Peter Pastor: Hungary Between Wilson and Lenin...

CHAPTER II.
THE OUTBREAK OF THE FROSTFLOWER REVOLUTION

It was clear now that the Wilsonian call for an Austria-Hungary independent of German influence had met with failure. The Allies needed new tactics to weaken the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This meant the return to the old strategy of the Entente--dissolution. At the same time unrest among the nationalities increased. On May 15, representatives of Czechs, Slovaks, Yugoslavs, Poles, Italians and Rumanians gathered in Prague under the pretext of celebrating the golden anniversary of the founding of the Czech National Theater. The meeting turned out to be a replica of the Rome Congress. It was a loud demonstration against the Empire where the names of Masaryk and Wilson were often repeated and hailed. On May 17, a committee, formed by the participating leaders of the nationalities of the Empire, drafted a resolution which promised to do everything in their power "in order that their nations may gain their freedom from this terrible war and on the basis of self-determination rise to a new free life in their independent states." [2.]

The initiative to return to the policy of dissolution was initiated by the Americans. On May 29, Secretary of State Lansing drafted a "Memorandom on the Policy of the United States in Relation to the Nationalities included within the Austro-Hungarian Empire" its purpose was to secure the President's approval of the new policy of the State Department. Lansing thought that a change of policy in the light of the "unwise publication of the Prince Sixtus Letter" and of the situation within the Empire was appropriate:

It would seem to me not only politic at this time of political unrest and social unrest in Austria-Hungary and of the failure of the offensive in Italy, but just to the nationalities concerned to declare without reservation for an independent Poland, an independent Bohemia and an independent Southern Slav State, and a return of the Rumanians and Italians to their natural allegiance.

This would mean in effect the dismemberment of the present Austro-Hungarian Empire into its original elements, leaving these independent nationalities to form separate states as they might themselves decide to form, especially if the severance of Austria and Hungary resulted. . . [3.]

President Wilson approved Lansing's memorandum and on June 26 he wrote his version of a death sentence to the Habsburg Empire:

I agree with you that we can no longer respect or regard the integrity of the artificial Austrian Empire. I doubt that even Hungary is any more an integral part of it than Bohemia. I have made this judgment in part upon a very interesting and illuminating conversation I had a month or two ago with a group of Magyar Americans who spoke plainly to the point. [4.]

The opinion of President Wilson that the separation of Austria and Hungary could be achieved was motivated by the leaders of the HungarianAmerican Loyalty League, formed in January 1918. This group was the most vocal of the Austro-Hungarian ethnic organizations in the United States. The organization was under the leadership of Alexander Konta, who in 1917 was appointed to head the government-run Hungarian Bureau of the Committee of Public Information. With the blessing of the C.P.I. Foreign Section Director, George Creel, the Hungarian-American Loyalty League accepted a platform supporting independent Hungary. This policy was later cabled to C.P.I. agents in Russia by Creel for the purpose of its clandestine introduction into Hungary. [5.]

The introduction of revolutionary ideas through Russia was made possible by the Brest-Litovsk Armistice and ,soon after by the Brest-Litovsk Treaty which permitted the return of the Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war in Russia to the Empire. With the aid of his agents, Creel expected to distribute C.P.I. propaganda publications among those Magyar prisoners of war who were still in Russian camps, but were to be repatriated in the near future. [6.] It seems, however. that the revolutionary ideology of Bolshevism, rather than U.S. sponsored separatism among the returning prisoners of war, gave the real headache to Hungarian authorities. Reports to the Austro-Hungarian Chief of Staff included strong warnings of the danger of Bolshevism among the prisoners of war [7.] and, as a result of the threat, returning soldiers were quarantined and investigated before they returned to duty. [8.] One of these camps was at Kenyermezo, where the returning prisoners of war were questioned about the Hungarian revolutionary organization at Omsk, Siberia. The interviewers were especially interested in the activities of the leaders, such as Jozsef Rabinovics and Bela Kun. These interrogators insisted that the repatriates "must know these men whose aim was to make revolutions at home also." [9.] Some of the insurrectionary activities were also led by returning soldiers. The Chief Prosecutor of the mining city of Pecs, for instance, reported that the instigators of a local rebellion were soldiers back from Russian prisoner of war camps. These men, according to the minutes of military court martials, were "saturated with Bolshevism." [10.]

The fear of Bolshevisrn was serious enough to prompt the German Embassy in Moscow to protest against the communist efforts to subvert the prisoners, of war allegiance to their own governments. [11.] During the same month of April, Allied observers were also sent to investigate the activities of the "Red", Hungarian prisoners of war in Russia. This was necessitated by official Allied reports that the activities of the Hungarians were instigated by the Central Powers and were dangerous to the Allied cause. The two investigators, the American Red Cross Attache, Captain William B. Webster, and Captain W. I. Hicks of the British Mission in Moscow were sent to Omsk, Siberia to survey the activities of the Magyars. In their summary report they dismissed the charge that the prisoners of war attempted to seize "the Trans-Siberian Railway in the interest of the German cause." They could only report a total of nine-hundred and thirty-one Hungarian Red Guards armed for Bolshevik military purposes. They reported the threat of tile Central All-Siberia Soviet, which promised to arm more Hungarians in case of an Allied "uninvited intervention." The Allied investigators thought that the report of German foul play concerning prisoners of war was spread by anti-Bolshevik Allied observers, and that in reality the Red Guards represented a threat to the Central Powers rather than to the Allies:

We can add after seeing the armed prisoners and the type of men which they are that we feel there is no danger to the allied cause through them. On the contrary, we feel that there would seem to be a large social danger to the course of the Central Empires, as the Socialist activity among the prisoners of war is very far reaching. [12.]

The Allies were not able to profit from the disruptive force of Bolshevism which was threatening the Dual Empire. This ideology became a taboo among the Allied leaders as well. They were afraid that its energy could not be harnessed and that it could backfire much as it did in the case of the Germans who were responsible for the return of Lenin to Russia. President Wilson thus felt that, unlike the Central Powers whose policy had been "to foment revolution in the countries with which they were at war," the United States could not do anything "that would directly or indirectly bring revolution even in an enemy country." [13.] Secretary of State Lansing had similar views about Bolshevik revolutions:

The question is as to what will be the result if the proletariat should overthrow orderly governments in Central Europe. A Bolshevik Germany or Austria is too horrible to contemplate. It is worse, far worse, than a Prussianized Germany and would mean an even greater menace to human liberty. [14.]

Because of the fear of Bolshevism, the Allies had no other tactic to disrupt the war effort of the Dual Monarchy than the support of the disgruntled Austro-Hungarian nationalities. The allies of "the United States were quick to accept the volte face that was initiated by Lansing. On June 28, the day the Secretary of State declared that all branches of the Slav race should be completely freed of Austrian rule," [15.] the French government recognized the Czecho-Slovak National Council as the "supreme organ of the nation and the first basis of a future Czecho-Slovak government within the historic limits of your provinces." [16.] The British government moved in a similar direction. On June 14, Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour approved a Foreign Office directive that suspended liasons with the Hungarian opposition led by Karolyi. The policy makers of the Foreign Office claimed that contacts with the Hungarians "would alienate the Slavs of the Empire and like in 1848, would create a pro-Hapsburg feeling." [17.] This policy was followed up on August 9 when the British government recognized the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a de facto co-belligerent government. The United States followed suit in September.

The recognition of the Czecho-Slovak National Council as a kind of government in exile had far-reaching implications. It meant the nullification of Point Ten of Wilson's Fourteen Points by the Allies. This was a concrete fact overshadowing the vague promises made in the past which could be respected or disregarded at will. The existence of the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris as a co-belligerent suggested the creation of a new state which had never existed in modem European history. With this act the nationalities question became an international question as far as Hungary was concerned.

The putting of the National Council on such solid grounds was also necessitated by the "uninvited intervention" of the Czecho-Slovak Legion in Russia in May 1918. The Siberian Soviet kept its word and decided to arm the Hungarian prisoners of war. The call was nationalistic in tone and described the murder of several Hungarian Red Guards at Chelyabinsk. Because of the anti-Magyar feelings among the Czechs, the appeal reasoned, Hungarians had to fight for their existence:

Before us stands open the question: to be or not to be. The Soviet has placed at the disposition of the central organization a thousand rifles. These thousand rifles we must use if we wish to guard ourselves and the Russian revolution which is our alIy and the basis for our future revolution. [18.]

The chief spokesman for the Czechoslovak cause, Eduard Benes, was eager to express willingness of the Czechoslovaks to fight in Siberia in return for Allied recognition of Czechoslovak aspirations. [19.] Czech anti-Communism was emphasized following the Czech intervention by the fact that of all the Czechoslovak prisoners of war in Russia, only 1,300 threw in their lot with the Bolsheviks. Benes went on to compare this number with the large number of Magyars in the Bolshevik fold. The Czech statesman claimed that the Magyars were so much influenced by communism that they refused to be repatriated and became serious adversaries of the Czechoslovaks. [20.] Reports from the Czecho-Slovak Legion also indicated that captured Magyar Red Guards were summarily executed, while their Russian camarades were merely made prisoners. [21.] Thus, the anti-Bolshevik intervention of the Czechoslovaks lead to a civil war between the nationalities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in distant Siberia. The violent hostility of the neighboring nationalities, however, came to be identified as a struggle of conflicting ideologies. The Czecho-Slovaks were recognized as warriors in defense of democracy while the Magyars were labeled as supporters of the Bolshevik menace.

If the Czecho-Slovak National Council was recognized because of its anti-Bolshevik position, and if the birth of the Czechoslovak state can be attributed to it, [22.] then it can also be said that the death of the historic Hungarian state that included Slovakia was significantly affected by events in Siberia.

In light of the changes taking place in Allied circles, the suggestion of Alexander Konta, dated July 31, 1918, that the Hungarian-American Loyalty League ought to contact the Karolyi party and work together for the dismemberment of the Dual Monarchy became anachronistic. If there were a dismemberment of the Empire, the dismemberment of Hungary was its corollary. For this reason, while Count Karolyi was gaining popular acclaim at home, the time for the application of his policies passed.

At the outbreak of the Sarajevo Crisis Karolyi took an anti-war position which he continued to uphold throughout the conflict. The news of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum caught him in Cleveland, Ohio, [24.] a city with a large Hungarian minority. Seeing that a clash between the two states would destroy the possibility of a future rapprochement between the Magyars and Serbs he took a position against the ultimatum. The August 30 issue of the influential Pester Lloyd, representing official opinion and the general war fever, attacked this speech with special vehemence. The paper called Karolyi's views bankrupt and questioned the advisability of Kirolyi's return to Hungary. In spite of the fact that he was a "traitor" in the eyes of the Hawks, a persona non-grata, the Count returned and. except for a short interval, proceeded to take lip a courageous fight for pacifism in Parliament where. in the spring of 19i 5. he stood almost alone.

In his memoirs, Karolyi later blamed himself for not remaining abroad and for not taking up a struggle "in the style of Masaryk." [25.] This belief that his postwar government would have been better treated had he stayed in exile is unconvincing in light of the preceding pages.

Unlike other aristocrats of similar wealth, Karolyi's political platform included demands for land reform and universal suffrage. Like the rightwing members of the Independence Party, he also advocated the nationalistic idea of "personal union', between Austria and Hungary. Unlike the right wing, however, he had a very anti-German outlook. As a patriot, Karolyi saw in the possibility of German victory a change from Austrian to German economic hegemony in Hungary. Karolyi's fears were buttressed by the appearance of Frederich Naumann's Mitteleuropa. ln this book the author expressed what was soon accepted in German official circles as the war aims of Germany. Naumann saw the necessity of a BerlinBaghdad axis through the Balkans. Because of its geographic location, Hungary would have been included in Germany's economic orbit.

By July 1916 Karolyi saw that he was unable to force the acceptance of his political platform upon the party over which he presided. He decided to leave the organization, taking some twenty other prominent members with him. The new Karolyi-independence Party proclaimed a policy pressing for peace without annexations, based on international law, land reforms and universal suffrage. [26.]

At the Pacifist Congress which took place in Berne in November 1917, Karolyi had occasion to meet Allied officials in the persons of the French public information officer, Emile Haguenin, and the American Ambassador to Switzerland, Hugh R. Wilson. At these meetings Karolyi attempted to convince the Allied officials that a call for an international conference which, he assumed, the German government would refuse to attend would be the best way to get Austria-Hungary out of the war. In that case, he reasoned, Emperor Charles would have been served a pretext to sever all commitments to Germany. [27.] The British Ambassador, Sir Horace Rumbold, also attempted to contact Karolyi and learn the views of the Hungarian opposition leader. [28.] Though there is no indication that such a meeting did take place. the Foreign Office was informed of Karolyi's plan for a post-war east-central Europe that would have federated Poland, Austria. Hungary and Yugoslavia under Habsburg presidency. Karolyi claimed that such federation would serve as an effective barrier against German expansion. [29.] Even if Karolyi's projects did not materialize, the Berne meeting furthered his reputation as a friend of the Allies.

In January 1918, Mihaly Karolyi welcomed Wilson's Fourteen Points and became their supporter. During the course of the year, his popularity among the Hungarian masses was greater than that of any one of the socialist leaders. The Austro-Hungarian government, however, did little to accept peace according to the Wilsonian points until the military collapse of Bulgaria. The defeat of the Balkan ally on September 26 shook the whole Central camp and on the 29th, Germany, AustriaHungary and Turkey agreed to appeal to President Wilson to initiate peace negotiations on the basis of the Fourteen Points. Austria-Hungary's appeal arrived in Washington on October 7. [30.]

The social and nationality crisis was now coupled with a military crisis. It became evident that if Hungary was hoping for a mild treatment at the hands of the Allies she had to find a man who was always on the side of the Entente. Gyula Andrassy summed up best the feeling of the war party. Referring to his son-in-law, Mihaly Karolyi, he said:

Now it's Mihaly's turn. He put his bet on the winner. Now he must show what he knows! [31.]

Peter Pastor: Hungary Between Wilson and Lenin...