Toward a New Central Europe

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

1. Signs of the Times

Under this heading, between 1963 and 1969, each and every issue of the Studies for a New Central Europe carried a timely survey of world affairs geared to the specific situations prevailing in the Danube Valley. These analyses were prepared by the Editors of the journal, primarily by Eugene Padanyi-Gulyas, Chairman of the Editorial Board, and Alexander Gallus, Editor. In this volume the last two of those analyses are being republished.

F.S.W.

a) ON AN EAST-WEST SECURITY CONFERENCE

THE necessity of a European Conference aiming at general security, based on regional agreements, was recurrently mentioned by a number of diplomats and foreign ministers, and was expressed in a resolution of the participants of the conference at Karlove Vary in 1967, which is the hundredth anniversary of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. The peoples who enjoyed a half century long peace following the Compromise, are looking forward with keen interest to a possible new covenant that would establish lasting order in their region. A reorganized, federally integrated, neutral group of Central European nations seems to be the best way toward their future progress. At the same time, as a significant balancing factor, it would safeguard peace in an area where two world wars started and where eliminating the causes of a possible friction may prevent or localize any future disturbance of international peace. It is in the interest of both the USSR and the Western Powers, that such a neutralized and federated zone of independent nations be established between the Germans and the Russians. Therefore we suggest that a Consultative Conference be arranged to discuss the possibilities and preconditions of such an arrangement, on the basis of a plebiscite under the supervision of the United Nations. The purpose of the suggested Consultative Conference would be to prepare recommendations for a future European Security Conference.

The peoples of this region are anxious to preserve the benefits acquired in the last decades. They are proud of the industrialization of their countries, achieved by the sacrifices of their workers and engineers who put the common cause before selfish interest. They are ready to go on the still long way leading to social justice for all. They are willing to work for the common goals of an enlightened

evolutionary humanism; for a social organization of life on our planet; and for that global peace, which has to be a great, well-planned endeavor rather than bourgeois tranquillity. Their dream is a peaceful federation of peoples living in established social order, with no dominating and struggling classes, or nationalities goaded by chauvinistic desire of aggrandizement. They feel, furthermore, that this can only be accomplished in complete freedom. There is a great faith in their minds that once the right of self-determination is granted to them, and based on their past common experiences, they will show new ways for progress by cooperation in a modern world as they did in the past. Between the peoples of Western Europe and the peoples of the Soviets with friendship and good will toward both, they hope to show an example of coordinating different national talents and ambitions to fulfill their common historic role in this area. Rather than merely waiting for the unification of Europe, they are anxious to promote this process with their example by reestablishing that spirit of solidarity which was disturbed and confused only by outdated ultranationalism of past generations. Their different languages, national characteristics and folklore may only make the life of this region more colorful and attractive. They consider it their mutual vocation to demonstrate unity in variety in an age when divergent political forces strive for world domination, with millions of frustrated and suffering people all around the world, living in misery and uncertainty. The dark clouds of threatening Third World War- of a possible first total nuclear war - are gathering on the horizon. "If elephants are fighting, it is the grass that will be crushed" - says an old Indian proverb, and we fear for our people living on a dangerous historic crossroads. All conscientious men striving for lasting peace based on justice, condemning war; desiring to use atomic power exclusively for peaceful purposes; have to reduce the chances of friction and eliminate sources of possible conflicts. Stopping the arms' race; the abolishment of controversial military blocs and the withdrawal of all military forces from all foreign territories; - common goals of all nations interested in peaceful progress - remain, however, in the realm of dreams unless we make practical steps toward more realistic understanding of each other's problems.

Such a practical step would be the further neutralization, the socalled "Helvetization" of East Central Europe, the home of about a hundred million people, whose desire is to live outside the sphere of interest of any major power and to be neutral like Switzerland or Austria. Such a group of independent nations, in some form of federation, would be strong enough to thwart the predominance of any single European power over the common interests of the European family of nations. They have been able to secure this in the past. Their balancing role may facilitate even the slow process toward European unity in the future.

The last hundred years proved without a shade of doubt that the problem of Central Europe remained unsolved. The situation, indeed, is more unstable than ever. This inflammable complex of problems and tensions might be blasted like a powder keg in any major international conflict similar to the cases of Cyprus and Indonesia. This troubled world does not need more crises. Foresight and preventive steps are in the common interest of the major powers and of the peoples concerned.

The area of uncertainty. An atmosphere of general uncertainty and nervousness is increasingly noticeable in Europe, especially in countries located between Western Europe and Russia. A division of the continent into Western, Central and Eastern Europe was created by geography, history and military events and was so acknowledged by President De Gaulle in his speech in the Polish parliament. Though a balance of power - sometimes called a "balance of terror"-seems to exist between the two super-powers, more than a hundred million people living between the Germans and Russians consider their states unstable. They earnestly hope that neither an outbreak nor war will occur. But there was similar hope in 1914 and there are many who still remember that a single shot from a revolver was enough to trigger World War I. World Was II started in the same area twenty-five years later.

Besides the dangerous military situation, there is also no real political peace. Bitter tensions continue among the neighbor states in Central Europe and in their relations to the great powers they feel isolated, dependent, living in a climate of hate and suspicion, where cooperation should prevail. The situation is far from satisfactory. It is ready to explode anew as it did in 1914, 193841, and in 1956.

The idea of a Conference on Security. This atmosphere of general uncertainty, viewed in the dark context of the dangerous Far Eastern situation, probably motivated the recent series of public statements urging a "European Security Conference". Delegates of the USSR and other Communist governments and parties at the Karlovy Vary conference in April 1967 declared the urgent need of a European Conference on Security and Cooperation. During the last two years almost all foreign ministers from the Communist countries have taken every opportunity to express this desire. E.g., Janos Peter, Hungarian Foreign Minister, said on March 11, 1967: "Many West European countries reacted more favorably so far to the proposals of the socialist countries concerning preparations for a conference on European security. After so many dangers and conflicts there now exist the objective prerequisites for the countries and peoples in this part of Europe to develop further their relations to the benefit of the general international situation. Our government strives in the first place to be a constructive factor in the development of the international

situation in her immediate surroundings - in the Danubian Valley and in Central Europe."

Following Soviet President Podgorny's visit to Austria in 1968 a communique was also issued strongly emphasizing the necessity of such a conference.

Should not both the Atlantic Treaty and the Warsaw Pact be replaced by a new solution? This would only be possible if a turn for the better takes place in Central Europe and peace and progress are assured by the establishment of a zone of neutrality accepted, acknowledged, and guaranteed by both the Western powers and the Soviet Union.

Past errors and plans for confederation. The many centuries of symbiosis in Central Europe was disrupted several times by outside powers who interfered in the region but had no real understanding of the complex problems of these nations. These foreign powers attempted to use the nations as pawns in their own power struggles in Europe and in their attempts to gain world domination. Such interference in Central Europe was not even in their own best interests as such actions increased their military budgets enormously, and slowed down their own peaceful development.

The only way to achieve lasting peace in the area is to promote the reorganization of the whole region into a greater economic and political unit through a maximum of free cooperation of the nations bound together by geography and history in accordance with the trend of our age rather than by the present treaties and forced alliances created by outside powers.

One economic and political formation - the former Habsburg Empire - functioned over a long period, but was finally disrupted when the rulers became dependent first on an alliance with Germany that led to World War I. The "Little Entente" period was overthrown by the German-Italian venture against Russia (193945) that resulted in the Soviet Union's seizing control of Central Europe in 1945. No outside power is strong enough to rule this region permanently without endangering the balance of power and world peace. Such domination always provokes counteraction and counter alliances.

After the ignorant, conceited, and aggressive acts of Clemenceau (1919), Hitler (1938), and Stalin (1944) in East Central Europe, the nations of the Danubian area now recall the plans for a peaceful confederation first formulated by the Hungarian Kossuth (1850), the Rumanian Popovici (1906), the Czechoslovakian Hodza (1936), the Austrian Renner (1946), and many others. They have been impelled to do so by the mistakes made first in 1919 when hundreds of thousands of men and women were made homeless, and millions became second- and third-class citizens. Later - after 1940 - again millions were forced to leave their homes and other millions were murdered

in the war, in death camps, or perished on the highways and in refugee camps. This still poisons international relations.

Peaceful and normal evolution is long overdue in Central Europe. No such normal progress has been made in the last hundred years as evidenced in the Scandinavian countries, in England, and Switzerland where society has succeeded in developing in an orderly way having now the highest standard of living in Europe. In Central Europe revolutions and counterrevolutions have caused catastrophes and misery. One hundred years after the transitory benefits reaped by the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 concluded after the battle of Koeniggraetz, the nations of this region now hope for a new settlement, a modern Covenant of "Helvetization" to settle their differences institutionally for many future generations. Such a new order of a Central European neutral zone could be based only on self-determination and free self-government.

A new and modern compromise solution needed. Must there be another "Koeniggraetz", another and greater catastrophe to force the great powers to accept a fair compromise in the best interest of all nations concerned? Must Russia wait several more decades before its standard of living is raised to that of Western Europe, let alone that of America? Also, is it necessary that both the USSR and the USA continue their costly arms race that challenges the patience of millions of taxpayers who are now overburdened with heavy military commitments? Would not Germany also fare much better if her neighbors were prospering in a neutral Central European zone strong and healthy along her Eastern borders? Planning for a new expansion eastward at the expense of peace and happiness of those nations who form a natural barrier to the possible "Drang" to the East would be self-destructive.

We have come to the conclusion that the time is ripe for ail countries concerned to send their most experienced experts in international and constitutional law, economy, finance, communication, military and nationality problems of Central Europe to meet at a consultative conference possibly in Vienna or Geneva. Its purpose would be to work out alternate solutions and make recommendations for a coming European Security Conference. Following this, the governments could further develop the treaties of neutralization, disengagement, "Helvetization" of the area involved. Neutral experts could make provisions for plebiscites or special local studies under international control where necessary. The next step would then be a Summit Conference of the nations concerned together with major powers to sign the agreements granting and guaranteeing the neutrality of a New Central Europe which is the best possible safeguard for a lasting peace and security in the area.

b) TOWARD A THIRD WAY IN A NEW CENTRAL EUROPE

EUROPE is an extremely sensitive area of the world where the use of bare military power will bring neither permanent peace nor a solution to its problems and needs. The Russians will soon realize that the use of a raw force in a highly developed area backfires. The military "blood and iron" method of Napoleon, the Czars, Bismarck, Mussolini, and Hitler harmed in the long run more than they helped their nations and Europe. American and Western policy must also change from their predominantly military counter measures, pacts, and expenditures, - as Richard Nixon recently emphasized - to "preventive diplomacy" and peace planning with "regional peace pacts" and the wholehearted participation of the nations concerned.

Three Alternatives in Europe

The solutions commonly advocated for Europe fall into three categories:

a) A United Europe. This is presently politically unrealistic, at least for the foreseeable future and so long as the Soviet Union is a nuclear superpower. Moscow would never give its consent to a politically, economically, and militarily unified Europe that included East Central Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals." Such a unity exists only culturally, based on deep historical sentiments of the European nations. But politically, a United States of Europe is still unrealistic, a fantastic dream like that of Coudenhove-Kalergi's Paneuropa proposed between the two world wars to which some statesmen like Briand, Seipel, and Masaryk gave lip service but which proved to be a political illusion. Now, the European Movement invites its friends and adherents to almost yearly conferences with its program devoted to "European unification." The main speaker of the last conference, held January 19-20, 1968, in Rome, was the German professor, Walter Hallstein, who emphasized the idea of "Europe as a whole." Another organization, Action Europeene Federalist held its congress November 18-19, 1967, in Brussels with the participation of Jean Rey, Professor Hendrik Brungmans, Dr. Dieter Roser, Vice President of the German Europa-Union, and others. The 17th congress of the latter organization met on March 4-5, 1968, in Cologne. But Jerzy Jankowski, a Polish journalist and editor of Poland in Europe who attended these congresses summarized their net results as follows: "The regimes in power in Eastern Europe are hostile to the United Europe idea. Thus, what is there left to say at the congresses besides repeating cheap formulas about an 'entire Europe' and platonic compliments to the peoples of the 'Second Europe'?"1)

b) The present Two Europes organized militarily by NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries would permanently fix the present East an(1West Europe side by side. This would be hell to those nations caught unwillingly between the two superpowers: the ministers of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This present status quo would leave the German problem unsolved, the Berlin Wall and the Iron Curtain permanently established, the Cold War, intermittently intensified, especially now after the occupation of Czechoslovakia and as it was previously, after 1948 and 1956. The greater the increase of military power on both sides of the Iron Curtain, the more unbearable will life be for the 120-180 millions who live between Russia and Gel-many. Such enormous military expenses incurred by both America and the USSR are also an unnecessary burden on their economies that unbalance their budgets, foreign payments, and hinder finding solutions to their problems at home. Both America and England are willing to withdraw from Europe but as long as the Two Europes exist, a military de-escalation in Europe remains a dream. At whose expense were the 650,000 Soviet troops deployed in Czechoslovakia and now rocket bases established there? The NATO forces, America, Germany and also Yugoslavia immediately reacted by increasing their military expenditures, ordering more expensive rockets, tanks and jet bombers. Cannot lessons be learned from Hitler's military failures? The present trend only lays the base for a Third World War which could not be contained in Europe. e)

c) We submit our realistic solution as a Third Way:

THREE EUROPES.

1. Western Europe with its nucleus, the Common Market.

2. East Europe which is practically Soviet Russia.

3. Central Europe, a neutralized buffer zone between Russia and Germany.

French President De Gaulle was realistic when he reminded the world in a speech at the Warsaw parliament. that politically there are Three Europes: Western, Central and East Europe. While a United Europe is a utopian dream, the present Two Europes a hell, Three Europes would be to the advantage of all nations - and is politically realistic. It would be in the interest of the nuclear power too, including the Soviet Union.

For Peace and Military De-escalation:
a Neutral Buffer Zone is needed in Europe

It is vain to exhort the leaders of the Kremlin to move their troops out of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Berlin so long as the British-American troops remain and are even strengthened on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Russia was invaded several times since Napoleon and it understandably feels the need of protection against what it calls "German revenge" or other aggression. The present "revenge" of West Germany serves as an admirable bogeyman

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to keep the Warsaw Pact group in line. Therefore a neutral buffer zone between the Russians and Germans would release the Soviet Union from this fear and enable the Kremlin to concentrate against a possible invasion from China. If a Central European neutral zone were guaranteed by the Great Powers and, as in Austria's case, by some other 60 states, the security of Russia's western frontiers would be unquestionable. Moscow's obsession must be removed by a proposal made through diplomatic channels to neutralize the zone from Finland down through the Danubian countries. Such an agreement would make the motivation written into the recent SovietCzechoslovak treaty obsolete. Article I of the treaty "ensures the security of the countries of the socialist community against the increasing revanchist strivings of the West German militarist forces." Neutralization would serve the security of the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia as well. It would open the way for a military de-escalation. The neutralization of Austria in the State Treaty of 1955 was one of the wisest steps taken in decades. The Kremlin now has less trouble with Austria than with the non-neutralized Hungary, Rumania, or Czechoslovakia. Neutral Sweden and Finland are better neighbors than Rumania. It will of course be in the best interest of the nations in such a neutralized buffer zone to have good economic and cultural relations with Russia. With their military expenditures reduced, peoples of the zone will attain a higher level of existence.

The idea of a neutralized Buffer Zone gains momentum

Fifteen years ago many questioned the usefulness of such a neutralized buffer zone between the great powers. Western diplomacy was reluctant in giving consent to neutralize Austria. Only after more than 280 fruitless four-power conferences did it yield. It was the Austrian Chancellor Raab who succeeded in negotiating the matter with Molotov in Moscow. The final Memorandum2) contained the "international obligation that Austria will maintain neutrality of the same type as maintained by Switzerland." This was the key. The neutralization of Austria was a step forward. Following this, the withdrawal of troops from Hungary could have been negotiated immediately on the same platform and formula. But Western diplomacy did not see this opportunity. When the Hungarian Revolution broke out in 1956, the government of Imre Nagy proclaimed neutrality. This was not backed by Western diplomacy, and the military intervention of the USSR followed. However, the Hungarian uprising marked the first defeat of Communism in Central Europe and its repercussions in the West undermined the prestige of Communist parties everywhere.

Recently, Western observers in Prague have reported increased interest among Czechs and Slovaks in the concept of a neutralized zone. Dan Morgan, correspondent for the Washington Post wrote from Prague on September 14, 1968:

"The Czechoslovak central authorities have completed a candid, confidential report in which they had to acknowledge an increase in a detectable interest in neutrality for Czechoslovakia. The invasion episode has also raised a significant doubt about the role of the (:Czechoslovak army, which, although one of the best in Europe, was not ordered to resist the Warsaw Pact onslaught."

At the tenth anniversary of Imre Nagy's execution, the Prague Literarni Listy (June 13, 1968) published a eulogy of Nagy emphasizing his demand for Socialist neutralism. The growing interest in neutralization in Central Europe is also stated in a note sent by Czechoslovakia to the Polish government on September 13, 1968:

"An allegation made in the Polish party paper Trybuna Ludu, that the Czechoslovakian National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee had advocated neutrality of Czechoslovakia - was absolutely false."

The note, however, acknowledged that the Committee did discuss neutrality but at the insistence of the government came to the conclusion that "a proclamation of neutrality would not bring about a solution." This confidential report proves that a plebiscite in Czechoslovakia would favor neutralization by a large majority. A Hungarian journalist, Tibor Petho, spokesman for the Government, wrote even before the Czechoslovak invasion:

"Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians have lived together close to each other for centuries. The common experiences of this long togetherness taught us many things. We gathered ample experiences concerning antagonisms and hatreds; also the advantages of friendship and cooperation... by eliminating the influence of foreign powers which tried to divide and confuse the people in the Danube basin either by methods of the Habsburgs or by those of Hitler... We trust in a federalist reorganization." (Magyar Hirek, June 29, 1968)

Janos Peter, Hungarian Foreign Minister, gave the following report to the Parliament (July, 1968):

"Diminution of the dangers in Europe is in the common interest of all continents. For further clarification of the situation in Europe it is necessary to increase the number of existing bilateral agreements, and also that of the regional agreements. Only from the mosaics of these can the future peace of Europe be composed. Together with our neighbors we are working for a well-organized cooperation of Central European and Danubian Basin countries with different systems economically, culturally and politically, in the interest of the peace and security of Europe."

Western Powers and a Buffer Zone

Franz Joseph Strauss, West German Minister, who has influence on German foreign policy matters, stated in one of his lectures:

"If the Eastern satellites can be formed into a buffer Europe, if the mistrust in Germany which derives from the prejudices and ex-

periences of the past can be allayed step by step, if this policy turns the pages of history and liquidates the legacy of the Second World War, then much will have been gained."3)

Dr. Lujo Toncic-Sorinj, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Austria, expressed his firm conviction more than once, that close cooperation among the peoples of the Danubian region is only a matter of time owing to the natural historical elements at work which will prevail against difficulties created from the outside. Even Otto Winzer, Foreign Minister for East Germany told the National Assembly on August 9, 1968 that "under European security we must understand a regional system based on international agreements."

It was the British Prime Minister Eden at the Geneva Conference of Heads of Government who proposed the establishment of a buffer zone on July 18, 1955:

We would be ready to discuss and try to reach agreement as to the total of forces and armaments on each side in Germany and the countries neighboring Germany. To do this it would be necessary to join in a system of reciprocal control to supervise the agreements effectively."

A mutual withdrawal of forces 250 miles on each side was proposed. It is regrettable that other events in world politics diverted attention from following up this idea or that of George Kennan on mutual disengagement. See also the study of E. Chaszar: "The Possibility of a Neutralized Zone in Central Europe."4)

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, advocated a "vigorous and articulate Third Force" between the great powers. We agree with Nelson Rockefeller: "The historic choice fast rushing upon us, then, is no less than this: either the free nations of the world will take the lead in adopting the federal concept to their relations or, one by one, we may be driven into the retreat of the perilous isolationism, political, economic and intellectual, so ardently sought by the Soviet policy to divide and conquer." 5 )

Richard Nixon recommended a regional buffer zone in his campaign speech at Eatonville, N. J. on October 19, 1968: ". . . regional pacts that can prevent a local conflict from escalating into world war. The regional pact thus becomes a buffer separating the distant great powers from immediate threat - and the danger of a Social conflict escalating into world war is thereby reduced. A regional pact would provide a buffer between the United States and the Soviet Union in future flare-ups."

Dangers to be averted by "preventive diplomacy"

Austrian Chancellor Klaus was told in Moscow during his visit of March 1~21, 1967 that Austria would be breaking the obligations of permanent neutrality if she joined the European Common Market and this would be a casus belli. On the other hand, Klaus was told

that Austria would be supported if she strengthened her neutrality and her relations with the other Central European states. Austria was also encouraged to call a Conference on European Security to be held in Vienna.

Today many dangers exist in the Central European area besides a new Anschluss. Because of the unsolved situation, the possibility of widespread protest movements, e.g., in Vienna, East or West Berlin, like those in Paris and France in May-June, 1968, cannot be excluded. Because of the closeness of the Soviet nuclear superpower, De Gaulle's methods would be dangerous. T he Soviet forces would step in to "help restore democratic order" in Vienna, Berlin, East or West Germany. It thousands of German citizens were killed in such actions as were Hungarians in 1956, the West German army, supported by fifty million West Germans would certainly step in. Such action could start a Third World War.

Could anyone predict what would happen if the dictator Tito should die without having an able successor to hold the multinational and insecure Yugoslavia together? Is there secure peace or safety in the Rumanian situation? Therefore, it would be wise for the U. S. State Department to nominate a committee of experts on Central Europe to prepare a detailed plan for a neutralized buffer zone between Russia and Germany to be proposed to a European Conference on Security. Although America won two world wars militarily, they were lost diplomatically at the peace conferences because of insufficient preparation of realistic peace plans. Clemenceau, Stalin, Molotov, etc. dominated the conferences because they had plans. Should not Western "preventive diplomacy" possess as carefully elaborated peace plans as the Chiefs of Staff who have their alternative military plans for possible dangers?

1) Jerzy Jankowski: Problems of Eastern Europe at the Three European Congresses. The Central European Federalist. New York. 1963. No. 1, p. 17-22.

2) Memorandum on the results of negotiations between Austria and the Soviet Union. Moscow, April 15, 1955. See Documents on American Foreign Relations. Vol. 1955, p. 121.

3) Franz Joseph Strauss, The Grand Design. Praeger. New York. 1966.

4) Published in this volume.

5) Nelson Rockefeller: The Future of Federalism. (Paperback, 1968.)