Toward a New Central Europe

THE HUNGARIAN FREEDOM FIGHT AND THE ENTRY OF THE SOVIET ARMY

ISTVAN SZENTPALY

THERE are always secrets, mysteries, false reports about historical events. The traditional state-interest with its carefully guarded official secretiveness prevents the exposure of the driving forces behind facts. The searcher has often nothing to go upon, except the careful work of analysis, the uniting of the links in the chain of cause and effect. This system leads mostly to an explanation the event itself does not offer.

The Hungarian Freedom Fight and Revolution of 1956, is also full of questions which have not been answered so far.

1.) There is no answer to the question of what caused the alleviation of political terror shortly before the Polish and Hungarian events ?

2. ) For instance, what caused the dismounting of the technical sealing of the frontier, the wire obstacles, mine-fields, the watchtowers - the demolishing of the Iron Curtain on the Hungarian Austrian frontier?

3 ) Why was Matyas Rakosi removed from the forefront of politics in Hungary?)

4.) How did it happen, that the invading Soviet troops got mobilized weeks and days before the outbreak of the Revolution, so that on October 23, they could invade the country?

5.) What is behind the fact that the Soviet troops thought themselves in Suez when they sighted the Danube?

6.) What was the moving force of the Soviet diplomatic decisions which followed each other rapidly in those days and which culminated - as the greatest surprise - in the concluding of the Austrian State Agreement they had so violently opposed until then?

To these questions one could add many more--diplomatic activity, the constrained framing of the "atmosphere of Geneva," the antiStalin drive and a whole string of measures inside of Hungary which could facilitate the movements of a large army inside the country.

On the 6th of November, 1956, in the days of the crushing of the Freedom Fight, Soviet Brigadier General K. Grebenyik, commanding officer of Budapest, put his signature on posters and leaflets. The first of those orders sought to explain the presence of the invading troops and their opposition to the Revolution thus:

"The Soviet troops have temporarily entered Budapest on request from the Revolutionary Workers and Peasants' Government, to give brotherly aid to the Hungarian people in their struggle to protect the fruits of their socialist efforts, to crush the counter-revolution, to avert the Fascist danger etc., etc."

This order was no surprise, nor was it new, it only repeated what we had heard on the radio on October 24, 1956 at 9 a.m. in Budapest:

"Counter-revolutionary bands have caused a serious situation by their base armed attack during the night. The bandits have entered plants and public buildings. The government did not reckon with this bloody treacherous attack and has appealed to the Warsaw Pact - for help from the Soviet troops located in Hungary. These have responded favorably to the request of the Government and are taking part in the restoration of order."

This news release had appeared in all major international papers. It was underlined by the fact of the Government having asked for help from the Soviet army and had thus given a legal aspect to the presence and intervention of the troops. Between the measures of the Government on the 24th and the Order of the Day by Grebenyik on Nov. 6. there is a vast and important difference. The measures of Oct. 24 limited the help to the local garrisons of Soviet troops, the order of Nov. 6, already mentions "entering troops" to execute the order of intervention. It is remarkable that the garrisoned troops hardly responded, though their forces would have been sufficient .o crush the unprepared and unarmed revolution. The evaluation of the Hungarian Revolution had achieved an international importance. From this point of view, it is particularly important to confront the facts with the mental attitude and to recognize the reality of the situation.

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On the 24th of October 1956 at dawn, I started from my home in Szentendre - 23 kilometers from the capital - on a bicycle to Budapest to see personally how things were regarding the Revolution. Halfway there, l met an acquaintance on the highway, which was jammed with excited people. He (P.M.J.) was trying to reach his home on a battered, muddy motorcycle. He told me that he had left Zahony (on the Soviet frontier) in the afternoon of the previous day. "The troops are pouring in, I couldn't get ahead of them up to Szolnok." We couldn't as yet evaluate the importance of this information: I only drew the conclusion that the Soviet troops would crush the

Hungarian Revolution and one could not romance about the effective development of affairs. I didn't keep this opinion to myself; I mentioned it to my friends and acquaintances without getting much reaction .

I reflected long on the words of the acquaintance I had met. The tact of troops streaming into our country before the outbreak of the Revolution shows that these troops marched in irrespectively of the Revolution, with some other intention.

During the first week of the Revolution, I bicycled in every day to Budapest. I saw Soviet tanks and small units, they did not seem to have any inimical intentions. They seemed to say: If you donít hurt us. we wonít hurt you! But at certain points, further away, one could distinctly hear shooting across Budapest.

On the 26th of October, I visited a friend - a doctor - in the Pharmaceutical Institute on Ulloi ut. To my astonishment, I saw a first-aid station in a corner of the building and just as I passed, two young students were leading in a wounded Russian soldier. His left arm was shot through. As they removed his coat, some Rumanian money fell out of his pocket. "How did you get these "lei," I asked him. He told us, that he started with his unit from Temesvar, Rumania, on October 19. They thought that the Suez Canal was their destination. His words corroborated everything my acquaintance on the motorcycle had said earlier. It was evident, that there was no connection between the invasion of the Soviet Army and the spontaneous outbreak of the Revolution. It was visible that ,he silence surrounding the invasion was hiding some secret Soviet intention. Otherwise why would the proclamation on October 24 only have mentioned the mobilization of the units garrisoned in Hungary and not openly admitted that the troops in the neighboring countries - such as Rumania - were already marching in to suppress the Revolution.

In the first days of November, 1956, I arrived in Salzburg. Austria. This town and its surroundings were the headquarters of the fleeing Hungarians streaming into Austria. There was a separate camp where those were quartered who had arrived with arms and had to be treated as prisoners of war. I interceded on their behalf with the "Landeshauptmann" of Salzburg, Dr. Joseph Klaus (later Primer Minister of Austria), who immediately intervened at my request that those unjustly held as "prisoners of war" should be freed. Through the news I collected from among these I enlarged my information regarding the Soviet invasion and got a full picture of the entire affair. I heard that some of the units of the invading Soviet Army had left their headquarters as early as October 12 and entered Hungary according to a previously well-prepared plan. Their starting points were: Kiev, Sofia, Bucharest, Uzhorod, Temesvar, etc. Their forces had 15 divisions. To these were added other units. The Soviet

troops were armed for war and differed or, this point entirely from the garrisoned troops. Many of them thought that the Danube was the Suez Canal.

In Salzburg the editors and staff of the paper, "Salzburger Nachrichten," helped me to continue my data-collecting activity. The entire archives of the paper were at my disposal and thus I was able to put the results of my research into regular files. I discovered from the large European newspapers, that the Soviets had made preparations for moving units in the first days of October. The chief concentration place for these maneuvers was around the "Baghdad States". News of similar activities came also from the Polish and East German frontiers. I did not find any concrete details about their movements in Hungary - this could only be heard on the Hungarian revolutionary radio---but these mostly agreed with other disturbing items of news. Today, seen from a distance of 10 year, the facts registered at the time have not changed their importance. On the contrary, they have gained stronger illumination by being coupled with newer details. On November 93, 1961, on CBS Walter Cronkite interviewed general Eisenhower. We watched the interview. "It began this way," said Eisenhower, "that everyone got a little confused, you know this anyhow - and when the large Soviet Army invaded Hungary with the tank units, there was nothing ore could do about it, the tragedy just happened." In l964 an American book called Diplomat Among Warriors, by Robert Murphy, came on the book market. Murphy was Deputy Secretary of State in Washington in 1956, so that his information was of the utmost value. He says in his book, that nobody expected the Revolution and nobody had any plan how to act: neither the USA, nor Moscow, nor Tito, nor the Hungarian authorities. The American legation in Budapest had no Minister. Mr. Christian M. Ravndalt had been sent to Ecuador in July 1956. His successor, Mr. F. T. Wailes, serving in the South African Union, only arrived in Budapest on the 2nd of November. Several members of the Government blamed the State Department and the USIA for having been taken so unaware of the impending danger. Murphy only heard of the Soviet troops entry into Hungary across the Carpathian passes on October 28, Sunday at 3 a.m. He writes: "The invasion by Soviet troops of Hungary was the greatest international entanglement since he Korean War 6 years ago. It was even more dangerous, because of the possibility of direct contact between the American and the Red Army in Europe." Murphy affirms that the units of the Red Army took action on October 24 and that further units entered the country in the next few days. In the November and December issues of. newspapers "Kanadai Magyarsag" and "Amerikai Magyar Elet", Alexander Szucs mentions the events under the title: "The frontier station at Zahony during the Revolution" Szucs was at the time station master in Zahony. He relates that during the Revolution, owing

to the general strike, the Soviet could not convey troops by rail. However more and more crossed the frontier daily and marched into Hungary. This announcements received small credit at the time.

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It is beyond question that the Soviet mobilization was not caused by the Revolution in Hungary and that her military movements began much before the outbreak of the Revolution. The arms and equipment of the mobilized Soviet army were not meant to subdue an unarmed revolution but were intended for far more subtle aims. It ought not to be difficult to find the plan of these aims. One cannot fail to connect the Soviet march into Hungary with the similar military movements in the Baghdad States and other European countries. Such movements were accompanied not only by many plans, preparations and problems of transportation but also by diplomatic arrangements. It we study the Soviet case, diaries of 1956 and prior to 1956, we can find carefully prepared military and diplomatic regulations, each one of which proves the Soviet plans of action. In this article we naturally must concentrate on the Hungarian events, but if someone takes the trouble to study the events in Poland and the character of the Soviet movements there, he will surely discover similarities to the situations in Hungary.

The Soviets Preparation for Mobilization in Hungary

After the 2nd World War, when the Soviet's political situation seemed to be consolidated in Hungary, the occupation troops retired to certain camps, so that after 1947 the Hungarians, particularly the people in Budapest had little contact with them. It was the more astonishing to note that in 1956 this situation suddenly changed. The capital and its immediate surroundings observed that the military occupation had not ceased. Trucks filled with Soviet soldiers raced about everywhere. Already in the spring of 1956, the population on the Soviet-Hungarian frontier noticed the arrival of mechanized units which, as it was later proved, were intended to inspect the load capacity of the bridges and underpasses and roads. In 1956 on the 10th of May to everyone's surprise the dismantling of the Iron Curtain began on the Austrian frontier. Wire obstacles and mines were removed. In August 19;6 strict orders were issued for the economical use of gasoline and oil. Most bus lines were closed. Private cars had to be given up, railways restricted. Railroad officials declared at the time that large transports had arrived from the Soviet Union. It became known that the "headquarters" would be located on the Danube island of Szentendre, north of Budapest. One could watch the preparations from the opposite shore. At many places bridges that had been situated on the branch of the Danube were moved over

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to the island. On the right shore underground cables were laid towards the north, in the direction of the mountains. According to unconfirmed reports the Soviets planned to install rockets there.

On the first of December 1957 I got a letter from Germany:

"I took part in the autumn of 1956 in maneuvers at about 120 kilometers from Kiskunfelegyhaza, Bugacpuszta on the line to Kalocsa. This was the manipulation with atomic arms produced by the Soviet army. They were perfectly managed. All of the Hungarian units were elite troops numbering 32,000 men. The attacking troops stood between the town - Kiskunfelegyhaza and the Danube. 12 kilometers further back the defending forces stood. Both had all the arms that existed in the Hungarian army. The nucleus consisted of an extra Soviet unit. The attack began on October 3 at dawn and lasted 41/2 days, till the attacking forces reached the Danube. I took part personally in finding the territory where, the atomic explosion took place 7 kilometers to the west of Bugachaza. The maneuvers ended when the attacking forces reached the Danube line. Crossing the Danube was accomplished by technical units on 3 bridges and 11 heavy ferries."

Such a maneuver in itself does not mean much, but it belongs to the completion of the entire picture.

I must add my personal experience. From the end of July and continuing over a period of about 30 days, every night towards midnight air units coming from the direction of Czechoslovakia and going to the south flew en masse over my house which was on the ridge of a hill. I heard later, from workmen in the airport, that these machines were transporting munitions to Egypt. There were as many as several thousand. It is known that at the time of the Suez conflict the Israeli army captured an entire arsenal. This arsenal was certainly connected with the above-mentioned activity.

More interesting even are the diplomatic steps taken to secure success to the armed forces. The most spectacular was the Austrian State Treaty. This was surely in connection with the military plan. Till the treaty, Austria was divided into 4 zones and required strong Western units. It had now to be made into a "military vacuum." Together with the Western forces, the Soviet forces had to leave. This sacrifice was cheap by Soviet reckoning because it opened the way across the Austrian military vacuum.

The dismantling of the Iron Curtain served the same purpose and corroborated Eisenhower's and Murphy's communications. They do not deny that they feared an armed conflict which would have happened - according to Eisenhower - had America made a military move. The Soviet secured its position not only to the West but in all directions and regulated all its pending alliances by, among other instances, restoring the friendship with Tito and Japan.

Political Aims of the Soviet Back of the Mobilization

In 1956 the events in Suez ranked first in importance in the political world. The aim of the Soviet Union was the creation of an Arab Soviet state.. If this would have succeeded, it would have entirely changed the Near and Far Eastern political balance. Its advance toward the West was intended to secure the plans-for Suez. The Soviets' military advance meant such a menace to the West that it was generally supposed that no opposition would be attempted. The menace to the West was strengthened as a result of Austria's disarmament. Both Eisenhower and Murphy corroborate this. But we cannot agree with Eisenhower where he says that the Hungarian Revolution could not have happened at a worse time than when the West was occupied with Suez. We think, on the contrary, that by sacrificing herself, Hungary through having disrupted the entire railroad system, having obscured the political plans of the Soviets, and having frustrated their aims was an asset in preventing the Western assault by the Soviet Army. This was quite sufficient to enable the FrenchEnglish intervention to develop itself with full force and by this initial success to upset the entire Soviet plan and oblige them to accept a compromise. Without the Hungarian Revolution the Soviet would have reached the Austrian frontier unopposed, and if this would not have been sufficient to stop the French-English intervention, it might have resulted in an international conflict, in which case - according to American judgment war would have been inevitable.

We have answered the questions posed at the beginning of this article with the following explanations. The alleviation of the Rakosi terror served the purpose of creating a peaceful atmosphere in which the advancing Soviet troops could move and the dismantling of the Iron Curtain opened the way towards Austria. The Austrian Treaty likewise served these same purposes.

The Hungarian Revolution acted as a bomb. Soviet plans were disrupted by the astonishment created by the Revolution. The Western radio stations gave the impression that America might have had a hand in it. The news of the Revolution awakened dissatisfaction in other vassal states, thereby preventing many military moves of the Soviets. The Kremlin even thought of giving up Hungary to save the rest of its satellites. When they found out that nobody stood behind Hungary they turned all their might and fury against a country that stood disarmed and helpless.

The Revolution is an unpaid debt weighing on the Western conscience. The Russian people would honestly like to erase the memory of those days. Time will never let it be forgotten. And when nations get back their rights only then will the debt of the West be paid.

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Toward a New Central Europe