The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

CHAPTER II
THE MILITARY POWER OF THE OTTOMANSTATE IN THE 1520s

The Makeup and Resources of the State

Since war is a social phenomenon, and the army a product of thesociety that wages war, we cannot measure the military potential ofa state merely by its army. Geographical factors, national resources,the population, its ethnic and social composition, the volume ofproduction, the state of transportation, as well as the political systemmust all be taken into account. Hence, before discussing thesize, mobilization, strategy, and tactics of the Ottoman armed forces,it is useful to provide a brief survey of these factors.

When Süleyman acceded to the throne in 1520, the OttomanEmpire, extending over three continents, was larger than any Europeanstate. Twelve to thirteen million inhabitants would be a conservativeestimate of its population. As a comparison, the population ofHungary was around four million at the time.[39]

Agriculturally, the Empire produced enough to provide a surplusfor export, and, except for a few articles, it was self-sufficient in rawmaterials. As a consequence of the tributes collected from vassalstates (Wallachia, Moldavia, the Tartar Khanate of Crimea), of thelarge amount of taxes paid by its huge population, and of the tariffson the transit trade crossing the Empire, the revenues of the statewere plentiful indeed. In the fiscal year 1526-27 the state revenuesamounted to 477 million aspers, the equivalent of about 9.5 millionin gold ducats. By way of comparison, Spain's income towards theend of the sixteenth century was 9 million a year, that of France 5million, and that of Venice 4 million in gold ducats. According tocontemporary estimates, at the beginning of the sixteenth century fielding and maintaining an army of 60,000 and a fleet of 150 vesselscost about 800,000 ducats.[40]

In addition to the material resources, the organization of thestate, the primary function of which was to sustain the army and toattain maximum military efficiency in order to continue the war,was the main factor that explains the tremendous military might ofthe Empire. The most important administrative officials, in peace asin war, occupied high military posts, and, in turn, the higher rankingmilitary commanders also functioned as governors of their areas.This intertwining of civilian and military functions may not beenough, in and of itself, to explain the impressive military achievements,since in the early feudal age the civilian and military functionswere held by the same aristocracy in western Europe as well.But the Ottoman state and military organization was also characterized by the fact that the bulk of the officials came not from the ranksof the nobility, but were of foreign background. Furthermore, theywere slaves whose life, property, and whole being depended on thesultan; hence they obeyed orders blindly and without reservation.The resistance by noble estates which hampered administration inthe western countries was something entirely alien to the OttomanEmpire.

The body of officials was not only obedient, but even thought alikeas a consequence of the uniform education and training it underwentat the seraglio. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries thestratum of officials in those European countries which had em-barked on a process of centralization received their training indifferent schools, and it was only in the course of the exercise of theirfunction that they became a body with a uniform spirit. Even thisuniformity applied only to the officials in the central government,rather than to the provincial officials. Instructions emanating fromthe court were often misinterpreted in the provinces or were poorlycarried out; worthwhile ideas and plans of governments frequentlyremained a dead letter. To understand the grandiose militaryachievements of the Ottoman Empire we must never lose sight of itswell-oiled administrative machinery, certainly outstanding for thetimes: it was able to supply men, funds, materials, everything thearmy needed, punctually and in sufficient quantities. An enormous area, a huge population, ample resources, well-functioning state organs, the intertwining of the civilian and military machineries--almost all the conditions necessary to field astrong army and to fight victorious campaigns were present in theOttoman state. Added to all this was the fanatical religious ideologywhich inspired the soldiers and ensured discipline. Unlike the Christian religion, Islam taught not a life of piety, but rather one ofcombat and toughness. Accordingly, an equitable and consistentsystem of rewards placed military merits above all else.

The Ottoman army was characterized by the fact that it comprised two diametrically opposite elements representing two mutually exclusive historical categories: a feudal and a professionalmilitary. These two forms of organization grew out of two essentiallydifferent social and economic structures, yet they were united in theOttoman army not as a passing phenomenon, as in the case of someEuropean states, but as a feature that was to last for centuries. To besure, troops maintained by the central power on a permanent basishad always been an ingredient of western feudal armies, and, inturn, remnants of feudal complements remained even in the paidstanding armies. Yet it can be usually determined for a given moment which was the dominant form and which the complementaryone. In the Ottoman army, however, one institution did not replacethe other, and we would be hard put to say which of the two derivedorganically from the given social structure. About the French armiesof the fifteenth century, it can be safely asserted that they werefeudal, even though they already included contingents of mercenaries, whereas in the seventeenth century the French army was astanding army, even if it had still some feudal complements. Incontrast there is no such clear-cut difference between the Ottomanarmy of the fourteenth and the seventeenth century.

Furthermore, the Ottoman armed forces remained free for a longtime of all those vulnerabilities and functional disturbances that onemight expect to have hampered them. The feudal soldiery neverturned into an undisciplined, unleadable, individualistic force, inappropriate for carrying out planned operations, as had the bands ofknights of western Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.Moreover, it never occurred to anyone that there should be somekind of territorial or time limitation to their service, as happened inthe West: the feudal sipahi remained under arms as long as thecampaign lasted, and his service did not come to an end at thefrontiers of the empire.

The troops of the permanent standing army--the janissaries andthe Porte's sipahis--had grown accustomed to each other in theschools, were trained uniformly, and lived together for long years.

Their number did not vary as did that of the standing armies in the West, where only the cadres served in peacetime, to be rounded out in time of war by means of recruitment and impressment. And while the mercenary soldiers of the West were recruited from the dregs of society, the professional soldiers of the Ottoman army formed a select elite.

The technical equipment of the Ottoman army was always up-todate. Its artillery and its engineers were able to resolve all tasks,tasks that were anything but negligible during the long march fromConstantinople to Buda or to Vienna, with sieges along the way.These skills were successfully imported from Europe. As the topofficials of the government were rootless and untrammeled by tradition, they could easily adopt all innovations from the West and makeuse of foreign experts without regard to expense.Much like the Romans, the Ottomans paid special attention,particularly at the beginning, to the construction and maintenanceof roads so important to efficient administration and for the movement of troops. The supply of the messenger service, the maintenance of inns, and the upkeep of the infrastructure were entrusted tothe population of the area and relentlessly controlled.[41]The Turkish sapper units deserve special attention. The sappers,or "master builders" as they are termed in one of the Ottomanchronicles, had to throw bridges over three rivers for the Hungariancampaign: the Sava, the Danube, and the Drava. In the OttomanEmpire as elsewhere the usual method of bridge construction wasthe pontoon-bridge. The sanjaks of the surrounding areas wererequired to provide the boats for the pontoons in accordance withorders issued well before the campaign started. When, in 1521, inconnection with the campaign for the capture of Belgrade and Sabac,orders were issued beforehand for the construction of boats, but, forlack of time, the boats were not ready, the army had to build aregular bridge on pillars--which was carried away by a suddenflood. The construction of bridges, and the crossing of rivers ingeneral, is one of the most delicate maneuvers any army has to face.For instance, in 1526, at the crossing of the Drava, the works weresupervised directly by the Grand Vezir Ibrahim in person, and evenSuleyman I himself spent some time at the site. In 1526 the bridgeover the Drava at Eszek was built in five days; by all indications,however, four of the five had to be spent on making the swampy areaon the northern bank transmittable since it took but a single day to prepare the pontoon bridge over the river itself. For the crossing ofthe marshes a dam left behind from Roman times (the remnants ofwhich can still be found) may have been utilized. When the Turksinstalled themselves in Hungary on a permanent basis, the part ofthe bridge at Eszek that actually crossed the river continued to be apontoon bridge, whereas the marshes along the bank were crossedby a bridge on supports, and the dam which led towards the Dravawas raised even higher.

In 1526 the Turks built two bridges over the Danube: one at Buda,in order to cross over to the left bank for their withdrawal, anotherat Petervarad. The bridge from Buda to Pest, about 700 meters inlength, was completed in six days with "continuous" labor, that is,working day and night. The army would have needed five days tocross had the bridge not broken up on the night of the fourth day,forcing the last troops and the rearguard to cross by boat. The bridgeat Petervarad was completed in five days.[42]

These considerable accomplishments demonstrate the thoroughcompetence of the Ottoman sappers. Of course, the construction ofthe bridges over the Sava, Drava, and Danube was done underrather favorable conditions since the materials could be shipped tothe site on water. The greatest technical difficulties in militarybridge-building derive precisely from the fact that the rivers may cutacross the line of advance of the armies, so that materials have to betransported over land. To bridge the Sava it was possible to ship thesupplies up the Danube, the Morava, and the Sava itself; as for theDrava or the Danube, the entire fleet could row up.

The maritime fleet of the Ottoman Empire, given its geography,played a role in most of its wars which were conducted simultaneously on land and on sea. The war plans of the Porte were oftenpredicated on a combined and synchronized use of army and navy.Moreover, the very fact that this nation of the steppes, traditionallyon horseback, became the greatest sea-power on earth in a matter ofa single century indicates the tremendous economic power of theEmpire and its inner resilience. As in other areas of military technology, these results were achieved thanks to experts from abroad. Thecapacity of the Ottoman Empire for shipbuilding was enormous. Inthe fourteenth and mid-fifteenth century the superiority of Veniceon the seas was unquestioned, but at the siege of Constantinople therole played by the Ottoman fleet was already decisive. In 1470 no fewer than 300 Turkish vessels participated in the attack on Negroponte. At this time the Venetian fleet still towered over the Ottomanin quality: it did not recoil from battle even when outnumbered six toone. In the following century, however, this difference decreased, forthe great mass of Ottoman ships acquired superiority of numbers. In1490 a Turkish fleet of 270 vessels was able to capture Lepantoagainst the united Venetian and French forces of 150 ships. Indicative of the staggering power of the Ottoman Empire is that, in 1571,although they lost 200 ships at the battle of Lepanto, within a yearthere were again 250 ships under the sultan's flag.

Two types of seagoing naval vessels were built. The galley of 20oars, the crew of which consisted of 30-35 sailors and 200 oarsmen(4 rowers assigned to one oar), plus 100 fighters, and the bastardewith 72 oars pulled by approximately 500 oarsmen (7 to an oar), ableto carry 216 fighters on deck. Thus, for a fleet of 100 vessels,20-25,000 oarsmen, 34,000 sailors, and 12-13,000 soldiers had tobe provided.[43]

The role of the navy equaled that of the army in the conquests;moreover, it provided the Empire with enormous economic returnsby controlling the commerce of the Near East and on the Black Seaand by fighting against pirates. Being able to curtail the cerealimports of Venice, the most dangerous rival of the Empire, it becamean excellent tool of political pressure as well. We have seen, how-ever, that the Ottoman sailors were only masters of the situation onthe Mediterranean, for they were unable to cope with the difficultshipping conditions on the Indian Ocean.

The Strength of the Ottoman Army in 1526

Our present knowledge does not include the exact number ofOttoman troops who fought at the battle of Mohacs. According tocontemporary or near-contemporary estimates, the number wassomewhere between 200,000 and 500,000, but we frequently readthe comment that only 60,000 or 100,000 of this great mass wascombat worthy. In the last hundred years a number of authors estimated the effectives at no more than 60-100,000. Jeno Gyalokaycalculated 75,000 and, most recently, Gyula Kaldy-Nagy estimatedthe number of "regulars" at 60,000, noting that there were someirregulars as well.[44] In view of these extreme divergences, I feel obliged to come up with my own estimates. By way of warning, Imust point out that the number of Ottoman troops participating inthe battle of Mohacs is important to us not primarily in order toemphasize their numerical superiority over the Hungarian army.Even if we accept the lowest estimates, the Turkish side still enjoyedat least a two to one numerical advantage, and that, in itself, issufficient to explain their victory. Rather we are concerned with thetactical problems, and the problems of command, of logistics, and ofmarching techniques. The numbers are relevant from the point ofview of logistics since, naturally, it is far more difficult to supply alarger army with food and forage. This was the reason why Turenne,Montecuccoli, and Zrinyi defined the upper limit of the effectives ofan army at 40 to 50,000.[45] The data seem to show that the Ottomanstate, rich in resources, highly centralized, and boasting of a mosteffective administration, was the only one capable of exceeding thislimit without running the risk of men and horses perishing for wantof food and forage. Of course, even their army experienced problemsof supply, but we must not forget that the army was operating attheaters far removed from the center of the Empire, at distances atwhich no European army would have been able to function.

At the same time, much as in the case of European militaryleaders, the mobilization of large masses entailed extraordinaryproblems of command. Actually, this is the real reason why we dealin such detail with the issue of the size of the Ottoman army: it ismost relevant to its march, to its deployment, and to its battleformation. All the data seem to indicate, in fact, that bringing thearmy to the field of Mohacs and deploying for battle entailed extraordinary difficulties for the Ottoman command. These problems had adecisive bearing on the outcome of the battle itself; in fact, in thefirst phase of the battle, the Hungarian army gained significantadvantages. It also seems the Hungarian high command expecteddifficulties in the deployment of the Turkish forces, and it chose tofight the battle at the very spot where it could expect to derivemaximum advantage from the situation--if, indeed, we are correctin identifying the location. All this makes it possible to reconstructthe whole battle in a way markedly different from former attempts.The following examination serves a purpose, even from the methodological point of view. We will attempt with the help of statistical procedures to analyze the raw data in earlier interpretations andbring them into some sort of rational order. It is hardly necessary to point out that, since we are resorting to statistics, our results can beno more than estimates.

The Ottoman troops comprised four groups: the timar soldiers orsipahis contributed by the timars, the professional troops (janissaries and sipahis of the Porte), the irregulars, and the contingents fromthe vassal states (Moldavia, Wallachia, and the Tartar Khanate ofCrimea). After the professional soldiers, who outnumbered the othergroups, it was the timar sipahis who had the greatest combat value.Nevertheless, it is most difficult to arrive at an estimate of thenumber of this group. While trying to find my way through the mazeof contradictory figures, I found the complaint of Sir Paul Rycaut, anOttoman specialist from the seventeenth century, very convincing,indeed: "It is not easy to make sense out of the matter...."[46]

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541