Toward a New Central Europe

CZECH AND SLOVAK STATESMEN IN FAVOR OF A CENTRAL EUROPEAN FEDERATION

JOSEPH OSTROVSKY

NOW that the new Czechoslovak leaders have accepted the idea of transforming Czechoslovakia into a federal state, it will be interesting to examine the point of view of outstanding Czech and Slovak politicians both in the past and present. Tomas and Jan Masaryk wanted a Central European Federation. New proofs of it.

Mrs. Marcia Davenport, whose husband was one of the founders of Fortune magazine, published a book 1) in which she tells in detail the last weeks of Jan Masaryk before his death. Mrs. Davenport spent many years in Austria and Czechoslovakia, especially Prague, while writing her book on Mozart. During the Second World War when Jan Masaryk was an exile in the USA, Mrs. Davenport became closely acquainted with him He later served as foreign minister for Czechoslovakia until his suicide or murder. Mrs. Davenport lived in Prague during the 1947/48 Communist takeover, where Jan Masaryk was in almost daily contact with her, sending penciled notes and making other interesting remarks to her about the tragic events in his country. Based on her conversations with the younger Masaryk, we read in Mrs. Davenport's book: "It is true that Thomas Masaryk was influenced by Woodrow Wilson's stubborn insistence on selfdetermination for all peoples, away from Masaryk's own original broader concept of a post-war reorganization of the Habsburg empire into a democratic confederation of the hitherto subject provinces. The failure to achieve this after the First World War laid Central and Eastern Europe open to Hitler; and Russians obstruction of any similar plan (which was Jan's own best hope) after the Second World War brought about the Communist satellite countries of today." (p. 333)

The text implies that Jan Masaryk shared his father's idea of forming a democratic confederation in the Central European area. Jan Masaryk's accusation, however, of Wilson's "stubborn insistence

266

of self-determination for all peoples" influenced the older Masaryk to drop his broader concept of a confederation, is false. We know that President Woodrow Wilson demanded, in his message to Congress January 8, 1918, in Point 10: "The peoples of Austria-Hungary whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development". In Anglo-Saxon law "autonomous development" does not mean breaking away from an existing system and forming an independent, sovereign national state. This was still more clearly stated by the British Prime Minister Lloyd George who described the war aims of Great Britain before the British Trade Union Congress in January, 1918, as follows: "The allies are fighting against the German government, not against the German people. They do not wish to destroy Germany or Austria-Hungary. (Point 4) They want self-government for the subject nationalities of the dual monarchy." "Autonomous development" and "self-government" in the English-American terminology and especially in terms of federalism does not mean breaking up a territory into sovereign independent states.

That Tomas Masaryk was in favor of a Central European federal solution can be easily proved. His English friend, Seton-Watson, knew Masaryk before and during the First World War intimately, and said of Masaryk's political plans at the time: "Masaryk did not despair of an evolution in a federal direction what was often called a monarchical Switzerland." 2) The same book contains Masaryk's ideas expressed in a letter to Professor Ernest Denis during Masaryk's first escape from Austria-Hungary. "Some days ago I received the first letter of Mr. Masaryk on the problem of Austria-Hungary" - wrote E. Denis to Seton-Watson. "To establish a confederation sufficiently large, leaving to every Diet an authority fairly expanded; not to confer on the Central Parliament more power than is necessary for the military and foreign affairs, the railways and the Post. Insofar as it will be forever impossible to follow the ethnographic frontiers exactly, to establish in the constitutional laws absolute guarantees to minorities, complete equality of languages, schools and universities; to eliminate all that could resemble the domination of one race by another; complete religious freedom; freedom of the press and association." (Letter of Ernest Denis, French professor of geography, to Seton-Watson, Oct. 31, 1914, p. 52.)

The well-known German biographer, Emil Ludwig, included in his book "Nine Etchings" his conversations with President Masaryk in Prague. Masaryk told his interviewer "his original plan was the transformation of the monarchy into a federal state of which the various members would be autonomous." Professor S. Harrison Thompson proves in his book 3) that Charles Kramar, the other most outstanding Czech politician who stayed at home and became the first Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, published articles in French newspapers

287

during the First World War in which he advocated that a "federal union of the Danubian countries should take the place of the Austrian monarchy." All leading statesmen knew at the time that the Czech members of the Austrian Parliament brought a resolution favoring the "transformation of Austria-Hungary into a League of States." 4) As late as 1918 Tomas Masaryk did not exclude a free federalization of the Danubian nations. In the issue "New Europe" published in Washington, DC he wrote: "Should there be federation of the smaller states, there will be federations freely entered upon out of the real needs of these nations, not out of dynastic and imperialistic motives. Federation without freedom is impossible; that must be emphatically stated to those Austrian and other politicians who are promising autonomy and federation."

>E. Benes and Clemenceau, not Woodrow Wilson caused the abandonment of federal plans.

Francis Joseph I died November 21, 1916. His successor, Charles sent a letter to his French relative, Prince Sixtus, in January 1917, authorizing him to begin negotiations for a separate peace between Austria-Hungary and the Entente powers. On the 8th of March 1917, Poincare stated to Prince Sixtus: ' I am willing to send the formal peace offer of the monarchy-when received to the English and Russian governments". Because of this proposal a real danger existed for the East European emigrants that they could perhaps never return to their homelands. But subsequent events in 1917 favored the emigrants. The Germans learned of the secret peace offer which had been refuted by the Austrian foreign minister, Czernin. Clemenceau was so enraged by the whole affair that he made it public thereby discrediting Austria-Hungary and causing the resignation of Czernin. It was then not a difficult task for the young and active collaborator of Masaryk, E. Benes, who worked in Paris, to persuade Clemenceau that it was in the best interest of France to break up the AustroHungarian empire into small units.

Benes himself was, in his earlier years, an ardent federalist. He finished his studies in Paris with the publication of his doctoral thesis 5) in which his main idea is expressed in the chapter "La Lutte pour l'Autriche Federale". In it he gives a sketch of his federal plan which is similar to that of the Austrian Social-Democrat Karl Renner 6) who remained faithful to his idea of a Danubian federalism. Benes and his collaborators in France deserted the idea of federalism after 1915 and succeeded in convincing Tomas Masaryk to favor the creation of] French-type national centralized states. To allay possible misgivings of President Wilson, the Czech statesmen inserted the following passage in the "Declaration of Independence of Czechoslovakia", made public in the Philadelphia Hall of Independence October 1918: "We

268

believe that the free nations of Central and Eastern Europe may easily federate should they find it necessary.'! In the Pittsburgh agreement signed in the same year with American Slovak leaders, the text speaks of the Slovak "Diet", i.e., legislature which has never been granted to Slovakia in its full sense. This was the cause of the bitter struggle of the Slovak parties, especially Hlinka's Slovak People's Party, with Prague. It caused many crises, e.g. the Tuka affair in 1928, and finally led to the breaking up of the Czechoslovak Republic. (The "independent" Slovak state under Tiso was a typical satellite state -1938-1944.)

Whenever Benes came under pressure he resorted to federalist arguments. For instance, before the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, when he pleaded for a Czechoslovakia that included three million Germans, one million Hungarians, half a million Ruthenians, etc. he promised (Memoir III): "Le regime serait semblable a celui de la Suisse." (Czechoslovakia's government will be like Switzerland's.) Because these promises were never kept, and because Benes, as the most influential politician and later president of his country, stubbornly refused real federalization and even autonomy for the Slovaks and Ruthenians, Czechoslovakia was unable to withstand the storms that followed. In the last moment, before the breaking up of Czechoslovakia, President Benes offered his {'Fourth Plan" on September 5, 1938: "The cantonization of the whole area with a system similar to Swiss cantons,'. But the offer came too late just as Emperor Charles' plan for the federalization of Austria in October 1918 was too late. Like the Hungarian Lajos Kossuth after 1849, Benes went a second time into exile where he had time to ponder his mistakes and plan ahead. In 1850-51 Kossuth produced his plan for a Danubian confederation. 6a) Ex-President E. Benes, in London and the United States in 1939, again turned to plans for federation. In his program of 1939 7) he wrote: "This harmony and synthesis can probably be established in a new system of a real and effective collective security... That can mean only a new system of international policy, more peaceful, more moderate, and more acceptable to all nations but also a kind of federative reorganization, first perhaps in certain regions (the Danubian region, the Baltic region, the Balkan, or Northern Europe) which, I hope will be extended later to the whole of Europe. There is no other possibility if we wish to avoid a repetition of war and crisis in Europe similar to what we have today, every ten or twenty 5 ears."

About the same time Pal Teleki, Prime Minister of Hungary, came to the conclusion that a Central European regional federation was the only protection from powerful Germany and Russia. 7a) If Teleki had left Hungary for London instead of committing suicide, he would have been able to associate with former President Karolyi, the Czech Benes, the Slovak Hodza, the Polish Sikorsky and others

269

who all were at that time in favor of the federalization of Central Europe. They could present the plan to the Allied Powers. If such a plan had been the condition of the American Lend-Lease assistance to Russia, the post-war arrangements in Potsdam, Yalta and Paris would have conformed more to the real interests of the Central European nations.

Between 1940 and 1942 ex-President Benes worked out a plan for a Czechoslovak Polish confederation which he then discussed with General Sikorsky and other Polish statesmen. He elucidated his plan in Foreign Affairs, January 1942: "The creation of this new political unit, Czechoslovak Polish Confederation can already be considered as an accomplished fact." He continues:

"It might be joined by Austria and Hungary and possibly by Romania. In Central Europe those territories which have associated together most naturally, must be fused into firm blocs. These will be the foundations for more expansive structures. . . I should expect that with the passage of time, a natural bridge will be established between the northern and southern confederation in Central Europe-that is, between the Polish-Czechoslovak group and the Balkan group - and that in this way, we shall take a further logical step toward the consolidation of Europe as an element in some sort of world commonwealth; for without the first, the second seems to me inconceivable. I go further and affirm that without this broad European framework, no regional confederation can be envisaged."

As seen from this quotation the Czech statesman stood on the principle of federalism as long as the battle of Stalingrad when he unexpectedly dropped it, went to Moscow and made a pact with Stalin and Molotov. He hoped the Red Army would restore the preMunich Czechoslovakia under his presidency as a purely Slavic state without the three million Germans,, one million Hungarians, etc. When he returned to Czechoslovakia he announced his Kosice program (19453 which nullified the citizenship of all non-Slavs. After expulsion of the Germans, the Czech and Slovak Stalinists organized a strictly centralized Communist regime which engulfed President Benes himself. The Stalinist era lasted almost twenty years-up to 1968. Has it completely ended?

Other Czech emigrant politicians who had remained in the West, continued to demand a more prudent federal solution for the area. Dr. Josef Cerny, chairman of the Czechoslovak Republican Agrarian Party, which was banned by the Communists after 1945, wrote as follows:

"The party succeeds to the political heritage of Antonin Svehla and Milan Hodza who many years ago had already realized that: small nations placed among powerful neighbors can preserve their liberty and independence only if they build up a close political and economic cooperation among themselves... The peoples of Central and South

270

eastern Europe, associated in a federation bloc of more than ninety million, would be an effective contribution toward the political consolidation of Europe. It would supply a firm foundation for peaceful order in an area which, already for the second time in one decade, has been the scene of brutal aggression against small and middlesized nations...

"A joint effort with other countries is indispensable in order to develop all existing excellent potentialities and in order to turn to best account the rich natural resources of the whole region. Furthermore, a federalized Central and Southeastern Europe would be an important step toward the economic integration of Europe. Aiming at this great goal which is paramount in our program, we shall have to seek a way toward the mutual understanding and cooperation of nations; we shall have to remove obstacles, primarily the economic ones; we must overcome the differences existing between nations. We must recognize that a fair minority policy is an effective instrument toward agreement and peace among us.

"The agrarian parties are coming with a far-reaching cultural, economic and social program which is to be their contribution toward the political consolidation of their respective countries, so as to give adequate strength to the nations that are going to form the nucleus for the federalization of Central Europe."

Other groups of Czech politicians like General Prchala and his Czech National Council (seat in London) advocated similar plans for confederation. General Prchala announced: "Instead of reestablishing a united Czechoslovakia we favor Czech lands (BohemiaMoravia-Silesia ) and Slovakia which will be the cornerstone of a Central European Confederation. According to this, the Czech and Slovak peoples will, as equal partners, decide about their participation in a Confederation in Central Europe."

Federal Plans Proposed by Slovak Statesmen.

Dr. Milan Hodza, Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia between 1935 and 1938, published his book: Federation of Central Europe (London, NY, 1942) from which highlights were quoted in the Studies for a New Central Europe (Series 2, No. 1, pp. 3341). Unfortunately, Hodza died in 1944 in England, leaving no counterbalance to the changed policies of President Benes. Other Slovak politicians continued their insistence that a Centralized Czechoslovakia is not the true solution for the Czech and Slovak people. Peter Pridavok, one-time editor of the Slovak newspaper, official organ of the Slovak People's Party, later chief of the Official Slovak Press Bureau and Secretary-General of the Slovak National Council in London, explained what kind of federalism the Slovaks want: 8)

271

"Why a federation and what kind of a federation? The First World War broke up Austro-Hungary so that President Wilsonís principle about the self-determination of nations might become effective. New states were formed-states which were only smaller copies of the former Austro-Hungary. A great economic and military unit was broken up and self-determination remained on paper! The dissolution of Austro-Hungary was one of the main causes of the new aggression of Germany toward the East: there was no one to stand in its way, because the small succession states were not on good terms with each other, they were weak internally and so the German Moloch devoured them 'one by one,. They say that men become wiser after a fracas and thus the world statesmen and politicians today see that it will be necessary to restore in some form the union of the nations in the former Austro-Hungarian empire. That must be done in such a way that the principle of self-determination-again formulated in the Atlantic Charter-be respected and that not only on paper but in reality, so that every nation, even the smallest, becomes the master of its own household and at the same time so that a strong barrier be formed against German expansion.

"This can be attained if all the nations living between Germany and Russia, from the Baltic to the Adriatic and the Mediterranean, unite in one Central European Federation. In such a federation there can even be smaller states than those which originated after the last war, indeed even smaller, e.g. than Slovakia today because even though all these states will manage their own national affairs according to their needs, their foreign policy, defense as well as federal economic policy shall have to be uniform so that with united strength they shall be able to defend themselves against any kind of a new Hitler in the future.

"Could Slovakia be an equal and full-fledged partner of such a federation? It not only could be but must be. In a federation-as is your in America-every state, even the smallest, has equal rights and equal obligations. In our federation there shall be states that are much smaller than our Slovakia. But even these shall enjoy the same rights as the largest and strongest member of the federation. The great warring democracies are eminently interested that in this part of Europe where we live there be peace, order and prosperity, otherwise this area shall become the focus of new disturbances and wars. Therefore in their own interest with combined effort they certainly shall see to it that this organization does not collapse. If its foundations are healthy, every member of it will be content. All the nations of Central Europe taught by the bitter present, will most willingly go into this joint federation."

In October 1945 the Central European Club in London issued a warning that nothing short of a federal solution would bring perrnanent peace to the Central European are. The Statement of Aims 9)

272

signed by the Slovak Pridavok, the Czech Lev Prchala, and many others, including Poles, Yugoslavs, Hungarians, etc. says:

"The experience of the period between the two wars and of the last few years have taught us that the idea of federation of the area, already present in men's minds before the war, will prove to be the best solution for the future. We wish to make it quite clear that this idea is not peculiar to us. Information reaching us constantly from Central Europe shows that the people there are coming to the same conviction and are taking more and more interest in this solution.

"This makes us confident that our conclusions, elaborated eventually in constitutional lines, will be acclaimed by our fellow-countrymen as their own wish and program as soon as they are allowed to express their will freely. This is our justification for setting them forth in the following statement:

"1.) Central Europe-that is the area between Germany and Russia-forms a natural geographical and economic entity inhabited by a number of medium-sized and smaller nations possessing mutual interests and similar culture, and therefore ought to be organized on the basis of a federation. In this way only, Central Europe will cease to be a field of rivalry between the big powers and an area of constant unrest, endangering the peace.

"2.) Within the framework of a Central European Federation (in the following paragraphs referred to as the FEDERATION), every nation shall have full rights to preserve its individuality, to cultivate and to develop its own culture and to bring up its young generation in this spirit. Every nation shall have the right to organize its religious, political, social and economic life according to the will of its people in conformity with the Federal Constitution.

"3.) The Federation must be built upon the fundamental constitutional principle of respect for the full rights of the free men. The Central Federal Authority shall take care that these rights are safeguarded and that internal peace based on Christian charity, universal justice and agreed constitutional order is maintained."

The Slovak National Council 10) addressed a memorandum to Ernest Bevin, English Minister for Foreign Affairs in which the Council pointed out:

"The Slovak people have not been given the opportunity to express their views with regard to the re-establishment of a centralized, unified Czechoslovakia or to elect to its Constituent Assembly such representatives who would voice the true sentiments, aims and aspirations of the Slovak people . . . Never, never again a centralized, unified Czechoslovakia! A new solution must be found for the problems of Central Europe. The justest solution excogited so far is a Federation or United States of Central Europe... We protest most emphatically, and in advance, against any future "liberation" activities

273

by so-called "Czechoslovaks"... There is no Czechoslovak nation to liberate. There is a Czech and a Slovak nation."

The Slovak League of America gave voice to similar demands in a volume published in May, 1951:

"The representatives of Central European nations are working for a federation, for a just and democratic arrangement of the region between Russia and Germany. This is in favor of the establishment of an independent Slovakia. The Slovaks at home and in exile are for such a federation of which Slovakia would be an integral part. Admitting Czechoslovakia as a unit within such a federation would not be a just and democratic settlement of the problem of Central Europe because the Slovaks would continue to be exploited."

Resurgence of Federalism in Czechoslovakia, 1968.

All the previous warnings and federal plans went unheeded. They were sometimes dropped and forgotten by their own authors who, once in power, acted as if homogeneous national states could be formed in multinational areas. Who would be so bold as to counsel the breaking up of Switzerland into three or four "national states"? But this was done in the Danubian area with the results before our eyes. The errors committed led to tragedies for millions but finally, true solutions must emerge. After so many tragic experiments the bureaucratic over-centralization of Czechoslovakia under Stalinist political leaders demonstrated ad ocolus that without federalism no lasting solution is possible. Realizing this, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, under the leadership of Alexander Dubcek decided to change Czechoslovakia into a federal state. The National Assembly brought a similar resolution September 13, 1968.

Political scientists have neglected the study of federalism, and, therefore, there is great danger of not seeing clearly the difference between true federalism and pseudo-federalism. The latter existed, e.g., in Bismarck's Germany, in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, today in the Soviet Union, and in several South American federal states dominated by military juntas. True federalism may exist in a small country like Switzerland, present-day Austria, or in a large area like Australia, Canada, the United States. Czechoslovakia may follow the example of present-day Austria which followed the Swiss pattern. If, however, the Czech and Slovak leaders think that instead of one national state, a federation of two national states will solve the problem, especially under the dictatorship of the Communist party, then they are on the way to another form of pseudo-federalism, as was the case with Austria-Hungary under the meddling rule of the emperor. As soon as Slovakia demanded statehood in January 1968 within a federal system, Moravia immediately announced its claim to a similar status which was denied to it. In a truly federal structure,

274

each community, town, district, Land or canton has its autonomy in its own local affairs. Consequently, the Czech and Slovak leaders would do better if they studied the Swiss or present Austrian federal system. A true federalism would perhaps not be possible under the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, the present experiment will mark only a transition. After a period, there will be formed a Common Market of the states between Russia and Germany and a return not only to President Benes' "cantonization plan" of 1938, but the much earlier plan of Tomas Masaryk 12) for a confederation in the neutralized zone of Central Europe.

1) Marcia Davenport: Too Strong for Fantasy. A personal record of music, literature and politics in America and Europe over half a century. New York. Charles Scribnerís Sons. 1967, pp. 498.

2) Seton Watson: Masaryk in England, Cambridge. 1943, p. 20.

3) S. Harrison Thompson: Czechoslovakia in European History. Kingston Press. 1943, p. 390.

4) Tomas G. Masaryk acknowledges in his book Making of a State (p. 394): "The Czech Parliamentary Association in Vienna demanded the transformation of Austria-Hungary into a League of States."

5) Benes: Le Probleme Autrichien et la Question Tcheque. Paris, 1908, r. 312 'The Austrian Problem and the Czech Question).

6) Renner: Grandlagen und Entwicklungsziele der Oest. Ung. Monarchie Wien, 1908.

6/a) From Kossuth's Unknown Federalist Papers. Pub. in this volume.

7) E. Benes: Democracy today and tomorrow. New York, 1939, p. 218.

7/a) Telekiís message to Minister Pelenyi in Washington was published in the Journal of Modern History, Chicago. June 1964.

8) Peter Pridavok: A Good Word to Slovaks Worthy of It. Jednota Press, Middletown, Pa. USA. 1963, p. 16.

9) The Central European Federal Club: Statement on Aims. Oct. 12, 1945. London.

10) Memorandum of the Slovak National Council in London to Ernest Bevin, Minister for Foreign Affairs, London. March 1948. Signed by Peter Pridavok, chairman.

11) The Slovak League of America: Slovakia Vol. I, No. 1. May 1951.

12) Dan Morgan reported in the Washington Post, Sept. 16, 1968 from Prague that the anniversary of Tomas Masaryk's death (Sept. 14, 1937, exactly 51 years after the birth of his son, Jan) passed without official mention-an ominous sign of relegating Masaryk again to silence instead of returning to the ideas of federalism proposed by Tomas and Jan Masaryk.

275

Toward a New Central Europe