HUNGARY IN THE MIRROR OF THE WESTERN WORLD

CHAPTER VII

BRITAIN, THE UNITED STATES, AND HUNGARY

The sudden rise of Hitler's Germany in the 1930's had completely changed the balance of power in Europe. In addition to this, Hitler sided with Mussolini during the Italo-Ethiopian war, thereby detaching Italy (burdened by the sanctions of the League of Nations) from the Anglo-French alliance. The outcome was the creation of the Berlin-Rome Aaxis," striving to change the post-World War I status quo.

This status quo, a consequence of the redrawing of Europe's map by the peace treaties in 1919 and 1920, was anything but a stable one. American, British, Italian, even French statesmen and publicists subjected the peace treaties to critical examination soon after their conclusion. The necessity of revising the treaties by peaceful means was mentioned repeatedly and in many different places, and in theory the Covenant of the League of Nations would have made this possible.

The revisionist claims of Hungary found an echo in Britain, Italy, and even in France in certain circles, but they did not produce any result until Hitler's sabre rattling scared the Western Powers, namely Britain and France, to the point where these two in 1938 acquiesced in revising the borders of Czechoslovakia in favor of Germany. Hungary was also interested in this, and hoped that the "Munich Agreement" would satisfy its territorial demands as well. But the revising of the Slovak border was more difficult than that of the Czech border, which resulted in the transfer of the Sudeten-German territories to Germany. In contrast to this the Four Power Conference entrusted the settlement of the problem of Hungarian and Polish minorities to the interested parties themselves, giving them a span of three months to reach an agreement.

Ignoring this, Poland issued an ultimatum to Czechoslovakia, which yielded immediately, and Poland annexed the Teschen-Tesin area inhabited by its compatriots. The Hungarian government, disappointed and now impatient, engaged in direct negotiations with Prague.

It is a well known fact that prior to the Munich Agreement, Britain and the United States observed with anxiety Hitler's Central European activities, including his effort to coax Hungary into military action against Slovakia. This would have made German intervention and the destruction of Czechoslovakia possible. London and Washington tried separately to advise moderation to the Hungarian government, and not without success. As early as July 2, 1938, the American envoy to Hungary, John F. Montgomery, assured the State Department in Washington that Hungary, according to reliable information from government circles, had no intention to undertake military action against Czechoslovakia, either by itself, or with Germany, as this would result in immediate response from Romania and Yugoslavia. Hungary did not want to disturb the peace in Europe, hoping that by doing so it had more chances to recover some of its lost territories by peaceful means, according to Montgomery's report.

The British regarded the territorial claims of Hungary justifiable, still they continued to advise moderation even after the Munich Agreement, for they were still afraid of an eventual forcible solution, which might have resulted in the complete disappearance of Czechoslovakia. The problem of revising the Hungarian-Slovak border was settled in the end through arbitration; this is discussed in detail in the chapters "Hungarian Mosaic," and "Hitler and Hungary." Britain and France agreed to Italo-German arbitration without their own participation. Subsequently, both of them accepted the results of the Vienna arbitration indirectly, by extending the authority of their consular office in Hungary to the recovered territories. In addition, George Barcza, Hungarian envoy to London, received verbal assurances from the Foreign Office that the British government considered the Vienna Award to be legally valid.

It is also known from diplomatic documents that the reannexation of Subcarpathian Ruthenia by Hungary in March, 1939, and the resulting common Hungarian-Polish border, was more to the liking of Britain than to that of Germany. The establishment of a common Hungarian-Polish border may have been, indeed, the only fact of consolation for Britain in the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, and even this consolation did not last long.

All in all, one may say that Britain and the United States maintained a watchful, but not unfriendly attitude toward Hungary during the Czechoslovak crisis. However, their posture changed somewhat during the stormy evolution of Hungarian-Romanian relations in 1940. To be sure, the problem of Transylvania, because of the pattern of ethnic settlements, was much more complex than the problem of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, where a rather well defined linguistic dividing line existed. One should also keep in mind, that Romania was not really a creation of the western powers; they merely made possible its territorial gains after World War I, at the expense of Hungary.

Finally, at the time of the Second Vienna Award in 1940, by which part of Transylvania reverted back to Hungary, the West still lived in the trauma of Poland's destruction by Germany, with the connivance of Stalin. Britain, France, and the United States were well aware of the fact that due to the Ribbentrop Molotov Pact they were unable to influence the Romanian situation. They considered Romania and Hungary now as Germany's satellites, Hungary being the "unwilling" one.

Much more than the situation in Romania, the Yugoslav crisis touched on British interests. The continued existence and the security of the British Empire made the dominance of the Mediterranean Sea a first rate importance for Britain. The alliance of Germany with Italy in itself endangered this important sea lane. If by destroying Yugoslavia Hitler reached the northern border of Greece, he was only one step away from the Mediterranean, leading to Suez.

One may therefore understand the worries of the British government regarding Yugoslavia. The signing of a Treaty of Friendship by Yugoslavia and Hungary was greeted with approval in London, but the events which followed were not. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden even sent a serious warning to Prime Minister Paul Teleki, threatening Hungary with a declaration of war in case the German forces moving against Yugoslavia were permitted passage through Hungarian territory. The passage eventually did occur, despite the Treaty of Friendship, and against Teleki's wishes, impelling him to commit suicide for this "dishonor." (See also "Hungarian Mosaic.")

Eden did not make good on his threat; Britain did not declare war on Hungary despite its participation in the military action against Yugoslavia and the reannexation of the Bacska-Backa region. Instead, Britain ruptured diplomatic relations with Budapest, saying that Hungary had become an operational basis against the allied powers. Representation of the British interests in Hungary was taken over by the United States.

Britain sought to maintain its influence in Yugoslavia during World War II. In anticipation of a possible postwar restoration of the monarchy, Britain initially supported the royalist General Draja Mihailovic, and his "Chetniks," rather than Tito's communist partisans. This changed at the end of November, 1943, when during the Teheran Conference Stalin succeeded in persuading the Western Allies to support Tito only. The switching of support precipitated a sharp debate in the British Parliament between Winston Churchill and one of the MP's during the question period.

But let us return to our main subject: What was the attitude of Britain and the United States toward Hungary during World War II?

A detailed account of the events leading to Hungary's declaration of war, and later its attempt to pull out, may be found in a different place of our work. Nevertheless, it appears necessary to supplement it here with some additional remarks.

One should note that the term "Allied Powers" at the time referred practically to Britain alone, or to the British Empire, because Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, and France already laid conquered at Hitler's feet. There still remained Greece, but that was also occupied not much later by the Germans.

An eventual declaration of war on Hungary by Britain would not have had any practical value besides its political significance. There was no "allied power" with which Hungary could have fought. Aside from this, Hungary did not consider itself at the time as a participant in the war against Yugoslavia. It maintained, instead, that with the declaration of independence by Croatia, Yugoslavia as such ceased to exist, and its territory with a mainly Hungarian population reverted back to the mother country.

From here on events picked up speed. Hardly a week passed after the outbreak of war between Germany and the Soviet Union (June 21, 1941), when Hungary also became a belligerent on the side of the Germans. In spite of this, a declaration of war against Hungary by Britain was still delayed, and did not occur until December 6, 1941. On that day, at the urging of Stalin, and because of their participation in the war against the Soviet Union, Britain declared war on Finland, Hungary, and Romania. A day later Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, and the United States was also at war.

Hungary tried, but was unable to avoid the declaration of war against the United States. The strange way in which this happened was told best by Antal Ullein-Reviczky, once in charge of the press section of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, later envoy to Sweden, in his book: Guerre allemande, paix russe (Ed. Baconniere, Neuchatel, 1947. Published also in Hungarian as Nemet haboru-orosz beke, Europa Publishers, Budapest, 1993.)

The sequence of events narrated by Ullein-Reviczky throws some light on the attitude of the United States toward Hungary.

Germany declared war on the United States on December 11, 1941. The same day Prime Minister Bardossy of Hungary, hoping to prevent a declaration of war, which was to be expected by Germany, yet fulfilling the duty of an ally, summoned the American envoy Herbert Pell (who was the successor of Montgomery) and informed him verbally that Hungary was breaking diplomatic relations with the USA. When Pell asked him whether this meant war, he answered in the negative.

Next day, however, the German charge d'affaires (the ambassador being in Berlin at the time), and the Italian ambassador, Marquis Talamo, called jointly on Bardossy with the explicitly stated request of declaring war on America. The Axis powers, they said, did not consider the breaking of relations sufficient. The request, which sounded more of an order, was complied with by Bardossy in a most unusual manner. He summoned Pell again, and informed him of the new decision. Surprised, but showing understanding, Pell requested the declaration of the state of war with the USA in writing. This was provided to him in the form of a diplomatic note, after Bardossy informed the ailing Regent Horthy. Ullein Reviczky comments on this as follows:

This note is a unique declaration of war. It begins with the statement that the Tri-Partite Pact imposed on Hungary a duty of solidarity with the principal contracting powers [Germany, Italy, Japan]. One manifestation of this solidarity was the breaking of diplomatic relations with the United States. But the full obligation assumed by Hungary included also the participation in war. Consequently, Hungary was now in a state of war with the United States.

Ullein-Reviczky, who was also a professor of international law, argued with Bardossy in vain, pointing out to him that the protocol of accession to the Tripartite Pact did not stipulate a declaration of war. After a brief discussion, in which only a few persons participated, Bardossy made the decision.

The former American envoy, Montgomery, relates in his book an interesting episode bearing on this subject. He says that when the first secretary of the American legation, Mr. Travers, made his courtesy call on Horthy to say good bye, the Regent told him this: "Remember that this so called declaration of war is illegal. Parliament did not approve it, I did not sign it."

Neither was it taken seriously by the American government, one may add. It was not until June 2, 1942, that President Roosevelt (at the urging of Stalin) informed Congress of the declaration of war by Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania. His message to Congress included the following remark, quoted by Montgomery: "I realize that those three governments took that action not upon their own initiative or in response to the wishes of their own peoples, but as instruments of Hitler." Not before July 18, 1942, did Congress declare that there was a state of war between the United States and those three countries.

America's entering the war was an important factor in the evolution of future relations between Hungary and the Anglo-Saxon world. Suddenly all official contacts were interrupted, not only with London, but also with Washington. Unofficial contacts still remained open through neutral countries. The importance of Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey in this regard grew gradually, as the end of the war loomed closer. Representation of the U.S. interests in Hungary was assumed by Switzerland. It was through the Swiss that American and British diplomacy obtained reports on the Hungarian situation until the war's end, including the occupation by the Soviet forces and the sad events connected with it. (A dramatic Swiss diplomatic report connected with the gruesome events of the occupation is included as an Appendix in Montgomery's book.)

The existence of a state of war made it impossible for Hungary to counter the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav propaganda in Britain and in the United States. After a while even the Hungarian-language press in America began to refer to the "old country" as a friend of the Nazis. Otherwise, Hungary's drift into the war was regarded by many in Britain and in the U.S. with sorrow, rather than condemnation, but the relationship was ambiguous. The destruction of the Second Hungarian Army at the river Don was hailed as a victory for the Soviet ally. Prime Minister Kallay's feelers for peace were greeted by satisfaction, whereas Hungary's sudden and unexpected occupation in March, 1944, by the Germans, to forestall defection, produced sadness in some circles, hostile feelings in others.

The latter can be illustrated best by pointing to a speech of Senator John Barkley, who chided Hungary for not resisting the Germans, and threatened the country with the possible loss of its independence after the war as a punishment. The answer to Senator Barkley's unfriendly words came eventually through American diplomatic channels from Ullein-Reviczky in Stockholm. Deprived of his ambassadorship and citizenship because of his anti-German statements and criticism of the German occupation of Hungary, he pointed out in a letter to the Senator that Hungary was already deprived of its independence, and it was hoping to have that independence restored after the war by the victorious Western Allies.

Fateful Events

The fate of Hungary was actually decided when, at the Teheran Conference and immediately thereafter (NovemberDecember, 1943), the supreme American, British, and Soviet political and military leaders agreed on the spheres of military operations to be in existence in Europe after the promised landing of the allied forces in France. Hungary was to be in the Soviet sphere of military operations. Ignorant of this decision, the Hungarian government still hoped for a Balkan landing of the allies, expecting it to advance as far as Hungary. The government of Kallay was ready in this case to conclude an immediate, but acceptable ceasefire, in order to escape a possible occupation later by the Soviet forces. (The story of the peace feelers is told in detail by Ullein-Reviczky in his book referred to earlier.)

Churchill guessed correctly the potential consequences for Central and Eastern Europe of delimiting the military spheres of operations in the manner it was done, and he attempted to correct this later. But the "percentage diplomacy" he recommended to Stalin at the Moscow Conference of October, 1944, namely an agreement on how much influence would each side have in the respective countries after the war, proved to be illusory. Stalin agreed to this easily, knowing well that wherever there would be Soviet forces of occupation, Soviet influence was to prevail.

The same is true regarding the agreement at Yalta to have "free elections" after the war in these countries. Stalin agreed again, stipulating merely that the neighbor countries create governments "friendly toward the Soviet Union." He already had his on plans on how to proceed if the elections do not produce them. President Roosevelt worried much less about the future of Central and Eastern Europe than Churchill did, with the possible exceptions of the fate of Poland and Czechoslovakia. He opposed the creation of spheres of influence for after the war, and believed in the friendship and trustworthiness of Stalin and the Soviet Union. This attitude of Roosevelt, bordering on naivete, was a result of several factors, including the influence of two of his confidants. One of them, Joseph E. Davies, was U.S. ambassador to Moscow before the war. He was known as a sympathizer of the Soviet system. His book, Mission to Moscow, which eventually was made into a movie, attempted to present the Soviet Union in a favorable light.

The other, perhaps even more influential person, was Roosevelt's close advisor and frequent emissary, Harry Hopkins. The idealism of the latter, rooted in political liberalism, bordering on socialism, affected Roosevelt. The President also hoped that the new security organization to be created ("United Nations Organization"), would be able to handle all of the unresolved problems after the war, including those of Central and Eastern Europe, and he expected the Soviet Union to cooperate.

Roosevelt's trust in Stalin was initially assumed by Harry S. Truman, when he became president after Roosevelt's death, and he would have liked to meet with Stalin to settle some of the emerging differences between the USA and the Soviet Union through bilateral talks. He informed Churchill of this plan through a personal emissary, former ambassador Joseph Davies. Churchill received Truman's proposal with surprise, and with some hidden inner consternation, as he related it later in his memoirs. His counter-arguments were presented first orally, to Davies, then in writing, to Truman.

According to Churchill every difference with the Soviet Union was to be considered as a difference common to both Britain and the USA, and should be handled as such. He explained in detail how the shape of Central and Eastern Europe's future impinged on America's interests. Moving from country to country, he made reference to Hungary's centuries long and valuable role in Europe, and its future endangered by the "Soviet flood."

While Truman was attempting to familiarize himself with the unexpected presidential role after the death of Roosevelt, the State Department was already in the midst of preparations regarding the postwar reorganization of Central Europe. Actually, the preparations for a peace conference were launched already by Roosevelt himself when, on December 28, 1941, he approved the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy in the State Department.

The Advisory Committee first met on February 12, 1942. Its members were academic experts, professors, scientists, and officials of the State Department. The Committee was responsible to the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, but its meetings were usually chaired by Undersecretary Sumner Welles. Participating in the peace preparations was also Adolf Berle, Deputy Secretary of State, who maintained contacts with the European emigre politicians, including Tibor Eckhardt of Hungary, and Janos Pelenyi, Hungary's former ambassador to Washington, who had resigned over Hungary's declaration of war on the United States in 1941.

Within the Advisory Committee there were six subcommittees working on postwar planning, the two most important being the Political Subcommittee and the Territorial Subcommittee.

The question of what kind of governments should be set up after the war in each of the liberated countries was entrusted to the Political Subcommittee, which also scrutinized the various plans for the creation of some kind of federation, or confederation in the area. One of these plans was advanced by the head of the Polish government in exile, Wladislaw Sikorski, who proposed a loose confederation, primarily of an economic nature, to include the territory from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea.

Eduard Benes, head of the Czechoslovak government in exile, proposed two federations: A Central European Federation, based on Czechoslovakia and Poland, and a Balkan Federation, based on Yugoslavia and Greece. Archduke Otto von Habsburg advocated a federation to include, by and large, the lands of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy, while the concept of Eckhardt and Pelenyi contained three loose associations of states: One of the Balkans, one Polish-Baltic, and a Danubian federation resembling the Habsburg plan. Roosevelt himself had a plan for the Danubian area. In the end all of these plans came to naught because of the repeated and vehement opposition by the Soviet Union. In Stalin's judgement every plan that would unite or tie together several countries was dangerous for the Soviet Union.

The task of the Territorial Subcommittee was the drawing of state borders, including possible revisions. In this connection the following considerations were taken into account: Peace can be guaranteed only by an international security organization, which has sufficient power to maintain the status quo. On the other hand, the status quo can be maintained only if it eliminates the territorial injustices of the previous peace treaties, or those perpetrated more recently. At the same time, no major territorial rearrangement was to take place. This approach, while seeking ethnic fairness, produced the principle of "minimum change."

Concerning possible modification of state borders, one consideration was whether the country in question had fought on the Allied, or on the Axis side during the war. This, however, did not imply punishment. In the case of Germany's satellites, their participation in the war was largely disregarded by the United States. Roosevelt and his Secretary of State considered these countries more as "victims of Hitler," than "aggressors." Their declaration of war was not taken seriously. Most members of the Territorial Subcommittee seemed to share this view.

Of the more than fifty situations considered by the Territorial Subcommittee thirty four were in Europe, twenty four of these in Eastern Europe. Except for the Austro-Hungarian border, all of the borders of Hungary with its neighbor countries were considered disputable.

It is not our purpose to present here in any detail the discussions in the Subcommittee concerning Hungary's borders. This has been done already in a most satisfactory way by the Hungarian historian Ignac Romsics in his book, Wartime American Plans for a New Hungary. Published in 1992, this work contains the relevant documents of the State Department, with a perceptive introductory essay by Romsics. Suffice it to mention here the fact that the United States, while declaring all territorial changes between 1938 and 1945 in Hungary null and void, was willing to modify slightly the postWorld War I borders of Hungary with Czechoslovakia and Romania in Hungary's favor.

Interestingly, the postwar plans of the British show considerable similarity to the American plans. The planning in Britain was entrusted to the Foreign Research and Press Service, initially an advisory body, later a branch, of the Foreign Office. The British were hoping to solve all of the outstanding problems in Central and Eastern Europe within the framework of one or more confederations. Like the Americans, they were also willing to make adjustments to Hungary's prewar borders, as revealed in Pax Britannica: Wartime Foreign Office Documents Regarding Plans for a Postbellum East Central Europe. This collection of documents, edited and with an introduction by Andras D. Ban (1997) contains memoranda discussing in great detail the nature of the confederations, and the state borders to be drawn within them, with all of the recommended revisions.

As we already know, none of these plans and recommendations came to be accepted at the Paris Peace Conference of 1947. The presence of the Soviet Union at the conference, and even more so its military presence on the territories in question rendered all of the planning of the Western Allies an exercise in futility.

Soviet Occupation, Communist Rule, Revolution

What could Hungary expect from Britain and the United States after the war?

Britain was busy with improving the economic situation of the exhausted nation, and with the inevitable liquidation of its colonial empire. Given its gradually diminishing power and influence, it could devote less attention and effort to Eastern European affairs.

The attention of the United States was turned primarily toward Germany and Japan. At the same time it had to make the transition from wartime to peacetime economy; a formidable task. America was interested in Central and Eastern European affairs, but found it difficult to exert its influence there. The head of the Allied Control Commission in all of the countries in question was the Commander of the Soviet occupation forces; this was a decisive factor for politics in each country. For example, the formation of a coalition government by the Smallholders' Party, victorious in the 1945 national elections in Hungary, was done under the supervision and according to the intentions of Marshal Voroshilov, giving key posts to the communists, the real losers of the elections.

The countries under Soviet occupation were steered firmly and surely into the Soviet sphere of interest according to a preconceived plan, in three distinct phases:

(1) Creation of a genuine coalition government, with some communists in key cabinet posts;

(2) Creation of a false or mock coalition government, with some noncommunists in insignificant cabinet posts;

(3) Government by the Communist Party alone, sometimes disguised under another name.

There were only two exceptions to the plan: Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia never had a genuine coalition government after the war. Its march into the Soviet sphere began with the "second phase." At the insistence of Britain and the United States Marshal Tito invited the head of the noncommunist Yugoslav government in exile in London to join the government in Belgrade, but soon it became clear that Tito did this only for the purpose of achieving formal recognition of his government by the Western Powers.

The other exception was Czechoslovakia, which skipped "phase two" altogether by way of a communist "coup" in February, 1948, giving the party full control of the government.

In all other countries the creation and installation of a government "friendly toward the Soviet Union" proceeded according to plan. This was the case in Romania and Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary.

The communist takeover in Czechoslovakia marked a significant turning point in U.S. foreign policy. On the map Czechoslovakia looked like a dagger aimed at the very heart of Western Europe. There was also the nostalgia of the American liberal establishment which played an important part in the birth of Czechoslovakia after World War I.

The earlier illbodings of Churchill about Eastern Europe came to be true already in 1947 during the Paris Peace Conference. The first change in the course of American foreign policy can be traced back to the same period. It produced the Mutual Security Assistance Pact by Congress at the initiative of President Truman. Turkey and Greece were the first to benefit from the "Truman Doctrine."

The answer to the Prague "coup" was even more decisive: the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in 1949, as a military response to the growing Soviet threat. The economic response to the communist challenge was already in place. It was the Marshall Plan, launched in 1948, to help the reconstruction of Europe's economies ravaged by the war. The expected rise in the standard of living was meant to counter the appeal of communism. This was a serious problem at the time, especially in France, Belgium, and Italy.

All of this was part and parcel of Washington's "policy of containment," a landmark in the Cold War.

The sudden eruption of the war in Korea in 1950 almost precipitated a "hot war" between East and West, the two military blocs, but the conflict was localized, thanks to United Nations intervention.

The "policy of containment" was followed by President Eisenhower's "policy of liberation," or the rolling back of the Iron Curtain. The United States, joined by Britain, launched a war of propaganda against the Soviet bloc. It is to this effort that one can trace the origin of Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, broadcasting toward occupied East Europe and the Soviet Union; the founding of the Assembly of Captive European Nations, and the creation of "National Committees," that is, wouldbe governments in exile. The Hungarian National Committee in New York consisted of exiled politicians, headed by Monsignor Bela Varga, Speaker of the last freely elected Parliament in Hungary.

The "policy of liberation" ended in failure in 1956, when at the time of the anti-Soviet, anticommunist revolution in Hungary it turned out to be an empty slogan.

The year 1956 was a turning point in history: the beginning of the end of communism. In the fall of that year the inconceivable had happened. The people of a small country revolted against Soviet communist rule, took up arms, and almost succeeded to free themselves from bondage. The entire world watched the event, first in admiration, then in horror, as brute Soviet force defeated the freedom fighters, waiting in vain for help from the West. This, however, is chronicled elsewhere.

Echoes of the Hungarian Revolution in the American Press

The official view of the United States government concerning the revolution in Hungary was voiced repeatedly by ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge in the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly, as well as by the spokesmen of the White House and the State Department. What follows here are some of the comments and opinions published in the American press after the suppression of the revolt.

... It is this mood which makes the great Hungarian rebellion of 1956 unique in history, more even than the heroism and sacrifice which in the last fortnight mere words have tried vainly to capture. The patriots seem to have sensed from the very first that they were fighting not just for themselves but for the whole of the free world outside them. Furthermore, they seemed to feel that victory wouldn't be today but in a better tomorrow to come." (Christian Science Monitor, Nov.10,1956)

"Why doesn't the U.N. send an ultimatum to the Soviet Union demanding the evacuation of Hungarian territory within a week and an immediate ceasefire? Why doesn't the U.N. send a police force to Hungary?.. Is it for fear of a general war and the Hbomb? If so, why should the Soviet Union be less afraid than we?... Is the faith of the West in freedom so low that they do not see the hope of liberating the whole of Eastern Europe and even Russia from communism if they make a stand now and prevent the murder of Hungary?" (Salvador de Madariaga. The New York Times, Nov.15, 1956)

Milovan Djilas, the disillusioned ideologist of Yugoslav communism, had this to say in The New Leader on November 19, 1956:

"Human history is changing in Eastern Europe and that is its center today... With the Hungarian people's revolution a new chapter began in the history of humanity... The Hungarian uprising is ... perhaps no less meaningful than the French or Russian Revolution... It means the beginning of the end of Communism generally."

One of the readers of The Washington Star penned the following letter to the Editor in response to an editorial:

"In your editorial "No bid to Suicide' (Dec. 15) you speak of "premature uprising' and state: "If there is to be a day of liberation for the satellite countries, it will come with time and the inevitable changes that time brings.' You might as well have said that if there is a day of slavery for the United States, it will come with time and the inevitable changes that time brings... If the day of liberation of the satellites is any closer today than it was nine weeks ago, it is not because nine weeks have elapsed but because of the courageous Hungarian people dealt a crippling blow to communism and demonstrated anew that man doesn't live by bread alone. But if the day of liberation is further away than it was nine weeks ago, it is because we Americans have shown the Reds that however much we may lift our voice we will never lift a finger to disturb the reign of the Kremlin tyrants over their illgotten slave empire.. We need not feel sorry for the dead Hungarians. To them the words of Patrick Henry were real... The tragedy of Hungary is in Washington, not in Budapest." (David Heyser, Dec.28, 1956)

Ten days earlier the well known political commentator, Roscoe Drummond voiced his opinion in a similar way in The Washington Post.

"Let us admit frankly that we are not encouraging the Hungarian people. It is they who are encouraging us. We can only hope to earn some of their respect and pray that some of their bravery would rub off onto us."

A more extensive collection of press commentaries and opinions about the Hungarian revolution and freedom fight may be found in Stephen Sisa's popular work, The Spirit of Hungary (Vista Books, 1990), from which the quotations above were selected with the author's permission. In conclusion, here is a quotation from The New York Times, expressing perhaps best the feelings of the American people at the time.

"One month ago today the Hungarian revolution began. It began as a peaceful demonstration of students and workers demanding redress of their grievances. It became a revolution when bullets from murderers in the uniforms of the secret police and of the Soviet Army slaughtered unarmed men, women and children. It continues as a revolution today, though the general strike has replaced arms as the chief weapon. History contains no brighter chapter telling of any people's heroic struggle for its freedom." (November 23, 1956.)

HUNGARY IN THE MIRROR OF THE WESTERN WORLD