From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award

The Czechoslovak government was ready to prepare a fourth plan in case the third plan did not work. The Prime Minister called the Sudeten German representatives for a meeting on 6 September to present them the fourth and final plan of the government, and initiate with them further negotiations. The same day Henlein went to Berchtesgaden and from there to Nurenberg for the party day of the National Socialists as the personal guest of Hitler.(46) For several days there was speculation concerning the contents of the fourth plan which included the following points: appointment of public servants and policemen according to the proportion of nationalities and placing them in the counties of their own nationality; new language law based on complete equality; state subsidies to the Sudeten region in the amount of 700 million Kc in form of a loan from France and Britain; autonomy for the nationalities in those

countries where they formed the majority; guarantees for the boundaries and the unity of the state; minorities departments in the central government which would control foreign affairs, finances and the army; protection of the citizens against denationalization; drafting of bills with the cooperation of the Sudeten German Party subject to the approval by Parliament.(47) The Sudeten Germans made their demands clear in the eight Karlsbad points, but Prague, instead of a definite plan, delayed its decision, testing tempers and causing diplomatic interventions. The western powers did not want to be involved in a conflict over the minority rights in Czechoslovakia. The negotiations were continued because of the presence of Lord Runciman. After the publication of the fourth plan, the reply of Hitler to the letter of Lord Runciman arrived in Prague and caused intensive diplomatic activity in Prague, London, Paris and Berlin. The contents of the letter were not disclosed but Hitler rejected the idea of armed intervention, and demanded further concessions from the Czech position which would correspond to an autonomy.(48) All parties continued the talks. On 3 September the British mission received Ignac Schulcz and George Csizmazia, representing the Hungarian Social Democratic group in the CSR. They explained to the mediators that they did not want to see the destruction of the republic. They had obtained important social benefits from the Czechs, such as suffrage, unemployment benefits and a democratic way of life. Their main difference with the United Hungarian Party was ideological but in certain questions, e.g. language of education, all the Hungarians of the CSR were unanimous regardless of party membership.(49)

After the publication of the fourth plan the Slovak autonomists expressed their displeasure with certain aspects of it, notably the division of Slovakia into administrative districts. Knowing the Slovak attitude, the Hungarian Social Democrats told the British that they would not like to be oppressed by the Slovak majority, if Slovakia were taken as a unit and given an autonomous legal status.(50) In their opinion the Hungarian minority question should be regulated by the central Parliament. The fears of the Hungarian Social Democrats were not unfounded. The city clerk in Pressburg issued a circular letter in which he prohibited the use of the Hungarian language in official contact with clients. Magyar taxpayers numbering 30,000 in Pressburg, the former capital city of Hungary (1541 1848), and the former coronation city of the kings of Hungary (156S1830), were forbidden to use their own language when they went on official business to the city hall. That circular letter was issued in those days when the Prague government made promises for the restoration of the language rights of the minorities. The city clerk was paid by the taxpayers but he was a member of the Slovenska Liga, the association spearheading the denationalization of the minority groups. The city clerk went too far in his intolerance by issuing an ordinance and threat of criminal proceedings against the disobedient employees of the city. Deputy

Esterhazy protested against that circular letter to Prime Minister Hodza. It was withdrawn, and the city clerk quickly went on vacation.(5l) The remarks of the Magyar Social Democrats to the British mission were justified in connection with the wish of the Slovak Populist Party relating to the planned cantonal administration of Slovakia.

The Italian embassy in Budapest reported to Rome its frequent conversations with Esterhazy of the United Hungarian Party in the CSR who made numerous trips to Hungary, Poland, Germany and later to Italy. According to Esterhazy's observations, the situation in the CSR reached, on 29 August, alarming proportions because of the hostile demonstrations in Prague against the Runciman mission which found itself in a difficult position.(52) The same day the Italian counsul in Pressburg noted that the ship on which Regent Horthy returned to Budapest on the Danube passed by Pressburg at 8:00 a.m. Thousands of Hungarians were waiting for him from the early morning hours on the banks of the river. When the steamer reached the city the onlookers waved their hands and waved their handkerchiefs. The Regent, surrounded by his retinue on the deck, responded with several military salutes. Extraordinary measures were taken on the Czechoslovak shore (about 130 km) to keep the population of the nearby villages away from the river. The Czechoslovak authorities wanted to prevent pro-revisionist demonstrations among the Hungarian minority living in that area.(53)

The Slovaks, as the supposed ruling nation, for twenty years had been demanding autonomy for Slovakia. The British embassy in Prague prepared a memorandum for the Foreign Office on the position of the Slovaks in the CSR. The main complaint of the Slovaks was that the Czechs had been tactlss to them, treating them as an inferior race but their grievances included political, economic, cultural and personal questions.(54) The Czechs followed a shortsighted policy towards the Slovaks. Slovak activists, who belonged to a minority among the Slovaks, were used by the Czechs to serve the interests of Czech imperialism in Czechoslovak colours. The majority of the Slovaks lived under the influence of the anti-Czech clergy. The Slovaks also wanted to have an appointment with the Runciman mission to air their grievances. Two Slovak political parties sought interviews with Lord Runciman: the Slovak Populist Party, represented by its Vice President, Josef Tiso, and the Slovak National Party, represented by president designate, Jan PaulinyT6th. According to the remarks of this latter politician, it was necessary to make the Czechs understand that the Slovak problem could be settled without shaking the unity and safety of the state.(55) He was received on 18 August by the British mission, and explained that the Slovak question should be settled independently from the concessions made to the Sudeten Germans. The problem between the Slovaks and Czechs could be solved if the Provincial Diet, and a proposed government for Slovakia, were to be given authority to

make appointments in the civil service, to sign state contracts and have their own budget. The representation of Slovakia in the Czechoslovak Parliament in Prague should be increased from 70 to 88. The Czechs were against the increase of Slovak influence for fear that it might contribute to a possible disintegration of the CSR.(56)

The autonomist Slovak Populist Party sent a letter to Lord Runciman and asked for an audience in order to inform him of the existence of the Slovak question and the necessity of its settlement. The British Foreigh Office had been sufficiently briefed on the Czech and Slovak relations, and the causes of the quarrels and discord among them. It was noted by the Slovak Populist Party that it had won 20 seats out of the 59 Slovak mandates, and was struggling with the Czechs for the equality of rights, for the national, cultural, political and economic development ofthe Slovak people.(57) The British delegation declined the request of the Slovak Populist Party, because Lord Runciman was invited to the CSR by the government in agreement with the Sudeten German Party to assist bringing about a settlement in the difficulties between them. The British mediator was unwilling to undertake any kind of intervention between the Czechs and the Slovaks without the approval of the Czechoslovak government. During the interval of the exchanges of these two letters, the fourth plan of the Czechoslovak government was published, and the Slovaks were opposed to the cantonal system which, in their opinion, would have shared the administration of Slovakia with the Hungarian and German minorities. They wanted to rule Slovakia as the Czechs ruled Czechoslovakia. Although the Slovak autonomists were not received by the British delegation, they, nevertheless, submitted the problems of the Slovak nation in a thirteen-page memorandum.(58) Hlinka's Slovak Populist Party thought if the Sudeten Germans deserved autonomy, the Slovaks were equally worthy of it. Tiso sent a confidential memorandum to Lord Runciman in which he did not hesitate to present the Slovaks as a national minority. The Hlinka Party felt the the Slovaks were in a worse situation than any other minority which enjoyed the support of bordering states. Tiso referred to the Czech fiction of a "Czechoslovak nation,, as nonexistent, and said such a nation, just as a Russian-Polish, CzechPolish, or French-Italian nation, did not exist. The origin of the Czechoslovak fiction is the Pittsburgh covenant which is the basis of the close association of the Czechs and Slovaks under the same laws. It resulted in the invasion of Slovakia's administration and cultural, spiritual and economic life by the Czechs. Tiso was against the subdivision of Slovakia into cantons because in some of them the Magyar population could have absolute majority.(59) Concurrently the Slovak Populist Party participated in meetings with the other nationalities and they formed with them a common autonomist front against the Czechs.

The supporters of the Ruthenians abroad also reminded the British delegation in Prague that the Czechoslovak government

had not yet kept its promises of autonomy for Ruthenia enunciated in the treaty of Saint-Germain. They indicated that London had some moral responsibility in the fulfillment of that obligation as one of the co-signatories of that treaty.(60) The Runciman mission was advised from Rome that the secretary-general of the CarpathoRussian Union of North America was on his way to Prague with a letter from Hodza on him to the effect that, if pressure was exerted on the Czechoslovak government by the British or French it would make it easier for Prague to grant self-government for Ruthenia.(6l) Autonomy did not cover the fullest degree of independence. The Ruthenians wanted to become masters of their own territory as the Sudeten Germans, Slovaks, Hungarians and Poles wanted to see their own people elected to offices and not be administered by the Czechs. In 1938, the Ruthenians were not waiting any longer for a move from Prague. On September 1, the representatives of the Republican Party in Carpathian Russia, Senator Badinsky and Mayor Bukovic, and Brody, representing the Autonomous Union, visited Hodza and declared that the two parties concluded an agreement and demanded autonomy in accordance with the treaty of Saint-Germain, and early elections to the Ruthenian Diet(.6)2.

Some grievances of the minorities reached Lord Runciman directly. The Hungarians of Leva (Levice), who formed the majority of the population, asked the government, in vain, to re-open the Hungarian high school taken away from them in 1918. They offered classrooms and the expenses for furnishing the school but permission for the opening of a high school was not forthcoming from the Czechoslovak authorities. This negligence prompted the Magyars in Leva to send a memorandum to Lord Runciman with the request of intervention on their behalf at the Prague government.(63)

The delegations and representatives charged with the negotiations of the nationality rights suspended their work because of the fatal incidents in Mahrisch Ostrau (Moravska Ostrava) between the Sudeten Germans and the Czech police. Lord Runciman invited Esterhazy to his office and told him that he would be willing to make some arrangements in the Mahrisch Ostrau incident if it was the wish of the Sudeten Germans. It was his impression that the remaining differences were bridgeable, and asked Esterhazy to warn Frank, Vice-Chairman of the Sudeten German Party, about the dangers of interrupting negotiations. This would mean war, misery and communism(64) Frank met Runciman the same day, September 8, and asked for the acceptance of the Karlsbad points.

In the Prague Parliament, the autonomists formed a common front. A press release was issued at the end of the conference. Under the presidency of K.H. Frank, the Political Comittee of the Sudeten German Party held a joint meeting with the Slovak Populist Party, the United Hungarian Party and the Committee of the Polish Union. It was pointed out that in the basic principles for the urgently needed reorganization of the state, and in the opinions concerning the regulation of the nationality question there was

complete unanimity. It was decided that joint meetings would be repeated according to needs.(65) The autonomists were convinced that their demands could only be fulfilled with their complete cooperation for the transformation of the CSR into a federal state.

Those days required serious deliberation on the part of the leaders of the republic. President Benes spoke to the citizens of the CSR on September 10. For twenty years--according to him--the republic had been a prosperous and tranquil state but the grave problems needed new methods for solution. He intended to settle them but the rapidity of world events demanded a faster tempo. He did not deviate from the old principles of the state but wanted to reach a degree of political justice which could be realized. In this spirit negotiations were started with all the nationalities, first with the Sudeten Germans. Reform plans had been published which assured free political, cultural and economic activities, and national rights for all the nations and nationalities of the state according to their numerical strength. The government was ready to make a sacrifice for the peace, and wanted to establish good relations with the strongest neighbour of the CSR, Germany. A new climate was needed at home, a new understanding, a moderation of the press on all sides. These things could bring the much needed confidence to the peaceful task.(66) Benes spoke prior to the congress of the National Socialist Party in Nurenberg, and of Hitler' s sharp attack and treats on Czechoslovakia.

Slovak, the official paper of the Hlinka Party, in its editorial entitled "Our patience is also running out", reminded Benes that in 1935 the Slovak Populist Party voted for him in the presidential election. Then the Czech press praised the political wisdom and maturity of the Slovaks. There were long, open and honest discussions with the new head of state on the Slovak question but without any results. He was warned verbally, in the press, in memoranda and in requests that everything was not in a satisfactory condition in Slovakia. As loyal citizens, the Slovaks used all possible means to induce the authorities to make the necessary steps for constitutional changes. Sometimes they received answers for their requests, other times they did not. The time for the fulfillment of demands of all nationalities living in the republic had arrived. The title of the Slovaks, as a ruling nation, was attractive. No one could live on empty titles. The Slovaks wanted their rights, liberty, employment, bread, existence, with one word: future. They did not believe in promises any longer. It was said that the Czechs went to the limits of their concessions. The twenty-year patience of the Slovaks reached the ultimate limits of human patience.(67) Five days later Benes invited four representatives of the Hlinka Party for lunch. According to the press release, during the friendly conversation the Slovak deputies handed the President a memorandum containing the urgent demands of the party(68)

Three members of the Runciman mission tried to find Henlein in his home at Asch (As) --a four-hour auto trip from Prague-- upon

his return from Nuremberg. A meeting was arranged between the Sudeten German leader and the British mission on September 15 before noon. Two days earlier the government proclaimed martial law in eleven counties. Henlein informed the Runciman mission that he declared the Sudeten German negotiating team dissolved in view of events of the preceeding 48 hours. In his opinion the conditions for the continuation of the negotiations ceased to exist in conformity with the original instructions. Henlein thanked the British mission for their kind efforts to solve the nationality problems. The news reached Prague late at night, and there was a meeting of the government held immediately upon the receipt of the news.(69)

A very interesting disclosure of facts was brought to the attention of the British delegation in Prague. Deputy Neuwirth, the legal counsel of the Sudeten German delegation revealed after the dissolution of the party, that on the Czech side the real power was in the hands of the army and the extremists, and Hodza was deprived of his authority. The Germans were in favour (95%) of union with Germany, and Henlein could not convince his followers to remain in the CSR. Only a quarter of the Sudeten Germans constituted the revolutionary element which was responsible for the current turning point, the majority were apprehensive of war. In his view the chief advantage of the plebiscite would be that it would transfer the whole question to another plane from that with which Hitler's Nuremberg speech had dealt.(70)

There was an hour-long Czech radio transmission from Vienna every day, and a Prague radio replied in German in polemic language. The British embassy in Berlin warned the Foreign Office of the ominous tone of the German press which depicted the sufferings of the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia. They were in reality defenceless against the Czech police, soldiery and communist mob. Under those conditions Germany should not have been blamed for supporting the cause of persecuted Germans.(7l) The Czechoslovak government dissolved the Sudeten German Party and all its organizations, and the police occupied the offices of the party, confiscated the correspondence and other documents found therein. Court action was ordered against Henlein for the attempt to violate the territorial integrity of the state.(72) Similar actions had been taken against other organizations. The dissolution of the party was the result of Henlein's demand of September 15 for the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany.(73) After those events it was wholly out of the question for the Sudeten Germans to remain within the CSR. One month earlier, there was a near breakdown in the negotiations after the Brux incidents on August 16 and 17. On September 15, after long and arduous work, Lord Runciman returned to London to give a report to the cabinet. (Appendix 8.) He went to Czechoslovakia as a mediator between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans, and almost became a mediator between the CSR and Germany. The last proposal of the Sudeten German Party was the inclusion of the Sudeten areas in the Reich.(74) On September 21,

Lord Runciman considered that there was nothing further for the members of his mission to do in Prague, and suggested their return to England.(75)

The Failure of British Mediation and Its Aftermath

After the rupture of talks between the government and the Sudeten German Party, the internal problems of Czechoslovakia were transformed into an acute international affair. The Hungarian minority also needed external help for obtaining their constitutional rights in the CSR. That assistance could come first of all from the Hungarian nation and to a lesser degree from friendly governments. The Magyars could consider Mussolini as the most powerful supporter of Hungarian claims. The Italian Prime Minister decided to influence the protracted negotiations in Prague by writing an open letter to Lord Runciman. His suggestions were published before Chamberlain's visit with Hitler. His newspaper article was published in all German papers. In Rome the press reported that Chamberlain had a telephone conversation from Berchtesgaden with the Duce, about a four-power conference-- Britain, France, Germany and Italy--to examine the Czechoslovak question and other European problems.(76)

On September 15, 1938, when an article entitled "Letter to Runciman" appeared in the Popolo d'Italia, Mussolini's Milan paper, it was not known that on the same day Runciman decided to break off his mediating role in Prague between the Czechoslovak government and the Sudeten German Party. The article was not signed but it was thought to have been written by the Duce. It claimed that some weeks earlier the world had no clear idea what Lord Runciman would do in Prague. Was his work only one of mediation or had it, at a certain moment, become one of arbitration? Lord Runciman had read dozens of memoranda and hundreds of letters, received dozens of people and conferred with the leaders of all concerned nationalities, for there was also a Magyar, a Polish, a Slovak problem, not only a Sudeten German problem. There were as many problems as nationalities which burdened the Czechoslovak republic at Versailles. The writer of the article assumed that Lord Runciman had reached the conclusion that a Czechoslovak nation did not exist. The components of Czechoslovakia were of diverse races and could not bear one another. They were animated by a centrifugal force and only a police force kept them together. The treaty of Versailles did not restore the historical Bohemia but it created a new and artifical state which from its birth contained in itself the elements of its own dissolution. The writer of the article believed that Lord Runciman had seen the situation in those terms, and should have simply proposed the plebiscite to Benes not only for the Sudeten Germans but for all the nationalities which asked for it. He wished courage to the British Lord to propose plebiscites under international supervision. With such a bold move,

the hotbed of disorder and anxiety in Europe could be eliminated. It was practically impossible for Italy to pursue a policy with Czechoslovakia; it would be possible with a Bohemia of tomorrow.(77)

A Polish newspaper, Gazeta Polska, reviewed an article written in a French weekly Gringoire. It represented one of the groups around the former Prime Minister Tardieu. Months before the British mediation, already on April 22, an article was published in the French paper entitled "Whether France is obliged to Fight for the Czechs." It described the activities of those French who wanted to drag France to the defence of the Czechoslovak goverment. The analysis of the author concluded that a Czechoslovak nation did not exist, and Czechoslovakia was an artificial political creation without a possibility for life, development and defence. It was a state of Czechs, Slovaks, Germans, Ruthenians, Hungarians and Poles. The international situation of the CSR was tragic if she could not even count on the help of France or the USSR. In spite of a seemingly democratic CSR, there was a rule of a most autocratic small group of people. The sympathy of the French leftists for the CSR was based on the links binding together the French and Czech influential politicians with Benes at their helm who governed the republic in a dictatorial way. Benes committed many political errors one after the other over the preceding twenty years. He hindered the restoration of the Habsburgs, blocked the shipment of ammunitions directed to Poland in 1920. He had much influence in the French Foreign Ministry and the press. Similarly, he was the patron of the pactomania which took France in the general direction in which she found herself. The article of the Gringozre, which was read by about 600,000 people, was not an isolated phenomenon in the French press, according to the summary of the Gazeta Polska.(78)

Mussolini again made comments about Czechoslovakia in his speech at Triest on September 18. London and Paris had been informed that Italy had resolved that the Czech problem should be settled entirely and definitively. France and Britain should not remain indifferent to the voice of the German and other nationalities in the CSR or to the urgency of a decision. The situation needed plebiscites and swift action. Only plebiscites could satisfy the nationalities and the territorial usurpation of Czechoslovakia since the treaty of Versailles. The historical friendship towards the Hungarians and Poles dictated the policy of the Rome-Berlin axis he said--but a European responsibility demanded a total solution of the Czechoslovak problem. It has been proven that the Czechoslovak state was not a durable creation.(79) On September 21, Mussolini touched again the Czechoslovak problem in another pronouncement in Treviso. The CSR lived through very critical moments. It would be better to call that state Czecho-Polono-HungaroRutheno-Rumano-Slovakia. He urged the solution of the Czechoslovak political question initiated by the British Prime Minister, and to bring the small country in a peaceful port.(80) Three days later

in Padova (Padua), Mussolini once more mentioned the Czechoslovak difficulties. The new Prime Minister, General Syrovy, was a great friend of Moscow, and his first act was to order the general mobilization of the army. The German answer was to allow Prague six days, until October 1, to reach a decision. It would be the greatest absurdity for millions of people to die to save the rule of Benes. Mussolini wanted to call the attention to the responsibilities of Prague while there was time to localize the conflict and find a peaceful solution.(8l) The following day, on September 25, Mussolini commented in Vicenza on the mistakes committed in 1919 at the conclusion of the peace treaties. Their untenability was proven already in 1921. It is human to make errors but to maintain them is diabolic. It would be the most tragic paradox of mankind to go to war for the CSR and preserve a mistake for a longer period of time.(82) Mussolini continued his series of attacks on the CSR in the course of which he recognized and appreciated the efforts of the British Prime Minister in order to provide a solution to the Czechsolovak problem. On September 26 at Verona he equally praised the patience of Germany shown in this question. It was evident that the Czechs must come to their senses, and not engage in a conflit, the outcome of which could not be doubtful. The triple problem, German, Hungarian and Polish, required a thorough solution according to the forces of history. Benes and the Czech people should have been aware that only a few days were left for a pacific settlement of the controversy. Europe certainly did not need a number of charnel houses on the frontiers of different countries. There should have been an extraordinarily rapid succession of events in granting justice to the minorities in the CSR and reconciliation among peoples. It would be useless to try to save the Europe of Versailles which was constructed in defiance of geography and history. Italy was not for that Europe(.83)

The visit of the British Prime Minister in Germany opened a whole series of international activities. In Roman political circles it was considered as a probability that the representatives of Britain, France, Germany and Italy would hold an international conference to discuss important European questions.(84) This news was the forerunner of the convocation of the Munich conference later that month. This idea had emerged more than three months earlier. The French ambassador in Berlin mentioned this to the British ambassador in Paris already on June 8, as a personal suggestion intended for Hitler.(85)

The Hungarian government intensified its activity in connection with the solution of the problems its nationals faced in the CSR. The August state visit of Horthy to Germany left a strain on GermanHungarian relations because Hungary did not want to support the hard and dangerous German political and perhaps military course. The expected support from the British government for the equality of rights for the Hungarian minority in the CSR did not materialize. According to British interpretation, the determination of the rights

given to the Hungarian nationals in the CSR was the task of the negotiations between the two interested states. The British government intervened in Prague on behalf of the Polish minority, which numbered about one tenth of the Hungarian minority, asking the Prague government to give formal assurances to Poland for granting the same rights to the Poles in the CSR as to the Sudeten Germans. The British failed to extend their mediation efforts in favour of the Hungarians. (86) The British ambassador in Prague told Esterhazy that the Hungarians would get much less than the Poles, and Lord Runciman's task was only the study of the German problem.87

The Polish ambassador in London reported that during the discussion of the Czechoslovak crisis with the British Foreign Secretary, the views of London were expressed that the treaties could be changed by three methods: by negotiations, by the threat of force, or by the use of force.(88) The Polish and Hungarian ambassadors in London informed each other of the territorial demands of their governments from the CSR. Hungary wanted to regain that territory from the CSR where Hungarians formed more than 50% of the population, and suggested a plebiscite for the mixed regions, and for the Slovaks and Ruthenians. The map published by the naval intelligence service confirmed the correctness of the ethnographic maps made in Hungary. The British government had understanding for the Polish demand of the Trans-Olza part of Silesia but expressed its hope that Poland would not do anything in the existing delicate situation that could increase the general crisis.(89) The unofficial judgment of the French government was that it would be better to apply the plebiscite for the Polish minority in the Teschen (Tesin) area. With it, the French wanted to prevent the takeover of Polish Silesia by Germany. Ten days later France persuaded Britain to allow the whole portion of Teschen-Silesia to come under Polish rule.(90) After the Munich conference, the Poles residing in Paris supplied this information for the occupation of that territory after 24 hours notice to Prague. The Polish ambassador told Bonnet that Poland had many complaints against France. In 1919 France intervened in the decision concerning the future of Silesia, and the administration of the district of Wilno. Later, France signed a treaty of non-aggression with Germany and Soviet Russia, and interfered with the evolution of Poland's relations with Lithuania. Benes had to be persuaded to stop dreaming that the Czechs were the representatives of the fiction of Pan-Slavism, which led them to their present catastrophe.(9l)

Although the Hungarian government lost the confidence of Hitler and Ribbentrop, who almost told them in August, 1938, that they must choose between Kiel or Bled in their revisionist claims, between the backing of Germany or cooperation with the Little Entente, Budapest was forced to adhere to Germany for the successful conclusion of the Magyar policy for regaining the territories and nationals lost to the CSR in 1918. Kanya declared on

September 1, that Hungary would maintain her claims against the CSR, and five days later Prime Minister Imredy, in his speech at Kaposvar, dealt with the problem of Hungarian nationals in the CSR whose treatment was an obstacle in the normalization of relations between the two countries.(92)

Upon the return of Chamberlain from Berchtesgaden, there were meetings of crucial importance for the Sudeten problem between Chamberlain, Halifax, Daladier and Bonnet. It was easier for the French to let Britain pressure Prague than to take the initiative in Paris. Joint British and French recommendations were expected in Prague in the sense that in case of surrendering the Sudeten district to Germany the four powers would guarantee the frontiers of the new Czechoslovak state.(93)

The German secret service intercepted several telephone conversations between September 14 and 28, 1938 which took place between Benes in Prague and his ambassadors in Paris and London. Jan Masaryk in London was told that the CSR was not ready to carry out the Anglo-French plan. Benes gave instructions to Masaryk in London and Osusky in Paris to get in touch with the opposition in both countries and negotiate with them the overthrow of the British and French governments.(94)

From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award