A thousand years of the Hungarian art of war

IN DEFENSE OF HUNGARY.

The 1st Hungarian army under the command of Colonel-General Istvan Naday was subordinated to the commander of the German "Army Group South." Field Marshal Friedrick Erich von Manstein. The 1st army consisted of four infantry divisions (16th, 20th, 24th and 25th divisions, each with three regiments), one light division (the 27th, with two regiments), one armored division (2nd), and two mountain brigades with the necessary artillery, engineering, Iogistic, medical and supply troops./44/

On March 28, 1944, Colonel-Generals Naday and Geza Lakatos (commander of the occupational forces, renamed as the 2nd army,

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comprised of the 7th and 8th army corps) reported at Manstein's head-quarters. They recommended that he withdraw the 2nd army to the Carpathian Mountain passes, at the same time marching the 1st army up to the same region. In this way Hungarian forces would be used exclusively for defense of the national frontiers. Manstein rejected their plan. Instead, he wanted the Hungarians to launch an attack against the advancing Soviet forces which had already reached the Delatyn-Kolomya line. Manstein's decision followed Hitler's order to hold every inch of territory at any price, and was influenced by the strategic situation of the South Army Group. Two Soviet armored columns two-armies-strong each broke through the German front in March and separated the 8th German army from the 1st armored German army. In a gap some 100 miles wide, the 7th army corps of the Hungarian occupational army was alone attempting to slow the Soviet attack. Manstein (with the Hungarian 1st army) wanted to launch a limited attack to fill the gap and thus restore the connection between he German 8th and 4th armies./45/

General Naday, as commander of the occupational army corps, upon receiving this assignment from Manstein resigned in protest and Regent Horthy appointed General Lakatos as Commander of the 1st army, which now also included the troops of the already fighting 7th army corps. Manstein expected the 1st Hungarian army to finish the march-up to the planned attack by April 7th.

As a result of these instructions, the Hungarian troops proceeded by rail and foot into Galicia through the still snow-covered passes of the Carpathians. Heavy snow and storms in the mountains slowed troop movement down to 4-10 miles daily./46/ Therefore the planned attack of the 1st army had to be postponed until April 17th. The Germans - either to provide the poorly-equipped Hungarian troops with more firepower, or to keep an eye on them (as their loyalty was doubtful), mixed German units with units of the 1st army. The composition of the army on the eve of the attack was:/47/

6th Hungarian army corps: 27th light, 25th infantry division, 201st reserve (occupational) division;

7th Hungarian army corps: 18th light and 16th infantry divisions, one German assault gun and one German antitank battalion;

l1th German army corps: 1st and 2nd Hungarian mountain brigades, 2nd Hungarian armored division, 24th Hungarian infantry division. The 1st army, in cooperation with the 46th armored army corps

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of the 1st German armored army and supported by German dive bombers, attacked as planned. By April 26 the troops prepared to continue the attack for the occupation of Kolomya. But the reorganized and reinforced Soviet forces (the 4th Ukraine front with the 1st Guard army and the 18th army), outnumbering the Hungarian army two to one, repelled the attack and forced the Hungarians to dig in. The Hungarian troops held their positions against the superior Soviet forces until the end of July when the general situation on the Eastern Front forced them to withdraw to the ridge of the Carpathian Mountains.

The success of the limited attack in April and of later successful defensive battles drastically altered the morale of the officer corps and of the rank and file of the 1st army. For the first time the majority of the soldiers became aware of the conditions suffered by the civilian population in the war zone. Without exception all agreed that Soviet armies should be prevented from turning Hungarian territory into a theatre of war. They were further aware that they had run out of space: their backs almost touched the Carpathian Mountains. They were jolted out of their previous complacency by the reported cruelty of Soviet troops./48/ While the Western world accused the Hungarian soldiers of fighting for Nazi Germany, they themselves knew better: they were fighting - with all their hearts, capabilities and strength - for their homeland. The inability to understand this leaves little hope for mutual understanding among peoples.

Thus the Hungarian army securely held the Northeastern Carpathians at the time Soviet forces launched their new attack (in July, 1944) in the direction of Lvov-Krakow. The German High Command then withdrew all German troops under the command of the Hungarian 1st army and used them for a counterattack. Thus the 1st army, left with no reserves, was at the same time assigned a more extensive area to defend. The new Chief of the Hungarian general staff, Colonel-General Janos Voros/49/ was appointed to his post at the declared demand of the Germans. On July 15 he asked the German High Command to agree to the withdrawal to the Carpathians of the northern flank of the Hungarian army. The Germans, counting on the 7th Hungarian army corps to strengthen their defenses against the Soviet attack toward Krakow, refused to relieve these troops.

July 20, 1944 was a fateful day: the assassination attempt against Hitler was unsuccessful. Ensuing purges among the German genera1 staff and high-ranking officers paralyzed any further conspiracies, even if no guilty ones were disclosed and arrested./50/ The impact of this failure to kill Hitler convinced him that it was

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"a sign from Providence the I must, and therefore sha1l, continue my work."/51/

No immediate repercussions from the assasination attempt were felt in Hungary, but the 1st army did feel the consequences. In order to repel the Soviet attack, foreseen for July 22, the Hungarian Chief of Staff, ordered the commander of the army Colonel General Karoly Beregfy, to withdraw his troops to the eastern slopes of the Carpathians. This mountainous region, covered with forests, prevented the Soviets from using tanks to destroy the Hungarian troops who were not satisfactorily equipped with antitank weapons. The German High Command, rejecting this plan, ordered the 1st army to hold its positions, at least until July 24./52/ Beregfy, who not only admired German military might but was also a true believer in Nazism, disobeyed the orders of the Hungarian Chief of Staff (and by July 24, those of Horthy) and refused to sanction the retreat. Complete chaos resulted.

The Soviets, breaking through the northern flank of the army on July 22, with fresh troops continued attack the next day. Threatening a breakthrough of the defenses, they thereby prevented the army's northern flank from withdrawing to the Carpathians. Beregfy, whose headquarters were behind the northern flank, moved behind the more secure southern flank. Thus the northern army corps, unable to communicate with the southern army corps and with army headquarters, could not head for the Carpathians./53/ The bulk of the force, sustaining severe losses, withdrew to the mountains in the midst of heavy fighting. There the troops occupied the marked-out but poorly-prepared "Hunyadi" defense lines, established for protection of the Hungarian frontiers. This line was relatively easy to occupy as by that time the attacking Soviet troops had also run out of reserves, ending any chance of further exploitation of their victory. By August 11 the Hungarian 1st army, in its new, improvised defense position, was threatened by a Soviet attack.

Our narrative concerning the operation of Hungarian troops outside of Hungary would not be complete without mentioning the 1st cavalry division. Completely separated from the Hungarian forces, this division fought its battles in Poland in the Pripjet marshes and later along the Moskow-Warsaw highway, under German command.

The main forces of the summer 1944 Soviet offensive, outnumbering the defending German army 25 to 1, launched their attack North and South of the Pripjet marshes. A chance to stop the

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Soviet strike would have been very slim had the Germans used a f1exible, imaginative strategy. But Hitler's demand to hold onto every inch of territory prevented his generals from employing such flexible strategy. The Pripjet marshes witnessed one of the greatest German victories of the First World War under the command of Hindenburg. Now they saw the destruction of the 2nd German army.

The Hungarian cavalry division was divided between the 20th and 23rd German army corps upon its arrival at the battlefield on June 18, 1944. Thus, the division commander could not lead his division as a strategic unit and had no opportunity to make independent decisions. The German army corps commanders used hussar troops to launch desperate counterattacks against the Soviet tank columns and assigned rear guard duties to them, covering the retreat of the main German forces. No wonder the cavalry division suffered catastrophic casulaties (50 per cent) in manpower, in armament, and in equipment./54/ The hussars fought desperate battles during the summer with traditional courage and self-sacrifice, and were released by the German High Command only on September l 9, 1944. By that time even the remnants of one of the best Hungarian divisions were badly needed in Hungary to help repel the Soviet invasion.

Hungary's situation became desperate from a military point of view on August 25, 1944 when Romania, in a surprise move, declared its withdrawal from the Axis Powers. The Romanians now joined the Soviet attack in an attempt to reoccupy Transylvania, clearing the way for the invasion of the Balkans by the Soviet 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian armies. The combined Soviet and Romanian forces, numbering 72 divisions, then confronted the 2nd and 3rd Hungarian armies which had been mobilized only on August 30th.

The 2nd army had only one division (25th) equipped with modern weapons. It gained experience in combat while being part of the 1st army in the northeastern Carpathians. But because of casualties, its effective force was below fifty percent. The other two divisions were reserves, with two (instead of three) regiments. One armored division (50 per cent combat value) was also subordinated to the 2nd army. The artillery was equipped with cannons left over from the First World War./55/

Such a weak army had a slim chance of stopping the overwhelming Soviet-Romanian forces only if they could beat the enemy to the ridge of the southern Carpathians and occupy the mountain passes first./56/ They tried, and failed.

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The 3rd army was no better off. The Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Armed Forces, Colonel-General Voros, ordered this army of nine weak, undermanned and underequipped reserve divisions to attack west of the 2nd Hungarian army, cross Arad and the Maros Valley/57/ and occupy the mountain passes of Transylvania. This attack, too, failed.

Both armies were, in September, subordinated to the German South Army Group which numbered 30 divisions, 3,500 artillery pieces, 300 tanks and 500 ariplanes. Units of the 2nd Ukraine Front - 60 divisions, 10,000 artillery pieces, 7,800 tanks and 1,000 airplanes/58/ - attacked The German Army Group South. Only a miracle would have helped to stem the assault by such superior forces.

Why did the lower officer corps (which carried the bulk of the operations and suffered tremendous casualties) and the rank and file (who naturally had even greater losses) continue fighting? Did they be1ieve in the ultimate victory of Germany? Did they believe in the "secret weapons" of Hitler? Were they fanatical Nazis? Not at all! Slogans, propaganda, and appeals to nationalist ideals seldom influence front-line soldiers who are constantly confronted with the sobering reality of death. What, then, kept the morale of the Hungarian armies high? The following explanation may perhaps shed some light on this perplexing question./59/

In late August and early September, 1944, "cook information" (gossip) began to circulate on the front line. The rumors were that Horthy was negotiating a separate peace with the Anglo-Americans, following which American parachutists would occupy Hungary. Therefore, the soldiers were to defend the frontiers from Soviet invasion until they could surrender to the Americans. These rank and file soldiers, knowing of no better alternative to end the war, eagerly watched the skies for the arrival of the Americans.

Was this hope unfounded - based on ridiculous gossip? Not at all! On September 15th and 17th, Otto Habsburg, with full authorization from Regent Horthy, met with President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Both agreed that with Hungary's declaration to side with the Allied Powers, American airborne brigades would land in Hungary./60/ Rome was chosen for the conclusion of negotiations. Tibor Eckhardt,/61/ notified the Hungarian Foreign Minister, Colonel-General Gustav Hennyey, of Otto's success. Eckhardt's letter unfortunately never arrived./62/ Thus the Hungarian government was led to believe that

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the Allies still harbored their previous conviction/63/ and that Hungary was required to petition Moscow for an arrnistice./64/ Accordingly, General Gabor Faragho was sent to the Soviet Union on September 25, 1944 to discuss the armistice.

The Germans got wind of the negotiations and with the help of a few Hungarian cronies arrested Regent Horthy (after his radio declaration to stop firing). Horthy was replaced by the leader of the National Socialist Arrow Cross Party, Ferenc Szalasi, who became the "Fuhrer of the Nation."/65/ supported by German divisions. Thus the entire attempt to switch sides was poorly organized, betrayed and the fighting men were not informed. After a short hesitation the soldiers continued to fight against the Soviet forces.

Official diplomatic efforts before the Arrow Cross coup d'etat to terminate Hungary's participation in the war were paralleled by an underground movement, formed by leaders of the anti-fascist political parties, with the knowledge and support of Horthy./66/ Under the direction of Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky of the Smallholders' Party, the movement organized a "Committee for National Uprising and Liberation" called, in short, "the Independence Front". The military sector of the Front, under the leadership of General Janos Kiss, with his general staff/67/ of ten officers, worked out a "resolute counteraction" against the Germans. They planned to arm the workers for a national uprising and enlist the support of military units garrisoned in Budapest. A large number of people were required to prepare and organize the execution of this project, and the Nazis learned about it too. On November 22, 1944 the secret general staff was arrested and court-marshaled. General Janos Kiss, Colonel Jeno Nagy and Captain Vilmos Tartsay were executed. The others were sentenced to life imprisonment./68/ The resistance, without leaders, fell apart. Although smaller groups had been heroic, they had failed to incite a national uprising.

It would be a mistake to believe that the Hungarian Army welcomed the October events. Although the new regime loudly announced that the Regent had released the officer corps from their loyalty oath to him, everyone knew that he had done it under pressure. A terrible spiritual and emotional crisis tore apart the consciences of the members of the officer corps. The alternatives open to them were: believe the Arrow Cross propaganda and give their loyalty to the Hungarian "Fuhrer"; or obey the Regent's order and surrender their weapons to the Soviet army; or take individual action, desert their unit and hide somewhere in the country until the war ended.

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The majority were clearly hostile to the German-supported Szalasi regime. Therefore, they would have been ready not only to obey Horthy's orders but also to fight against the new pro-Nazi government. But to lay down their arms before the Soviets? They bitterly protested against this a1ternative; anybody but the Soviet soldier. Many of them cried out: "Where are the Americans?" The third alternative, to desert their units individually, was rejected outright by the officers. The idea of deserting the soldiers who had confidence in them and remained loyal in the most dangerous situations was repelling to the front-line commanders.

The remaining alternative was to continue to fight under the new government, not for the government, but against the Soviet forces. At the same time the officers, consistently c1osing their eyes to the increasing desertions in the rank and file, reported deserters as "missing in action."

The Szalasi leadership, well aware of the mood of the officer corps, tolerated the rejection of the new rules, at least by the frontline units. Loyalty oaths were not strictly required. Instead of the new Nazi salute, the soldiers were allowed to use the old salute - raising their hands to their helmets, and so forth./69/ What was important for them was the fact that the officers, even if not for the Nazis, continued to fight against the Soviets.

Another question arises: why did the rank and fi1e personnel of the Hungarian Army not follow Horthy's order to observe an armistice? What made the Hungarian soldiersóin the rank and file - fight to the bitter end? The following explanation is not based on statistical data, since no one bothered to ask the soldiers after the war why they had fought, but rather on generally accepted and logical reasons:

-The high commanders of the Army were immediately placed under German control. The German liaison officers, who had the right to read all reports and instructions, forestalled a surprise capitulation by any unit.

-The lower officer corps, having front line experience and knowing how the Russians handled P.O.W.s from loudespeaker propaganda broadcasts, feared the P.O.W. life specifically promised (by name) to Hungarian front line officers.

-Learning from captured Russians and Hungarian-German soldiers, as well as from deserter Romanian soldiers, the conditions in P.O.W. camps and the manner in which the Soviets used Romanian troops for near1y suicidal mass attacks against the Hungarian front, no one wished to become the cannon fodder of the Soviet Army against the still formidable German forces.

-The rank and file, uninformed of the political situation, were

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trained to follow orders and so they did when the high commanders ordered continuation of the war.

-Finally, their experiences with Russian troops also strengthened the soldiers' resolve to continue to fight.

The following is an account of one such experience./70/ "My company, rear guard of the regiment, was holding a village against attacking Soviet troops. We were ordered to withdraw at midnight. Soviet troops, alerted to our retreat, engaged in house-to-house combat. The rear guard retreated in a small forest near the village where the Soviets did not pursue us. Our personnel was checked quite easily and in silence. Instead of losing men, we actually gained manpower as a few villagers joined us rather than submit to Soviet occupation. As we were about to leave the woods, houses in the village burst into flames, shots were fired, men cursed and women screamed. The rear guard - some 30 soldiers and a few civilians - froze. Shortly after, when the clamor from the village intensified instead of subsiding, a soldier cried out: "Let's go back. And so we did."

This is not the proper place to describe graphically what they found in the village. The surprised Russians - those who could - took flight in the night. After four hours, the rear guard abandoned the village for the second time, leaving behind only empty houses: the entire population of the village left before them.

Today it is easy to pass judgment on the illogical actions of the rear guard and the vil1agers. After all, the war was clearly lost and Soviet occupation unavoidable. But nobody thought logically in this and many similar situations. Only the instinct of survival prevailed, and if one had to die - was it not better - more dignified - to die with a weapon in one's hands?

Only a multivolume study could properly describe all the deeds of the various Hungarian army units during the combat for Hungary. We have tried to give some examples of the spirit and skill of Hungarian soldiers during World War II within the framework of our short study. The great battles around Tokaj in the Tisza, Bodrog and Hernad Valleys, the battle of Debrecen, the defense of encircled Budapest, the battles along Lake Balaton an in Slovakia, all attest to military excellence of the Hungarian soldiers; the self-sacrificing devotion of the lower officer corps: and (when weaker German control made it possible) the leadership and professional worth of the Hungarian generals.

This study has omitted mention of the heroic fighting by the smal1 Hungarian air force against overwhelming odds. We could not describe all the deeds of all of the troops belonging to separate

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branches of the Army. Needless to say, without artillery and engineering support, without adequate supplies and logistics, the soldiers' courage would have been in vain. Nobody knew better the combat value of the Hungarian soldiers than the Soviet and Romanian troop commanders. Let us quote here only one statement made by a Russian general upon the capitulation of the Hungarian 24th Division on April 6, 1945: "If I could have had Hungarian soldiers, I would have occupied Berlin a year ago."/71/

Writing about the art of war of an army which lost the war is not an easy and fruitful subject for an author. Yet, the real value and morale, as well as the fighting skill, of any armed force, undergoes the greatest test during a period of lost battles, retreats and defeats. The Hungarian Army passed these tests with superior grades. The retreat did not turn to panic-stricken flight. The battles in Transylvania, in the upper Tisza Valley, around Debrecen or the great Lowlands, at encircled Budapest, in the counter offensives of Komarom, Szekesfehevar and along Lake Balaton the rear guard operations in the mountains of Slovakia, and in the lowlands of Kisalfold and the hills of Vas and Zala counties, were all witness to the great military virtue of the Hungarian commanders and soldiers.

After the lost war it was not "comme il faut" to talk about the Hungarian heroes of the Second World War. The Soviet puppet Hungarian regime praised only the "glorious" Soviet soldiers and celebrated the "liberation" of Hungary. No soldiers in the history of mankind have been treated with such deadly silence as the Hungarian soldiers of the Second World War. No statues or monuments remind young generations of their sacrifices. No data register the extent of those sacrifices. Their deeds have been forgotten!

It is the extreme irony of life that, while wars are always planned and initiated by statesmen and politicians, the blame for a lost war falls only on the soldiers. The war criminal trials following World War II attempted to correct this. The victorious powers tried, imprisoned and executed many generals as well as many statesmen from the defeated nations. Nowhere was the hangman busier than in Hungary. Goddess "Justitia" could not see the facts with her blindfolded eyes. Had she been able to see, she would have noticed ther dead-end street into which Hungarian leadership had already been pushed by the late 1930s. Had she been able to see, perhaps an accusation would have been leveled at those statesmen who, with their policy of unlimited appeasement, first opened the door to the imperialistic attempts of the Third Reich and then sanctioned the establishment of Soviet colonial rule in

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East Central Europe. Who gave the victors the right to condemn the small nations for not individually standing up against the Nazi war machine; for not committing suicide? After all it took four years for the entire world to defeat Hitler's armies!

The Hungarian soldier did not f1ght for Hitler's aims. No military alliance was ever signed between Germany and Hungary. If the Hungarian armies fought to the bitter end on the side of Germany, they did so because they were soldiers who had learned to obey orders and defend their homeland against the Soviet armies well above the call of duty./72/ This patriotism - love of the fatherland - makes heroes of the soldiers of the ill-fated 2nd army, those of the occupational forces, and of the young soldiers of the Szent Laszlo and other divisions./73/ We accept the realities of war and the unavoidable consequences of "Vae victis". It should not prevent us from paying tribute to the heroes and to their deeds.

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CONCLUSION

History has been - and still is - all too frequently used by politicians, statesmen, administrators and bureaucrats to justify current political goals, procedures and ideologies. Such "use" of history prevents students (of history) from learning the truth about what happened, why it happened and how it happened. In our modern era of specialization, historical studies have also become specialized - almost fragmented - and offer little opportunity to understand the events, attitudes, goals, successes and frustrations of nations. Yet without knowing the general history of a nation, it is almost impossible to understand its psyche (if such thing exists); impossible to calculate its actions and reactions in certain situations.

Military history is one field of specialization which has been neglected or at least strictly separated from the fields of political, social and economic history. Without the chapter of military history, no general history can be complete. Great victories and lost battles leave long, sometimes everlasting, traces in the memories of nations. Unaware of the great crises of the Hungarian people, of their traditional prejudices, fears and convictions, Western statesmen and diplomats assigned roles to Hungary which were alien to her, unacceptable to every individual and every class of society, as, for example, capitulation to the Russian forces instead of to Anglo-American troops in World War II. That the Soviet Union, for Hungary, was not merely one of the victorious powers but much more, did not occur to these statesmen. For the Hungarians the Soviet Union was Russia, the descendant of czarist Russia which crushed the Hungarian freedom fight of 1849, fought against Hungary in World War I, and exported communism to Hungary in 1919. Even the best organized capitulation of Hungarian forces would have failed because the people did not think; they were not realists. The people were emotional and we know that in some situations people

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reject realism and obey emotion. In the case of Hungary, the l956 Revolution and freedom fight provided proof for this statement. Realism had very little to do with it.

In reviewing some examples of the Hungarian art of war our first goal was to write a short, concise narrative of military history and point out the unalterably close relationship between politics, social and economic conditions diplomacy and military affairs. We hope that this effort will help statesmen, politicians and nations of the free world who are responsible for the present status quo, for the preservation of peace, and for our future, to better understand Hungary's national spirit.

The second goal of this study was to provide a clear mirror for second and third generation ethnic Hungarians who live in the free world. This author knows too well from personal experience the mental crisis of Hungarian youth who have learned from their parents, from emigrant literature, club meetings and associations, the history of Hungary and the military deeds of their fathers and ancestors. Upon entering high school and college, they seldom find a textbook or suggested reading which would not contradict or deny outright those "facts" learned in the ethnic community. Hungarian college students have searched for proof, for books, for undeniable "facts" to learn the "truth." What they have found are old, outdated books written in Hungarian, memoirs, novels and patriotic legends, or the studies written in today's Hungary and translated into English. None of these works measures up to the academic and scholarly standards of their college texts. Second and third generation Hungarian young people have become frustrated and disillusioned, and will soon forget (or have already forgotten) their ethnic origins.

This short study of the Hungarian art of war intends to come to their aid. Selecting examples of Hungarian victories and defeats, recognizing military virtue even when it prevailed in the service of doubtful goals, this study attempts to avoid bias and narrowmindedness. Where Western European and American interpretations may have misconstrued the truth, with the help of ample documentation we have tried to illuminate some controversies. But first of all we wanted to produce a handbook which, because of its selection of topics and scholarly meritst will help our young people to argue effectively when confronted with distortions of Hungarian

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military history and thus prevent them from turning away in frustration from their ethnic heritage.

Our study ends with World War II, before the glorious Hungarian freedom fight of l956, but not because the deeds of the youngest generation of Hungarian heroes are not worthy of mention here! Praise of the young Hungarian freedom fighters has already been written in many languages and is thus readily available and easily understood for the non-Hungarian reader

Finally, this author would like to call the attention of young ethnic Hungarian historians to the subject of the Hungarian art of war and encourage them to study it, research it and write about it in a longer, more ambitious and possibly multivolume work Such a study is needed not only from a narrow Hungarian nationalistic point of view but also for the benefit of the general history of Western civilization With all my heart, I wish the best of luck to such an endeavor.

Oak Park, June, l981.

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A thousand years of the Hungarian art of war