A Case Study on Trianon

Part III

in the Process of Peacemaking

Peter Pastor

In 1921 these terms brought into question the viability of Hungary as a nation state. Hungarian public opinion embraced tenaciously the slogan "nem, nem soha!"/No, no, never!/; it became the rallying cry for territorial revisionism. This policy was eagerly adopted by the conservative Horthy regime, which recognized that revisionism helped to buttress an antiquated socio-economic system. As the slogan became synonymous with the Hungarian counter-revolution, few, if any recalled that it was coined by government propagandists in Mihaly Karolyi's revolutionary regime.

The revolution, with its liberal-democratic goals, broke out in the dying of the Habsburg monarchy. From October 31 to March 20, 1919, the Revolutionary governments weighed options and searched for compromises as an alternative to territorial exactions which roughly overlapped with those that were stipulated in the Treaty of Trianon. The collapse of the Karolyi regime, and the rise of the communist regime of Bela Kun on March 21, 1919, was directly related to the refusal by Denes Berinkey's liberal-democratic government to accept further territorial amputations spelled out in an Allied demarche known as the Vix Ultimatum.

It was the representatives of the counter-revolutionary Horthy regime who, however reluctantly, accepted and signed the punitive peace. This regime represented the interest of those circles which had been primarily responsible for Hungary's support of the war. Yet these groups showed their compatriots no remorse about being involved in a war that had led to Trianon. In a psychological climate

receptive to scapegoat-seeking, official circles succeeded in accusing Mihaly Karolyi and his supporters of being responsible for the territorial losses.¹

Mihaly Karolyi, then in foreign exile, was judged to be a traitor and his considerable wealth was confiscated. The historians of the era considered him and his government naive and held him responsible for the territorial losses, which was allegedly accepted as early as November 7, 1918.² This interpretation has been engraved in the Hungarian collective consciousness to such an extent that even today it finds broad acceptance among them.³ Due to a similar evaluation found in Francis Deak's Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference,⁴ this view has also influenced American scholars. Numerous publications of the last two decades, basing their findings on recently opened archival sources in Hungary, France and Britain, have challenged this view, and it is hoped that they will lay the old politically motivated charges to rest.⁵

The roots of the territorial clauses in the Treaty of Trianon could be found in the old adage on the consequence of war-"To the victors belong the spoils." World War I was no exception to this unwritten rule. The Entente powers offered large chunks of Austro-Hungarian territories to Italy (1915) and to Romania (1916) as a reward for joining the alliance in its struggle for victory. It is evident that the harshness of the territorial settlements made by the peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk (1918) and Bucharest (1918) would have been the same had the Central Powers won the war. The victors would have been different but spoils would have existed nevertheless.

Following the Bolshevik revolution of November 1917, Russia and the United States offered a challenge to traditional war aims. The Bolsheviks denounced the goals of the belligerents as being imperialistic. They called for the revolutionary overthrow of the warring regimes by the proletariat and the conclusion of a peace without indemnities or annexations.

President Woodrow Wilson introduced an equally radical program as the United States entered the war on the side of the Allies. He also called for peace without indemnities and annexations. Instead of proletarian revolutions, he called for the establishment of liberal-democratic regimes based on the American model. The right of self-determination for the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy was also part of this program. Wilson's call was based on

a combination of idealism and diplomatic realism.⁶ The collapse of the enemy governments, he believed, would force an end to the conflict.

On Wilson's urgings, the Entente abandoned traditional war aims. However, this did not assure the territorial status quo of the Austro-Hungarian empire.⁷ Although the Wilsonian solution favored autonomous rights for the various nationalities within the Empire, spokesmen for the Czech and Slovak people, both in the west and in Russia, wanted more than that. They called for the creation of a Czechoslovak state; hence, the end of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Their views were influential because western governments relied on emigre specialists. What is more, the formation of volunteer Czechoslovak armies enabled the emigre leaders to make demands on the Allies; they could not be dismissed lightly.⁸ The intervention of the Czechoslovak Legion on the side of the Anti-Bolshevik forces in Russia in June 1918 made the Czechoslovak cause even stronger.⁹

The Habsburg Emperor Karl, unable to achieve a separate peace, responded too late to the subversive, yet appealing, ideology originating from the West. Only in October 1918-with his armies on the verge of collapse-did he call for the federalization of Austria. By then the Allies, including the United States, had abandoned their belief that Austria-Hungary's survival was desirable for the sake of international stability.¹⁰

To assure the decomposition of the realm through revolutions, the Allied leaders had even delayed the execution of a speedy armistice. Thus, when on November 3, 1918, the representatives of Austria-Hungary signed the armistice, the empire no longer existed. Since there was as yet no agreement on the geographical boundaries of the emerging successor states, the Armistice of Padua included purely military clauses, and it was not, therefore, a commitment for a specific type of peace agreement. This was to be worked out at the coming peace conference.¹¹

In Hungary, a bloodless revolution brought to power a coalition on October 31 which represented the opposition in and outside of parliament. The head of the revolutionary government was Mihaly Karolyi, the leader of the anti-war opposition Karolyi party since 1916. The most important member of the coalition was the Social Democratic party, with no parliamentary representation. The small Radical party rounded out the coalition. Its leader was the sociologist and specialist on the nationalities problems: Oszkar Jaszi.

The revolutionary platform called for land and tax reforms and universal suffrage. In essence, it reflected positions held by the coalition members for some time. The platform also overlapped with the liberal-democratic program favored by President Wilson.¹²

For the nationalities of Hungary the government offered self-determination. It assumed that the Croats would secede, but that the others would support the plan of the Minister of Nationalities, Oszkar Jaszi. It envisioned the reshaping of Hungary into a confederation, a kind of "Eastern Switzerland," which in turn would be part of a Danubian confederation of states.¹³ This project clearly indicated that the leaders of the People's Republic of Hungary expected to preserve the frontiers of the former kingdom.

The ideology buttressing their efforts was Wilsonianism. The Hungarian policy, just as the American one in 1917, was based on idealism and diplomatic realism. The Hungarians were sincere partisans of the Wilsonian program, but they also knew that Hungary lay prostate before the victorious powers. It was incapable of resorting to arms in pursuit of its own interests. Therefore, it was believed that only a Wilsonian peace could extricate Hungary from its unenviable position.

The Hungarian ministers were not alone in their trust of Wilsonianism. A number of American and British officials also hoped that with the guns silent, a new Europe could be constructed,¹⁴ and some type of confederation would replace the defunct Austro-Hungarian empire.¹⁵ It was also believed, however, as Lewis Namier, a British specialist of the Foreign Office noted, that the Allies pledged themselves "to the entire independence of too many of Austria-Hungary's constituent elements to make it practicable."¹⁶ This view reflected a degree of fatalism at a time when firmness by the leadership of the victorious great powers and a belief in confederation could have achieved better results.¹⁷

The great degree of disorganization among the peacemakers gathering in Paris also contributed to the lack of effectiveness of the Wilsonians.¹⁸ Following the armistices, the threat of Bolshevik-type revolutions hung over Europe, diverting the attention of the victorious Allies from the details of the peace terms.¹⁹ Thus, peacemaking, just like warmaking during the previous four years, did not fulfill expectations and did not follow plans set earlier.

In East Central Europe, the intransigence of the Entente's small

allies over territorial issues created further complications. Some of these touched Hungary directly. Romania, following the Armistice of Padua, broke the Peace Treaty of Bucharest and re-entered the war against Germany just three days before the armistice at Compiegne was signed. Romania's new declaration of war, however, was used not to further territorial demands against distant Germany, but against neighboring Hungary.

Romania's claims were based on the secret Treaty of Bucharest (1916) in which France and Russia promised Romania a large chunk of Hungary, including Transylvania. These exaggerated war-time promises which the Entente had no intention of fulfilling were also nullified. This was done because Romania had signed a separate peace with the Central Powers.²⁰

Due to the anti-Bolshevik stance of the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia, the Czechoslovak National Council in Paris was recognized as a government in exile.²¹ The emigre government was promised an independent state within "historical boundaries." Although no Czechoslovak state had ever existed before 1918, establishing boundaries for such an entity meant territorial losses for Hungary.²²

The Entente also had wartime commitments to Serbia on which she intended to cash in. On August 18, 1915, the Entente promised Serbia Fiume and the Banat of Southern Hungary. The same territories were also promised to Italy and Romania-Fiume, to the former, and Banat to the latter.

Under the circumstances, the Karolyi government had assumed a hopeless task when it insisted on the integrity of Hungary's frontiers. It was apparent that most nationality leaders in Hungary were hostile toward the idea of federalism and were enthusiastic about secession instead.²³ Therefore, whether the Allies acted along the principles of Wilsonian self-determination or according to traditional war-time practices, their major task was to redraw the boundaries at Hungary's expense.

Although the Hungarian government's position stated that the nationalities could be persuaded to stay within an integral democratic Hungary, its officials in the cabinet were quite realistic. They believed that territorial concessions were unavoidable. Thus, the avowed insistence on territorial integrity was a maximal position motivated by the desire to secure an advantageous compromise under adverse conditions.

The first occasion to deal with the boundary issue came up during

the first week of November. Although the Austro-Hungarian representatives had signed the armistice of Padua in the name of the Hungarians as well, the Commander-in-Chief of the Balkan front, General Louis Franchet d'Esperey, demanded a separate armistice from Budapest.²⁴ He was still on the offensive against the Germans and the 170,000 troops of General August von Mackensen were still in Transylvania.

An early meeting with Franchet d'Esperey was desirable for the Hungarians. Its purpose would be to secure a favorable demarcation line from this Allied arbiter before the Romanians had a chance to do the same. In conjunction with a mission to the Allied Commander, the government also wanted to send deputies to Romania. The pretext for the latter mission was based on a technicality. Since the Hungarian parliament had never ratified the Peace Treaty of Bucharest, a final settlement between Hungary and Romania was still needed. The Hungarians wanted to make a bilateral deal over territories before Romania's appetite was reawakened.²⁵ The fall of the Marghiloman cabinet in Jassy and Romania's reentry into the war, made the project superfluous.

The Hungarian cabinet faced the upcoming meeting with Franchet d'Esperey with reservation. Mihaly Karolyi, the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Hungary, was advised by his colleagues not to take part in the negotiations. It was feared that if the Hungarians were given extremely unfavorable terms, Karolyi would be discredited and his government hopelessly weakened.

The deteriorating economic situation, however, forced the ministers to change their minds. It was concluded that Karolyi's presence was needed as he had a long-established pro-Entente reputation. Therefore, he was expected to prevail upon the Allied commander to lift the economic blockade of Hungary.²⁶ The considerable debate over the make-up of the mission indicates that neither Karolyi nor the other leaders had illusions about the bleak future facing Hungary.

The final decision to have Karolyi as the leader of the delegation turned out to be a good one. When the Hungarians met Franchet d'Esperey in Belgrade on November 7, it was only Karolyi who was treated with deference, while his entourage, including Jaszi, was humiliated.²⁷ The French general noted in his report to Paris that he thought well of Karolyi, an aristocrat with pro-Entente sympathies, but that he considered his cabinet a bunch of second raters.²⁸

Franchet d'Esperey considered the negotiations in line with the changed situation in East Central Europe. Since the Austro-Hungarian Empire had ceased to exist, he believed that the Padua Armistice, signed on the Italian front, needed updating. He considered the terms he was now giving to the Hungarians as an addendum to the armistice, a convention. The agreement was military in nature. It established a line of demarcation only in southern Hungary which put part of Transylvania under French occupation, with the Banat, and part of Baranya under French and Serb occupation.²⁹

The Allied occupation of even this limited amount of Hungarian lands led to the insistence by Hungarian negotiators that the convention specify that the demarcation line could in no way be considered as a new political boundary. That was to be settled by the Peace Conference. This stipulation was swiftly accepted by Franchet d'Esperey with the blessing of his superiors in Paris.³⁰

The Belgrade meeting indicated success for Karolyi. Franchet d'Esperey, following his government's instructions, did not recognize the Karolyi government de jure. Nevertheless, he was sufficiently impressed by it-so much so that he advised Paris that it was in the interest of the Allies to support Karolyi because the latter represented "the party of order."³¹

Fair treatment of the Hungarians was possible only at the cost of leaving some of Hungary's neighbors unsatisfied. Rewards, however, had to be given to the Czechoslovaks for their ongoing intervention in Russia. There was also the price to be paid to Romania if she were expected to do the same.

By the end of November, therefore, the French government, at the urgings of the Czechoslovak foreign minister, Eduard Benes, broke the terms of the Belgrade Convention in the name of the Allies. It gave the Czechoslovaks a green light to occupy Slovakia without defining its borders. In order to camouflage this unilateral action, the French offered a false explanation. They indicated that Franchet d'Esperey had overstepped his duties at the Belgrade negotiations when he allowed the continuation of Hungarian administration over all territories formerly belonging to the old kingdom. There was also an effort mounted to discredit Karolyi as a "perfidious" leader of an anti-democratic Hungary bent on enslaving the non-Magyar nationalities.³²

In fact, the Hungarians had attempted to come to an understanding with the nationalities through negotiations. When it was evident

that the spokesmen for the Slovaks or the Romanians were unwilling to accept autonomy within Hungary, the cabinet searched for compromise solutions which would be based on the principle of self-determination.³³

Negotiations were undertaken with Milan Hodza, a representative of the Slovak National Council, and with Iuliu Maniu, a member of the Romanian National Council in Hungary. On December 6, Oszkar Jaszi and Minister of War Albert Bartha came to an understanding with Hodza, who also represented the Czechoslovak government. A demarcation line was established in Slovakia which closely followed the ethnic boundaries. Yet Prague, aware that a more favorable line was being prepared in Paris, disavowed the Hodza-Bartha agreement.³⁴ On December 23, the Allied Supreme Council, dominated by Marshal Ferdinand Foch, transmitted a new demarcation line. This line was similar to the frontier given to the Hungarians at Trianon.³⁵ It left close to a million Hungarians on the Slovak side.

The shaping of the demarcation line in northern Hungary reflected the apparent French decision favoring, in the words of Foreign Minister Stephen Pichon, a "purely Magyar" Hungary. He further announced that France had no intentions of supporting the principle of self-determination. Instead it favored strong East Central European states which could be the allies of France.³⁶ Since France was allowed to have primary responsibility for peacemaking in East Central Europe, the case of the Hungarian government became weaker than ever.

Negotiations with the Romanian National Council started on November 13 and 14. Jaszi, the head of the Hungarian delegation, offered the abolition of the counties, the old administrative units of Hungary. In their stead, he proposed the creation of national areas which, like the Swiss cantons, would have cultural and administrative autonomy. These cantons were to send representatives to the central government in Budapest. As a temporary solution, he also suggested the transfer of administrative power to the Romanian council, where a Romanian majority existed.

The Romanian National Council, led by Iuliu Maniu, Alexandru Vaida Voevod, Vasile Goldis and Ioan Erdelyi, rejected the offer and demanded full sovereignty for the council. The Hungarian officials returned to Budapest empty-handed.³⁷ However, Maniu's visit to Budapest at the end of November and his conciliatory manner revived Hungarian hopes for a negotiated settlement.³⁸

A Case Study on Trianon