Peter Pastor: Hungary Between Wilson and Lenin...

CHAPTER I
THE ROAD TO REVOLUTION

The compromise aggravated, rather than alleviated the nationalities problem. The Czech intelligentsia wanted equal partnership with the Austrian Germans; the Croat intelligentsia demanded equality with the Hungarian Magyars. South of the border, with Russian encouragement, Serbia was waging a propaganda war against the Dual Monarchy and was aiming for the alienation of the southern Slav minorities of Hungary from the Crown of Saint Stephen.

The appeal of nationalism was not restricted solely to the non-Magyar nationalities. The Magyars themselves were carried away by its attraction. The conservative Hungarian ruling classes of wealthy landowners and less numerous capitalists used the appeal of nationalism to perpetuate their political hegemony over the Magyar and non-Magyar masses alike. The Magyar nationalist aim was to establish a personal union with Austria through a common monarch. This meant that even the existing common ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Defense would have to be separated. This policy appealed to Magyars of all classes. Most could neither forget nor forgive the defeat of their newly independent country in 1849 by the Austrians who had been aided by Russian military forces.

In I904 the nationalists in the Budapest Parliament aimed at sabotaging the efficacy of the assembly through the barrage (31 endless filibusters. Reaction presented itself' in the person of Prime Minister Istvan Tisza who on November 18, 1904, through a well-executed parliamentary maneuver, changed the rules of the house and put a limit on such obstructionist tactics. The reaction of the parliamentary opposition was swift in a beerhall-like atmosphere. they went on a rampage, destroying the furniture of the Chamber of Deputies. The uproar caused the dissolution of the Chamber and forced new elections. The January 1905 campaign brought an end to Tisza's reign, and to the domination of the Free Thought Party, a faithful supporter of Dualism. The victory of the opposition parties through a coalition was disregarded by the Emperor Francis Joseph who, instead of choosing his next Prime Minister from among the victorious party leaders, appointed Geza Fejervary, a trusted royalist. Ferenc Kossuth, the leader of the most powerful party of the coalition, the Independence Party, declared that such an arbitrary act could not be accepted and called for a nation-wide passive resistance movement. However, Francis Joseph intimidated the coalition by threatening to introduce universal suffrage in Hungary. This measure, promising a strong political voice to the non-privileged classes and, most importantly, to the ethnic minorities, forced the coalition to abandon the pursuit of nationalistic aims in return for the Court's retraction of its threat. In April 1906, the leading politicians of the Hungarian independence movement thus reaffirmed the principles of the Compromise of 1867, which assured continued aristocratic dominance while betraying the "national cause."

Thus it was evident that, for both the leaders of the oppressed Hungarian nationalities and the Magyars, nationalism was a means of serving different ends. The leaders of the oppressed nationalities believed that independence meant freedom to reform, to educate, to build--to modernize. For the Magyar nationalists in power, nationalism's functional purpose was to preserve a semi-feudal social and political system. In the course of the years following the 1906 compromise, the Hungarian Government continued its harsh policies against the awakening nationalities of the realm. On October 27, 1907, at the Slovak village of Cernova a group of Slovak peasants, congregating for the consecration of their church, was fired upon by the Hungarian gendarmerie when they demanded the presence of Father Andrus Hlinka, their imprisoned national leader. The fusillade resulted in fifteen deaths and some sixty wounded. [2.]

Such governmental reaction forced the Slovaks to choose between complete passivity or mass emigration. especially to the United States. [3.] In the Meanwhile, the seven Slovak representatives in the Budapest parliament organized themselves into a nationalities bloc. The group was under the leadership of the journalist Milan Hodza. Its aim was to propagate the ideas of the heir-apparent Francis Ferdinand, calling for concessions to the national minorities. Soon the fifteen Rumanian as well as the four Serb representatives joined Hodza's group. The forty member Croatian delegation did not follow until 1908 after the central government's confrontation with Croatia. [4.]

That year, in "autonomous,, Croatia, the Hungarian government's requirement that the state railway employees know the Magyar tongue, brought about the victory of a Croat-Serb political coalition at election time. The Hungarian government, disregarding these results, introduced a virtual dictatorship, while Croat leaders were arrested, accused of lese majeste and sentenced to prison terms of from five to twelve years. [5.]

As a result of the elections of 1910, the emasculated coalition gave way to the party of Tisza, rechristened the National Party of Work. It aimed to preserve Magyar dominance within the framework of the Compromise. In November of that year Tisza clearly expressed this goal:

The nationalities question is one of the basic questions of our national policy. The Hungarian Nation can fulfill its raison d'etre and establish its future on solid foundations if it resolves this great problem. With severity if necessary, with understanding and level-headedness wherever possible, we must insure that every citizen of the country will bow before the Hungarian constitutional ideals, which are based on the political unity of the Hungarian state. [6.]

If Tisza's party stressed Magyar national preponderance, it certainly did not stress the interest of the worker but rather that of the worker's masters. Hungarian labor was represented by the Hungarian Social Democratic Party, which, as a result of the restrictive suffrage laws, was not able to send representatives to parliament. Under the existing system the demands of the Social Democratic Party for universal suffrage were utopian, and on one occasion, on May 23, 1912, a demonstration organized for that very reason was met with violence. Workers demonstrated in front of the Parliament building and in other parts of the city. The explosive situation had a number of victims: seven died, four were critically wounded while another two hundred and sixty persons required medical attention. [7.] The near-revolutionary situation of this date lives on as Bloody Thursday and its seriousness can be measured by the fact that Tisza demanded the imprisonment of the socialist leadership, though this suggestion was voted down by the Council of Ministers. [8.]

In the Chamber of Deputies, the newly elected Speaker of the Chamber, Istvan Tisza, disregarded certain parliamentary rules, which caused one irate opposition member to lose his temper and fire at him. The deputy's assassination-suicide attempt failed, but the critically wounded perpetrator was hailed by public opinion as a hero and martyr. On the following day, June 8, a young Croat student attempted to assassinate the Croatian governor in Zagreb. When he was captured he confessed that his crime was motivated by events taking place in Budapest. [9.]

The Social Democratic Party journal Nepszava lauded the crime of the deputy who was seen as a victim of the "decadence of the Party of Work and of the mad villain who occupies the Speaker's chair." The only complaint of the writer of the article was that "the poor man's aim was bad.,, The bourgeois daily, Polgar, sized up the situation in its true significance when it claimed that the general feeling in the city and the countryside was like dry pest-moss which could be set afire by a solitary spark engulfing the whole country in flames. [10.]

Thus, it is evident that the Hungarian state faced social revolutionary as well as ethnic revolutionary opposition. The traumatic experience of the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife at Sarajevo by the Bosnian fanatic Gavrilo Princip added a new twist to the Hungarian situation. The assassinated Archduke, the heir to the Austrian and Hungarian thrones, had plans favoring the trialistic reorganization of the Dual Monarchy and opposed Magyar domination over the Hungarian nationalities. [11.] It was, therefore, widely held in 1914 that the crime was perpetrated with clandestine Magyar support to prevent the resulting redistribution of political power in favor of the non-German non-Magyar nationalities. It soon became evident, however, that strong groups whose influence was felt in Serbian circles were partly responsible for the act. Serbia was a long-time external nucleus of South Slav nationalism and wanted to frustrate all attempts of reconciling the Slav 'nationalities t.3 the Empire. If their discontent died. Belgrade's dream of a greater Serbia, including Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, would die with it. [12.]

The death of the Archduke was nevertheless no cause for tears among Hungarian nationalists, whom the deceased regarded as "rabble Huns," and who viewed his ideas as a threat to their political hegemony. Furthermore, his assassination was an indication of the intricacy of the nationalities problem which had to be dealt with. It became evident that Serbia had to be crushed for Budapest's sake as well as for Vienna's.

For this reason, the son and namesake of the late Gyula Andrassy, the chief architect of the Dual Alliance, assailed the act in no uncertain terms. Andrassy, who was a member of the presidium of the opposition Independence Party eulogized the dead heir-apparent as one "who was filled with noble ambitions and a will to greatness, wishing to help the nationalities of the Monarchy.... For this reason he was killed because he represented a position which was in the vital interest of Hungary." [13.]

Even if most of the politicians were in favor of forceful action against Serbia, the Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Istvan Tisza, was opposed to it, knowing that Russia would intervene on behalf of the Serbs. The consequences of such action would be disastrous to the Dual Monarchy. [14.] Tisza was aware of the ineptitude of the Austro-Hungarian army in a possible confrontation with the "Russian steam-roller." As soon as he was assured of German military assistance, however, Tisza abandoned his opposition. For the Hungarian leaders, the war had to be waged for no other reason than the preservation of the status quo of "Thousand Year Old Hungary ." * l 5

Tisza saw the war not only as an opportunity to find a cure for the nationalities problem, but thought that it would still all important political opposition in parliament. The reinvigorated Independence Party under the leadership of Mihaly Karolyi would have been a prime target in this drive.

Mihaly Karolyi was one of the richest magnates in Hungary, with over 60,000 acres of land in his possession. His wealth was valued at twenty-five million Pounds. He first became active in politics in 1901, when at the age of twenty-six he made an ill-fated attempt to get into parliament on the Independence Party platform. His second attempt in 1905 brought success which led him to party leadership by 1913. [16.] Under his leadership, the Independence Party revived its drive for a personal union.

Tisza expected that the war would disarm opposition coming from the Independence Party, which could be reminded of the will of its dead apostle, Lajos Kossuth. Kossuth, at the time of the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish crisis in 1877, called on the Hungarians to support Austria in case of an Austro-Russian conflict. The self-exiled opponent of the Compromise had seen in a possible Russian victory the end of Hungary:

In case of such defeat, Hungary would be the stake at which the Austrian Eagle would be burned. [17.]

Time especially seemed opportune, as Mihaly Karolyi, at the invitation of the wealthy New York banker, the Hungarian-American Alexander Konta, was on a speaking tour in the United States. Karolyi's aim was to gather funds for his political platform, which aimed to reorient the Austro-Hungarian foreign policy from a pro-German to a pro-Entente position. [18.] In Karolyi's absence, the pro-German faction seemed to carry the Independence Party and welcomed the war with relief. As a member of the party's presidium, the former minister of education, Count Albert Apponyi endorsed with enthusiasm the declaration of war against Serbia with a resounding "at last," which seemed to indicate the birth of a Hungarian union sacree.

Tisza also expected to eliminate the crisis in Hungarian society by the new war. In a declaration, made to an editor who impressed upon him the extreme importance of the suffrage question, Tisza emphasized that after the war a new Biedermeier epoch (an allusion to the relatively peaceful, conservative 1830,s) would characterize the world and soldiers would be happy if, after their terrible sufferings, they could return to their work and their families. [19.] Thus, for Tisza the war became a cure for all the ills of Hungary.

If the war at its outbreak was considered as a vehicle for the salvation of the Dual Monarchy and, in its narrower context, for the survival of traditional Hungary, its course indicated that not one of Tisza's expectations bore the expected fruit. Instead, it sharpened existing internal conflicts. In respect to political unity, Hungary remained the only country among the belligerents where a party truce never materialized and a truly national government never took shape. [20.]

In the month of August, while all the parliamentary parties of the countries involved in the conflict surged to support their government, Hungary's two major parties were contesting for the glory of being solely responsible for the war. The opposition Independence Party claimed that it had pressured the indecisive Tisza to accept war. The Party of Work's case rested on its traditional support or military preparedness, while the opposition continually sabotaged the army hills of the Monarchy. If Tisza had not used force to break the obstructionist tactic of the opposition, a poorly furnished army would have faced the Russians and the Serbs. Opposition members grudgingly agreed with Tisza that, for the time being at least, they had history on their side. [21.]

Tisza's expectation of an end to the social crisis, however, remained a dream. The Social Democratic Party was in a good position to further dissatisfaction among the urban proletariat, as the Hungarian labor union movement was closely connected with the party. The Party, having no representatives in Parliament, unlike its sister parties in the Entente and Central camps, took no part in the decision to go to war. The party journal Nepszava, however, reflected mixed feeling at the very beginning. It was printing anti-war articles alongside those which supported the cause of the Central Powers in the "defense of culture against tsarist barbarism." [22.] As early as July 1915, the party's leadership called on the International Socialist Bureau to meet in order to restore peace among the national socialist parties. While the Hungarian Socialists did not participate at Zimmerwald, they approved its anti-war program. [23.] The September 25 lead article of Nepszava appraised the importance of the meeting in a positive fashion, though it criticized the way the meeting was called together. The party's new platform, which was adopted at the time of the Zimmerwald meeting, declared that it was the duty of the Socialists to start a strong peace movement. The call was justified by the exhaustion of the population.

In January 1916, two members of the party's presidium, Erno Garami and Mano Buchinger, left for Germany and for Holland in order to mediate differences. between the socialist parties of the Entente and the Central camps. The Hungarian socialists drafted a program of conciliation which included the re-establishment of Belgian independence, the creation of an independent Russian Poland, a plebiscite in Alsace-Lorraine, the re-establishment of independent Serbia and the rejection of its "economic annexation. [24.]

As early as 1915 major strikes for higher pay and suffrage took place the Budapest munition factories. As the continuing war meant more more deprivation and sacrifice , the situation became more explosive. The year 1917 witnessed a new high in work stoppages and general strikes. he miners walked out on most of the mines during the spring, followed r the railway workers. As a result of general labor unrest, the government as forced to permit the celebration of May Day, banned since the outbreak of the war. Over 100,000 workers participated in the Budapest demonstration. On May 2, a one-hour general work stoppage in the entire munitions industry took place. The strikers demanded higher pay and suffrage reforms.

On November 25, the victory of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia as celebrated at a Socialist-sponsored rally of 100,000 workers. One of the party leaders, Dezso Bokanyi, called on the workers to follow the Russian example and establish workers' and soldiers' councils. The success f limited socialist activism in general is best reflected in the rapid growth f labor union membership, which increased from 43,381 in 1915 to 215,222 by 1917. [25.]

The nationalities problem was not solved by the war either. Instead, have new impetus to ethnic leaders to press for hard bargains or to look for support for their policies from the Entente powers. The first major demand for change on behalf of the nationalities came from the enemy. Serbia defeated the Austro-Hungarian forces in the initial phase of the war. A greater Serbia which would include Croatia, the Banat, and Bacska seemed within reach. [26.] The Croatian Sobor, whose majority did not aspire to Serbian citizenship, produced a different utopia following the German-Austro-Hungarian victory over Serbia during the Spring of 1916. lt favored a greater Croatia including Bosnia and Herzegovina. this demand, which might have placated Croat nationalistic aspirations, was refused by Budapest. The Budapest government wanted nothing less than the outright annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovia by the Hungarian Crown. [27.]

In Bohemia, outstanding political leaders, such as Eduard Benes and Thomas Masaryk, chose exile in Entente countries and decided to give up the seemingly futile idea of rearranging the Monarchy into a partnership of the nationalities, thus becoming the champions of the creation of a new state of Austrian Czechs and Hungarian Slovaks.

The Great number of Rumanians in Transylvania were also beginning to stir and look toward the Rumanian Kingdom, which, until 1916, was undecided as to what course to follow. It was likely, however, that Rumania, like Italy in 19l5. would side with the highest bidder. The Hungarian Prime Minister, Count Tisza, was adamant in his refusal to concede territory to these fence-sitters and was afraid that even concessions of non-Hungarian lands to Italy would lead to Rumanian claims in Transylvania. [28.] Even following the entry of Italy on the side of the Allies, Tisza refused to grant some limited territorial concessions to Rumania as a price for her continuing neutrality. When in June 1915, there was some German pressure to appease Rumania, Tisza refused and lashed out at the Germans as he wrote to the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Baron Istvan :

It is appalling that the tragic role that was played by the poor Francis Ferdinand in playing the fools game with the Rumanians is now taken over by the Germans. [29.]

France and England entered the war against Austria-Hungary without aiming to destroy the Habsburg Monarchy and public opinion expected quick victories for Entente arms. It soon became evident, however, that in spite of the expansion of the war and in spite of the immense sacrifices of the soldiers at the front, the Central Powers were holding the initiative. Thus it became necessary for the embattled Entente to embrace high ideals justifying further bloodshed and sacrifices. Therefore, nothing was easier than to find sympathy for the nationalities of Eastern Europe who struggled for national self-determination at the very moment when the Entente powers were facing the possibility of losing their own as a result of their declining military fortunes. The immense cruelties of the war, the thousands of crippled and mutilated soldiers who returned from the fronts, and the hundreds of thousands who were never to return made war appear to be a struggle for national existence. By early 1916 it was evident that quick victory was but a chimera: the public became disposed to clamor for the destruction of the enemy who seemingly intended to do the same.

British government officials were first to entertain plans for the makeup of post-war Eastern and Central Europe. For this purpose they began to consider a major policy change. The old Palmerstonian concept of the desirability of a Habsburg-ruled Central Europe gave way to a policy which was to support the centrifugal forces of the Dual Monarchy. Thus, in the autumn of 1916. the Foreign, Office began to reshape British foreign policy and to recommend new guidelines for the future. The new project was drawn up in a confidential memorandum that began with the premise that England should "ensure that all the states of Europe, great or small, shall in the future be in the position to achieve their national freedom and security." [30.]

Similar changes were evident in France which, like England, entered the war without thinking of destroying the Dual Monarchy. France could hardly be imagined as a sincere champion for the non-Magyar nationalities when French revanchism was clamoring for the return of territories, by far more German than French in culture. The course of war, however, had its result. The government of Aristide Briand accepted the reorganization of Eastern Europe as early as February, 1916. [31.] The active participation of Czech volunteers on the side of France furthered the cause of those Bohemian exiles who championed the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. By early 1916, plans of the French military included the utilization of Czech legions organized in Serbia. Later on, in 1918, these troops took part in the fighting at Amiens and were instrumental in preventing the collapse of that front. [32.]

The 1916 Treaty of Bucharest represented the convergence of Allied aims in respect to post-war Hungary. It promised Rumania not only Transylvania, Bukovina, and the Banat, but also a wide band of the Hungarian lowlands almost up to Debrecen. In the hope of such extensive concessions, Rumania declared war on Austria-Hungary to assure the realization of her "national ideal." [33.] The January 1917 Inter-Allied Conference at Rome furthered the intention of the Allies to destroy the Dual Monarchy when it adopted a resolution calling for the "liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Romanians and of Czechoslovaks from foreign domination." [34.]

Only the Russian Monarchy championed the destruction of the Dual Empire and the "liberation" of its nationalities from the very beginning. After initial victories of the Russian armies in Galicia in August 19l4, Grand Duke Nicholas issued his manifesto to all "nations of Austria-Hungary," which appeared in nine languages and promised them "liberty and realization of national desires." [35.] On November 21, 1914, Tsar Nicholas outlined his view to the French ambassador Maurice Paleologue, explaining that the defeat of Austria-Hungary would mean the collapse of the Empire as the nationalities would want to reassess their relation with a defeated power. Nicholas`s vision in this respect was prophetic. What .Nicholas failed to foresee was the collapse of Tsarism in Russia in March 1917, followed by the Bolshevik Revolution in November. The Bolshevik government under the leadership of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin withdrew from the hostilities and was demanding an end to the war with no indemnities and annexations.

The loss of Russia as an ally was compensated by the entrance of the United States into the conflict on the side of the Allies. The exchange of a Russia in turmoil for a country with seemingly inexhaustible resources was a great gain, and for the first time there was definite hope that the military impasse would eventually be overcome by the reinvigorated Allies. For the first time, their military leaders were able to predict total victory by 1919. Yet the threat of Bolshevism at home and general war weariness forced these very same leaders to be on the military defensive and to look for a non-dictated peace that would end the war as soon as possible. The Fourteen Points of President Wilson, announced in January 1918, suggested the same intentions. Article Ten of this document did not speak of the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy as a war aim. It merely demanded that "the peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development." This declaration of war aims toward the Empire came hardly a month after the American break with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. President Wilson in his speech to Congress recommending a declaration of war claimed that such an act was necessary as the government of the Dual Monarchy had become separated from the people and had become the tool of Germany. From the speech it seemed to be evident that the aim of the United States was to force on Austria and Hungary a government which was responsive to the people:

We owe it, however to ourselves to say that we do not wish in any way to impair or to re-arrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is no affair of ours what they do with their own life, either industrially or politically. We do not propose or desire to dictate to them it any way. We only desire to see that their affairs are left in their own hands, in all matters great or small. [36.] It is clear, therefore, that the cessation of hostilities depended on a twofold Austro-Hungarian response: first of all. the creation of governments in Austria and in Hungary that responded to the popular will; secondly, governments which were able to steer clear of German influence. Wilson, like Lenin. formulated his view toward government in a Rousseauesque fashion and made it clear that there was a distinction between government and governed. He hinted that the guilt of war would be borne by those in government who instigated it, and not by the people.

The other major Western Allies were quick to respond to Wilson's war aims and their intentions toward the Austro-Hungarian government became milder. The wild claims of early 1917 gave way to Wilsonian ideals. Lloyd George, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, declared on January 5, 1918:

Similarly, though we agree with President Wilson that the break-up of Austria-Hungary is no part of our war aims, we feel that unless genuine self-government on true democratic principles is granted to those Austro-Hungarian nationalities who have long desired it, it is impossible to hope for a removal of those causes of unrest in that part of Europe which have so long threatened the general peace. [37.]

Stephen Pichon, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, accepted Lloyd George's program and the Fourteen Points which were promulgated on January 8. In a speech which was coupled with a seething attack on the "usurping,, Bolsheviks in Petrograd, he expressed his government's position in no uncertain terms:

Coming after those made by Mr. David Lloyd George these declarations give world wide character to our claims. [38.]

The demand for self-expression of the popular will was not limited to the Allies. In Hungary. the opposition in parliament continued to press for universal suffrage. In April 1917, outbursts in the Chamber of Deputies regained their violent character. Shouts of "long live universal, equal and secret voting-nothing shall be discussed here but the franchise" greeted the appearance of Tisza, forcing the Speaker to suspend the session. [39.]

May Day was observed with a demonstration for suffrage and peace. On the fifth anniversary of Bloody Thursday. the Karolyi Party, with the co-operation of the Radicals, the Social Democrats and two other smaller parties, established a united front to achieve universal suffrage. [40.] The war, which Tisza and his supporters conducted in the hope of preserving the ancien regime, did not seem to achieve its aim. The swelling tide of opposition forced King Charles to call on Tisza to introduce a suffrage reform bill. On May 23, rather than accept even the slightest extension of the vote, Tisza resigned as Prime Minister of Hungary.

The Bolshevik revolution in Russia reverberated in Hungary, and in January 1918 workers, strikes became widespread. In some factories workers, councils were formed in the fashion of the Soviets. The mere demand of political revolution through universal suffrage was not satisfactory to many by the time of the Lloyd George and Wilson manifestoes. With the rise of Bolshevism in Russia the workers began to pay more attention to socialism which seemed to promise political revolution with its thoroughgoing social changes.

Fear of revolutionary agitation forced Sandor Wekerle's Minister of Justice, Vilmos Vazsonyi, to introduce strict censorship over strike-reports in the journals. The papers were ordered to refrain from reporting strikes, riots or "similar movements either at home, or abroad, even in the enemy camp." [41.] Similarly, he threatened the use of force against Bolshevik movements:

. . .we shall prevent the seeds of Bolshevism from ever being sown in Hungary. This faith I do not tolerate: I will trample it under foot. [42.]

The fear of Bolshevism induced this influential statesman to oppose even the Brest-Litovsk negotiations which took place at the time, as he rejected any idea of negotiation with the Bolsheviks.

To ameliorate the internal situation, Vazsonyi was empowered to work out the details for a suffrage bill which passed the Budapest Parliament on June 18, 1918. The new law granted suffrage to male citizens over twenty-four who had proof of literacy and fulfilled a one year residency requirement. The right to vote was also limited by property or income qualifications. These prerequisites were waived for non-commissioned and commissioned officers and for soldiers decorated for valor. The new law increased the size of the electorate from 1,162,000 (6.9% of population) to 2,714,000. [43.] The Karolyi group derided the bill which fell far short of universal suffrage.

The nationalities problem did not fare better as a result of the war. The Congress of Oppressed Austro-Hungarian Nationalities met in Rome in April, 1918. There, representatives of several national committees in exile proclaimed the right of self-determination and denounced Austria and Hungary. It promised to mount a concerted attack aimed at the destruction of the Dual Monarchy. The emasculated version of the franchise reform could hardly enthuse the nationalities who were looking in the direction of those who promised them self-determination and sovereignty.

It thus seems that the two original war aims of the Hungarian leaders, the solution to the social problem and to the nationalities question had met with hopeless failure by April 1918. In terms of Magyar objectives the war was lost in the spring of 1918, even before the royal armies had laid down their weapons. It was an ironic twist that nothing could now be salvaged of the status quo without accepting the Fourteen Points in the international sphere, and without entrusting authority to the enemies of war at home. The latter choice clearly pointed to the selection of Count Mihaly Karolyi.

Peter Pastor: Hungary Between Wilson and Lenin...