A Case Study on Trianon

Until now assumptions regarding French politics were usually based on the actual events, on the debates at the Peace Conference, or on records in the archives of other countries. Of course, these sources reflect the reality of the situation, but do so with certain adjustments, not to say distortions. The materials in the French archives now make it possible to see certain aspects of the intervention in a new light. This applies particularly to the French plans themselves, and to the motives underlying the changes in these plans. Since I intend to deal with these changes, certain introductory remarks seem to be in order,

A perennial problem in historiography has been the question of alternatives, the "What would have happened if?" syndrome, How to deal with those political or military plans which were never fully carried out and which, with the benefit of hindsight, now appear to have been unrealizable, exaggerated, irrational? And how to deal with contingencies which did not arise under the circumstances but are simply reconstructions after the fact, on the basis of rationalizations which for some reason or other could not have occurred to the participants at the time. ... In fact, these did not even constitute true alternatives. Hence, perhaps a word of explanation is in order: Why should we bother with, or give significance to, plans which either were never carried out, or which were realized only in a modified form? I believe it is necessary to draw a sharp distinction between the

two kinds of alternatives, the actual contingency plan, and the one based on ulterior construction. A plan that has been formulated is a real alternative; an elaborated military or political project becomes a conditioning factor even if it is modified, even if it proves mistaken and is discarded. The elaboration of the plan and its adoption exclude other plans, exclude alternative courses of action, hence influences the situation fundamentally.

Such was the entire plan of intervention designed by the French General Staff and the French government, including intervention plans against the Soviet Union. This plan was never carried out in its entirety, while those aspects of the plan which applied to Hungary were carried out only after considerable modification. Nevertheless, it undeniably affected the climate in Europe, including Central Europe, in a powerful and lasting way.

One aspect of the project of intervention revealed by the French records was its constant dichotomy, as opposed to what was formerly perceived as an undulating line, a sinusoid. More specifically, the constant of economic coercion was accompanied first by military force, then by political promises, then by waiting, then again by military compulsion, and finally by political manipulation. The French documents indicate, however, that the French government and General Staff never abandoned either the military or the political options as parallel expedients. Military intervention and political negotiations do not figure as alternatives in these plans, but were present together all along, and the occasional changes were merely on the surface, in appearance.

The first French project which dealt with the Hungarian Soviet Republic, in addition to the Soviet Russia issue, was dated March 24, 1919. It focused on the danger presented by the spread of Russian Bolshevism and the complementary Hungarian one, including the threat to Poland and Romania. The General Staff noted that the means of compulsion applied or contemplated had not proven effective with regard to Hungary, and came to the conclusion that military force should be considered. It proposed three anti-Bolshevik fronts; one of these was already in existence in southern Russia, centered around Odessa, the second was to be set up with Romanian assistance along the Dniester, starting in Bessarabia, and the third would come into being on Hungarian territory. For the execution of a march on Budapest the project counted on three Serbian infantry

and one cavalry divisions, four Romanian infantry divisions, as well as the two French divisions and cavalry brigade stationed in the Balkans.²

The project presumed a considerable multiplication of the forces actually available. It was based, first, on the assumption that the bridgehead at Odessa could be maintained until fresh and more significant forces could be dispatched; and this implied, in turn, nothing less than the guaranteed resupply by sea of the units encircled by the Bolsheviks there. A second precondition would have been a fully equipped Romanian army which was then only in the process of formation. Yet another assumption was the consent of the Yugoslav government to significant participation in the intervention against Hungary. This last condition appeared important to the French General Staff as it did not see its way clear to including the Czech army, in its present state, in its calculations; in addition to its lack of training and equipment, there was the problem of the leadership of the Czech army-an issue, however, which the plan did not discuss.

The French project of March 24 was defeated at the meeting of the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference the following day; or, to be more exact, the plan was altered. The Council created the basis for the organization of two fronts rather than three. Indeed, it decided on the evacuation of the bridgehead at Odessa. While the Council made no mention of the other two fronts, the one along the Dniester and the one in Hungary, it did provide for their establishment. It accomplished this by rerouting the important British convoy reserved for General Denikin, which included materials and clothing for 100,000 soldiers, to the Romanian port. It thus created the basis for the active participation of the Romanian army at the Dniester and on Hungarian territory. This decision was probably a matter of priorities, and the Supreme Council opted to bolster the Romanian interests because they seemed more urgent. (I should add, parenthetically, that it soon became evident that this choice was not final, for the British had the capacity to arm the counter-revolutionary forces in Hungary as well. The objective of the maneuver, therefore, was rather to justify the withdrawal of the Entente troops, as well as to cut down on the enormous expense which the supply of Odessa would have warranted.)

Because of the weight given to Romanian interests, this choice

implied that the main concern of the Entente forces was Hungary. A simple fact may explain this concern; while the Romanian government was "satisfied" with defending the boundary of Bessarabia against Soviet-Russian forces, its ambitions were to acquire further territories at the expense of Hungary. To be more exact, Romania meant to secure the boundary line it was promised under the secret Bucharest Treaty of 1916: this line led from near Vasarosnameny south of the Tisza River, passed five kilometers east of Debrecen, and reached the confluence of the Tisza and Maros Rivers once again near Szeged. The French General Staff harbored no doubts about the operation: it could always count on Romanian participation in this area, whereas Romanian participation in the anti-Soviet action could not be taken for granted.

On March 27 Marshall Foch, before ordering the execution of the resolution of March 25 taken by the Supreme Council, again tried to convince the Supreme Council to grant an increase of the forces available for intervention, and to obtain in some manner the material contributions of the United States. The attempt of March 27, however, failed completely. Another difficulty had to arise before Clemenceau would order, on March 29, the complete evacuation of the Odessa zone.

The negotiations conducted by Franchet d'Esperey about the forces available for intervention ran into difficulties in Belgrade. Although the Yugoslav government gave no definite reply, its extreme reluctance to participate in the intervention was obvious enough. Prince Regent Alexander let it be known that since the Great Powers had not authorized the conversion of the Serbian army into a Yugoslav army, that is, it did not authorize an increase in its effectiveness through the addition of military units conscripted in the newly acquired territories of Croatia, Slovenia, and elsewhere, he was "unfortunately" not in a position to order intervention against Hungarian Bolshevism at the moment.

The French had to reckon with these factors-i.e., with the impossibility of securing American financial aid and the refusal of the Yugoslavs-as early as March 29, when the Supreme Council undertook to discuss Bela Kun's offer to take up negotiations. A closer look at the situation revealed that the Romanian army would have to bear the main burden of the attack along both fronts, an undertaking which, in the opinion of the French General Staff, would have exceeded its capacities. Clemenceau based his next moves on this

opinion. On the one hand, after four days of delays and hesitation, he ordered the evacuation of the Odessa zone; but, rather than recall the troops, he redirected them towards the Dniester.⁴ Thus he decided that France would take part in the defense of Romania's eastern frontier while facilitating the movements of the Romanian army in the West. At the same time, he gave up the Odessa front once and for all. On the other hand, at the Conference table Clemenceau agreed to the Budapest mission of General Smuts; he did not hesitate in reaching that decision, since in any case the conditions necessary for a military intervention had not materialized for the time being because of the reluctance of the Yugoslavs.

Thus political manipulation rather than military offensive became the order of the day. But while Clemenceau temporarily barred an offensive in accordance with the spirit of the decision at the Conference, at the same time he instructed Franchet d'Esperey to proceed with the negotiations for the organization of the attack. While Smuts was negotiating in Budapest, Franchet d'Esperey was trying to convince the Yugoslav officials in Belgrade of the absolute necessity of Serbian participation. But since this attempt did not work out, the plan for an open, concentric military action under French command had to be dropped for the time being.

This was when the first significant modification of the French plan took place. It was not a matter of political moves replacing military ones outright; rather, instead of a concentric attack, the modified plan contemplated a limited offensive utilizing the forces of the Romanian army.

I wish to emphasize once more that one of the conditions for such an attack was the transfer of forces from Odessa to the Dniester, initiated shortly thereafter, on April 6. The modification in the French plan was revealed, for the first time, in a telegram from Clemenceau to the commander-in-chief in the Balkans, dated April 14. In this telegram, Clemenceau, who was both Prime-Minister and Minister of War, reacted to a worried report sent by Franchet d'Esperey regarding the contemplated Romanian offensive. The latter had requested Paris to dissuade the Romanian Chief of the General Staff from taking the offensive as it might have disastrous consequences. For the benefit of the general, the Prime Minister summarized the French views in the following terms: "First: If the Hungarians attack the Romanians, the latter are fully justified in retaliating. Second: Since the decision taken by the Peace Conference of February 26 was

not further modified, the Romanians have likewise the right to occupy the area allocated to them, up to the eastern border of the neutral zone."⁵ As we know, the eastern border of the neutral zone corresponded essentially with what was to become the national boundary line.

Such was the theoretical framework within which the Romanians launched their offensive on the night of April 15-16. Clemenceau's stand was easy enough to defend at the Conference table since it derived from decisions the Conference itself had reached earlier. But the Romanians reached the line of demarcation they could legally claim already by April 25, and then a new justification had to be found. The Romanian General Coanda, who represented his government in Paris on a number of issues, called on General Alby, the French Chief of the General Staff, on April 26. He informed Alby that the Romanian General Staff had decided to cross the demarcation line designated in the Vix memorandum. The Romanian forces intended to advance as far as the Tisza River, and were ready to build bridgeheads on the right bank of the river as well. The French Chief of the General Staff relayed this information without any comment to the pertinent section chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In other words, the French General Staff acquiesced in the plan.⁶

This definite and explicit change in view was occasioned by the Romanian military success. On the day the Romanian army reached the Tisza, the French General Staff put its views on paper. The gist of the newly elaborated plan was: "The Romanian advance, brilliantly executed, without intervention on the part of French forces concentrated in the Szeged area (two infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade), entitle us to believe that there will be no need to resort to these forces even if it does become necessary to compel Hungary to carry out the peace decisions by military force. The concentric action of the powers directly interested (Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Serbia), will be amply sufficient for the purpose."⁷

According to the new French military plan, the French forces at Szeged could be pulled out and transferred to Bulgaria. By so doing, argued the General Staff, France could exert pressure on Bulgaria to sign the peace treaty and, at the same time, relieve the Romanian army of another burden by pinning down the Bulgarian forces.

The execution of this plan, however, became highly problematic as a consequence of the formation of the Soviet front at the end of April and the beginning of May. The Soviet Russian government sent an

ultimatum to Romania and gathered significant forces along the Dniester. Under the circumstances, Paris did not venture to give its blessing to the most recent Romanian request, namely that the Romanian army be authorized to continue its advance and march into Budapest. On the contrary: the French authorities insisted that the army be halted along the Tisza and that part of it be transferred to Bessarabia. Even the Romanian Chief of the General Staff felt the situation was serious enough to warrant rescinding the May 4 resolution of the Romanian cabinet regarding the action against Budapest. General Presan emphasized that Romania did not have territorial claims against Hungary beyond the Tisza, hence the military effort was unwarranted; moreover, the army would not find a better line of defense than the Tisza, hence the action would entail certain military risks as well, while the situation along the Dniester was deteriorating. On May 5 the Romanian government resolved to stabilize the front along the Tisza in Hungary, and to retrieve three divisions for transfer to the Dniester.⁸

This transfer gave rise to bitter reproaches on the part of the Czechoslovakian government. The temporary stabilization of the Romanian front made it possible for the Hungarian Red Army to concentrate its efforts on one front in Slovakia and to attain significant successes against the Czechoslovak forces. As mentioned, as a result of these successes the president of the Conference, Clemenceau, personally decided in favor of a political solution, and he himself persuaded the Supreme Council to endorse his message to Bela Kun. Thus, it was a military dead end that led to this message, but at the moment it was sent the French Prime Minister attributed no greater importance to it than would have been warranted by a well-chosen excuse or alibi; for it was expected that Budapest would reject the proposal.

Such an interpretation is justified by the text of the message itself, which demanded Hungarian withdrawal but gave not even a hint as to how far the Hungarian troops were expected to retreat. It is also made obvious by other measures Clemenceau adopted on the same day. While he persuaded the Supreme Council to endorse the so called Clemenceau letter, he sent the Hungarian-Romanian file to General Belin and instructed him to work out plans for military measures in case the Hungarians rejected the letter as expected. Belin did not require much time to carry out the instructions. The General Staff was practically ready with the plan, and was able to relay

Clemenceau's instructions to Franchet d'Esperey that very day. The essence of the plan was to concentrate the Romanian forces in the northern sector in order to relieve the Czechoslovak forces and, once this was accomplished, to advance towards Budapest. In the meantime the Serbian units would have to advance directly towards Budapest, while the two French divisions would operate between the two armies and ensure coordination.

The function of the message of June 8 as an alibi is confirmed, moreover, by the exchange of telegrams between the French Ambassador in Prague and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Clement-Simon reminded the Ministry that it should require the Hungarians to withdraw to a specific line; Pichon replied that the ambassador should make inquiries regarding the French plans from General Pelle, stationed in Prague.⁹ In plain words, this meant that a line of demarcation no longer had any relevance, since the whole country would be occupied. Furthermore, the above interpretation of French intentions is confirmed by the fact that after almost two weeks spent on preparations for the intervention, the excuse considered necessary for the launching of the action did not materialize: the Hungarian government decided to comply with the French demand, and the Conference immediately began the search for a new excuse.

It became clear at this time, as the Hungarian troops were evacuating Slovakia, that Clemenceau, unlike the Parisian representative of the British government, and unlike the British and French military strategists, ceased to insist on military intervention against Hungary. As of July there no longer was a strict parallel between the French military and political plans. While the General Staff did not discard the military plan, its practical value and significance diminished because of Clemenceau's attitude. To find the motive behind the change in the attitude of the French Prime Minister, we must look for the factors revealed by the French documents.

Clemenceau's disillusioned remarks at the Conference in the second half of July cannot be attributed to a single factor. First of all, he was prompted by the circumstance that while France was advocating a policy of intervention, her allies, although constantly harping on intervention, were unwilling to share the military and financial burdens, or even the responsibility for the act. Clemenceau was also swayed by the failures for which the French military and political leadership were ultimately responsible. He was influenced by the fact that he did not have useful, adequate, sufficient military power at his

disposal. Moreover, he was reluctant to assume the responsibility for the ill-fated policy of intervention in face of French public opinion, emanating primarily from the left.

In addition to these factors, which are discussed by other historians in far greater detail than my thumbnail sketch can hope to do, there was yet another factor which played a role in Clemenceau's stance, one we had little knowledge of until now. This factor was the French appraisal of the attitudes of the small countries adjacent to Hungary. We have mentioned that the French views changed, in the course of April, expecting the neighboring small states to overthrow the Hungarian regime and make Hungary bow to the resolutions of the Peace Conference even without French contributions.

During the subsequent months, however, it became clear that these countries were far from being completely prepared to achieve these ends and, what's more, they expected a reward for their anti-Bolshevik intervention. As regards the former, the problem was still mainly Yugoslavia. The French exerted themselves considerably to interest Yugoslavia, but the Yugoslav government did not budge from its neutral position. The Entente powers finally recognized the existence of Yugoslavia at the insistence of the French, and tried to whet the appetite of the Yugoslav government with promises of greater or lesser territorial change. None of these efforts, however, was crowned with success. Belgrade never promised the French General Staff to furnish the troops it expected. We need not discuss the reasons for the Yugoslav attitude here.

The prospect of Czechoslovakian participation and the substitution of the Serbian force with a Czech force remained problematic for the French General Staff. This alternative was raised by Franchet d'Esperey as early as the end of March and the beginning of April, whereas General Pelle was constantly urging Paris to give its consent to a Czechoslovak operation that would take place simultaneously with the Romanian operation, but there is no trace of French authorization to that effect in this period.

On the contrary; during the month of April Clemenceau reiterated several times that neither the southern, i.e., the French, nor the northern front should move. The March 20 resolution of the Czechoslovak government, taken before the proclamation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, to extend its line of occupation, had to be suspended; and because of the veto from Paris, the Czech government hesitated to initiate military action until April 26. The time for

the final decision and for the launching of an attack came on April 27 when, because of the Romanian offensive, the Czechoslovak government felt its own interests jeopardized in Ruthenia and certain other areas.

To be sure, in the days immediately preceding, Pelle kept insisting that Paris finally hand down a verdict, but I have found no trace of any such decision in writing. It is possible that the Czechoslovak government did receive some kind of encouragement, but the French authorities did not wish to assume responsibility for this military operation.

Thus military inadequacy remained an obstacle to intervention. There remained yet another obstacle which, in fact, became increasingly decisive, namely the territorial claims of the neighboring states vis-a-vis Hungary; more exactly, those claims which exceeded French expectations regarding the peace terms as well as the frontiers designated at the Conference.

During the period of the Hungarian Soviet Republic the French government did take the initiative to rectify the demarcation line in one area, the southern frontier of Hungary, and part of its proposals were actually adopted. Two factors were involved: one of the reasons for the initiative must have been that the most important role in the intervention-as attested by several French documents-was assigned to the Serbian army. The other was a technical circumstance: namely, that along this front line, because of the confusion of the Austrian and Italian intrigues, no final decision had been reached as yet, while the pertinent territorial committees did sanction the new Hungarian frontiers in the north and in the east even before the proclamation of the Soviet Republic. There is no evidence that any of the Entente powers, including the French government, subsequently intended to change these lines at the expense of Hungary. Both the so-called Territorial Committee and the Supreme Council stuck to their decision regarding these frontiers during the Council's regime.

Neither the Czechoslovak nor the Romanian government was satisfied with these decisions. In fact, it would be more accurate to say that they were intensely dissatisfied. Czechoslovakia launched an active propaganda campaign against the plan at the beginning of March. Its method at this time was to raise a lot of dust about a supposed Hungarian-Austrian-German conspiracy which the three republican governments were to organize with the dismemberment

of Czechoslovakia in mind. Since the Conference gave no credence to the Czechoslovak accusations, the Prague government began to claim rectification of the borders for economic and even military reasons, and reached a decision regarding military action to that effect on March 20. Benes succeeded in obtaining the assent of Marshal Foch for the operation, but after the proclamation of the Soviet Republic, this proposal was voted down by the Czechoslovak committee at the Conference on March 24. This was done at the suggestion of Paul Cambon, the French chairman of that committee.¹⁰ Later on, the Czechoslovak government restricted its participation in the intervention on the grounds that it would occupy only those areas to which it lay claim, regardless of the nature of the Hungarian regime. President of the Republic Masaryk and some members of his cabinet explained on several occasions that Czechoslovakia's internal difficulties prevented it from marching into the Hungarian capital or from participating in the overthrow of the regime. On the other hand, it was quite willing to occupy Miskolc, Satoraljaujhely, the coal basin at Salgotarjan, the foothills of Tokaj, as well as the entire left bank of the Danube down to the level of Vac, in addition to Ruthenia. All this convinced the French government, as the French ambassador in Prague was wont to remark, that the "imperialism" of the Czechs knew no bounds, yet they were not prepared to make sacrifices for the sake of invention, even if their claims were to be satisfied.

It was even more obvious that the measures undertaken by the Romanian government were based on the already mentioned boundary line decided by the secret treaty of 1916. The decisions of the pertinent Romanian authorities, military as well as civilian, made this clear.

Because of the victories of the Hungarian Red Army, and for the sake of the stabilization of the Czechoslovak situation, the decision of the Conference to inform the Czech and the Romanian governments about the irrevocability of the already approved boundaries assumes its full significance. This took place in Paris on June 11. Following this, and particularly in July, the French organization of intervention encountered serious obstacles. When the British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour was urging intervention, Clemenceau mentioned several times, among his counter arguments, that the small states involved were demanding compensation. The problem was so obvious that even the French General Staff made allowances for it. It

pointed out that should the time for a concentric attack against Hungary finally come, it will become necessary to clarify the French conditions, considering that the interested parties have come up with excessive demands for compensation.¹¹ If we might conclude from such a formulation of the problem that the General Staff was inclined to give in to these "excessive demands," the French documents and the minutes of the meetings of the Council tend to indicate that Clemenceau was not inclined to undertake the satisfaction of new claims beyond those the Conference had already granted.

Hungarian historiography has often and emphatically pointed out the gap between the measures undertaken at the Paris Peace Conference and the principles it represented and advocated, particularly in the application of the national ethnic principle. Let us add the following: in the name of another proclaimed principle, that of anti-Bolshevism and the defense of democracy, small-state nationalist imperialism forced the Conference to depart in even greater measure from the ethnic principle. Considering that, all in all their claims were substantial, it behooves us to point out that, in spite of its determination to defeat Hungarian Bolshevism, the Conference did not satisfy these claims. While the Republic of Councils elicited this determination by its very existence, it played on the other hand the role of a stabilizing force thanks to its successful military ventures.

As far as Clemenceau's attitude in the matter is concerned, we must not interpret it as mercy towards the Hungarian regime. The French Prime Minister was guided by entirely different considerations. In truth, he had confidence that the relations of power in central Europe would sooner or later, in one way or another, grind the Republic of Councils to bits, and from this he derived the conclusion that there was no need to commit the French government. and especially no need to let himself be blackmailed by his own minor allies. He felt the Republic of Councils was near its demise, for the economic conditions surrounding it would not let it survive long. He also hoped that either the Hungarian or the Romanian government would lose its patience, that the momentary cease-fire would be replaced by renewed hostilities in which the Hungarian side, presumably, would fall as victim. If this be the case then, once again, the issue would be resolved without the French having to intervene. Finally. when news was received concerning the negotiations between Vilmos Bohm and the leaders of the British and Italian missions in Vienna, Clemenceau could also expect that the leaders of

the Republic of Councils would, without further ado, draw the logical conclusion regarding the hopelessness of their predicament, and would simply depart from the scene for some kind of coalition government.

Thus, the French Prime Minister adopted a wait-and-see attitude, and expressed at the same time certain basic principles of the French government. One of these was the preservation of the Conference and of the integrity of the decisions taken by the great powers vis-a-vis the small allies. (Indeed, it would be difficult to understand Clemenceau's politics unless we considered France as a great power, a power that would not allow its decisions to become the subject of open bargaining between France and the "states with particularist demands.") Another and equally important principle concerned the reorganization of Central Europe along French lines; this required that some kind of harmony prevail in this area in spite of the transitory antagonisms and troubles aroused by the Hungarian proletarian state.

All things considered, while Paris retained all the means for action against Hungary in its hands to the very end, its plans alternated as the situation warranted. The plan for military intervention, overt and concentric with French participation, or covert and without the French, or even disjointed in appearance; furthermore, the economic blockade and twisting the arms of the Hungarian regime, or the excuses for further steps or delays-all these contemplated measures had two inseparable objectives: the overthrow of the Communist regime and the acceptance of the decisions and conditions of the Peace Conference by all parties concerned. The Entente achieved both these objectives.

The peace delegation finally sent by the Horthy regime did not succeed in obtaining better conditions along the two most debated boundary lines, the northern and the eastern. Nor did the conditions become worse than those which the Conference had elaborated during the Karolyi regime, and which it maintained during the Republic of Councils, thanks in part to the efforts of the latter.

Notes

1. The limits of this article do not allow for the usual scholarly apparatus. As a matter of general information I would add that this summary is based on historical studies and documentary publications, as well as on materials

found in the following French archives: Archives diplomatiques: Paix 1914-1920; Conference de la Paix (mostly the minutes of the Czechoslovakian and Yugoslav-Romanian committees); Europe Z., Autriche, Hongrie, Roumanie, Tchecoslovaquie, Yougoslavie 1918-1919; Armee de Terre, service historique; Conseil Superieur de Guerre; Ministere de la Guerre; l'Etat-Major; Armee Francaise d'Orient; Armee du Danube.
2. "Note sur la situation en Orient," March 24, 1919, Service historique, 4, n. 53, doss. 1.
3. Concerning the Yugoslav stance: Archives diplomatiques, Europe Z, Y, Vol. 45, 40-41, note for March 29, 1919; 10-11,12-13 and 14, telegrams from Fontenay dated March 29 to April 1, 1919.
4. Clemenceau, March 29, 1919, Service historique. 4 n. 53, doss. 1.
5. Franchet d'Esperey, April 12,1919 and 86, Clemenceau, April 14,1919, Archives diplomatiques. Europe Z, R, Vol. 47, 83-84.
6. Ibid., 95. Notes concerning the report of General Alby, dated April 26, 1919.
7. "Etude sur la situation militaire en Hongrie et en Bulgarie et sur l'emploi des Forces Francaises d'Orient," April 30,1919, Service historique, S,N. 53, doss. 1.
8. Graziani, May 3, 5, and 6, 1919, ibid., 5, n 202 Roumanie; memorandum of the Rumanian government, May 5,1919, Archives diplomatiques, R, Vol. 47.102-104; 122-124, military attache Petain, May 5, 1919.
9. Service historique, 4, n 51, doss. 1. Clemenceau to Belin, June 7.1919; Clemenceau to Franchet d'Esperey; Archives diplomatiques, Europe Z., T., Vol. 44,62-63, Clemenceau to General Pelle. June 7,1919; Clement-Simon, June 8, 1919,70-71; June 9, Pichon to Clement-Simon, June 8, 1919, 70-fl; June 9, Pichon to Clement-Simon, 72.
10. Memorandum of the Czechoslovak committee, session of March 24, 1919, Archives diplomatiques, Conference de La Paix.
11. "Note sur le conflit entre Tcheco-Slovaquie et Hongrie" summary from the second half of June, Service historique, 6, n 75.

A Case Study on Trianon