should have been "more willing to bring sacrifices",or "wiser" and 'braver", and so on, but little is said about whatexactly should have been done, and even less, what realistically could have been done. It is worth quoting the wise words of thenineteenth-century historian, Ferenc Salamon:

The writers of the generation immediately following 1526 in particularfilled with bitterness because of the disaster of Mohacs, do not stoprepeating all the negative things about the leading figures of thepreceding period. Yet, had these severe historians been forced to confront the conditions prevailing before 1526 it is rather doubtful thatthey could have come up with a practical solution. [131]

Indeed, even with the wisdom of hindsight, it is hardly possible topropose a workable solution. Having thought through each temptingalternative step by step, I, too, have to admit that none of themwould have offered a way out. Hence, all that remains is to outline onthe relationships between state, politics, and war in the Jagellonianperiod in order to demonstrate this quagmire.

To begin with, it must be pointed out that the ruling class was farfrom short-sighted; it had a clear understanding of the Ottomanthreat. In fact, it can be safely asserted that this threat haunted itlike a nightmare. No particular wisdom or virtue was required torealize the danger, since the forces were so disproportionate and thestakes so high. The consequence of Ottoman conquest was seen asnothing less than social, economic, and political, in a word, total,annihilation. Nor can it be averred that the leaders remained inactive. Hungarian foreign politics may never have been more activethan at that time: ambassadors were coming and going, engaged inconstant negotiations with foreign powers regarding the great waragainst the Turks. No matter what source we consult, all agree thatthe military issue was in the forefront. At least half of the decisionsof the diets which, according to Szekfu, do not deserve examinationor study, had something to do with military issues. Yet, to avert thedanger more funds would have been needed, and these, as we haveseen, were not available. Once again it would be a historical to findthe explanation of this shortcoming in the "wasteful finances" of theruling class, as Istvan Brodarics, one of the crown witnesses of theevents, asserts. [132] of course, we also cannot claim that the country'sleaders had always had their hands immaculately clean of anywrongdoing, or that there were no incidents of corruption and embezzlement. We must bear in mind, however, that not even EmperorCharles V could cover the expenses of his wars from the income ofthe state. It would be naive to assume that even the most puritanical *management of funds in that "poor country of a rich land" could haveprovided the necessary finances.

We have argued that the number of goal-oriented rational solutions in any given situation is usually quite small, while that of the useless or irrational ones is infinite. Moreover, it is a psychologicalfact that in tight situations, when there is simply no chance ofreaching a rational solution, people are seized by panic and resort tosolutions which might never have occurred to them under morenormal circumstances. Such was the predicament of the Hungarianruling class. Since the primary means, the funds, were lacking, thepoliticians adopted one measure after another even though it shouldhave been obvious from the start that none of them could provide thedesired result. When the resident foreign ambassadors sarcasticallypredicted, before each meeting of the diet, that the Estates wouldring about many measures, but none would have any effect, theywere, sadly, correct. However, in contrast to Szekfu's assertion, thisfailure was due not to disinterest or irresponsibility, but to thosevires majores which the men of the early sixteenth century could notovercome.

There was no obvious, effective prescription to cure the ills of thecountry; and this was precisely the circumstance that engenderedbitter party strife and, consequently, that anarchy which virtually paralyzed the state machinery. Everyone, whether it be the courthe aristocracy, or the common nobles, the pro-Habsburg party, thepro-Venetians, or those who trusted in help from Rome, soughtdifferent way of saving the country. This party strife, at the moments ofthe greatest crisis, entailed frequent changes in the personnel of the government. Each party strove to have its own representatives appointed; chaos ensued. Nothing indicates better how the circle of possibilities had shriveled than the fact that the parties of the aristocracy and of the lesser nobility were more than once incapable of reaching a consensus at their joint meetings because each party was advocating some miraculous cure; nevertheless, when after a lot of squabbling and passionate scenes they split to carry on the debate separately, the decisions they reached hardlydiffered from one another.

The most striking fact of the history of the period is the lack ofprestige of the ruler and of government in gene nobility adopted a threatening stance vis-a-vis the aristocracy, but often even the king did not feel safe in their presence. While no decisions could be found to provide a radical solution to Hungary's ills, even those laws and regulations that were promulgated and which might have provided some degree of relief to the country andits defense could not be carried out conscientiously because of thegovernment's low standing. Only in the last moment, at the diet ofApril 24, 1526, barely four months before the battle of Mohacs, thenobility proposed and pushed through a number of measures whichaimed at significantly strengthening the power of the king. According to Vilmos Fraknoi:

The lesser nobility...disregarded its previous program. It now supported decisions that diametrically opposed the aims it had pursued fordecades, and negated all the results it had managed to obtain so far; itconsecrated royal power by destroying the institutions brought about torestrict that power. In the preamble to their decision, the estatesrequested the ruler that he "make use of his prestige and power" ingoverning the country. Thus they authorized the king "to decide himselfupon mature consideration" in all matters regarding the increase andhandling of royal revenues and the defense of the country. [133]

Indeed, the king had never enjoyed this much power during thethirty-six years of Jagellonian rule. Nevertheless, by present-daystandards of historical analysis, it would hardly be possible to describe the powers bestowed upon Louis as "unlimited." One canspeak of unlimited authority or of absolute monarchy only if theruler, backed by the citizenry, had succeeded in destroying thepower of the aristocracy and of the lesser nobility, had excludedthem from the administration of the state, and had assumed solecommand over the army, placing a ban on the private armies of thelords. Such a state of affairs, however, could never come about as aconsequence of the support, let alone the initiative, of the nobility.On the contrary, it usually resulted from a long struggle betweencrown and nobility. Hence it is conceptually incorrect to speak of theunlimited powers of Louis II, not to mention the fact that thesepowers were far from unlimited in practice.

Even if the ruler had been able to deal with the affairs of thecountry with absolute power, there could be no illusions regardingvictory. Let us assume for a moment that a surge of enthusiasm hadsuddenly enabled the Hungarian state machinery to function likeclockwork: would that have produced substantially larger funds fordefense? Assuredly not. Moreover, is it possible to believe that withhis "unlimited" powers Louis II would have been able to cure allthose ills which had accumulated to such a disastrous extent overthe previous forty years?

To summarize: both the society of Hungary and the state whichformed the foundation of the army were extremely weak at themoment of the showdown; hence military efforts fell far short ofwhat was required or desirable. The situation was rendered evenmore serious by the diplomatic isolation of the country, owing towhich it could expect no help from any quarter.

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541