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CHAPTER VI
PREPARATIONS ON THE HUNGARIAN SIDE.OTTOMAN ADVANCE

Hungarian Reconnaissance and Assessment of Ottoman Intentions

Thanks to its efficient reconnaissance, [362] the Hungarian government was able to monitor Ottoman preparations from the autumn of1525 on. The court received reports on Ottoman preparations andmovements through diplomatic channels; reports from Ragusa wereespecially valuable according to Brodarics and Burgio; Tomori kept"many spies" and received important information from deserters aswell. We have specific data regarding the intelligence service operated by Szapolyai; the surviving municipal accounts of the city ofNagyszeben contain many entries, such as: "Knez Demeter was sentto Wallachia, along with an assistant, to obtain news about the routeselected by the Ottomans. Expense: 4 florins."[363]

As for Burgio's information on the Ottomans, one must be careful,for much of it is mere kitchen gossip. For instance, it is hard tobelieve that as late as the fall of 1525 the Ottoman leaders wouldstill not know which route to choose for an attack on Hungary. InJanuary 1526 Burgio wrote: the voivode of the Serbs, Pavel Bakic,who deserted from the Ottoman side, informed Tomori that it wasdecided during one of the divans of the Sultan to march against Budathrough Transylvania because "they could easily enlist 60,000 menalong the way." The following day, however, "a Serbian", summonedto the divan, talked the Ottomans out of this plan, proposing theroute through Belgrade. [364] Either Bakic was telling a tall tale--whichis unlikely--or Burgio's fantasy constructed the whole affair frombits and pieces of news that reached him. It is altogether inconceivable that the participants at a most secret military meeting should divulge its proceedings, or that Sultan Suleyman would ask foradvice from just anyone who happened to drop by. Moreover, as wehave seen, the Ottoman leaders had been aware of the advantages ofthe Belgrade route even in the fifteenth century.

No matter how well Hungarian reconnaissance functioned. itcould not possibly have uncovered every detail of the Ottoman planof attack. Thus the government could not have known whether theattack would be directed against Hungary only or against Croatiaand Transylvania as well. This would become clear only once theentire Ottoman force had reached Belgrade. But it may be presumedthat the Ottoman leaders did disseminate false news to mislead theenemy. This would explain why, towards the end of March 1526.Louis II wrote to Batthyany to remain in his place with his troopsand prepare the defense of these provinces. As late as June Szapolyai still felt that Transylvania was threatened. [365] Only about themiddle of July did the king appeal to Batthyany and Szapolyai tohurry to central Hungary with their forces. [366] It can be assumed,therefore, that only then did the Ottoman intentions become clear.By that time the entire Ottoman army had reached Belgrade.

Peace Plans, the Financial Situation, and Preparations

Familiar with the international situation and the relationship offorces, the court as well as Tomori and some of the magnates sawclearly that Hungary was bound to lose the war. But the shortsighted lesser nobility were not aware of this. According to Burgio'sreport of February 2 the court continued to discuss the issue of peace,and even sent an emissary to the king of Poland: "I think he was sentabout the issue of peace; though nothing can be decided without thediet, they [the estates] still try to prepare the letter of credence forthe ambassador and other matters needed for negotiations; if onlythey could manage to convince the people about the need for peace." [367]Of course, "people" refers here to the lesser nobility.

At the beginning of March Burgio reported that Tomori had beennegotiating with Chaus Behram, the Turkish envoy retained in Budasince 1524. Tomori told Behram that he may regain his freedom if he does something to deserve it. And he made Behram write a letter to the Turkish court to the effect that the king was offering peace or at least armistice to the sultan, and added that the Hungarians expected a reply within three weeks. King Louis does not dare send an emissary to Turkey now and for good reason: this is why they arc attempting to initiate negotiations through the intermediary of the Polish king and of chavush Behram." [368]

The following excerpt from Burgio's report dates from much later,from July 31:

Archbishop Tomori attempts to persuade the king In secret, through the intermediary of the bishop of Bosnia to send an emissary to the sultan and ask for peace, even at the price of paying tribute if nothing else will do.... While the aristocrats would readily accept such a proposal, they dare not say so out loud because not all are assembled as yet [i.e., at this time mobilization was still proceeding and the armies were advancing towards Tolna--G.P.], and they are afraid of the nobility." [369]

Regarding the Ottoman reception of the peace feelers Tomorimakes some interesting remarks. In his letter to the king dated June25 we read: the Ottoman leaders have announced that the Hungarians "intend send an annual sum of 10,000 marks to Imperial Majesty [Suleyman], and all the people [i.e., the troops] rejoiced; but theemperor will not accept." [370] The Ottoman leaders seem to have knowna thing or two about the psychology of the soldier. They probablymade a public announcement of Louis' offer of peace in order tobolster the self-confidence of the troops: the enemy is afraid of war;therefore he must be weak.

Considering the relation of forces, the chaotic internal conditions,and the severe lack of funds, one not only understands the government's inclination to sue for peace, but also cannot help but approveof it. The only thing one cannot approve of was that Hungary optedfor peace when there was no chance of its being granted and turneddown peace when it was actually offered.

The sources of financial aid were drying up to the point where thelack of funds was becoming increasingly oppressive. In mid-MarchBurgio reported that he had no more than 30,000 gold pieces left. [371]If all went well this money was enough to hire 5,000 mercenaries forthree months. They could expect more funds from three sources only:the war tax, which required a decision by the diet; further donations by the pope; and the sequestration of church treasures, which alsorequired the permission of the pope.

The Consistory at the Vatican agreed to grant further aid onMarch 26. Disbursement, however, was very cumbersome: the sumreached Vienna only at the beginning of June, and Burgio had it inhis hands in the middle of the month. The pope's permission to makeuse of the church treasures arrived at the same time--too late, sincethere was no time left for minting money out of the treasures. [372]

The court tried everything to obtain aid from foreign powers. Itsent desperate letters depicting in dramatic tones the great dangersthreatening the country. Some are worth quoting. In his letter ofMarch 25 to Venice, Louis II wrote, for the first time, that he felt itwas unnecessary to give details regarding the disproportion offorces, for the Signoria must be well aware of it. He continued: "Weyearned for peace among the [Christian] rulers and a concertedcampaign [against the Ottomans], for this would have been our onlysalvation." But it seems only God can help us now, because thedanger is imminent and, "weakened and exhausted by so manyyears of strife, we do not feel strong enough to resist...." Therefore,he urgently requested money, so that he could at least hire somesoldiers. [373] Another letter to Venice, dated June 21, reflected complete despair: "The Emperor of the Turks himself is but three or fourdays, march away from Belgrade. He is coming against us and ourcountry with all his might...which our very depleted forces cannotmatch." [374]

As already mentioned, the Ottoman diplomats prepared the campaign so adeptly that Hungary, completely isolated, could turn to noone for help. Brodarics discusses the attitude of the king of Poland inthis connection:

With King Sigismund of Poland a kinsman of the king, things were different, since he went as far as to sign a treaty of alliance with the Turks not long ago to parry the danger threatening his country. He was unable to obtain peace by any other means, given the dissension that prevailed among the Christian rulers. It seemed, therefore, that this brave prince, who had always kept his word, would not offer any help against a ruler allied to him.''[375]

Brodarics implies that Sigismund had acted wisely in requesting peace from the Ottomans; however, he keeps silent about the factthat he himself had implored from Rome over many years the king ofPoland to persuade King Louis to do likewise. By neglecting tomention any attempt at Hungarian-Ottoman peace negotiations,Bodarics was in fact the initiator of the "Mohacs complex."

Unfortunately we have no reliable information on the ceaselessdiscussions at court on what to do. Burgio's reports are obviouslybased on incomplete information, and Brodarics did not write aboutthese negotiations, for he was ill at the time.

Burgio took part in some of the meetings. He wrote his firstpertinent report on March 5 relating that he had read out the pope'sbrief in which he enjoined Charles V to come to the aid of Hungary:"everyone was moved by it, no eyes remained dry." [376] The pope,however, was perfectly aware that there was no chance to turn theemperor away from his ambition to become the leader of a worldpower and to move him to come to Hungary's rescue. According to Burgio, at this meeting of the council it was decidedto send the banderia to the frontiers on April 24. It is hard to see,however, what possible military advantage could have been derivedfrom such a move, whereas the dangers it entailed are obvious: thetroops dispatched would have consumed the little money which wasat the country's disposal, and when the Ottomans launched theirgreat attack there would be nothing left to pay the troops. Indeed,the banderia did not get sent down, perhaps because of the irresponsibility and disobedience of the magnates; it is also possible, however, that the whole project was but a feint, since the Hungarians had to give evidence of some activity in order to make Burgio open up his purse.

In his report of March 27 Burgio provides an account of a meetingof the governing council. At that occasion it was allegedly decidedthat only half of the banderia would be dispatched to the frontier andone-tenth of the peasants would be armed and held in readiness.Some lords also proposed that the diet meet near the frontier, atSzeged or Pecs, and that the nobility come equipped to fight "withprovisions and all the necessary material." It is a pity that Burgiodid not specify which "lords" made this proposal, [377] for it is hard tobelieve that anyone actually entertained such an idea. While thedispatch of the banderia is doubtful, Burgio's report regarding the nobility is unbelievable. Such a project would have implied that thenobility stayed under arms from spring to fall, at a time when evenattending the diet was an enormous burden for many. This is indicated by a decision of 1526: "Because diets are being held continuously, the poorer nobility is at such expense that many, in order tomeet the costs, have had to pawn their cattle and have turnedcompletely into peasants; therefore, let it be decreed that from nowon the diet will meet only when absolutely necessary." [378] Burgioregretted that the king rejected the proposal, since he was all infavor of it. Louis insisted that the diet be held at Buda and wasapparently supported, wisely, by some "other lords".Burgio talks about many other thing as well: about endless debates during council meetings, mutual recriminations, indecisiveness, lack of a sense of responsibility, and so forth. Hungarianhistorians have made abundant use of this information to demonstrate to what extent the fate of the country was in the hands ofutterly corrupt, irresponsible, ignorant, and base creatures. It wouldbe difficult to prove the contrary, for lack of pertinent sources, nor isit my intention to present the generation of Mohacs as an assemblyof knights with shining armor. But even if the eminencies were allangels, there was--as already discussed several times--no way theycould have saved the country. Let us now turn to the military decisions of the diet of April 24.One of the most important decrees regulated the duties of thetreasurer: his task was to take immediate care of the pay for thegarrisons in the frontier fortifications, to secure funds for it from theroyal revenues or, if necessary, from taxes; to equip the royal banderium and cover the expenses of its maintenance; to procure,through his agents, the military equipment needed for war--gunpowder, cannonballs, ships, etc. The diet obliged the magnatesand prelates to provide soldiery in excess of what the law prescribed.As to the peasants, it ordered that they report for duty at the rate of20% rather than the usual rate of 3-10%. In fact, in case of extremenecessity the law even provided the mechanism for calling all peasants to arms. The estates decided that those landed nobles who were not compelled to present banderia contribute, nevertheless, financially tothe contracting of soldiers in their respective provinces. The diet alsoprescribed a census of the population of arms-bearing age and required the administrative organs to send the eventually mobilized units to the points of assembly under the command of competentcaptains. It also adopted provisions for a military council to functionalongside the king and for the selection of a conmmander-in-chief. [379]

All these measures were useful, well thought-out, and appropriate; one cannot claim that in this extreme situation the estatesagreed to half-measures. The trouble was that all the good will in theworld could not compensate for the host of accumulated troubles. Atany rate, Burgio's report on the diet sounds a gross exaggerationwhen it states that the estates "are not aware of what they areconfronted with, or how to defend the country, and it does not evenoccur to them to deal with the issues." [380] He must have been onceagain in a bad mood when he wrote this report, because a week laterhe saw the situation in an altogether different light: "His Majestyand the royal council have finally decided that they will go to war;not only did they decide, but they are determined to go no matterwhat. As far as I can understand, I am convinced that they will fightwith great enthusiasm and the best equipment they can come upwith." [381]

The court decreed mobilization around June 1(), adding that theunits should assemble at Tolna on July 2. As already mentioned,Hungarian historical research has not yet investigated the system ofmobilization of the Jagellonian period; hence we cannot know how itwas carried out in 1526. On several occasions Burgio commends thenobility for its great enthusiasm and vitality. Let us quote a few suchinstances because, while Hungarian historians are busy repeatinghis negative assessments, they are more bashful when it came topraise. On June 24 he reported:

Here everyone is working on the defence of the country, striving to theutmost; but all projects encounter great obstacles and make but slowprogress for lack of funds.... The only thing that comforts me somewhatis that all Hungarians, great and small, with whom I talked aredetermined to fight and come so bravely to the defence of the countryand of themselves that if only they had the military equipment to goalong with their determination we could reasonably hope to win." [382]

On August 20, that is, nine days before the battle of Mohacs, hewrote: "The Hungarians do have the spirit and determination tofight; if nothing else were needed, we could still expect success." [383]

While these declarations of Burio restore somewhat hat the properbalance, they certainly do not mean that the mobilization of theHungarian army in 1526 proceeded smoothly. In fact, it proceededslowly, the units assembled with great difficulty and in disarray,much as it was usual everywhere in the age of feudal decentralization. If we add to these typical shortcomings all the difficultiessaddling the country, we must be surprised that the Hungarianarmy was ready for battle on the field of Mohacs at all.

The Ottoman Armies March Across the Balkans

Suleyman left Constantinople with his retinue and the janissarieson April 23, reaching Adrianople on May 3. The army campedaround the city; the whole area "was covered with tents like coopedchicken." [384] They rested for four days, during which time the "divanmet for a few days to decide matters relating to the campaign." [385] OnMay 8 they continued on their way, sending the janissaries ahead,"since the roads were narrow." [386] The objective of the maneuver wasto break up the extremely long column of march into segments, orechelons, as is done even nowadays.

The army of the sultan reached Philippopolis (Plovdiv) on May19 [387] Here too a divan was held, this time with the participation ofBehram pasha, the commander of the Anatolian army. The unitsfrom Anatolia had marched from their peacetime stations to theassembly point at Bigaz where they underwent their first muster;then crossed the straight at Gallipoli and reached Plovdiv, viaAdrianople, on May 21.

At Plovdiv the mass of troops was so considerable that the columnof march had to be extended even further. As Djeladzade reports:"Since there could have been a great deal of trouble and damagederiving from the jamming of troops and units and the crowding ofanimals, the commanding grand vezir received an order from theSultan to march a day ahead with the entire Rumelian army, someservants from the Sublime Court, and a detachment of arillery." [388] By"one day" Djeladzade did not accurately define the distance betweenthe Rumelian forces and the remainder of the armies since theRumelian forces themselves marched in at least two echelons. From Suleyman's diary we may conclude that the janissaries of the sultanreached the same station as the Rumelian army with four or fivedays' delay.

The most difficult stage of the march was from Plovdiv to Sofia,separated by the Balkan mountains. The troops marched along tworoutes: the sultan's janissaries, probably together with the artilleryand the train, crossed the mountains via the pass at Kapu-derbend(the gate of Trajan), while the Rumelian and Anatolian armies usedthe Zlatica-Teteveni pass. [389]

The sultan reached Sofia on May 29 and stayed there until June4. [390] Here too a divan was held and the Rumelian army "paraded" infront of the sultans for inspection. Although the troops advancedslowly they suffered from the oppressive heat. Kemal Pashazadewrote: "There was a terrible heat, as if air and water had been aboil;blood poured through the pores of the skin instead of perspiration;the difficulties of the march were like the tortures of hell." Fortunately, "Allah the Merciful', had pity on the true soldiers of the faith,and "rain came every day, softening the hard surface of the earthand tempering the heat of the summer." [391]

Sofia was a very important station for resupplying the army.Ferdi wrote: "The camels carrying the provisions arrived too, and therental fees for them were paid out of the state treasury. Competentpersons were sent to other areas of the Empire to collect food." [392] Asalready mentioned, the discipline of march in the Ottoman forceswas strict indeed, and the inhabitants of the villages and townsalong the way were spared. Ferdi wrote that "His Majesty the Judgeof the World kept such strict discipline in the armies that he set upchaus to guard the fields along the way; hence no harm befell thepeasants at all; for whoever damaged but one blade of grass receiveda thousand blows in punishment." [393] In some instances, soldiers weredecapitated for pillaging.

In Sofia Ibrahim was given the order to "gather the world-conquering banners around him and advance with the aforementioned victorious division to enable the invincible army to cross theSava, onto the island of Srem." [394] His troops were reinforced with150 pieces of artillery and 2,000 janissaries. This communication of Kemal Pashazade should be interpreted to mean that the Sultanentrusted Ibrahim with the organization of the crossing, of the Sava;the bridge itself was completed long before he reached Belgrade.

The sultan reached Nis on June 9. Bali Beg reported to him here.most probably to inform him of the latest developments in Hungary.Presumably it was on basis of this report that Kemal Pashazadewrote:

So far Bali's spies were well informed, indeed. Yet the followinginformation of Kemal Pashazade was not correct:

It is not the figure of several hundred thousand that astonishes,for this was just the usual exaggeration of Ottoman chroniclers; it isthe statement regarding the defense of the two rivers, for, as wehave seen, the Hungarian high command did not feel the least bitsecure behind them. It is unlikely that Bali would have reported inthis sense since only a few days after the Sultan's having reachedNis the bridge over the Sava w as completed without the Hungarianshaving hampered its construction. It is also likely that the Hungarian defence of the Drava was a figment of Kemal Pashazade'simagination, because at the time of Bali's report no signs could bedetected of such an intention.

Moreover, Lufti was quite definite that the Hungarians had noplans for defending themselves along either river. He paraphrasedKing Louis' words thus: "The best thing would be to give them bait.... If they throw a bridge across the Sava, let us pay no attention; let them cross that river, then the Drava, and, as soon as theyhave crossed, we will cut off all the avenues of approach in front ofthem...." [397] It was probably at the recommendation of Bali Beg thatSuleyman entrusted Ibrahim, in Nis, with launching the siege ofPetervarad as soon as he crossed the Sava. Ibrahim reached Belgrade on June 30 with the army under his command. As we know, bythen the bridge across the Sava had been ready for over a week. [398]The troops of the sanjak of Bosnia, the akindjis, the flotilla rowingup from the Black Sea, as well as the transport barges built in theneighboring sanjaks and manned by azabs and oarsmen recruitedfrom all over the empire joined the main forces at Belgrade. Theassembly of the troops from Rumelia lasted until July 11. Suleymanand his retinue reached Belgrade on July 9 [399]

A great muster was held. Ferdi wrote:

The begs and the sipah-salar, as soon as their troops had been inspected in accordance with the defter of Khakan in full battle dress,immediately crossed into enemy territory, namely the Srem, using thebridge. The regiments and other units of the blessed army filed by infront of the vezirs a whole week. The Anatolian army and the kapuhalki were the last to pass inspection. [400]

Only the march of the sultan's janissaries can be described on thebasis of Süleyman's diary with any exactitude. The distance ofroughly 1,000 km was covered in 77 days, of which 20 were devotedto rest; thus the average daily march was 13 km or 17 km, discounting the days of rest. The rate of march of the other units must havebeen basically similar. There are data regarding the advance of theRumelian army from Sofia: it left Sofia on June 4 and arrived atBelgrade on June 30; thus the march took 26 days. The distancecovered was roughly 370 km; the average daily performance was 14km or 19 km if we subtract the 6 days of rest. It may be worth notingthat the rate of march of large armies was about the same well intomodern times, until the motorization of troops.

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