Mark Imre Major : American Hungarian Relations 1918-1944

In October, 1918, as a consequence of World War 1, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy broke up. The result was a complete change in the Eastern European international structure. New national states came into being on the basis of self-determination.

Hungary's primary objective was to secure a moderate peace treaty. To achieve this, Hungary was proclaimed a "People's Republic." The Hungarian National Council elected Michael Karolyi President of the new republic. But it soon became obvious that the Allies had taken sides with the successor states against Hungary, and Karolyi reached the bitter conclusion that his country had little to expect from the victorious Western democracies. As a result, Hungary turned from the West to the East and became a Soviet Republic.

The establishment of the Hungarian Soviet Republic represented the first victory of communism beyond the borders of Russia and strengthened Bolshevik hopes. This communist projection into Hungary appeared more menacing due to the possibility of Hungary's military link-up with Russia, and the growing Bolshevik menace to all of Eastern, and even Western, Europe. Bolshevik Hungary in the heart of Europe cast a temporary pall over the Paris Peace Conference, but Western Powers definitely rejected the use of their forces against her because public opinion sharply opposed new sacrifices after a long and bloody war. The overthrow of the Soviet Hungarian regime may be traced to its own failures as well as to Rumania's military intervention.

In August, 1919, Bela Kun was expelled and a counter-revolutionary regime came into power. There came an outbreak of anti-Semitism, largely due to the fact that nearly all the leading figures of Be1a Kun's regime, including Kun himself, were Jews. This resulted in a good deal of propaganda against Hungary by left radicals who lived in emigration. This propaganda reached the United States, too. Although it was serious and caused many problems for Hungarian politicians, it had not, except in some academic circles, any great political success. Nevertheless Hungary at that time was regarded by many people abroad as a dictatorship.

Indeed, post-war Hungary was not a dictatorship. After a period of transition, Count Stephen Bethlen, premier from 1921 to 1931, carried through a complex combined policy. The peasant's leaders were induced to abandon cooperation with the in dustrial workers and to accept the reintroduction of the open franchise in the rural areas in return for a very modest land reform and promises of further reforms when conditions had become more stable. The industrial workers renounced cooperation with the agrarian proletariat and promised to support the govern ment's foreign policy in return for secret franchises in the larger towns, an amnesty and the restitution to the trade unions of their funds and their liberty of action in the purely industrial field. Meanwhile a provisional solution had been found to the question of the crown by recognizing the monarchy as still existing and electing Admiral Nicolas Horthy as Regent for the absent king.

Post-war Hungary was not a democracy in the Western meaning. The word "democracy" could not be accepted as a ruling idea and a national way of life in post-war Hungary simply because the Paris peace treaties which reduced Hungary to one-third of her former area were carried out allegedly under principles of democracy. It must be definitely stated, however, that Hungary always was an Eastern outpost of all Western ideas - political or religious, scientific or artistic - and respect for human rights, individual liberty, and constitutional safeguards in post-war Hungary had been far greater than they were in many other Eastern- European states of that time.

In June, 1920, the Treaty of Trianon, imposed on Hungary at the close of World War I. had in effect wiped out the historic Hungarian state, a state which for one thousand years had occupied the whole Carpathian Basin. The Treaty of Trianon was the most drastic of all the peace treaties of the period. It had been carried through in the name of the national principle, but so many concessions had been made to the strategic and economic interests of the successor states that no less than 3,200,000 Hungarians, one-third of the whole Hungarian speaking people, had been assigned to these successor states. Whether the Treaty of Trianon was just or not, whether it was carried through on the principle of self-determination or not, are questions which do not need discussion. As a matter of fact, the whole Hungarian nation was united in its conviction that the treaty was unacceptable, and the chief aspiration of Hungarian foreign policy, up to the close of World War II, was the desire for treaty revision.

On the other hand, the memories of Kun's regime bit deep into the minds of the nation, and its hatred and fear of Bolshevism equaled in intensity its desire for treaty revision. All governments after 1920 described themselves as "counter-revolutionary" and acted in that spirit towards any manifestation of international Bolshevism. On this point the whole Hungarian ruling class was united, and the Soviet Union played no part in influencing Hungary's foreign policy and her economy. This factor must be remembered, considering the later part of the story, as a lack of political realism.

But within itself the Hungarian ruling class was deeply divided, falling into two distinct camps. The differences between the two groups were primarily social and economic in origin. but they led to a strong ideological differentiation which resulted in widely differing approaches to the foreign political problem.

The first group, of which Count Bethlen had emerged as leader in 1921, included most of the large and medium landowners, the businessmen, the professional classes, and a large number of

civil servants. This group described their own political tenets by the word "Conservative-Liberal". The foreign observer would have described this political tenet, quite simply, as conservatism. In this political creed, the word "liberal" meant only not anti Semitic, while "conservative" meant a certain blindness towards social problems although the regime was not anti-social in general. Nevertheless, the regime had qualities which it would be unjust to deny. It tried to solve Hungary's problems in peaceful fashion, through cooperation with the Western democracies and with their support. It brought considerable economic and financial revival for the country. When, however, the Western democracies did not even attempt to remedy the injustices of the Paris peace treaties, when the effects of the world's economic crisis reached Hungary and set her back very seriously on her road towards economic recontruction, Bethlen's policy could not avoid bankruptcy.

The "New Generation" of the 1930's wanted revolutionary changes in the internal as well as the international field: changes which should include land reform, restriction of the rights of capital, and a new orientation in foreign politics. They were thus the enemies of conservatism; but to oppose conservatism they would not use the program of the "left," for Michael Karolyi had made a revolution of the left, which had been followed by the dismemberment of Hungary and had led to Bela Kun's Bolshevism. Even democracy was suspect to them, as the pet ideology of these European forces which they regarded as especially bent on the destruction of Hungary. The Jewish question played a large part in determining what particular direction this group should take and thereby its program meant one form or another of Fascism.

The two groups headed by Count Stephen Bethlen and Julius Gombos waged a bitter struggle for power. The question of which group should rule Hungary was primarily a domestic one, yet it became in time entangled with the foreign political problem. Each side naturally sympathized with those countries whose

ideology was similar to its own, bade for its support, and in return offered its own support. This was always subject to national interest and each group was inclined to believe sincerely that its own friends would help Hungary towards treaty revision, and when it became clear that concessions would have to be made in any case, each preferred that these should be to its own friends. Due to this situation Hungary's policy became one of hesitations and intricate maneuverings between the West and Hitler's Germany.

Among the various reasons for this hesitation was the fear for Hungary's independence awakened by the re-establishment of a great, united German power, which, after the occupation of Austria, stood on Hungary's very frontier. Furthermore, there was a question of simple calculation. It was obvious that a conflict must soon break out between Germany and the West, and both groups wanted Hungary to be on the winning side when the war ended.

The outbreak of World War II found Hungary on the Axis side as a nonbelligerent. But the country became involved in the conflict soon, and after that there was no way out. That policy of hesitations and maneuverings, however, continued and its effect was that Hungary held out against any major German de mands until the spring of 1944. The Liberal group argued that with American help the Allies were bound to win the war, and it was therefore essential for Hungary to dissociate herself from Germany; and they believed it was possible. They believed that the Western Allies regarded their alliance with Russia as a war time necessary evil; that would not take Hungary's military operations against Russia amiss. In other words, they believed that Germany's defeat could not mean that Russia would be let into Eastern Europe. The fundamental idea of this policy was to offer the maximum resistance without endangering the nation's interests: to give the least possible moral, material, and military aid to Germany but to avoid by all means occupation by her. They tried to lead the nation on the right road "so that at the end of the war the "West" when it entered Hungary would find a nation,

people, parliament, military forces, public order, and economic life so well organized that Hungary could without a jar join in a world reformed in the spirit of the Atlantic Charter".⁽¹⁾

The other group argued that Hungary could never hope to outbid the Little Entente states in the competition for the favor of the West. They argued that no effort on Hungary's part to secure from the West any satisfaction for what she believed to be her just claims, or even protection against the Soviet Union, would be other than fruitless. Hungary's only course was therefore to cooperate with Germany.

Hungary'. Ieaders certainly did make mistakes. But, in the light of later events, we can say that no matter what policy had been adopted at any particular time, the result would have been exactly the same. The leaders of the Western Powers concentrated everything on winning the war and political though had been pushed into the background. The war became the end and the West for got why it had begun. At first all the states between Germany and Russia looked to the West. They had not thought other than to link up with the Anglo-American world. And what happened? The national regime in Poland had to defer to Russia's wishes. King Peter of Yugoslavia was dropped for Tito. Czechoslovakia turned to the Soviets. Those enormous successes of Soviet diplomacy happened at a moment when Russia was only holding her own through British and American help

The Atlantic Charter began to take the place of Wilson's Fourteen Points, but both were ill-fated documents that eventually became the ideal, not of the authors, but of the conquered. How many times did America pay, and will pay, for these mistakes ?

In spite of many accusations, Hungary had one great accomplishment during the tragic years of war: the treatment of refugees (both Jews and gentiles) and prisoners-of-war. Until the German occupation in March, 1944, of all of the Axis belligerents, Hungary alone fulfilled to the last letter the Geneva Convention

concerning prisoners-of war. In this respect Hungary often acted far more bravely and humanely than the neutral countries. Several thousand French escaped war prisoners were allowed complete freedom; British and American prisoners-of-war were courteously and humanely treated in Hungary. An evidence of their freedom of movement is that on March 19, 1944, when the Germans occupied Budapest, they collected most of the British and American prisoners-of-war at the horse races in Budapest.⁽²⁾ Hungary did not discriminate among people seeking asylum, and Jews and non-Jews alike were admitted if they requested admission into the country. It is also a remarkable fact that the onlv Polish high school operating at that time was in Hungary.

Another question which needs to be answered is the relation between Hungary and the United States during the peaceful years between the two wars. This relationship was not at all without significance. Those men who represented the United States in Hungary: Major General Harry Hill Bandholtz; Jeremiah Smith, Commissioner General of the League of Nations; Ambassador John Flournoy Montgomery; and many others, represented the best type of their countrymen in Hungary - the upright, fair-minded, and humane Americans. Their works resulted in friendly political relations, and close economic connections between Hungary and the United States, and deepened the cultural relations for the benefit of both countries In this work, the Hungarian-Americans also had a share.

1 Kallay, Hungarian Premier, p. 369.

2 On the same day that the Germans occupied Hungary, the Hungarian minister in Lisbon sent the following telegram to Budapest: "Lisbon, March 19, 1944. Letters from American prisoners-of-war of the air force were read at the United States embassy here in the presence of highranklng officers of the American air force, who happened to be passing through. These letters made the best impression. The ambassador cabled their names to Washington with the comment that a nation which treats prisoners of war in such a manner deserves the greatest consideration ."

3 Kallay, Hungarian Premier p. 344.

Mark Imre Major : American Hungarian Relations 1918-1944