The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

Calculation from the 1526 Column of March

This figure can be compared to results derived from militaryscience. The size of an army can be inferred from the length of itscolumn of march: all we need to know is how long it took for the hostto cross a specific spot. From the diary of Süleyman and from thechronicle of Ferdi we know that it took the army of 1526 three daysand three nights to cross the bridge constructed at Eszek. [57]

The first question, therefore, is what was the capacity of thebridge, that is, its width. Süleyman's diary specifies that it was 2rofs which, according to the translator of the text, Jozsef Thury, isequal to 1.4 meters. This, however, seems most unlikely, becauseneither cannon nor cart would have been able to cross such a narrowbridge. There is some confusion here. Ferdi gives the length of thebridge built at Sabac in 1521 as 1,800 rofs (which would be theequivalent to 1,200 meters if one rof was 67 cm.), which is anunacceptable figure because the width of the Sava at Sabac could nothave been over 300 meters. On the other hand, the length of thebridge built over the Danube in 1526 is given by Kemal Pashazade as 980 rofs, which sounds plausible, being equal to 660 meters. Thewidth of military bridges in this period was at least 3.5 meters, andwe have no reason to believe the Ottomans built them any narrower.Moreover, the Hungarian chronicler Szeremi observed the Turkscross the Danube at Buda in 1529. He noted that the bridge was 12feet wide, that is, almost 4 meters, and three camels could pass on itside by side. [58]

Given the fact that the Ottoman army crossed the bridge at Eszekin three days and three nights and that at least four hours a day hadto be devoted to maintenance--tightening the anchors and theropes, changing the damaged boards--then the actual crossing musthave taken 60 hours. Counting with a speed of 4.54 km/h, the totallength of the marching column must have been between 270 and 300km. what does this mean in terms of numbers?

Since the greater part of the army was composed of cavalry, wewill assume that 100,000 of the 150,000 were mounted. This is alsothe sum of regulars, sipahis furnished by the timars, the irregularcavalry and the Tartars, as calculated above. The length of a columnof 100,000 cavalrymen, if the horses were led across the bridge threeby three, is 100 km. For the infantry we may add another 12 to 15km, depending on whether they were marching by fives or by fours;the distance between the ranks can be taken as 1.2 meters on theaverage. [59]

The computation of the length of the artillery's column of march ismore problematic. There are two sources of uncertainty involved:one is the number of guns, the other the composition of the batteries.For the former we have to rely on Ferdi's estimate of 300 guns,confirmed by the estimate of Pal Tomori, the commander-in-chief ofthe Hungarian army in 1526. As to the composition of the batteries,we may assume that the Ottoman artillery, set up by European experts, was organized much like the western ones. By extrapolatingthe suggestions on the "standard" set-up of field artillery of thesixteenth-century military author Reinhard Solms, [60] the probabledistribution of the Turkish artillery in Table 5.

Table 5.
Probable Distribution of the Ottoman Artillery in 1526

Distribution of a field artillery of 54 cannon as recommended by R. Solms

			24 lb.	12 lb.	6 lb.	3 lb.
	24 lb.	half-	half	quarter	falco-
	snake	khartoum	snake	snake	nette	Total
Piece	6	8	10	10	20	54
%	11.2	14.8	18.5	18.5	37.0	100
Extrapolated to the 300 cannons estimated for 1526
Piece	33	45	55	55	112	300
Technical data and calculations:
Wgt.of cannon(t)	2.3	1.5	0.8	0.6	0.4
Carts	2	2	2	1	1
Horses	16	16	1	12	6	4
length of	40	40	25	25	20
Draft needs: cart+horses (m)
Min. length of column (km)	1.3	1.8	1.4	1.4	2.3	8.2
Weight of ball(kg)	12	12	6	3	1.5
Weight of powder/	6	6	3	1.5	0.8
shot(kg)
Weight of	59.4	81.0	49.5	24.8	25.8	240.5
powder+ balls for 100 shots for each cannon (t)

On the basis of this calculation the artillery's column of march,without the carts and camels carrying ammunition, but addingappropriate distance between carts (330 X 8m = ca. 2.5 km), can beassumed to have been 11-12 km.

A calculation of the total length of the army's column of march and the time required for their crossing the bridge gives the following figures:

Table 6.
Length of Column of March and Time Required for Crossing

	Length in km	Time in hours
Cavalry	100	20-22
Infantry	12-15	3-4
Artillery 10-	10-11	2-3
TOTAL	123-127	25-29

To these lengths and times for the crossing of the troops, we haveto add the train. The factors determining its size are the weight ofthe ammunition, of food, and of forage. Five to six hundred cartswere needed to transport the ammunition for the artillery and about300 carts to haul the cannons. While these numbers may appearexaggerated, other fragmentary data enhance their probability. [61]

In computing the weight of the food transported we start from thefact that, similarly to European armies, the daily ration of bread andrice of each soldier was 1 kg. Although we have found no relevantdata, we may take it for granted that the logistics of food supplyamong the Turks was the same as with European armies. The grainmust have been ground and stored in magazines erected well beforethe start of the campaign, while bread was baked on the spot andbrought to the troops by cart or beasts of burden. It is also probablethat there were four daily distributions of bread among the troops. Itmay be assumed, however, that a larger quantity had been accumulated for the crossing at Eszek and the subsequent stages, becausethe swampy terrain cut the troops off from the supplies on board thebarges on the Danube. Assuming the rations of bread in possessionof the troops to be sufficient for eight days, we may calculate 1,200tons for the 150,000 soldiers.

Finally we must compute the necessary amount of forage. If thehorses were given forage cereal, their daily ration would be 15 kg,but if they received only green fodder, they would need 25 kg. The number of riding horses and draft animals can be conservativelyestimated at 200,000; hence the daily ration of forage must haveamounted to 3,000 tons. Since a supply of four days of forage wascollected each time, as was the practice in the European armies, thetotal can be estimated at 12,000 tons. Although we do not haveprecise information pertaining to any of this, we do know, for instance, that in 1526, 20 of the 77 days needed to cross the Balkanswere days of rest, and we may assume that forage was collected oneach of those days. Süleyman's diary mentions foraging on twooccasions, each time because the soldiers assigned to the detail wereattacked by the "Vlachs." [62]

All things considered, the weight to be transported included: 240tons of ammunition, 1,200 tons of food, 1>12,000 tons of forageadding up to a total of 11,300-13,400 tons. [63]

In summary, if we count 130 km for the troops and 17s230 km forthe train, the length of the column of the army as a whole must havebeen 300430 km. A column of such length would have required6>70 hours to cross the bridge--a figure that corresponds, by andlarge, to the reports from Ottoman sources about the time it took.

Contemporary data also support these estimates. Tomori's intelligence deserves particular attention since he was well acquaintedwith the Ottoman army; moreover, his excellent reconnaissanceservice provided news regarding the enemy from the moment itstarted to assemble at Adrianople. What seems confusing, primafacie, is that on one occasion he gave the strength of the Ottomanforces as 300,000, at another time as 70,ooo.[64] If we look at thematter more closely, however, both statements may be valid. WhenTomori was referring to 300,000 troops, he was also including theirregulars of lesser combat value, the drivers, the leaders of thebeasts of burden, and the servants. On the other hand, when he cited70,000, he must have been referring only to the soldiers provided bythe timars and to the regulars of high combat value. Of course, thelower estimate was not entirely fair, because the county nobles of the levy and the peasant soldiers in the Hungarian army did not fightany better than the Ottoman irregulars. From the point of view ofpsychology, however, the underestimation of the forces of the enemywas in fact appropriate at the moment of the report: just before thedecisive battle. Indeed, the news about 300,000 enemies had elicitedan enormous consternation in the Hungarian war council, andthe knowledge of overwhelming superiority of the foe would haveundermined the self-confidence of the army. I shall return to thismatter in some detail later.

Mobilization and Aufmarsch

[65]

The Ottoman system of mobilizing and moving troops across theBalkans (Aufmarsch) against Hungary evolved in the fifteenth century and seems to have remained unchanged until the Peace of Karlowitz in 1699.

The decision in matters of war was made by the sultan, in agreement with the grand vezir. The details were defined by the leadingofficials of the Ottoman state in the divan [divan-i humayun]. Therethe grand vezir, the two chief justices of the army, the begler begs ofAnatolia and Rumelia and their treasurers (later, even the defterdars of Syria and Egypt), the janissary agha representing the army,the kapudan basa or admiral of the sea representing the navy, andthe secretary of state [the nisanci], discussed the methods of the war,primarily the mobilization, the financial and other technical issues.The decision of the sultan, together with the measures enacted bythis council, were then borne by "messengers swift as meteors," thechaus, to the four corners of the Empire, putting into motion thepowerful military machinery of the Ottoman state.

I he order of mobilization specified first of all the task falling uponeach individual component of the army. The army was divided intotwo parts: one to take part in the campaign and one to stay home.The military force of the eyalets near the theater of operations, onthe one hand, and the professional forces garrisoned in the capital,on the other, formed the army that went on the campaign. Thesoldiers from the eyalets far removed from the theater of operationsremained at their home bases, yet they too were mobilized to fulfillborderguard duties and tasks pertaining to internal order war-ranted by the state of war. At the moment of mobilization the coffers of the treasury were filled, most likely to store money in case the wardid not come to a rapid end. Likewise special measures were takenfor increased vigilance in Constantinople, a task entrusted to thekapudan basa who was also the begler beg for Gallipoli.

The individual timar landowners received their orders for mobilization via the chain of begler begs, sanjak begs, and alajbegs; they were then required to show up at the venue appointed for theassembly within one month. If the war took place in Europe, thesoldiery from the eyalet of Rumelia usually met at Sofia, whereasthe troops from Anatolia crossed the Bosporus at Gallipoli and joinedthe sultan at Adrianople. The sultan himself traveled from Constantinople accompanied by the court, the janissaries, and the sipahis of the Porte.

At this time the beys of the akindjis also received their orders tomobilize, and the drafting process got underway. Being troops fromthe border areas, the akindjis assembled at some border fortress,usually at Semendria. Instructions were also issued to the azabsgarrisoning the individual castles summoning them to the venue forthe assembly, as well as to the azabs and sailors stationed in otherparts of the Empire. The azabs of the castles in the sanjaks ofSemendria, Zvornik, and Vidin, in or near the area of deployment forthe European campaigns, were always led out, and, since they werethe ones to provide the crews for the Danubian fleet, they wereusually directed to wherever the fleet was assembling.

Since the Danube was of decisive importance from a logisticalpoint of view, the formation of the Danubian fleet was outlined inconsiderable detail. The majority of the naval units sailed from theirbases on the Black Sea, whereas the barges, or at least some of them,were built in the months preceding the campaign in the sanjaksalong the Danube and the Sava from the income of the hasslandowners in the area. There must have been important shipyardsat Zvornik where up to 300 vessels were launched on certain occasions. Some of the artillery pieces were transported from the arsenals in the capital by ship, while others were founded in the cannonfoundry at Uskub.

No matter which direction the war took on land, the naval fleetwas always placed on war-footing. The kapudans of the fleets atAlexandria, Rhodes, Morea, and Valona were instructed to cruisethe Mediterranean and protect the coasts of the Empire. [66] Once thearmy had assembled, a divan was held at Adrianople or in Sofia to discuss operational matters. On these occasions the principal officers of the border areas had considerable influence, for it was theirfunction to carry out reconnaissance of enemy territory; hence theywere expected to be well informed about enemy forces, the terrain,and all other circumstances of military importance. At one of themore important stations along the route a muster was held wherethe troops were inspected.

The march from Adrianople to Belgrade took 50 to 70 days andwas divided into stages. The columns of march were highly segmented in order to avoid jams; hence they followed each other atseveral days, interval. Where the going was difficult, as on thestretch between Philippopolis and Sofia, in the mountainous areabetween the Balkan and Rhodope chains, one part of the army--usually the troops from the eyalet of Anatolia--turned off from themain road leading through the narrows at Kapu Derbend and advanced towards Sofia along the valleys of Topolnica and Slatica.Since the main line of the army's advance was the road from Constantinople to Nis and from there to Belgrade, and the surroundingareas were its base for procuring provisions, the population in thisarea had to be protected from the soldiers; hence, extremely strictdiscipline was maintained throughout. Soldiers who pillaged fromthe inhabitants or spoiled the crops were severely punished. [67]

---

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541