The New Central Europe

Since the First World War no Central European country had enjoyed more sympathy from the West than Czechoslovakia. During the Second World War Czechoslovakia's reputation rose even higher. Her shameful betrayal at Munich weighed heavily upon the conscience of the West. Praise of her as the democratic country of Central Europe became more widespread than ever.

If Czechoslovakia was the darling of the West, admired and recognized as the builder of peace and democracy in Central Europe, Hungaryon the other hand was the whipping boy, rebuked for her reactionary regime and blamed for the failure of peaceful evolution in post- Habsburg Central Europe. A.J.P. Taylor, during the Second World War, expressed quite a common belief when, writing with admiration about Czechoslovakia, and the "Benes system," he said of Hungary "The failure to establish wider, deeper, political and economic cooperation in Central Europe between the wars was the fault of the Hungarian governing class alone."[1] Although by no means "alone" responsible for the failure of cooperation, the Hungarian governing class was certainly the chief obstacle to the consolidation of the peace settlement in the Danube Valley. Post- war Hungary surrounded by Austria, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, occupied the center of the Danube Valley, and the viability of the new system, which Taylor called the Benes system, depended largely upon Hungarys cooperation. The Hungarian governing class, however, was the least interested of all in making this system work. And, considering the anti- Hungarian bias of the peace settlement, there was no reason why any Hungarian regime should wish the new system to prosper.

It was often said by the leaders of Czechoslovakia that had Hungarybeen a democracy, relations between the two countries would have developed amicably. The antipathy of Hungarys reactionary rulers toward the Czechs on account of their democracy was undeniable. On the other hand, Czechoslovakia's hostility toward the Hungarians was not motivated merely by the Czech democrats, contempt for Hungarys reactionary ruling classes. The conflict between the two countries was rooted in nationalistic rivalry. The true nature of this conflict was clearly revealed following the two world wars. The most flagrantly hostile actions against Hungarians by Czech democrats were committed at these times: the forcible incorporation of Hungarians into Czechoslovakia after the First World War, and the forcible expulsion of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia after the Second; yet at both times Hungaryhappened to have incipiently democratic governments: under the Károlyi regimein 1918- 19, and under the coalition regime in 1945- 47.

Professor Taylor was right, of course, in pointing out that "the failure of the Károlyi regime which held out the promise of a democratic Hungary was a disaster both for Hungaryand for Europe. . . ." It was a "disaster" indeed that the failure of Károlyi's revolution swept away from the Danubian scene those Hungarians who, deeply conscious of the causes of the Habsburg tragedy, held the most enlightened views about peaceful cooperation among the Danubian peoples. They were keen guardians of Hungarian national interests (they even hoped for a while to maintain the unity of historical Hungaryby federalizing it), but they were free of the excessive national ambitions which motivated the imperialistic territorial demands of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. Under democratic leadership, post- war Hungarywould have had a soothing effect on the turbulent nationalism of the whole Danube Valley. Moreover, the Hungarian democrats held so much in common with the Czech democrats that Czechoslovakia, instead of launching the Little Entente against Hungary could perhaps have entered into partnership with Hungaryto build democracy in Central Europe; and then the injustices inflicted on Hungaryby her neighbors in the post- war atmosphere of hatred might have been adjusted peacefully.

Such a development, although far from certain, would not have been entirely impossible had the Károlyi regimesurvived the revolutionary crisis of 1918- 19. But it did not survive, and it should be remembered that one of the major causes of its failure was the hostile pressure of Hungarys neighbors.[2] After Károlyi's failure came Béla Kún's Communist rule of terror, then Horthy's counterrevolution. Thus, under Admiral Horthy's regime, Hungaryslid back into the hands of the old ruling class, which combined in its policies some of the worst features of social reaction and chauvinistic nationalism. There was of course plenty of social reaction and chauvinistic nationalism elsewhere in post- Habsburg Central Europe, but it was a disaster that Hungary the geographical center of the Danube Valley, did not come under a progressive and enlightened leadership.

The double tragedy of the lost war and the unsuccessful revolution destroyed Hungarys chances to help in building a new Central Europe. Humiliated and isolated, gutted and dismembered, helpless against her neighbors' greed and vengeance, Hungarystarted her post- war career in a pitiful condition indeed. Opinions differ as to which was Hungarys greater tragedy: the Trianon Peace Treaty or Horthy's counterrevolution. The counterrevolution certainly frustrated Hungarys chances, what- ever they were, of extricating herself from the disastrous consequences of the Trianon peace settlement.

The counterrevolution, under Admiral Horthy's regency, restored the power of the pre- war oligarchy: the coalition of big landowners and lesser gentry, supported by high finance. Even worse, it entrenched in power the clique of army officers and bureaucrats, who had been accomplices in the "white," terror of the counterrevolution. However, the difference between the old and new strata of the post- war ruling class was one of degree rather than kind; they were all one in their dislike of democratic ways of life. The conservative wing of this oligarchy lingered in the aristocratic past, eager to keep society in a paternalistic system, with themselves of course as the privileged rulers, at the top of the hierarchy. The radical wing of the counterrevolution had no under- standing of noble refinements; they indulged in the hollow mannerisms of the "Hungarian gentleman," but fundamentally they were neither gentle nor humane: they found their ideals ultimately fulfilled in Hitler's brutalities. The crucial shift of power toward the latter elements began under Gyula Gömbös's premiership in the thirties. Premier Gömbös, not unlike his colleague in Austria, Chancellor Dollfuss, was an admirer of Mussolini. But Gömbös, unlike Dollfuss, was also an admirer of Hitler, and when the latter assumed power (1933) Gömbös hurried to Berlin to assure the Nazi Fuhrer of Hungarys loyalty and traditional friendship toward Germany. Under Gömbös's premiership (1932- 36), the leadership of the aristocracy decreased in favor of the lesser gentry and middle classes. This "democratization" of the regime was, however, detrimental rather than beneficial for both the country and Central Europe as a whole; it enhanced the influence of those counterrevolutionary forces which identified "reforms" with anti- Semitism, and "struggle for independence" with blind pursuit of revisionist policy in alliance with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.

The conditions of democratic progress were actually far less favorable under the post- war counterrevolutionary regime than they were in pre- war Hungary The liberal- democratic spirit, always the expression of a minority, did not succeed in recapturing even its pre- war position. True, Budapest, the capital, was still one of Europe's great cities, an island where cosmopolitan culture flourished; in the Parliament and in the press a democratic opposition, though weak, nevertheless voiced its views; and the outer facade of liberalism was restored under Count Stephen Bethlen's premiership in the twenties, though the government carefully limited the freedom of democratic dissent. Advocacy of medical reforms proved futile in pre- war Hungary but, in a comparatively liberal atmosphere, progressive ideas had a better chance for development than in the post- war times. Pre- war radicals could agitate more freely for democratic reforms than their spiritual heirs in post- war Hungary For instance, in the thirties a group of writers called the "village explorers," who exposed the unhappy lot of the peasantry, were persecuted for subversion. No such "writers' trials" had ever occurred in pre- war Hungary The post- war regime resisted especially stubbornly the two long- overdue basic reforms without which the country could not even start living the life of a truly democratic society: universal suffrage with the secret ballot, and the redistribution of land.

In 1920 some land reform was instigated; it redistributed less than two million acres, and not exactly among those who most needed the land. In 1939 the government announced another "reform," which promised approximately two million acres to the peasants. This second "reform" was never carried out, because of the Second World War. However, even if it had been, it would scarcely have solved the agrarian problem. Very different intentions from those of which the old regime was capable, and much more radical reforms, were needed. After the first "land reform," the distribution of land ownership in Hungary(a predominantly agrarian country with a population of nine million) was scarcely less outrageous than before. About a thousand families owned one- third of the land, while about three million people, who comprised two- thirds of the rural population, did not own any land at all, or not enough to sustain themselves as independent farmers. The Little Entente propaganda was alert in pointing out that the Hungarian government, while protesting the unjust treatment of the three million Hungarians outside the country, was in no hurry to cure the injustices of the "three million beggars" inside. Indeed the Horthy regime, which called itself "Christian and national," was moved neither by Christian ethics nor by national interests to end the plight of the Hungarian peasantry.

Government propaganda rejected charges against Hungaryas a "feudal" country, arguing that the medieval system known in the West as "feudalism" had never taken root in Hungary In a strict historical sense they were right, but such arguments did not improve the social conditions of twentieth- century Hungary According to another theory popular with the ruling class, the failure of the democratic revolution, ending in Bolshevik terror after the First World War, and the unjust Trianon Treaty, dictated by the democratic powers, should be sufficient to discredit democracy in the eyes of the Hungarian people. Certainly the democratic program was discredited, but mainly as a result of vicious propaganda. The Horthy regimewas most eager to convince the Hungarians that Károlyi's mistakes were responsible for the nation's tragedy. The democratic revolution was slandered and despised; it was described as a criminal act of traitors, unpatriotic Jews and Communist sympathizers, whose aims and deeds hardly differed from those of the Bolshevik terrorists. A public opinion was thus created which, as one observer remarked, attributed "an evil connotation" to the very term "democracy."[3] The extension of this line of thought was that Western betrayal of democratic principles of justice in the Trianon Treaty drove Hungaryinto the arms of Nazi Germany; this was the Hungarian variation of the Czech thesis, according to which Western betrayal of Czechoslovakia in Munich drove Benes into the arms of Soviet Russia.[4]

Trianon indeed was unjust; or, as Rustem Vámbéry (incidentally, a passionate castigator of the Horthy regime expressed it, "worse than unjust or wrong, it was, indeed, stupid."[5] The separation from Hungaryof about three million Hungarians--that is, over one quarter of the entire nation--was a great injustice. This flagrant offense was the more unbearable inasmuch as the majority of the detached Hungarians lived along the new frontiers--forcibly separated, and only by the frontiers, from the rest of the nation. Their bitter opposition to the Trianon Treaty was justifiable; their protest was genuine and spontaneous. It was flimsy propaganda on the part of the Little Entente to represent the whole revisionist movement as the work of the Hungarian ruling class, eager to recover their estates in the neighboring countries, or anxious to divert the people's attention from the social ills inside Hungary No doubt the Hungarian ruling class found it convenient to talk about the injustices the Trianon Treaty had inflicted on the nation, rather than to abolish the injustices they themselves were perpetrating against their own people; nevertheless the treaty was bad, and the Little Entente was wrong to defend its injustices.

Hungary ever since her foundation a thousand years before, had always been an ethnically heterogeneous state, although politically she was united under Hungarian dominance. Following the First World War, she was reduced to a purely Hungarian state, ethnically almost homogeneous. Under no circumstances could such a great historical metamorphosis have taken place without stirring up bitter controversies. Unfortunately everybody concerned did his best to make the change as difficult as possible.

No hope whatsoever appeared that Hungaryand her neighbors could come to an agreement on the revision of the Trianon peace settlement. There was no sign that the Little Entente would be willing to give serious consideration to Hungarys just claims. Moreover, there was no indication that Hungarywould be satisfied with what could be considered her just claims, namely the reunification of the Hungarians living along the frontiers and the granting of autonomy to the rest, living farther away from the Hungarian ethnic bloc. The lofty "idea of Saint Stephen" envisaged the restoration of historical Hungaryon a federal basis, with all the various nations enjoying autonomy and the Hungarians occupying the position of "primus inter pares," first among equals.[6] Such exaggerated claims of the revisionist propaganda, the great stress it laid on the "perfect union" of "thousand- years- old Hungary" gave the Little Entente at least an excuse to oppose any revision; it was, however, far from certain that they would have been more responsive to revision if Hungarys revisionist propaganda had been more reasonable.

If there was a chance to gain the confidence of Hungarys neighbors (who were naturally resentful of the past) and to convince them of the necessity of replacing the vindictive peace treaty with a new deal, the Hungarian ruling class was certainly not qualified to reach such a pinnacle of statesmanship. Although they believed themselves to possess superior political abilities, they were neither capable of creating a modern democratic society for their own people, nor able to work toward an up- to- date compromise with their neighbors.

In contrast with Hungary Czechoslovakia was most successful among the Danubian countries in building a modern democratic society. Nevertheless the much sought- after compromise between the ruling Czech nationality and the multinational population of the young republic proved unattainable, much as in the other states of post- Habsburg Central Europe where old struggles for national prerogatives continued.

The Czechs, dazzled by their undreamed- of triumph over Austria- Hungary embraced enthusiastically the program of the national state. From the very beginning it was obvious that Czechoslovakia was not going to be "a sort of Switzerland." The Czech nation, with its will and talent, was the primary prop of the Czechoslovak national program and Czech supremacy was unavoidable if there was to be a Czechoslovak national state. For only the Czechs were in a position to make the new state a going concern, by defending it against the hostile pressure of the massive minorities, and by educating for leadership the two backward members of the fragile majority, the Slovaks and Ruthenes.

The linguistic affinity between Czechs and Slovaks was close enough. Their differences, however, resulting from long historical separation, proved in the long run to be stronger than their similarities. With the freedom they enjoyed in Czechoslovakia, the Slovaks developed into a distinct nation; and while their pro- Czech elements succeeded in merging Slovak nationalism with loyalty to the Czechoslovak state, their autonomist elements, imbued with local patriotism, clamored for independent rights. Thus, though the natural process of national growth, which the Slovaks had been unable to attain under Hungarian rule, was completed in Czechoslovakia, it ended also in a split within the Slovak nation. A somewhat similar process took place in Ruthenia, with even more confused results. The Ruthene nationalists were wavering not merely, like the Slovaks, between Czechoslovak loyalty and local patriotism, but also between Ukrainian and Russian sympathies.

The Czechs had troubles with the nationalities they intended to invest with majority rights (Slovaks, Ruthenes) as well as with those who were granted so- called minority rights (Germans, Hungarians, Poles). These troubles persisted in spite of the enlightened principles of President Masaryk which guided Czechoslovakia's policy. Czechoslovakia carried out progressive social, political, economic and cultural reforms. Her policy toward national minorities was more liberal than that of any other country of Central Europe, and in particular the Sudeten Germans of Bohemia enjoyed broad rights. However, in comparison with the status of the Czechs in old Austria, the Sudeten Germans had a some- what less favorable position. This was because old Austria, though her supranational ties of loyalty to the dynasty were fading away, never was a German national state; whereas Czechoslovakia was the national state of the Czechs from its very beginning, and therefore parity between majority Czechs and minority Germans was, so to speak, by definition an impossibility. As far as Slovakiawas concerned, there the Hungarians enjoyed incomparably more rights than the Slovaks had had in pre- war Hungary But this was no consolation to the Hungarians; the change of their status from majority to minority was as painful for them as for the Germans in Bohemia.

The leaders of Czechoslovakia thought the democratic progress of the country--and the progress was remarkable--would appeal to both majority and minority, and would strengthen the ties of loyalty to the state; but in spite of the blessings of democracy and liberal minority rights, loyalty to the state which had conferred them was conspicuously lacking in vast portions of the population. In fact, only the Czechs were unconditionally loyal, for they not only enjoyed their national rights in full, but also occupied a privileged position as leaders of the country.

The ambition of the Czechs to create a unitary Czechoslovak nation on the one hand, and their mistrust of the non- Czech half of the population on the other, prolonged the rule of centralized government despite repeated promises of decentralization. A substantial part of the Slovaks, the centralists, accepted unity of their nation with the Czechs as final. Nevertheless, the Slovak "autonomists," whose leader in the inter- war period was the impulsive priest- politician Andrej Hlinka, were not merely clerical reactionaries (as Czech propaganda often called them) who turned into Fascists during the Hitler era; among Slovaks of various political beliefs there was a genuine and growing demand for autonomy, which had been pledged in the controversial Pittsburgh Convention of May 31, 1918, signed by T. G. Masaryk and some American citizens of Slovak descent. Similar to the feelings of the Slovaks were those of the Ruthenes. Moreover, the Ruthenes' right to autonomy was secured unequivocally both in the Minority Treaty of 1919 signed in St. Germain and the Czechoslovak constitution of 1920. Autonomy was also the popular battle cry of the Germans, Hungarians and Poles against the centralism of the Prague government. They had, however, no legal basis for claiming collective national minority rights, since the Minority Treaty and corresponding Czechoslovak laws provided them with minority rights for individuals only, not with rights for the national minority as a whole.

If all of the claims for autonomy had been fulfilled, Czechoslovakia would have been transformed into a federal state; but considering the lack of loyalty of the various nationalities toward their common state, federalization might have led to dissolution. During the great crisis in 1938, when the government's resistance to federalization was finally broken, the claims of the nationalities for autonomy turned out to be mere pretexts for ultimate complete secession. Perhaps an earlier federalization would have had the same effect, but this no one can know for certain. Obviously, however, the denial of autonomous rights was a source of permanent tension and irritation. The Slovaks felt insulted not to be allowed even to call themselves a nation, being obliged to say "Czechoslovak nation." And the resentment of the Germans and Hungarians against the state was only intensified by such contentions as that the Germans of Bohemia, or the Hungarians of Slovakia were colonists and foreign intruders in "millennial Czechoslovakia." The Germans and Hungarians, in turn, called Czechoslovakia a "Saisonstaat," a country which owed its birth in 1918 merely to favorable "seasonal" circum- stances and would collapse if the international political climate should cease to favor her existence. The Czechs countered these angry charges with skillful propaganda.

Western scholars, through sympathy for the democratic Czechs, often endorsed the theory of a millennial Czechoslovakia in European history. The American historian S. Harrison Thomson, for instance, looking at the minority problems of Czechoslovakia, concluded that these problems were due to "the gradual infiltration of foreign influences into the territory occupied by the Czechoslovak people.... Germans came from several directions, Magyars from the south, into the living space of the Slovaks."[7] This was the same argument with which the Prague government defended its thesis that Czechoslovakia was the national state of the Czechs and Slovaks and that the Germans and Hungarians (that is, Magyars) were entitled to minority status only. The Germans, however, thought the question of "who came first" was meaningless from the point of view of how much privilege one should enjoy; moreover, they rejected the minority classifications on the ground that there were at least one million more Germans than Slovaks in Czechoslovakia. The Hungarians on the other hand labelled the theory of Slovak historical prerogatives as mere propaganda, and argued that their minority status was simply the result of artificial boundaries which separated them from the bulk of the Hungarian nation.

In order to gain the loyalty of the non- Czech half of the population, the Prague government, which was essentially controlled by the Czechs, used a variety of tactics. It appealed to the Slovaks and Ruthenes mainly in nationalistic terms. The gist of the argument laid before the Slovaks and Ruthenes was that Czechoslovakia saved them from Magyarization, assured their national development, and also endowed them with the blessings of democracy. Meanwhile in an effort to capture the loyalty of the Germans and Hungarians the government toned down the nationalist program, emphasizing the supranational and democratic mission of Czechoslovakia. The Germans were reminded of the old ties of Bohemian patriotism and, especially after the Nazi seizure of power in Germany, of the advantages of living in a democratic country. The Hungarians were told how much better was their position in democratic Czechoslovakia than in semi- feudal Hungary[8]

The German and Hungarian "activist" movements in Czechoslovakia, which advocated loyalty to the state and cooperation with the Prague government, were not altogether unsuccessful. Also, assimilation, a natural process of adjustment, which was strongly fostered by the government's loyalty drive, tended to lessen the hostility of the minorities to the state. Nevertheless the loyalty thus evolved proved ephemeral. Under the impact of Nazi propaganda the Sudeten German masses were alienated almost completely from the Czechoslovak state, which they had never liked anyway. And all the other dissatisfied nationality groups--with the exception of Jews and leftist elements among their numbers--also deserted the state without scruple during the 1938- 39 crisis. The Jews were terrified by Hitler's anti- Semitism, and the leftist element regarded the defense of liberal Czechoslovakia against the Nazi German foe as a matter of democratic duty.

The inner cohesion of Czechoslovakia was diminishing apace, as the threat of hostile forces began to engulf the Republic from without. Whether the Czechoslovak state was a "Saisonstaat" or not, her existence depended on preservation of the European balance of power as it existed in 1919. The Czechs owed their national state, with a non- Czech population twice as great as that of the Czechs, to the conviction of the peacemakers that such a state would serve as a bulwark against Germany; and its unusually prominent role in post- war international affairs rested upon its position in the system of alliances created by France as a counterpoise against the threat of German imperialism. Once the Western Powers allowed Germany to rearm and overthrow the European balance of power, Czechoslovakia's security was doomed. Isolated from without, and undermined from within by disloyal citizens, she stood alone before the revived threat of German imperialism under Hitler's aggressive Third Reich.

The New Central Europe