Toward a New Central Europe

THREE NEGLECTED DOCUMENTS ON SELF-DETERMINATION AND NEUTRALITY

MIROSLAV LAZAROVICH

THE Moscow Pravda of September 26, 1968 tried to justify the invasion of Czechoslovakia by saying:

"The occupation troops are conducting a struggle for the principle of self determination of the peoples of Czechoslovakia, for their inalienable light themselves to decide their own fate." It continues: "Former ideas of sovereignty and national independence could not and will not inhibit the USSR from forceful intervention against 'counterrevolutionaries' in Communist countries and against the revival of neo-Nazism in East Germany."

This statement is in stark opposition to Lenin's principle announced on November 8, 1917, when Poland, the Baltic states and a great part of the Ukraine were under German occupation. At that time, the second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers, and Peasants' Deputies, at the request of Lenin, accepted the following "Decree on Peace'': 1)

"The Workers' and Peasants' Government created by the Revolution of 24-25 October (6-7 Nov.) and based on the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' deputies, proposes to all belligerent peoples and their governments the immediate opening of negotiations for a just and democratic peace.

By such a peace the Government understands an immediate peace without annexations (i.e. without seizure of foreign territory, without the forcible incorporation of foreign nationalities) and without indemnities.

By annexation or seizure of foreign territory the Government understands, in accordance with the sense of justice of democracy in general, and of the laboring classes in particular, the incorporation into a large or powerful State of a small or weak nationality without the definitely, clearly, and voluntarily expressed consent and desire of this nationality, regardless of when this forcible incorporation took place, regardless also of the degree of development or backwardness of the nation forcibly annexed or forcibly retained within the frontiers of the given State, and, finally, regardless of whether this nation is located in Europe or in distant lands beyond the seas.

If any nation whatsoever is retained as part of a given State by force, if, despite its expressed desirewhether expressed in the decision of political parties, or by rebellions or insurrections against

national oppression it has not the right of choosing freethe troops of the annexing or, generally, the more powerful nation being completely withdrawn and without any pressure being brought to bear the constitutional forms of its national existence, then its incorporation is an annexation, that is, seizure and coercion.

The Government considers it the greatest crime against humanity to continue this war for the sake of dividing among the powerful and wealthy nations the weaker nationalities which they have conquered."

This practically forgotten Leninist document clearly condemns such military intervention by which the Red Army tried to prohibit self-determination in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and menaces Rumania, Yugoslavia, etc.

Creating a Central European neutral zone would make the Soviet Union secure against aggression and the "danger of revival of neo-Nazism or German revanchism."

It is an historic fact that Russia was invaded from the West several times since Napoleon's adventure. The peoples of Russia are therefore, understandably entitled to absolute guarantees against a repetition of an invasion of their country. If they are honestly convinced that the great German nation, perhaps in alliance with other nations, may present a danger, the have the right to ask guarantees. If all the great powers, including the nuclear powers, should guarantee a broad neutral zone between Russia and Germany and, like Austria, sixty nations would sign a neutralization act, this guarantee would serve effectively to allay the fears of the Kremlin. It would make the expensive keeping of foreign armed forces unnecessary in this zone and Anglo-American forces could leave the European continent. This would lead to a real detente, mutual disengagement with international guarantees under the United Nations. The NATO could then be transformed from a military alliance into a peaceful partnership which, together with the USSR, would guarantee the neutrality of the Central European zone. Nothing else would serve so well to prevent aggression.

Rumanian and Hungarian Governments in Favor of Neutrality1939

Documents on German Foreign Policy (London 19491953. Series D. 1936-1945. Vol. VIII. p. 305, 317, 319) contains the text of the Rumanian government's plan for neutrality which the Rumanian foreign minister, Grigore Gafencu, formulated. (See also his "Prelude to the Russian Campaign," Mules. 1945). The plan was launched by Rumania in November 1939, after preliminary talks with statesmen of the Balkan countries. The Rumanian official plan contained the following points:

1.) The members of the neutral bloc would declare themselves neutral in conflicts of war.

2.) They would sign a non-aggression pact with each other.

3.) They would be obligated to a politically benevolent neutrality if a member of the bloc became a victim of aggression.

4.) Along the common frontiers military units would be demobilized.

5.) Mutual consultations would be held to protect the interest of the neutral countries. 6.) Foreign ministers of the neutral countries would form a council.

The initial reaction of the other governments including that of the Hungarian Pal Teleki favored this plan which the Italian foreign minister, Ciano, also supported. But later Hitler told Ciano that "although the interest of Germany is to maintain the neutrality of the Southeastern and Balkan states, the establishment of a permanent bloc of neutral countries may lead to the crystallization of a situation which may hinder further plans.'' Therefore, Nazi Germany prohibited the further discussion of this plan for neutrality.

Professor Sandor Szilassy has recently had access to the papers of John F. Montgomery, American ambassador to Hungary between 1933 and 1940. The ambassador recorded that Pal Teleki, several times Prime Minister of Hungary, was also in favor of a neutralization of Central Europe. But caught between the struggle of great powers, he committed suicide on April 3, 1941. (See the article "Hungarian Efforts for Neutrality in 1939," Uj Latohatar (New Horizon) Munich, July-August, 1968 pp. 317-328.)

Neutrality Once Favored by the Hungarian Communist Party

Under the title "Documents from the history of the Party" the official newspaper of the Hungarian Communist Party, Nepszabadsag, (Budapest, Nov. 73, 1968) published recollections of the period following September 1939 when diplomatic relations had been established for a short time between Hungary and the Soviet Union. The article says:

"It would have been possible for Hungary to declare a policy neutrality in order to avoid the war of the imperialists. The Communist Party, reorganized at that time, tried to influence developments in this direction."

Imre Nagy, Moscow-trained nationalist Communist leader and twice Minister President; of Hungary, reaffirmed in October 1956, the demand for neutrality. Why does not the Hungarian Communist Party demand political neutrality now as it had once recommended for Hungary? Or in absence of the Soviet troops would it favor neutrality again?

1) Kluchnikov and Sabanin, vol. II, p. 88. Soviet Documents of Foreign Policy. Selected and edited by Jane Degras. Vol. I. 1917-1924, Vol. IL 1925-1932. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. oxford University Press. London, New York, Toronto. 1951.

Toward a New Central Europe