The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

Continued...

It is possible, however, that the Porte also listened to John'sadvice regarding strategy. It so happened that in the fall of 1531, theBavarian princes, whose relations with the Habsburgs were tense,sent an emissary to Buda and worked out a joint plan of action should the Habsburgs launch an attack against the princes. According to this plan John would provide light cavalry for the Bavariansand would penetrate into Austria with his own forces and persuadethe Ottomans to attack Carniola and Styria as well. Indeed, weknow that after the Ottoman forces retreated from under the wallsof Koszeg, they wound their way towards Styria and caused havoc inthe region. [255]

It would be most difficult to establish the actual plan of theOttoman Supreme Command in 1532. One thing is certain, however:the capture of Vienna was not its objective. The commander ofKoszeg, Jurisich, was convinced of this, as we know from his letters. [256] But Djeladzade writes to the same effect in his chronicle:"The padishah of the seas and land did not bring along heavy.artillery on this victorious campaign because his intention was notto liberate castles, but rather to repress the rebellion of the evil ruler[that is, Ferdinand] who was attacking the people of Mohammed andwas allied against the believers of the true faith." [257] We may safelyassert, on the grounds of logic, that it was not Koszeg that deterredSuleyman from his original intentions, whatever those may havebeen. Without in the least diminishing the merits of its heroicdefenders, the castle of Koszeg and its handful of guards could nothave accomplished the task that castles in general are expected toaccomplish, namely, to interrupt the enemy's contact with its supplybase after it by-passed the fortress. Had Suleyman intended tomarch on to Vienna, he could have surrounded the castle with a fewthousand soldiers, and the castle garrison, a handful of soldiers,would have been unable to interfere with the communications of theOttoman forces by mounting forays against them.

According to some researchers Suleyman remained under thewalls of Koszeg so long because he was waiting for Charles V to moveaway from Vienna so as to then engage the emperor in open battle. [258] This interpretation, however, is not convincing. On the onehand, the French and Hungarian delegates attending the Imperialdiet in Regensburg reported to their governments that the Germanestates had voted in favor of the "Turkish aid" only as far as theHungarian border. [259] Suleyman must have obtained this information from Francis I and John. In other words, he could rest assuredthat the emperor would not come to Hungary. Moreover, the Ottoman military leadership was perfectly aware that it was facing thebest military force of the period, among whose ranks were theunsurpassed masters of contemporary tactics, the Spanish infantryand the German Landsknechts. The Ottoman army, relying onobsolete tactics, was no match for them in spite of its usuallyoverwhelming numerical superiority. In fact, in this case even numerical superiority did not apply since the effectives of the HolyRoman Imperial army were around 80,000 and we know alreadythat the nucleus of the regular Ottoman army, the soldiers availablefor a pitched battle, was no larger.[260]

The apparently inexplicable events of the "strange war" of 1532may perhaps be best explained by the fact that Suleyman undertookthe campaign half-heartedly, and even with outright anxiety. Evenbefore his departure, while still in Constantinople, he was notified ofthe signing of the Portuguese-Persian pact; by then he also knewthat, for the first time, Charles V was taking an active part in thewar. All this meant that he could no more impose his will on theHabsburgs now than he had in 1529; hence the Hungarian issueremained unresolved. Perhaps it occurred to Suleyman even thenthat his concept could not work out because he could not guaranteethe integrity of Hungary and hence he could not use the country asa buffer state vis-a-vis the Habsburgs. Thus a long war, with unforeseeable results, was in the offing in Europe, even though the trueinterests of the Ottoman Empire lay in the Near and Far East!

Just at this time a chain of events requiring all the attention of thePorte took place in the Mediterranean and the Near East, forcing itto confront and to disarm the aggressive intentions of the Habsburgswith apparent concessions.

Suleyman received the alarming news while still under the wallsof Koszeg, around August 28-30: Andrea Doria, the admiral ofCharles V, occupied Choron, the important naval base in southernGreece, on August 8. Although the Turkish chronicler Ferdi writesthat the messenger bearing the news caught up with the sultan onlyaround October 5, in the neighborhood of Eszek, this must be amistake. [261] We know for certain that after departing from Koszegthe Ottoman army broke into Syria and then marched homeward, by way of Varasd and Pozsega; in other words, Eszek was not evenon its way. Apart from this mistake, Ferdi's communication soundsreliable, for he describes we]l the great importance Suleyman attached to Choron. He writes:

having spent a day at the castle of Eszek, he wended his way andcontinued across the island of Srem. Here, having received the newsthat the damned Franks [that is, the forces of Charles V] came to Moreaby ship and, and having ravaged and destroyed several places, occupiedthe cast]e of Choron, he forthwith gave the unalterable command thatthe Segban Basi [the commander of one of the subordinate units of thejanissaries] should reach the castle of Choron in forced march with2,000 janissaries and some of the sipahis of the sanjak begs of Moreaand liberate it. [262]

Moreover, we may recall that the army stationed by the Red Seaand the artillery were also directed in this direction. Even so, it wasonly a year later, in September 1533, that the Ottomans were able torecapture Choron.

From then on events moved very quickly. [263] The greater or lesserclashes along the Turkish-Persian border became more frequent andescalated into a regular war. At first only smaller Turkish units tookup the fight with the Persian armies, which had been supplied withfirearms by the Portuguese, but then, in October 1533, the GrandVezir Ibrahim himself traveled there to take charge of the campaign.Suleyman followed his grand vezir in the summer of the followingyear. They initiated mobile maneuvers in the course of which Tabrizfell into Ottoman hands, the campaign ended in complete Ottomanvictory, and another rich province was added to the Empire: Mesopotamia.

Once the Persian campaign was brought to a victorious conclusion, Suleyman headed back and reached Constantinople in January1536. Already in late 1535, he had received a message from Indiaasking for assistance. The Sultan of Gujarat, hard pressed by theGreat Mogul Empire, was asking for help. Since, however, Suleymanwas not in a position to provide such help for the moment, the Sultanof Gujarat turned to the Portuguese. The Portuguese did providehelp, but the Indian ruler had to allow them to build a fort and anaval base at Diu. The acquisition of this important base considerably strengthened the Portuguese presence in the Indian Ocean and would eventually cause no end of worry to the leaders of the Ottoman state.

In the meantime Hayreddin, now in the service of the Porte,occupied Tunis in 1534. This success of the pirate chief, however,proved to be short-lived since Charles V was able to recapture thecity in the following year.

Ottoman involvement in the Near East and in the Mediterraneannaturally had its impact on Turkish-Hungarian-Habsburg relations.Just as at the time of his European war, Suleyman once againsecured his rear by resorting to diplomatic manipulation. Hence theemissaries of Ferdinand were given an unusually hospitable welcome in January 1533, even though the proposal they delivered wasno different from previous ones: that the sultan should break withJohn and hand Hungary over to Ferdinand. [264]

Zaray, one of the emissaries Ferdinand had dispatched to Constantinople, sent a message full of cheer in February 1533: thesultan recognized the rights of Ferdinand to those parts of thecountry he actually controlled--that is, the western parts ofTransdanubia and Northern Hungary as far east as Kassa. No oneknows whether such a promise had actually been made; and, if ithad, whether the grand vezir had made it on his own initiative, orreceived a cue from the sultan. Whatever the case, the news exploded like a bombshell both in Buda and in Vienna--more exactlyin Pozsony where Ferdinand was staying at the time. Ferdinandhimself, although he had paid little attention to the opinion of hisHungarian councilors until then, felt the matter to be of such greatimport that he had to summon them to give their opinion. In theirmemorandum to Ferdinand, while they did not voice their indignation, they did express deep anxieties, foreseeing all the problemswhich were indeed to result from partitioning the country. Theywarned Ferdinand that while peace would contribute to the prosperity of his provinces, it would be at the expense of Hungary since thetask of halting the Turkish attacks would henceforth fall upon thewestern part of the country belonging to him. In any case it is anunusual thing, they wrote, that a state in existence for so manycenturies should be divided up, under two rulers. Furthermore, thecouncilors admitted that the partition would make the followers ofFerdinand face an insoluble dilemma, for there was not a single oneamong them who did not have estates in the zone under John's jurisdiction. Therefore, they had but two options: either they gave upthese estates, opting for misery but remaining faithful to Ferdinand,or they hung on to their property, but abandoned Ferdinand. As aconsequence of such a partition, the provision of justice and publicsecurity would all fall by the wayside, for whoever committed somecrime would simply escape to the other side in order to extracthimself from judicial proceedings and would obtain pardon there, tothe immeasurable detriment of law, order, and public virtue. [265]

A few days later the councilors came up with yet another proposal. Resigned to the notion of partition, they merely asked that, forreasons of defense, mountain chains and rivers be designated as theboundary line; moreover, that after the death of John, the entirecountry fall under the rule of Ferdinand. Thus the lords consented topartition. No one knows what caused them to change their stance.Most probably they received some assurances from Ferdinand thathe would compensate them for the loss of their estates in the zonesbelonging to John. Of course, it is possible that they simply agreed tothe unavoidable; while Ferdinand could not obtain the whole country, the fact that Suleyman had changed his position, that he wasnow willing to concede territories to Ferdinand, and that this couldwell be the starting point for future reunification was already a bigstep forward. Indeed, it would be foolish not to take advantage ofsuch an opportunity.

Shortly thereafter Ferdinand sent another delegation to the Porteto clear up technical matters pertaining to the partition of thecountry and to draft the boundary lines that were to separate thetwo parts.

If the Porte's decision had elicited deep astonishment among thelords on Ferdinand's side, it caused outright panic among those whohad sided with John. Hearing about the partition, the lords realizedthat John's rule was shaken to its very foundations; the sole justification for it had been Suleyman's promise to preserve the territorialand administrative integrity of the country. John quickly sent Grittito Constantinople and a few weeks later Werboczi as well, to askfor clarification. [266] Ferdinand's new emissary saw the sultan in thefirst half of June. At this audience, while Suleyman recognizedFerdinand's rule and made some hints at partition, no reference wasmade to any exact definition of boundaries; rather, the eventualsettlement of the matter was left up to Gritti. On the other hand, the proposal for signing a peace treaty was graciously accepted by thesultan, and Ibrahim had the pleasure of informing the emissary ofFerdinand that the exalted Porte had signed "eternal peace" with hislord.

The above took place on June 22; not quite two weeks later thePorte sent Ferdinand a letter written in an altogether different tone.It stated, among other things: "I gave all of Hungary, which I hadgained by the sword, to John out of my good grace.'' [267] Thus Suleyman had returned once again to his original position.

As noted, the history of these negotiations, which took about ayear and a half, is not entirely clear; but merely on the basis of thefacts presented here, we may venture an assumption: namely, thatthe Ottoman government, mobilizing against the Persians and thePortuguese, was intent on securing its rear at any price. This wasthe reason they were prepared to make concessions at the beginning.Thus they obtained peace and gave nothing tangible in return. If thiswas indeed their motivation then it is proof of the skills of Ottomandiplomacy.

In the following months news of success kept pouring in at thePorte: Hayreddin had occupied Tunis, Choron had been recaptured.These events may explain why the emissaries of Ferdinand werespoken to in ever harsher terms. Gritti was enjoined to write a letterFerdinand informing him that the January message, which hadcaused such joy, was based on a mistake. It contained "articles andclauses which had never been discussed at the Porte and which,therefore, must be falsifications by the emissaries." [268]

In November Grand Vezir Ajas, who had replaced Ibrahim duringthe latter's trip to Persia, declared without beating around the bushthat Hungary belonged to John in its entirety. Ferdinand ownedonly what he had already in his possession at the time of the deathof King Louis II, and that was not much--Koszeg and vicinity.

These were the events which preceded Gritti's return to Hungary.His task was to act as referee in the outstanding disputes betweenJohn and Ferdinand. Gritti had participated in the negotiationswith the emissaries of Ferdinand; in fact, he even chaired some ofthe meetings. Thus he had had the occasion to speak to the emissaries confidentially and to mention his grand design hinting at therevival of the concept of an anti-Ottoman crusade, the alliance of allEuropean powers, smashing the power of the Turks, and the capture of Constantinople. Fantastic as this project may seem, it was typicalof this bigger-than-life adventurer. We should note, by the way, thatthe project, impossible though it was, or precisely because of this,fits organically into the infinite series of projects which severgenerations of politicians and ecclesiastics, uninhibited adventurers,and fanatic devotees had been elaborating since the fourteencentury. A no less important personage than Pope Paul III wasentertaining similar ideas, almost at the same time as Gritti. [269] Theonly outcome of Gritti's obscure plot was that it aroused the suspicion on of the leaders at the Porte. By the time he was finally able todepart for Hungary, in July 1534, to carry out the border arrangements he had more or less fallen from grace. "The son of a bitch" said Jonus Beg, the interpreter at the Porte, "there is no more lowly and vicious man than him on earth; he is neither Turk, nor Christian. I feel infinitely sorry that not a Hungarian has been found yet to kill this good-for-nothing." [270]

Gritti had already earned hatred in Hungary for his previousactivities. Now the Hungarian lords were seized by terror becausethe news that preceded his return was that, by command of thesultan, he would use a heavy hand to restore order and had come"separate the superb Hungarian heads from their shoulders."Reaching Brasso, Gritti had Imre Czibak, whom he detested fromlong before because Czibak[271] had objected to John about Gritti'sappointment as governor, killed. With the tacit consent of John; infact with his mild encouragement, the Hungarian lords besiegedGritti at the castle of Meggyes and captured and executed himOctober 29, 1534. The worldly adventurer remained true to his styleto the end. On the execution block he presented the executioner witha diamond ring worth a fortune.

The killing of Gritti evoked a great deal of astonishment, everyonereacting according to position and interests. Although he had givenhis tacit consent to the event, John became frightened and quicklydispatched emissaries to assuage the sultan; this was indeed a wisemove, since the sultan, still uninformed about Gritti's machinations,was very irritated by the killing of his representative.

Ferdinand, on the other hand, received the news of Gritti's deathwith an outbreak of joy because, being an incurable optimistthought the death of the favorite would lead to John s demise. He also quickly sent an emissary to the Porte and, raising seriouscharges against John, expressed his hope that Suleyman "realizingthe devious machinations of his favorite [that is, John]...would nowhand over the crown of Hungary to him." [272] In his accusations,however, he missed his target because in the meantime the sultanhad become convinced of Gritti's guilt and decided that Gritti hadmerely earned in Hungary what was coming to him had he returnedto Constantinople. What is more, the cloud even extended over thehead of Gritti's mentor, the Grand Vezir Ibrahim.

It may be assumed that the machinations of his favorite, Gritti,had a lot to do with the fall and execution of Ibrahim although it ispossible that even more serious matters were involved; the extremely able Ibrahim may have already recognized that Suleyman'sstrategy was untenable and perhaps even expressed this viewpoint.

The real losers in this diplomatic affair were John and Hungaryitself. The hesitation, or perhaps deliberate tactics, of the Ottomanleaders had two serious consequences. First of all, the civil warresumed in Hungary. Since the early news had it that the sultanwould partition the country according to de facto possession, bothparties strove, until the arrival of Gritti, to lay their hands on aslarge a portion as possible. Of course, this process involved armedconflict. Thus, peace and quiet, so earnestly desired, once againreceded into an unreachable distance. Once again, John's situationbecame shaky since his rule had been accepted, in good measure,because of the expectations that peace would be restored to thecountry.

The other serious consequence was that John lost his confidence.Indeed, the doubt arose in his mind that if even the Porte's protection could not guarantee peace for the country, then his position wasindefensible. Consequently, the only remaining solution was to handthe country to the Habsburgs. Verancsics, who was well versed inthe politics of his time and who fulfilled diplomatic functions as well,wrote in his history:

[273]

In October 1534 he sent Brodarics to Vienna for the purpose offeeling out the situation. Ferdinand rigid]y cut himself off from an)notion of compromise; what is more, confident that the killing ofGritti had definitely shaken John's position at the Porte, he denounced John to the sultan, accusing him of responsibility in Gritti'sexecution, and requested permission to "punish" John. He sworethat, should the sultan hand over Hungary to him, he could restassured "regarding his [Ferdinand's] unlimited good will, his sincerefilial disposition and friendship, and that he would maintain goodneighbor policies and peace as well." Ferdinand was so self-confidentthat he even concluded an alliance with the voivode of Moldaviaabout the same time, with the specific objective of attacking Johnsimultaneously--Ferdinand from the west, the voivode from theeast. [274]

The lack of success of Brodarics's first mission did not deter Johnfrom his goal; Brodarics was sent back to Vienna in March of 1535.It is possible that the news of the Tunisian victory of Charles V,which caused great sensation throughout Europe in May 1535, aswell as the threats of the chavush sent out to investigate the Grittiaffair in September 1535, made him even more determined to securepeace; now he presented the matter to Ferdinand in concrete form, tothe effect that he would recognize the latter's right of inheritanceand, moreover, he would agree to Ferdinand retaining the areas nowin his possession.

John went even further, exposing his person and even the countryto considerable danger. In September 1535 he sent Brodarics andFrangepan to Charles V himself, to inquire whether the emperorwould be willing to occupy Buda and Temesvar with his own troops.If the emperor should agree, he would abdicate, in the knowledgethat his country was in safe hands. Indeed, such a move could onlyhave been the result of utter despair, because there could be littledoubt that if the Ottoman leaders had learned of the proposal theywould have launched war immediately.

Thus John, disregarding his personal interests, was prepared togive up his crown in order to save the country. We have no reason orright to doubt that his proposal was dictated by sincere patriotism, but we should not exclude the possibility that political and tacticalconsiderations played a part. Well aware of the mood of the rulingclass, he knew that whether it be his own followers or those ofFerdinand, they were agreed on one thing: the integrity of thecountry had to be preserved at all cost. The resolution of the partialdiet of Ferdinand's side, held in 1536, rigidly insisted on the administrative and territorial integrity of the country: "Since the estatesand orders of Hungary fear nothing, at this time, so much as thepossible partition of the country between His Majesty and his adversaries, be it resolved, in order to avoid this, that His Majesty notconclude peace under any circumstance without the prior knowledgeof his Hungarian councillors." [275] At the meeting of the diet of thosestanding on John's side a similar decision was made. It is possiblethat John's proposal was intended to win over the nobility, saying ineffect: "See, I have the fate of the country so much at heart that I ameven willing to give up my rights!"

Fortunately for the country and for John, Charles V could nothonor the request because of a sudden change in the political andmilitary situation in Europe. In 1536 the king of France sent histroops against Italy while concluding an alliance with the sultan.The emperor, in order to force the French to retreat, invaded Provence. The attack, however, did not bring about the expected result,for the French, applying the policy of "scorched earth" in their owncountry, burnt and destroyed everything in the path of the Imperialhost; thus the Imperial forces soon encountered insurmountableproblems of supply. Their soldiers were starving, their ranks decimated by epidemics, and they had no alternative but to withdraw. [276]

It would have been suicide on the part of John to continue negotiations with Ferdinand under the same conditions, since he couldexpect no help from Charles V, as indeed, the emperor had let himknow in a message. Thus, when Wese, the archbishop of Lund, cameto Nagyvarad to pursue the negotiations in the summer of 1536,Friar George and Frangepan frankly told him that the negotiationswere to continue on entirely different premises. The archbishop ofLund gave the following account:

[277]

Verancsics relates the affair in basically the same way, addingthat should John hand over Buda to the Habsburgs, "he would playaway the friendship and good will of the Turkish Sultan, and that, inJohn's estimation, would be neither useful nor safe." [278]

Since Ferdinand insisted on receiving Buda, the negotiationsbroke down, and both sides resorted to arms once again. It wasknown in Buda and Constantinople already in the summer of 1536that Ferdinand was making intensive preparations for war. It ispossible that this was what prompted John to undertake preventivewarfare: in December 1536, with a carefully prepared expedition, hetook Kassa by surprise. The significance of this successful undertaking was considerable from both a military and a political perspectivesince a strategically important place fell into John's hands whilecausing division in the ranks of the counties of northern Hungarywhich until then had backed Ferdinand.

The unfavorable international conjuncture and the loss of Kassadid not prompt Ferdinand to reconsider. He persisted in his conviction that he could persuade John to resign, by force of arms ifnecessary. He began by preparing the ground diplomatically; thetotal failure of his endeavors alone should have sufficed to make himreassess his situation. A letter to Brodarics, written from Rome,reveals the Vatican's position: "Poor Hungary will perish if she is notcured by peace; under no circumstance would the Turk tolerate thatthe country be placed under the rule of the King of the Romans." [279]

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541