Peter Pastor: Hungary Between Wilson and Lenin...

g would have been his responsibility to arrange military matters. [33.] In accordance with the new order of the Supreme Council, by December 28, Czechoslovak troops occupied Kassa (Kosice) in northeastern Hungary and on January I , 1919 Pozsony (Bratislava) came under Czecho slovak control. [34.] In spite of the generous decision of the Supreme Council, the Czecho slovaks were still not satisfied with their territorial claims and pushed for a corridor through Hungary to connect the Czechs and Slavs with the South Slavs. Late in December, in an address to the Prague National Assembly, Tomas Masaryk declared that "in Czechoslovak and in Yugoslav circles almost everybody is convinced, above all, that a direct geographical union is necessary." [35.]

The Hungarian envoy to Prague, Rudolf Krajcsi reported in midJanuary 1919 that the Czechs would demand a corridor at the Peace Conference. In the opinion of Krajcsi, the Czechs wanted to unite "with the United Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes', because they wanted a link with the sea. He said that the Czechs would justify their claim by declarations that a Slav barrier against pan-German and Bolshevik threats was necessary. And indeed, in a memorandum handed to the Allies, the Czechs did justify their territorial demands with arguments based on strategic principles, for the number of all Slavs in such a strip of land would not exceed 25% of the total population. The Yugoslavs seemed to favor the idea as well. An attempt was made to seize part of the area inhabited by Slovenes. An unsuccessful military action was carried out under the command of Captain Erminij Jurisic. [36.]

Among the Allies, France vigorously backed the CzechoslovakYugoslav claim. The influential French frontier-maker, Andre Tardieu, thought that the other Allies would also favor it as it was a matter of European interest "favorable to two of our allies." [37.]

British and American views were less enthusiastic. Lloyd George, for example, thought that it was a "very audacious and indefensible proposal." [38.] In spite of Anglo-American opposition to the idea, the corridor plan was not officially rejected until March 8, when it was brought to the attention of the Peace Conference. [39.]

The Czech government itself was determined to establish a power balance strong enough to hold Hungary in check. The continuation of the coal blockade, which was causing economic havoc in Hungary, served as a lever against the Hungarians. Foreign Minister Benes frankly admitted that Czechoslovakia expected to exploit the coal situation to influence Budapest. [40.] The exasperated mayor of Budapest vainly appealed to President Wilson to have the Czechs lift the blockade "which makes public security impossible.'' [41.]

In the south, Hungary was continuing to struggle with Serbia, whose troops had crossed the demarcation line established at Belgrade. They continued to push north until they had occupied Hungary's last remaining important domestic coal mines in the area of Pecs. [42.]

The Hungarian government fared no better with the Rumanians. On December 1, the Rumanian National Council of Transylvania decided to unite with the Kingdom of Rumania. [43.] As soon as this was announced, Rumania annexed the twenty-six disputed counties of Transylvania and called on the Hungarians to evacuate the area. Like the Czechoslovaks, the Rumanians also used the threat of Bolshevism as a justification for expansion. Bucharest claimed that the Hungarian government was undertaking a Bolshevik conspiracy in cooperation with the Russians. The communist campaign was particularly dangerous to the Transylvanians who were so instigated by the Karolyi government. [44.]

On December 15, General Berthelot, using the pretext of the Bolshevik threat gave permission to the Rumanian General Staff to occupy Hungarian territories beyond the limits fixed by the armistice. [45.] On the following day, Lieutenant-Colonel Landrot, a liaison officer of Berthelot informed Vix that, according to Allied decisions, the Rumanian troops were to cross the line of demarcation and were to take positions at a new line stretching from Szatmarnemeti (Satu Mare) to Nagyvarad (Oradea-Mare) to Bekescsaba. The justification Landrot gave to Vix for Berthelot's orders was that there was a need to protect the Rumanian peasants in Kolozsvar (Cluj) and in the Maros Valley.

Upon receiving this information, Vix contacted the Hungarians with the new order. He made it clear, however, that his information should not be considered an official order as yet, because he had heard nothing from Belgrade on this matter. He asked the Hungarians to order their troops not to resist Rumanian advances for the sake of avoiding bloodshed, and he promised to call on the Rumanians not to advance for the same reason. Vix also sent a hurried report to Henrys on the situation and expressed surprise that such an important decision was not communicated to him directly. He further protested the injustice of the projected Rumanian advances, claiming that the disregard of the original demarcation lines destroyed the convention and for that reason the mission ought to be withdrawn. [46.] On December 18 Vix received further orders from Berthelot, asking the Hungarians to withdraw from Kolozsvar which, as Berthelot alleged, would be occupied by Rumanian troops until French forces became available for the occupation. Vix, who just a few days ago had asked the Hungarians for constraint and had promised a reciprocal act by the Rumanians, was indicating exasperation. He bitterly complained to Henrys about the existence of dual authority in Hungary. He claimed that in addition to receiving orders from Franchet d'Esperey and his subordinate Henrys, he was now being commanded by Berthelot, the commander of the French forces in Rumania and in southern Russia.

Berthelot's additional demands on the Hungarians for one hundred locomotives and fifteen hundred railroad box cars were also protested by Vix as it was not part of the Belgrade treaty. Since Hodza handed the Supreme Council's memorandum to the Hungarians during these difficult days, Vix had also considered Hodza as a threat to his own authority. In his report to Henrys Vix concluded:

In summary, the Convention of November 13 is nothing more than a scrap of paper (chiffon de papier). The attitude taken by our small Allies and by ourselves, the absence of authority capable of redressing abuses, seems to show well that there is one authority: the right of the strongest. [47.] Vix felt that the usefulness of his mission to Budapest would be over unless concerted efforts were made to give the Hungarians demarcation lines that were respected by all. Furthermore, he suggested the occupation of Budapest by French and British forces. Both of these suggestions were out of the question. The French government did not consider it necessary to send more than two thousand troops to Hungary, who were there to provide protection for the Entente mission. [48.]

The British government continued its policy of non-intervention, although Berthelot's claims of the threat of Hungarian-inspired Bolshevism did come to the attention of the Foreign Office. Lewis Namier criticized Berthelot's actions and claimed that the French general provided "another example of how the cry of 'Bolshevism, is exploited nowadays by anyone who wishes to obtain a hearing and prejudice the case of his opponents." [49.] In spite of such a critical attitude, the British refrained from protesting Berthelot's unilateral action.

Berthelot's harking to Bolshevism was buttressed by the fact that, since November 2, he was the commander of the Allied interventionist forces in Russia. For his activities in Russia, he was directly responsible to the Minister of War, Clemenceau, and to the General Staff. His troops in Rumania and Transylvania, now named the Army of the Danube, however, remained subordinate to Franchet d'Esperey. [50.] The division of Berthelot's responsibility indicates that for the French leaders the destruction of Bolshevism in Russia was more pressing than the political and military situation in the Balkans. Berthelot's task in Russia was the progressive invasion of Russian territory, including occupation of the ports of Odessa, Nikolaev and Sevastopol on the Black Sea and Taganrog on the Sea of Azov. Inland his advance was expected to reach the Dnieper and Donets region where Allied detachments were to give advice and material support to the anti-Communist White forces. [51.]

French intervention in Russia began on December 18 with the landing of 1,800 French troops at Odessa. [52.] In his zeal to find allies for intervention, Clemenceau even supported Rumania's participation in the Peace Conference as a minor alIy. This was a volte face for the French premier who earlier claimed that he could not accept Rumania as an ally because it signed a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers on May 7,1918.[53.] On December 29 the French foreign minister, Stephen Pichon, announced in the Chamber of Deputies in Paris that the Rumanian Army was being reorganized by General Berthelot and was ready to intervene in Russia. That a territorial bounty had to be paid for Rumanian support was explicit by his call for the creation of a "purely Magyar,' Hungary while declaring his faith in Czechoslovakia and in Rumania as faithful allies of France. He declared that France had no intention of accepting the establishment of states in Central Europe on the basis of self-determination, but aimed to follow the traditional policy of having strong Eastern European allies. He justified this position as the victor's right over the vanquished. One of the opposition deputies interjected that Pichon was adopting Clemenceau's dictum: "Let us be strong to be just." Clemenceau applauded Pichon's speech and declared that he pinned his faith on a system of alliances to preserve the peace of Europe. [54.]

The alliance Clemenceau was alluding to was the anti-Bolshevik alliance. It was for this reason that Pichon's public statement was preceded by instructions to the French ambassador in Bucharest to express his government's support of Rumania's presence at the Peace Conference as an alIy. The Rumanians were being told that the Secret Treaty of Bucharest had been annulled by the Peace Treaty of Bucharest of May 7, 1918. Pichon, however, had promised the Rumanians that the French would ask the Allies to support Rumanian demands based on the Secret Treaty. [55.] Still, France's rejection of Rumanian claims in the Secret Treaty of Bucharest was significant, for the Rumanians were in the process of advancing into western Transylvania, an area promised them in the Secret Treaty. The Belgrade Military Convention of November 13, however, had clearly stated that it was for Hungary to administer the area unless the Peace Conference decided otherwise. [56.] Rumania's advance was done with the overt support of Berthelot, much to the despair of Colonel Vix. General Berthelot, who visited Vix in Budapest, told the French supervisor of the Convention and the Armistice that he considered the Belgrade agreement as arbitrary and supported the Rumanian advance. To Vix and to his superiors, Berthelot,s behavior seemed insubordinate. [57.] On January 13, 1919, Franchet d,Esperey lodged a complaint about Berthelot and buttressed it by claiming that Berthelot's actions were weakening central authority in Hungary and would facilitate the progress of Bolshevism there. [58.]

General Berthelot, who was aware of the assailability of his actions, tried to gain Clemenceau's support by arguing that Rumania must be treated generously because of her proximity to Russia. Berthelot called the Hungarians the enemies of France and asked for a Transylvanian boundary unfavorable to Hungary which would also make the Rumanians pro-French and a virtual French colony. He also reminded Clemenceau that the Rumanians had re-entered the war and as a result they deserved to be treated as old allies. [59.] What Berthelot was really seeking was Clemenceau's explicit support of the Secret Treaty of Bucharest.

The French leader's reply was not long in coming. He expressed the view that the Rumanian Peace Treaty with the Central Powers annulled original Allied commitments to Rumania. She had also cooperated with the enemy with her annexation of Russian Bessarabia. Thus, he concluded, Rumania was treated very fairly when it was invited to the Peace Conference as a minor ally. As for the boundaries drawn by the Belgrade Convention, Clemenceau upheld them as a military demarcation line. In support of General Franchet d'Esperey he called on General Berthelot not to act as a broker for Rumania and either to obey his orders or request his own recall. [60.] When Count Auguste Saint-Aulaire, the French Ambassador to Bucharest, came to Berthelot's defense, the angry premier accused the general of sounding like a Rumanian statesman rather than an impartial judge of the Rumanian situation. [61.]

Clemenceau reacted to Franchet d'Esperey's complaint by restating his earlier orders delineating the areas of responsibility between Berthelot and Franchet d'Esperey. The latter was in charge of supervising all the armistices in Eastern Europe and was also ordered to see to it that the territorial status quo was not disturbed in Transylvania or elsewhere in Hungary. Clemenceau confirmed that Berthelot was the chief of the Army of the Danube in Rumania, subordinate to Franchet d,Esperey, and in charge of the troops in southern Russia, where he had three French, one Italian and three Greek divisions under him. The Rumanians were to contribute as many troops as Berthelot deemed necessary. As before. Berthelot was directly responsible to Clemenceau and Foch for his activities in Russia, but his supplies for Russia were left in the hands of Franchet d,Esperey, who therefore also had some influence over Berthelot's activities there. [62.]

Clemenceau's orders and disciplining of Berthelot indicate that in January, when French intervention in southern Russia was proceeding smoothly, even without Rumanian help, he took Franchet d'Esperey's warning seriously. The threat of Bolshevism and anarchy in Hungary forced Clemenceau to retreat from his position on Rumania, taken just a few weeks ago, which was now seen as causing rather than stopping the spread of communism. Even Berthelot,s strange reference to French colonial opportunities seemed to have little impact, but perhaps this was due to a general assumption that the Balkans would fall into French influence in any case. [63.]

Clemenceau's attention to problems in Hungary was motivated by developments which could possibly create problems for France. In the wake of hostile French pronouncements in the Chamber of Deputies, Karolyi also gave a major foreign policy address which stressed a proAmerican position. A possible involvement of the United States in Hungarian affairs had the potential of disturbing the French. On December 30 the Hungarian premier stated:

My foreign policy is based on Wilsonian ideals. We have only one ideology: Wilson, Wilson, and for the third time Wilson. I am sure that Wilson will win not only in America but in Europe as well. The role of America is to remake Europe, extirpating the idea of revenge and creating a peace that will not leave people embittered. [64.]

Karolyi's hope that the United States would come to Hungary's aid received a boost from Count Sigray. In a letter dated January 2. the unofficial envoy to Switzerland informed Karolyi that the United States intended to abide by the Wilsonian principles and that an American mission was on its way to Budapest. In the same letter Sigray also spoke of the hostile French attitude toward Hungary-news that no doubt surprised no one in Budapest. [65.]

In the French press the Hungarians were identified as pro-Communist. Early in January Le Temps accused Karolyi of being in league with Lenin, furnishing funds to Russian and Rumanian Bolsheviks to exploit the social problems in Rumania. The French newspaper cited as an example of Hungarian duplicity an alleged Hungarian document captured by the Rumanians. It supposedly instructed the Hungarian commissioner for Transylvania in Kolozsvar, Istvan Apathy, to print propaganda leaflets against the Rumanian King which were to proclaim that only the Hungarian People's Republic would give land to the peasants. [66.] This official and unofficial anti-Magyar policy of France led to Rumania's decision to arrest the Hungarian administrator while the city of Kolozsvar was occupied by Rumanian troops and its citizens were forced to pay 900,000 crowns to the Rumanians in indemnities. [67.]

The year of 1919 began with setbacks for Hungary. Much of Hungary's territory was occupied. The Ka'rolyi government was regarded with hostility by its neighbors, who were resolved to make their provisional conquest permanent. French policy was hostile while the other great powers seemed indifferent at best.

The government crisis that erupted in Budapest was certainly a consequence of these accumulating difficulties. The crisis was precipitated by the resignation of Marton Lovaszy, the moderate minister of education. Lovaszy, who was influenced by Esterhazy's report on foreign hostility, resigned in protest against the radical policies of the Karolyi government and decided to organize a bourgeois opposition. He was confident that the government, apparently deserted by the Allies, would eventually have to resign, yielding to an opposition party. [68.] In the hope of securing French backing, Lovaszy soon paid a visit to Vix. He told Vix of the impending government crisis and claimed that Karolyi would be willing to resign in favor of a bourgeois ministry of Lovaszy. Karolyi insisted, however, that any viable government must include the moderates of the Social Democratic Party. Lovaszy, aware of Karolyi's popularity among the Hungarians, had an alternative solution. He suggested that his bourgeois government could be popular among the masses even without the participation of the social democrats if Karolyi were to become the president of the republic-a post that could be created with the concurrence of the National Council.

Since Ka'rolyi rejected Lovaszy's solution, the former minister of education hoped to gain support for his scheme from Vix and the Allies. He inquired if Vix could find out if the Allies in Paris regarded his project in a favorable light. Vix informed Lovaszy that he ought to discount Allied military support for his endeavors and refrained from promising him information on the mood of Paris. [69.] Lovaszy left Vix without any further comment, apparently in full realization of the fact that he had neither external nor internal support for his ambitious plans.

The fact that Vix clearly indicated Allied aloofness from meddling in Hungarian politics also showed that Esterhazy's reports from Switzerland were often fabrications. His report on the desirability of changing the composition of the Hungarian government to please the Allies actually reflected the desires of the right-wing Hungarian aristocrats in their Swiss refuge.

The withdrawal of Lovaszy, which split the Karolyi party, made the socialists wary and they began to question the role of the Social Democratic Party in government. At the enlarged conference of the party's Executive Committee on January 7, two courses were considered. The first, advocated by Sandor Garbai, called for the formation of an all socialist government. The right-wing socialist, Erno' Garami, countered with a proposal that the socialists withdraw all support from Karolyi and stay outside the government until election to the Constituent Assembly was held. When a vote was taken, Garbai's suggestion was carried by a slender majority. Because of the close vote, the socialists decided to continue the discussion at the Workers' Council meeting the next day.

At the Workers' Council Garbai announced the previous day's decision, warning his comrades of the risk of continuing the coalition because it might lead to a counter-revolution inspired by the "jealousies of the dispossessed bourgeoisie." He claimed that the socialist government would make it possible to control all sources of counter-revolutionary activity emanating from the military and from the bureaucracy. He argued that, with a coalition government in power, the socialist program to nationalize the economy would be indefinitely postponed. An all-socialist government, moreover, would also mean the end of Bolshevik agitation.

In reply, Garami argued that, with party ranks swollen by increased labor union membership, it was necessary to educate the new members before the socialists could participate in government. Calling again for withdrawal from government, Garami reminded his audience that the party's alliance with the bourgeoisie was a betrayal of traditional socialist strategy and meant accepting the Bolsheviks, radical socialism "in social democratic disguise." This, in turn, threatened the "delivery of the socialist masses,' into the Bolshevik fold.

Zsigmond Kunfi, who had the reputation of a conciliator suggested that the socialists ought to remain in the government, because their withdrawal would most benefit the counter-revolution. [70.] Kunfi's fear was based on a warning by Karolyi that without the assistance of the trade unions, government would be impossible and that, rather than form a purely bourgeois government, Karolyi would resign. [71.] Kunfi also knew that the countryside was not socialist. Without the peasants supporting the socialists in Budapest, the advancing successor-state forces might bring down a socialist government. He therefore favored continued cooperation with Karolyi on the condition that the number of socialist ministers in the cabinet be increased. On the first ballot the council rejected Kunfi's suggestion and voted in favor of Garbai's position by 169 to 101 .

Kunfi then took the floor again and warned the council against forming a "pseudobolshevik" regime. In response to Kunfi's appeal Garbai decided to withdraw his resolution rather than chance a party schism. The next vote was 147 to 83 in favor of Kunfi's compromise. In response to Vilmos Bohm's call for unity, however, the council decided to vote for the resolution unanimously. When the final vote was taken, only the communists voted against it. [72.]

Because of his party's vote of non-confidence Karolyi decided to resign as prime minister. On January 11 he handed his resignation to the executive committee of the National Council, only to be appointed to the newly created post of President of the Republic. The committee's action was a recognition of the fact that with the all important socialist support behind him, Karolyi was still the best candidate to lead the country.

The creation of the office of the President of the Republic filled a gap that had existed since the declaration of the People's Republic on November 16. lts establishment was justified by article three of the recently promulgated Public Law of the National Council. This law empowered Karolyi to become temporary chief of state until a constituent assembly decided otherwise. It was now argued that a president rather than a prime minister should represent the highest authority in Hungary. This legal maneuver thus permitted Karolyi to maintain leadership of the government. The official statement of the executive committee called on Karolyi to "attempt to solve existing and possible future governmental crises through the presidency with the help of those individuals whose participation in government he deems necessary.,, Furthermore, the committee declared that there was no reason why Karolyi could not continue to exercise the "direction of foreign policy,, from his new post. [73.]

As President of the People's Republic, Karolyi appointed the independent Denes Berinkey to head the government. Berinkey, the former minister of justice in the cabinet, was not a professional politician but a professor specializing in international law. Karolyi intended to appoint him as the new minister of foreign affairs as well. Berinkey's candidacy, however, was opposed by Harrer on the technical grounds that the President and the prime minister could not both be in charge of foreign policy. Thus, from the middle of January, technically speaking, there was no minister of foreign affairs. Karolyi was still in charge of foreign policy making, while Harrer continued to be in charge of the ministry of foreign affairs in the capacity of ambassador-at-large. [74.]

The new cabinet, which finally began functioning on January 18, included five ministers still loyal to Karolyi, one minister from the Radical Party and one minister from the Smallholders Party. Jaszi, whose nationality program based on his concept of an "Eastern Switzerland" had been defeated, resigned but was not replaced. The socialists, as a price for their participation in government, received two more cabinet posts, doubling their representation. [75.] The composition of the Berinkey government thus indicated a definite shift to the left. The government's policy, however, was not more radical, because the aim of the new cabinet was to implement programs that had already been legislated.

Even though the right wing's abandonment of Karolyi was the cause for the crisis, it was that element that wanted to exploit the cabinet's shift to the left. On January 26, Mihaly Esterhazy's letter to Sir Horace Rumbold was transmitted to the British peace delegation in Paris. In his letter. Esterhazy claimed that the new Hungarian cabinet did not represent the desires of the Magyars. He argued that the cabinet came to power as a consequence of a pact between Karolyi and the social democrats. Since the Social Democratic Party was the only organized party in Hungary, representing the interest of a mere 240,000 workers, the majority of the population was not represented. Thus, he stated that the socialists exercised near dictatorial powers and that Bolshevism could only be avoided with Allied intervention. Esterhazy reasoned that only such action would "stop the insane bolshevist and socialist agitation which emanates from Budapest." [76.] Since the French did not move during the crisis, and Lovaszy was cold-shouldered by Vix, Esterhazy tried to convince his readers that Great Britain ought to develop a sphere of influence in Hungary, claiming that "Budapest and the Danube line lie on the line of the London-Persian Gulf." [77.]

Lewis Namier, the Foreign Office's Austro-Hungarian specialist, rejected Esterhazy's arguments. He compared the Karolyi government to the socialist government in Germany, and was of the opinion that the Hungarian coalition was "the only combination through which Hungary can escape civil war.,, He went on to assail right-wing intrigues and accused Esterhazy of wanting to use British power to execute a coup d 'etat on the behalf of the Magyar oligarchy. Namier considered that socialists represented Magyar national interests claiming that the majority of the Magyars were workers. Moreover, the British specialist saw peasant support for the Karolyi government as it promised land reforms. Namier thus advised his superiors to support the Karolyi government on all issues with the exception of the territorial question. Namier called for an official declaration by his government stating that Great Britain "does not mean to interfere in internal Magyar affairs and entertains no prejudice against the existing Magyar Government." [78.] Although no such pronouncement came, it is clear that Britain continued a hands-off policy with respect to Hungary. The British position also reflected the fact that the right wing made little headway in influencing the Allies in its behalf.

Peter Pastor: Hungary Between Wilson and Lenin...