The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

CHAPTER V
OBJECTIVES AND PLANS OF THE TWO SIDES

To describe the course of the entire 1526 campaign would be auseful and necessary project, but the question is whether it can bedone with the available sources. Considering the dearth of evidenceon the period, as already discussed, it is rather doubtful. The sourceson the strictly military aspects of the battle of Mohacs are evenscantier and less reliable than those relating to politics.

Sources

There are two important sources for the reconstruction of themilitary events on the Hungarian side. The dispatches of the papalnuncio, Baron Burgio, [312] and the narrative of Bishop Stephen Brodarics, De conftictu Hungarorum cum turcis ad Mohatz verissimadescriptio (The true description of the battle waged on the field ofMohacs by the Hungarians against the Turks.) [313] Unfortunately,neither author was familiar with the military metier. Moreover,both wrote about the events with bias, although each had a differentway to grind.

Burgio admitted that he "understood little', about the "militaryprofession." [314] We find specific evidence of his ignorance everywherein his account. Even his data did not exceed the level of informationavailable to the run-of-the-mill foreign diplomat. While he participated in many a deliberation of the government, naturally, he wasleft out precisely from the most significant military discussion because of the necessary security measures. Thus he got his militaryinformation second or third hand, perhaps from agents; there areindications that prominent persons more than once deliberatelymisled him in private conversations, especially when there seemedthe opportunity of extracting money from him. (And unfamiliar as hewas with military matters, he was unable to assess the reliability ofsuch information.)Reportedly, Burgio had an impulsive temperament, lacking the most important qualification for a successful diplomat, name]y, cooldetachment. However Hungarians may be moved by the degree ofhis empathy with their cause, such feelings were not exactly advantageous in assessing the facts. Moreover, his dispatches were affected by mood and emotion. He could write about a matter firstpessimistically and then optimistically. He was quite aware of hisown moodiness; as he wrote in a letter to a prelate: "Please, Majestydo not be shocked by the inconsistencies with which I judge thesituation of Hungary in my letters: I have depicted it as desperateearlier, and now I am hopeful once again. These changes of mood arecaused by the events." [315] Of course, Burgio's dispatches reflect hisposition: however sympathetic he may have been to the cause ofHungary, he naturally saw issues and judged personalities primarily from the Vatican's point of view.

The reliability of Bishop Brodarics is also questionable. First ofall, he was the very first representative of the "Mohacs complex:" theleitmotif of his entire account is that the disaster was the consequence of personal weaknesses and errors. Furthermore, since hewas a courtier and an unwavering follower of the king, he shifted theresponsibility for the failures onto those magnates and nobles of thearmy who had been opposed to the court or at least critical of it. Hewas probably not a member of the military council, but, even if hehad been, the indications are that he could not have participated inall deliberations. When he did participate in military discussions heoften misunderstood or entirely missed what was debated, becauseof his unfamiliarity with military matters.

A description by Christopher Frangepan of the campaign and thebattle and a report of his deputy have also survived. Although theywere military experts, they took no part in the campaign, wrote theirreports on the basis of hearsay--hence their reliability may bequestioned. Moreover, Frangepan was not unbiased, for he hated theHungarians. [316] As for his deputy, his reliability may be measured byhis stating that the Ottomans built three bridges across the Drava,when, of course, we know that they had built but one.

While in contrast to previous historians, I have reduced considerably the value of the sources from the Hungarian side, the oppositeoperation must be performed in regards to Ottoman sources. Previous research on Mohacs has made little use of Ottoman sources, andeven that was badly done. As a consequence of their hypercritical attitude some Hungarian historians have given no credence to thechronicles, whereas others have accepted only those parts as truewhich are conspicuously not. They have hardly used the diary ofSuleyman, although it is an "operations diary" in the modern senseof the term and is completely reliable. Less heed was paid to Luftiand Ferdi, who understood military matters well, than to Djeladzade, who indulged in poetic license, did not understand militarymatters, and deliberately distorted certain facts. In consulting Turkish sources scholars have entirely overlooked the most essentialaspect of the battle of Mohacs, namely, the placement of the Ottoman armies onto the field of battle. On the basis of this evidence it issafe to assert that deploying this enormous army entailed extremedifficulties. Moreover, these difficulties could be foreseen by theHungarian side, and, as already mentioned, Tomori and his companions had indeed taken them into consideration in their battle plans.

Let me stress once more that my reconstruction of the battle ofMohacs and of the preceding campaign is in many aspects hypothetical. The gaps in our knowledge do not permit otherwise. Moreover,the area of Mohacs, including the battlefield, has undergoneconsiderable change over time: villages vanished and new ones werebuilt, the bed of the Danube and of the smaller rivers in the regionhave shifted as a result, causing the wet swampy areas, so extensiveat one time, to disappear. Of course, modern agriculture and technological progress in general also have produced much change.

Nevertheless, the probability of these hypotheses is quite high,first of all, because the available data fit even the model establishedregarding military operations of the age. (Actually, the reliability ofspecific data can be judged by whether they fit into the model or not.)The proposition about the Ottoman and Hungarian leaders, expertise in military science is also based on our thinking in terms of themodel: these leaders mastered the routines, the "methods", asClausewitz called them, which enabled them to reach correct decisions. If one discards the many exaggerations and the almost mystical aura attached to the person of commander, one can easily seethat the decisions faced by the leaders on both sides required littlemilitary "genius", but all the more mastery of routine based onmilitary experience and practical knowledge.

Military Planning.The Question of River Defense in Southern Hungary

I have attempted to argue convincingly that the Ottoman objective in 1526 was not to absorb the country into the empire; there isno better proof for this argument than the fact that the armyeventually withdrew from the country. The objective, rather, was tocompel the government to accept the peace offered on two previousoccasions. This political objective could not be achieved by a war ofannihilation, but only by a war with limited objectives in which theOttoman army was intent on achieving two tasks: to destroy theHungarian forces and to occupy the capital. The Hungarian government had rejected Suleyman's peace proposal because it did not wantto surrender the country's independence. The attack of the Ottomanarmy necessarily followed this rejection. The task of the militaryleadership was to defend against the Ottoman attack. These were,then, the political and military objectives of the war of 1526. Thetask now is to reconstruct the military plans of the antagonists byexamining the three main factors of war: force, space, and timing(see p. 6 sqq.).Force. As calculated earlier the strength of the Ottoman army inthe Hungarian theater was about 150,000; the total mobilized forceof Hungary can be estimated at 60-80,000, or 110-130,000 if weinclude mercenaries and the local peasant levy. Even if mobilizationhad not been hampered by grave financial problems, it was highlyunlikely that the Hungarians could unite all armed forces of the country because of the range of territory to be defended. Thus it waspossible that in the decisive battle a mere 30-40,000 Hungarians hadto face 150,000 Ottoman soldiers.Space. We have seen that the Ottoman army could not do withoutthe Danube as its main line of supply. Thus it was quite certain thatthe army would advance along the Danube to occupy Buda, one ofthe objectives of the campaign. It was also very unlikely that itwould advance on the left bank of the river, i.e., the area between theDanube and Tisza rivers. [317] The only reasonable possibility for theOttomans was to advance on the right bank, along the itineraryBelgrade-Petervarad-Eszek-Tolna-Buda. The Hungarian army wasjust as dependent on the Danube as its opponents. Actually, a "military road" via Eszek to Belgrade is known already from theeleventh-twelfth century. Gyalokay also attributes great importance to the Danubian transport, but he explains the sultan's choiceas an indication for his intent to wage a decisive battle against theHungarians, and by assuming that Suleyman received informationon the start of the king's movement he selected the same route. As amatter of fact, it was just the opposite: the Hungarian army advanced along the right bank because it could be sure that the Turksalso took that route (see Map 3). [318]

Hungarian historians have condemned the country's leaders fornot having tried to hold up the Ottomans along the three obstacleson their route: at the crossings of the Sava, at that of the Drava andin the swampy valley of the Karasso. This conclusion is totallyunfounded, based as it is on two mistaken assumptions: first, onacceptance at face value of the criticisms by Brodarics and Burgio;second, on exaggerated judgment of the effectiveness of a defencebased on rivers or swamps, resulting from the lack of proper assessment of the theoretical and practical implications of a forced crossing.

Since the matter is of central importance, let me deal with it insome detail. First of all, it has been demonstrated above that afterthe fall of Belgrade Hungary was generally believed to be defenseless. [319] This consensus of Hungarian, Ottoman, and other experts implied that neither the Sava, nor the Drava, nor the Karassowas ever seen as a real chance for defense. Let me briefly review thetheoretical and practical issues regarding defensive battles alongrivers or swamps in order to clarify the basis of this unequivocalstance of the contemporaries.

Clausewitz asserts that defense along rivers offers chances ofsuccess only if the river is a major one, such as the Rhine or theDanube, and even then only along their middle or lower course. Twodecisive factors must be taken into account when crossing a riveragainst opposition: one is the throwing of a bridge, and the other thebridgehead on the opposite side to secure the building operation.Since it is impossible to know just where the attackers will attemptto cross, the defense has to guard a long sector of the river bank bydistributing his forces evenly. The time required to build a bridgedetermines the distance between the smaller units guarding the line of the river; if we divide the sector of the river to be defended by thedistance between these smaller units, we obtain the number of unitsinto which the forces should be divided. We divide the effectivenessof the army by the number of smaller units to obtain the numericalstrength of each. Then, if we compare the size of these units with thesize of that part of the enemy force which may reach the oppositebank by means of pontoons, barges, rafts, etc., while the bridge isbeing built, we can determine whether or not it is possible to wageriver defence with any chance of success. Generally, it is not possibleto force a crossing if the defence is able to assemble a superior forceat least twice the size of the troops that managed to cross into thebridgehead. [320]

Thus three factors must be taken into account: 1) the width of theriver; 2) the number of craft available for crossing it, since this woulddetermine the size of the force that can be transported into thebridgehead; and 3) the strength of the defense. If these three factorsdo not favor the attack, then the crossing is not likely to succeed,regardless of the size of the attacking army.

The defense of a river line can be successful if there is no possibility of circumventing the defending force; hence its flanks must reston some insurmountable obstacle, such as the sea, a neutral country,or a mountainous region. It follows from this that river defenceneeds to be generally more extended than an ordinary line of defence. The roads along the river available to move the force attackingthe bridgehead are also of crucial importance for success. If there areno such roads, their construction becomes an organic part of thesystem of defence.

It is a peculiarity of river defence that only a negative result maybe obtained: to repel the enemy attack. It cannot have a positive result, such as the destruction of the foe, since the river is just asmuch an obstacle for counterattack as it is for the advancing enemy.Moreover, river defense is extremely rigid: if the enemy shouldsucceed in breaking across the line at any one location then thewhole line of defence is likely to collapse rapidly, given that it is notpossible to pull the troops together on time at the decisive spot,because of their widespread deployment.

If it is not undertaken for the sake of obtaining a decision, that is,of presenting a crossing at any price, river defense may serve to gaintime. Gaining time may indeed offer extraordinary advantages,especially when it comes to a defensive campaign. But it is onlypossible if the enemy does not dispose of sufficient craft in the area.

So far no mention was made of the strength of the attack in ourdiscussion. Yet this is not a negligible factor. If the superiority of theoffense is great, and the flanks of the river defense do not rest onsome kind of an obstacle, then the offense can get around thedefensive positions more easily while still leaving forces along theriver to tie down the defense.

Let us apply these principles to river defense in Southern Hungary. In the case of the Sava there could be no serious problem forthe Ottomans. With the capture of Belgrade, Zimony, and Sabac,they had obtained strong bridgeheads across the river. Moreover,the Hungarian Danube flotilla was far weaker than the Ottoman.According to Brodarics, Tomori "had considerable numbers of soldiers to man the boats, yet these were far less numerous than whatthe enemy had." [321] Istvanffy writes: "[Tomori] had a small flotilla,quite strong, composed of small craft called sajka or naszad [sloop]--but it was no match for the enemy fleet composed of so-called piratebiremes for pirates were the ones to use such ships on the high seasand on other large vessels." [322] According to Ottoman sources, theirflotilla consisted of 800 vessels, of which only a fraction was meantfor war, the remainder being for transport. Incidentally, this figureis no exaggeration; according to intelligence reports, the construction of ships an the sanjaks along the Danube, the Sava, and theMorava had been in full swing since 1524. [323] In contrast, the Hungarian river fleet, along with the transport barges, amounted to no more than 200. The waters were thus dominated by the Ottomans, whichas already mentioned, enabled them to land troops when and wherethey liked behind the Hungarian forces that might have penetratedinto Srem.

As for the Drava, to begin with, it did not even satisfy the numberone requirement for successful defense against river crossings, sinceit was not very wide. Judging from the first military charts datingfrom around 1770 the Drava at Eszek could have not been more than170-190 meters wide. Indeed, this width corresponds to the length ofthe bridge built at Eszek, according to the diaries of Suleyman. [324]Since the sector of the river to be defended was at least 100 km, andthe Drava above Eszek was narrower, and wider below it, we maytake 200 meters as an average (see Map No. 45.)

Unfortunately, we do not know exactly how long it took to build abridge across a river 200 meters wide in that period, even thoughSuleyman's clerk recorded the construction of the bridge in detail.The works were begun on August 15. The entry for that day reads:"This morning they very quickly started to build a bridge across theDrava." Work continued on the 16th, and on the 17th the clerk noted:"The construction of the bridgehead is completed; all that remains isto set up the ships." It seems that was done on the 18th since on the19th the following was recorded: "Today with God's help the bridgewas completed." [325] Thus, we can see that in addition to bridging theDrava by means of ships, the two other necessary operations, building a bridge and establishing a bridgehead, were also completed.

A further question is the number of soldiers the Ottomans wereable to ferry into the bridgehead. The answer would have to dependon the number and capacity of the crafts available. According toKemal Pashazade, the smaller craft carried 20 soldiers. Ferdi speaksof 30 soldiers per craft. [326] If we accept the latter figure, and assumethat one-fourth of the flotilla was available for crossing, we cancount on 6,000 troops ferried in every echelon. If we take 25 minutes for the crossing of each echelon, [327] the Ottomans should have beenable to ferry about 12,000 soldiers per hour across the Drava. Buteven if we assume hitches and technical difficulties and take aconservative 40 minutes as the turnaround time, 30 000 soldierscould cross in 3-3 1/2 hours.

As to the Hungarian side, let us assume that it was able to muster60,000 men for the defense of the Drava in time. Assuming 100 km [328]of riverbank to be defended upstream from the mouth of the Drava,the best defensive setup would be to divide the Hungarian army infive equal groups of 12,000 men each, separated from each other by20 km. If the Ottomans undertook the crossing between groups 3and 4, and if these groups initiated immediately the march towardsthe bridgehead, and assuming, moreover, that the length of thecolumn of march was 8-9 km, their vanguard would reach the spot inthree hours, the rearguard in five. They would require an additionalhalf an hour to launch their attack. We have seen that during thistime, and even sooner, the Ottomans could send 30,000 soldiers intothe bridgehead. Thus the 24,000 men of the two Hungarian groupswould be insufficient to thwart the crossing.

These computations demonstrate Clausewitz's tenet that thewidth of the river and the number of craft are determining factorswhen inferred. [329]

I have not yet considered the additional observation of Clausewitz, about the requirement that the river to be defended may not becircumvented. In the case of the Drava this condition was lacking:the fact that it emptied into the Danube enabled the Ottomans toembark their troops, row up the Danube, and disembark at anygiven point to attack the defenders in the rear, should the crossingfail. Another disadvantage from the Hungarian point of rear wasthat the northern bank of the Drava was swampy in this period,hampering the movements of the defenders. Finally, the Ottomansenjoyed a further advantage: they could send elite troops into thebridgehead, while the Hungarians, not knowing where the crossingwould take place, had to distribute their best troops more or lessevenly between the defending divisions. Thus only a small part ofthem could participate in the attack against the bridgehead.Hungarian military historians believed the swamps of theKarasso to be a another significant obstacle. Indeed, the area wascovered by extensive marshes in that period. Brodarics writes: "Inthis area, not far from Mohacs, there was a stream which can bereferred to as swampy water rather than an outright swamp or river,and which the inhabitants call the Karasso...'' [330] Istvanffy describesthe area between Mohacs and the Drava as a plain "on which noforest or bush grows, but which is bisected by a swollen brook soswampy...that no matter how close you look you cannot determinewhich way it flows; the reeds, the sedge, and the bottomless mudprevent crossing, except in the winter, when it is frozen." [331] Indeedaccording to the earliest military map, the bed of the Karasso wasbordered by a swamp 1.5 to 3 km wide. Still, it was not an insurmountable obstacle. The swamp was usually crossed by severalpaths or fillings which were difficult to be made impassable. TheHungarian forces, therefore, would have to be deployed to blockthese approaches. Such a deployment, however, would have rendered the defense rigid, and the Ottomans would have had nodifficulty in breaking through. Incidentally, numerical superioritybecomes decisive when the terrain is swampy, bushy, or forested; theOttoman army could have easily overrun the small Hungarian force.Final]y, much as in the case of the Drava, the Ottomans might haverowed up the Danube to attack the defensive positions from the rear,not to mention the fact that they could easily circumvent the obstacle from the west.

The contemporary experts did--correctly--not regard the Sava,the Drava, or the Karasso as serious obstacles. How then has theopinion that the Ottomans ought to have been detained along theserivers become so general among historians of Mohacs? Essentiallybecause they have accepted at face value Brodarics's and Burgio'sremarks. Brodarics relates that Tomori, informed of the Ottomanpreparations on March 20, 1526, recommended to the king that theenemy be prevented from crossing the Sava. [332] On April 24 Burgiowrote: "This morning [Tomori] leaves, with the help of God, ...todefend the crossing of the Sava, should the Turks attack from thatdirection." [333] We should note that in January he had readily acceptedthe opinion that since the bridgehead across the Sava was in Ottoman hands, the Turks could not be stopped there. [334] The issue ismentioned once again in his report dated July 13: "If there had been4,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry in readiness at the Sava, asTomori had requested, then--possibly--we could have stopped theTurks from crossing the river." [335] By that time the court alreadyknew that the bridge over the Sava, build by the commander ofBelgrade, Bali Beg, was near completion, and that the Ottomansmight begin to cross within ten days. Finally, on June 30, when thefirst echelon of the Ottoman main army had reached Belgrade, andits vanguard was already in the Srem, he wrote: "I lost hope of usbeing able to hold the line of the Sava." He continued: "His majestygave orders, that the palatine and the archbishop of Kalocsa shouldcall the population of the border areas to arms, detain the foe and, ifstill possible, prevent the Turks from crossing the Sava. And if thisno longer be possible, let them confront the Turks on this side of theriver." [336] We should note, moreover, that by this time it was no longera matter of defending the Sava, but only the Drava. In other words,"Sava" must be a slip of the pen, or else Burgio was unable todifferentiate between the two rivers.Istvanffy also writes about this matter: "Tomori...reported thatSuleyman. ..is coming to Hungary with his host. He could be stoppedat the crossing of the Sava..." On the other hand, Istvanffy alsowrote that Tomori's plan was contested. "Suleyman, already inpossession of Belgrade and Sabac, always brings along a large army.

He cannot be detained or prevented from crossing the Danube or theSava by any means at our disposal." [337]

In short, those who objected to the plan of using the Sava as adefense line were absolutely right. As for the reports of Burgio, theyshow how poorly informed he was. We happen to know that the kingdispatched the palatine Bathori not to the Sava, but to the Drava;also, it is inconceivable that anyone should have been thinking of thedefense of the Sava towards the end of June, a time when the bridgebuilt by the Ottomans had been standing for over a week and theirtroops were in the Srem. Nor can we make much sense of Brodarics'sand Burgio's reports on the defense of the Drava. Brodarics contradicts himself when he argues that the line of the Drava could havebeen defended. Elsewhere he writes:

At Tolna we held large assemblies almost every day. We also debated about how the line of the Drava might be held, if the Sava and Petervarad were already lost, while the Turks were approaching szek.... Hence the palatine, who had been entrusted with the task already earlier, was once again instructed to hurry and beat the enemy to the crossing of the Drava. But finally the matter of defending the line of the Drava was dropped. [338]

Incidentally, at this time, the Ottoman army was only 40-50 kmfrom Eszek,--as the king and his entourage well knew--while Bathori at Tolna was 100 km away; hence by no means could he have"beaten" the Ottomans to it.

As for Burgio, let us remember that in his letter of January hegave credence to intelligence reports about the Turks that it was a"simple task" to throw a bridge across the Drava and that it was notpossible to set up a line of defense there. Clearly, the Hungarianmilitary leaders agreed. Thus, one is surprised to read, that in hisreport dated July 13, Burgio was worried that, because of the rapidadvance of the Turks, "not even the crossing of the Drava can bedefended." [339] And two weeks later he was to write: "The king wants tohold the line of the Drava, which is certainly not an easy task. Andif we see the disorganization, the disorientation, and the poverty thatsurrounds his majesty, our only hope in holding the Drava rests in the cowardice of the enemy, more than anything else." [340] On August5 and 6 Burgio reported: "the king told me that he is going to proceedto Tolna and prevent the Turks from crossing the Drava,' and: "Theking is going forth to defend the line of the Drava." [341] The Ottomanarmy reached Eszek on August 14, but as late as the 13^th Burgiowas still confident that Bathori and Ambrus Sarkany would be ableto occupy Eszek before the Turks. [342]

Twice the king entrusted Bathori with the mission of defendingthe line of the Drava. Istvanffy describes the matter in the same veinas Brodarics, but adds that in both instances the court was not at allconvinced that this defense was viable. On the first instance hewrites that the palatine left to prevent the Ottoman army fromcrossing or, "failing this, since the situation was doubtful and mostrisky, at least to delay their crossing by minor skirmishes." On thesecond instance he writes that the task of the palatine was to occupyEszek "and strive to prevent the enemy from crossing, but should hefail because of the enemy's enormous host and power, to delay himuntil such time as the troops expected from various places can reachthe camp of the king." [343]

Delaying the Ottoman crossing was an entirely different matterfrom attempting an all-out defense along the Drava. ChristopherFrangepan also writes about fighting to gain time--something that,according to him, "would have made it possible to inflict seriousdamage" on the Ottoman army. [344] Given our knowledge of the technical and tactical aspects of river crossings, it is hard to see howsmaller units might have been able to delay the sultan. Maybe in ourown days, in the age of rapid-fire weapons, such a maneuver ispossible, but when fighting was essentially hand-to-hand combatthere was little chance of success. Tomori was clearly aware of thehopelessness of such a tactic. After the fall of Petervarad on July 28and the onset of the Ottoman march towards Ujlak there could be no doubt about their intent to cross at Eszek. Tomori would have hadample time to reach the Drava, y et he did not.

The idea of river defense along the Karasso did not originate insources from Hungary, for these do not mention it all. However, oneof the Ottoman chroniclers, Kemal Pashazade, raised this issue:

Between that field [i.e., the battleground of Mohacs] and the Dravathere is a large swamp resulting from the overflow of a riser. It isextremely difficult to cross: the terrain is so swampy that it can carryneither man nor horse, and wherever one steps one is bound to sink. Ifthe miserable king with his dogs had come to the edge of the swamp, setup his batteries, and fired against the attackers, he could have prevented the soldiers of the true faith from entering the game-pack ofjihad. [345]

Kemal Pashazade was a most respectable scholar, writer andimam, but had little knowledge of military matters. He obtained hisimpression from the undoubtedly difficult crossing of the swamps,but forgot that it would have been just as difficult for the Hungarians to move; and the prerequisite for delaying tactics conducted bysmall forces--and there could be no question of more than that--isprecisely high mobility.

Another Ottoman chronicler, Ferdi, also mentions the swamps ofKarasso in passing: "It was as difficult to cross the aforementionedmarshes as to cross the eye of a needle." [346] He does not intimate thatthe Hungarians should have mounted their defense along theswamps.

We must conclude, therefore, that Brodarics and Burgio exaggerated the chances of defense along the river by far. If there had beenthe slightest hope of detaining the Ottoman army along the Drava,then the troops would have been called to assemble, not at Tolna, buton the north bank of the river. In late July the king summonedBatthyany, the ban of Croatia, not to Eszek, but to Valpo where itwould have been impossible to defend the line of the Drava. [347]

All told, as far as terrain was concerned, all advantages were onthe Ottoman side. While it offered the Hungarians no possibility ofa sound footing, it ensured the greatest possibility of strategicmaneuver for the attackers.

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541