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The Great Powers and the Fate of Transylvania Between the Two World Wars

1. The most comprehensive treatment is contained in Sherman David Spector, Rumania at the Paris Peace Conference (New York: Bookman Associates, 1962), p. 67 ff.

2. Eva S. Balogh, "Romanian and Allied Involvement in the Hungarian Coup d'Etat of 1919," East European Quarterly 9, no. 3 (1975): 297--314; Spector, op. cit., pp. 222--25; Rudolf L. Tõkés, Béla Kun and the Hungarian Soviet Republic (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 199 ff.

3. A comprehensive discussion containing ample bibliographic references will be found in Walter M. Bacon, Jr., Behind Closed Doors: Secret Papers on the Failure of Romanian-Soviet Negotiations, 1931--1932 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 3 ff.

4. See in particular Stephen Fischer-Galati, "The Moldavian Soviet Republic in Soviet Domestic and Foreign Policy," in Roman Szporluk, ed., The Influence of East Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), p. 231 ff.

5. Bacon, op. cit., p. 7; Stephen Fischer-Galati, "Moldavia and the Moldavians," in Zev Katz, ed., Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities (New York: The Free Press, 1975), p. 417.

6. The likelihood of such relationships has been suggested by students of Soviet foreign relations. However, until the appearance of Béla Vágo's forthcoming book on Transylvania no hard evidence has been made available to researchers.

7. See the perceptive analysis contained in Ghita Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, 1944--1962 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 1 ff.

8. Bacon, op. cit., p. 7 ff.

9. Ibid.; Anthony Tihamér Komjáthy, The Crises of France's East Central European Diplomacy, 1933--1938 (Boulder and New York: East European Quarterly and Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 143 ff.

10. Béla Vágo, "Le Second Diktat de Vienne: Les Preliminaires," East European Quarterly 2, no. 4 (1969): 415--37; Robert M. Bigler, "Heil Hitler and Heil Horthy!" East European Quarterly 8, no. 3 (1974): 251--72.

11. Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavera, The Green Shirts & the Others (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1970), pp. 274--308; Al. Gh. Savu, Dictatura regala, 1938--1940 [Royal Dictatorship, 1938--1940] (Bucharest: Editura Politica, 1970), pp. 99--120.

12. Vágo, op. cit., p. 415 ff. and Béla Vágo, "Le Second Diktat de Vienne: Le Partage de la Transylvanie," East European Quarterly 5, no. 1 (1971): 47--73.

13. Vágo, "Le Preliminaires," p. 415 ff. with ample references.

14. Savu, op. cit., p. 99 ff.; Nagy-Talavera, op. cit., p. 296 ff.

15. Typical of such statements are those contained in stefan Pascu, ed., The Independence of Romania (Bucharest: Editura Academiei R.S.R., 1977), p. 209 ff.

16. Ionescu, op. cit., p. 54 ff.; Savu, op. cit., p. 361 ff.; Jack Gold, "Bessarabia: The Thorny 'Non-Existent' Problem," East European Quarterly 13, no. 1 (1979): 47--74.

17. An interesting study related to these issues is by William O. Oldson, "Romania and the Munich Crisis: August--September 1938," East European Quarterly 11, no. 2 (1977): 177--90. See also Eric Roman, "Munich and Hungary: An Overview of Hungarian Diplomacy during the Sudeten Crisis," East European Quarterly 8, no. 1 (1974): 71--97.

18. An exhaustive study of these problems is by Marilynn J. G. Hitchens, Germany, Russia and the Balkans: Prelude to the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, April--August 1939 (Boulder, Colo.: East European Monographs; New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).

19. Vágo, "Le Partage de la Transylvanie," p. 47 ff.

20. Savu, op. cit., p. 407 ff.

21. Ionescu, op. cit., p. 110 ff.; Stephen Fischer-Galati, Twentieth Century Rumania (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 70 ff.

From the Second Vienna Award to Paris: Transylvania and Hungarian-Rumanian Relations During World War II

1. Excerpts from Kristóffy's report of July 11, 1940 (113/pol.-1940).

2. Hungary recognized the U.S.S.R. in April, 1934. The Soviet government severed diplomatic relations in February, 1939, because Hungary adhered to the Anti-Comintern Pact.

3. The Ciano Diaries 1939--1943, ed. Hugh Gibson (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1946).

4. Ibid., Jan. 6--7, 1940.

5. Csáky requested Ciano to inform the Rumanians of the following: "If Russia attacks Rumania and Rumania resists sword in hand, Hungary will adopt an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards Rumania. On the other hand, Hungary would immediately intervene should one of the three following cases arise: (1) the massacre of the minorities; (2) Bolshevik revolution in Rumania; (3) Cession by Rumania of national territory to Russia and Bulgaria without fighting." Csáky added that even in that case "nothing will be done without previous consultation and agreement with Italy." Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, ed. Malcolm Muggeridge (London: Oldham Press, 1948), p. 331.

6. The Ciano Diaries, Mar. 25, 1940.

7. Ibid., Mar. 28, 1940.

8. Ibid., Apr. 8, 1940.

9. Ibid., Apr 9, 1940.

10. For details, see András Hóry, Még egy barázdát sem [Not Even a Furrow] (Vienna: Hóry András, 1967). Hóry was the Hungarian negotiator in Turnu-Severin.

11. Before the occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Molotov assured the German government that the Soviet Union "simply wished to pursue its own interests and had no intention of encouraging other states (Hungary, Bulgaria) to make demands on Rumania." Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939--1941, (Washington, 1948), p. 160.

12. According to Hungarian documents, Hitler made statements in this regard to Sztójay on February 1, 1941, and to Bárdossy on March 21, 1941. Hitler told Bárdossy that the Rumanians asked for a quick German intervention because of the preparations of the Red Army to cross the Danube. Cf. Petru Groza, In Umbra Celulei (Bucharest, 1945), p. 276.

13. The Ciano Diaries, Aug. 28, 1940.

14. Ibid., Aug. 29, 1940.

15. An area of 43,492 square kilometers with a population of 2.6 million was reattached to Hungary. According to the Hungarian censuses of 1910 and 1941, the number of Hungarians exceeded the Rumanians in this territory, while the Rumanian census of 1930 indicated a slight Rumanian majority. Following the delivery of the Vienna Award, Csáky and Ribbentrop signed a treaty assuring special rights to the German minority in Hungary. With the conclusion of this treaty the problem of the German citizens of Hungary ceased to be exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the Hungarian state. For the text of the treaty, see, Matthias Annabring, "Das ungarländische Deutschtum," Südost-Stimmen 2 (March, 1952): 13--14. For detailed discussion and bibliography, see Béla Vágó, "Le Second Diktat de Vienne: Les Preliminaires," East European Quarterly 2, no. 4, (1969): 415--37 and idem, "Le Second Diktat de Vienne: Le Partage de la Transylvanie," East European Quarterly 5, no. 1 (1971): 47--73.

16. Molotov considered the Italo-German guarantee to Rumania, with respect to its national territory, as a justification for the supposition that this action was directed against the USSR. For the pertinent exchange of notes see, Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939--1941, pp. 178--94.

17. It is a curious historical parallel that Article 22 of the peace treaty of February 10, 1947, authorized the Soviet Union "to keep on Hungarian territory such armed forces as it may need for the maintenance of the lines of communication of the Soviet army with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria."

18. The government was violently attacked by the opposition in both houses of parliament because of this step. Count István Bethlen and Tibor Eckhart, leader of the Smallholder party, strongly criticized this move. The Hungarian minister to Washington, John Pelényi, resigned in protest.

19. Cf. A. Ullein-Reviczky, Guerre Allemande Paix Russe: le Drame Hongrois, (Neuchâtel, 1947), pp. 71--73.

20. Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 168. For Teleki's way of thinking during the critical events in 1940 and 1941, see Richard V. Burks, "Two Teleki Letters," Journal of Central European Affairs, 7 (1947): 68--73. Cf. Loránt Tilkovszky, Teleki Pál --- Legenda és Valóság [Paul Teleki --- Legend and Reality] (Budapest, 1969).

21. According to a German diplomat, Erich Kordt, the German General Staff arranged the bombing. Wahn und Wirklichkeit (Stuttgart, 1948), p. 308. At the Nuremberg trials General István Ujszászy stated that he was convinced "that the bombarding was carried out by German planes with Russian markings." The Kassa incident is still a much debated question. See for the intricacies involved N. E Dreisziger "New Twist to

an Old Riddle: The Bombing of Kassa (Kosice), June 26, 1941," Journal of Modern History 44 (1972): 232--42; "Contradictory evidence Concerning Hungary's Declaration of War on the USSR in June 1941," Canadian Slavonic Papers, vol 19, no. 4. (Dec., 1977), pp. 81--88. Regarding the political influence of military leaders in these crucial years, see Dreisziger, "The Hungarian General Staff and Diplomacy, 1939--1941," Canadian-American Review of Hungarian Studies, 7, no. 1 (Spring 1980); 5--26.

22. Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, vol. 7 (Nuremberg, 1947), p. 335.

23. The British note was handed to Bárdossy on November 29, 1941, by the American minister to Hungary. It read as follows: "The Hungarian Government has for many months been pursuing aggressive military operations on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, ally of Great Britain, in closest collaboration with Germany, thus participating in the general European war and making substantial contribution to the German war effort. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom finds it necessary to inform the Hungarian Government that unless by December 5 the Hungarian Government has ceased military operations and has withdrawn from all active participation in hostilities, His Majesty's Government will have no choice but to declare the existence of a state of war between the two countries."

24. The British ultimatum was delivered to Finland, Hungary, and Rumania as a result of Stalin's repeated and pressing appeal. Prime Minister Churchill tried in vain to convince Stalin that the declaration of war against these countries would not be beneficial to the Allied cause. Churchill explained to Stalin in his telegram of November 4, 1941, that these countries "have been overpowered by Hitler and used as a cat's-paw, but if fortune turns against that ruffian they might easily come back to our side. A British declaration of war would only freeze them all and make it look as if Hitler were the head of a grand European alliance solid against us." Winston S. Churchill, op. cit., p. 528. Bárdossy's record of his conversation with Pell and Travers is among the files of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry.

25. Bárdossy's instructions sent to the Hungarian ministers in Berlin and Rome on December 11 and 12 show how he tried to avoid involvement in war with the United States. For the text of the instructions see Stephen D. Kertesz, Diplomacy In a Whirlpool (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953), pp. 234--36.

26. Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1948), pp. 1114, 1175--76. Cf. Documents on American Foreign Relations, vol. 4 (1942), pp. 123--24. Senator Vandenberg suggested that the declaration of war on Hitler's Danubian satellites was done in response to Russian demand. The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, ed. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), pp. 31--33.

27. Filippo Anfuso, Du Palais de Venise au Lac de Carde (Paris, 1949), p. 221.

28. Hungary's military participation in the war against the Soviet Union was limited. The number of combatant Hungarian divisions in Russia was five in 1941, ten in 1942, none in 1943, and fourteen in 1944. During the same period, the number of divisions for occupation duties varied between two and six divisions. The number of combatant Rumanian divisions was twelve in 1941, thirty-one in 1942, and twenty-five in 1943 and 1944. There were only three Rumanian divisions for occupation duties in 1942 and 1943. For details see La Hongrie et la Conférence de Paris, vol. 1, Publié par le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de Hongrie (Budapest, 1947), pp. 86--90. It should be noted that during this period, the population of both Hungary and Rumania was around 14 million.

29. See about my assignment, Dániel Csatári, Forgószélben: Magyar-román viszony 1940--1945

[In the Path of a Tornado: Hungarian-Rumanian Relations 1940--1945] (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1968), p. 123.

30. Memorandum of the conversation between the Führer and the Duce, with Ribbentrop and Ciano also present, at Klessheim near Salzburg, April 29, 1942. Bulletin of the State Department, 15 (1946), no. 367, p. 59.

31. For the activities and report of this commission, see Csatári, op. cit., pp. 124--32. This book with some abbreviations was published in French under the title: Dans la Tourmante. Les relations Hungaro-Roumaines de 1940 a 1945. (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1974). For the Italo-German Commission see pp. 114--18.

32. The Hungarian government inquired and found out that the German and Italian governments did not know of this Rumanian allegation.

33. For details see Csatári, Forgószélben, pp. 229--51 and Dans la Tourmante, pp. 209--24. Cf. Elemér Illyés, Erdély változása [Transformation of Transylvania] (Munich: Aurora könyvek, 1976), 2nd, expanded edition, p. 101.

34. He indicated his feelings frankly to the Rumanian foreign minister, G. Gafencu, on April 19, 1939. "They say that I want to restore the grandeur of Hungary. Why should I be so ill advised? A greater Hungary might be embarrassing for the Reich. Besides, the Hungarians have always shown us utter ingratitude. They have no regard or sympathy for the German minorities. As for me, I am only interested in my Germans. I said so frankly to Count Csáky... And I have said so without equivocation to the Regent Horthy and to Imrédy: the German minorities in Rumania and Yugoslavia do not want to return to Hungary; they are better treated in their new fatherland. And what the German minorities do not want, the Reich does not want either." Grigore Gafencu, Last Days of Europe, A Diplomatic Journey in 1939 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 68--9.

35. Paul Schmidt, Hitler's Interpreter (New York, 1951), pp. 205--06.

36. Ibid., p. 244. As to Hitler's encouragements given to Antonescu concerning the ultimate fate of Transylvania, see Trial of the Major War Criminals, vol. 7 (Nuremberg, 1947), p. 322. Hitler and his underlings juggled with promises and threats to keep Hungary and Rumania in line. This was especially the case when political leaders of these countries visited Hitler. Ibid., pp. 320--23.

37. The Ciano Diaries, Aug. 25, 26, 27, 29, 1942. Mussolini considered the Hungarian plan as part of an anti-German conspiracy that would have caused a crisis in Italo-German relations. For the details of the affair, see Filippo Anfuso, Du Palais de Venise au Lac de Garde (Paris, 1949), pp. 230--31.

38. The Ciano Diaries, Nov. 5, 1942.

39. Nicholas Kállay, Hungarian Premier (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), p. 147.

40. For the entire exchange of views, see ibid., pp. 146--61.

41. Colloqui con Due Dittatori (Roma: Ruffolo Editore, 1949).

42. Ibid., pp. 102--08.

43. Ibid., p. 109.

44. Ibid., p. 112--14.

45. For the wartime period many Hungarian, Rumanian, German, British, American, and Italian documentary sources and memoirs are available. For further readings see some monographs that used such sources: C. A. Macartney, October Fifteenth, A History of Modern Hungary, 1925-1945, 2 vols., (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1961); Nandor A. F. Dreisziger, Hungary's Way to World War II (Toronto, Canada: Hungarian Helicon Society, 1968); Andreas Hillgruber, Hitler, König Carol und Marschall Antonescu, 1938--1944, (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1954): Mario D. Fenyõ, Hitler, Horthy, and Hungary: German-Hungarian Relations, 1941--1944.

(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972); Csatári, Dans la Tourmante; Gyula Juhász, Magyarország Külpolitikája, 1919--1945, [The Foreign Policy of Hungary, 1919--1945] (Budapest, Kossuth könyvkiadó, 1975) idem., Magyar-brit titkos tárgyalások 1943-ban [Hungarian-British Secret Negotiations in 1943] (Budapest, Kossuth könyvkiadó, 1978).

46. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 222--27.

47. See Albert Resis "The Churchill-Stalin 'Percentage' Agreement on the Balkans," American Historical Review, (April 1978), pp. 368--87; Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War, vol. 3 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1971), pp. 149--53; Daniel Yergen, Shattered Peace (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1977), pp. 58--61; Geir Lundstestad, The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe, 1943--1947 (Tromso: Universitetsforlager, 1978), pp. 89--92.

48. Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, The Reckoning (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965), p. 560. Elisabeth Barker, British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1976), pp. 140--47, 220--22.

49. Eden, op. cit., p. 559.

50. For details see Cordell Hull, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 1451--57.

51. For description of the delegation's Moscow trip and its aftermath. see Ferenc Nagy, The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948). pp. 204--19.

52. Actually Hungarian manpower and Hungarian experts were used for this work performed under the direction of the Red Army. Some of the railroad lines for which Hungary was required to pay were situated in the neighboring countries. Ibid., p. 208.

53. Article 19 of the Rumanian armistice agreement set forth: "The Allied Governments regard the decision of the Vienna Award regarding Transylvania as null and void and are agreed that Transylvania (or the greater part thereof) should be returned to Rumania, subject to confirmation at the peace settlement, and the Soviet Government agrees that Soviet forces shall take part for this purpose in joint military operations with Rumania against Germany and Hungary." The parenthetical phrase was used by the Russians as a club held over the Rumanians and as encouragement to the Hungarians in Budapest. The British and Americans proposed the expression "subject to confirmation at the peace settlement." They thought that this insertion would keep the whole question for reconsideration at the peace table after the war. By handing all of Transylvania to the Groza regime in March, 1945, the Soviets played their trump card to consolidate that puppet regime in power. They refused to discuss at inter-Allied meetings the meaning of the parenthetical phrase. And "subject to confirmation at the peace settlement" thereafter meant to the Soviets automatic confirmation of what they had done. The important thing to them was control over Rumania. Stalin was not secretive about his aims during the war. When the British foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, visited him in December, 1941, Stalin explained his ideas concerning the postwar territorial and political settlement. He stated that "Rumania should give special facilities for bases, etc., to the Soviet Union, receiving compensation from territory now occupied by Hungary." Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 629.

54. La Hongrie et la Confèrence de Paris, vol. 1, pp. 108-11. For the English text of this note, see Appendix C.

55. Foreign Relations of the United States, (FRUS), 1946, vol. 2, pp. 309--10; John C. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs, 1945--1947 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), pp. 67, 115, 117, 123, 142; idem., "The European Territorial Settlement," Foreign Affairs, 26 (1947): 211--13; Philip E. Mosely, "Soviet Exploitation of National Conflicts

in Eastern Europe," Waldemar Gurian, ed., The Soviet Union (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press), p. 75.

56. FRUS, 1946, vol. 2, pp. 441--42.

57. See note 54.

58. The following delegations supported the Australian motion: Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, Greece, New Zealand, Union of South Africa, U.S.A. The following delegations voted against it: Byelo-Russia, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, USSR. See for details FRUS, 1946, vol. 3, pp. 311--12.

59. Ibid., pp. 330--31. For the text of his address see Appendix D.

60. Ibid., p. 339. For the text of his address see Appendix D.

61. Ibid., pp. 375--76.

62. Ibid., pp. 376--77.

63. Ibid., pp. 528.

64. FRUS, 1946, vol. 4, pp. 851--53.

65. FRUS, 1946, vol. 3, p. 761.

66. FRUS, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, pp. 1074--75.

67. Le Problème Hongrois par rapport à la Roumanie, Publié par le Ministère des Affaires Etrangères de Hongrie (Budapest, 1946). For the grievances of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, see notes of May 20, 1946, and of July 15, 1946, Appendix C.

68. See Appendix C.

69. La Hongrie et la Conférence de Paris, vol. 1, pp. 142--71.

70. Cf. Martin Domke, "Settlement-of-Disputes Provisions in Axis Satellite Peace Treaties," American Journal of International Law, 41 (1947): 911--20; Stephen D. Kertesz, "Human Rights in the Peace Treaties," International Human Rights: Part II, Symposium published as the Autumn, 1949, issue of Law and Contemporary Problems, Duke University Law School, Durham, N.C., pp. 627--46.

71. Cf. Yuen-Li Liang, "Observance in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: Request for an Advisory Opinion on Certain Questions," American Journal of International Law, 44 (1950): 100--17; Kenneth S. Carlston, "Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, and Rumania, Advisory Opinions of the International Court of Justice," American Journal of International Law, 44 (1950): 728--37.

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