Mark Imre Major : American Hungarian Relations 1918-1944

The replacement of Bela Imredy by Count Paul Teleki as Minister President of Hungary on February 16, 1939, meant that Hungarian policy was going to alter its course once more. Furthermore, as Minister President, Count Paul Teleki became one of the most important and memorable persons of inter-war Hungarian history.

Count Teleki was a member of a famous and historic Transylvanian family, many of whose members had played a large part in Hungarian history.⁽¹⁾ Teleki's own interests were always primarily academic. Although he had entered Parliament as early as 1905 (when he was only twenty-six years of age), he had even then devoted most of his time to his special study of geography, and particularly cartography, in which fields he earned an international reputation. In 1920 he devoted himself to preparing Hungary's case for the peace negotiations, in the form of a series of maps, statistics, and treatises which were in a class by them selves, from the point of view of learning, among all the material

submitted to the Peace Conference in any of its phases. In 1920 he was asked to serve as his country's Foreign Minister and soon after as Minister President; but he resigned in 1921, devoting the next eighteen years primarily to teaching at the University as Professor of Geography but also to a number of public activities. He was founder and President of the Hungarian Sociographical Institute, Director of the Cartographical Institute, Rector of the University of Economics, President of a score of societies, and - the occupation nearest his heart - Chief Scout of Hungary. With all these interests he found time to travel widely in Europe, America, and Asia. Among other things, he served on the League of Nations Commission for determining the frontiers between Turkey and Iraq.

Count Teleki was a man of very wide and deep culture. Besides an acknowledged master of his own profession he was also deeply read in the history and sociography of many lands. He spoke half a dozen languages fluently and was an extremely brilliant lecturer. He was a very devout Catholic and quite indifferent to riches, living on his professional stipend. It was among his students and his Scouts that Teleki was at his happiest and best. And it was, perhaps, only here that he found complete spiritual satis faction; for believing as he did in the powers of reason and of the spirit, and having a strong faith in the efficacy of personal contact and example, he held that the most direct and effective way in which he could serve his country was by communicating his vision to the younger generation and inspiring them with it.

Teleki loved his country and his fellow-countrymen with a deep and sincere passion and lived only for their service. In his social and political philosophy he held history to teach that no political formation could survive in the Middle Danube Basin unless its frontiers coincided with the natural frontiers of that area. Nature, by creating that area a geographical unity, had imposed on it the necessity of political unity, and any attempt to give it any other form of political organization, being contrary to nature, carried the seeds of its own destruction within it.

Although holding the view that Hungary must be a politically unitary state, he was absolutely and sincerely opposed to any aggressive or unjust treatment of the non-Magyar population, or any attempt to Magyarise them forcibly. He took great pains to ensure that the treatment of the national minorities should be as he wished it, personally selecting enlightened officials for the minorities areas, instructing them most carefully in their duties, making tours of inspection and even organizing a network of independent private observers, most often priests and Scouts, who had orders to report to him secretly and directly any cases in which the conduct of the authorities was such as to give the minorities cause for complaint.⁽²⁾

More idealistic than many of his contemporaries, Teleki saw that the problem of existence for Hungary, and for the Hungarian people, was not simply one of recovering lost territories but also of defending what remained against further dangers. He seemed to have been relatively little impressed by the fear of Pan-Slav imperialism. He abhorred Bolshevism, mainly on account of its Godless character; yet he does not seem to have regarded Russia as seriously threatening Hungary's national existence. But he was impressed by the fear of the danger presented to Hungary by the expansive force of Germany. While he saw that only Germany could or would break the Little Entente, he also regarded Germany as a danger to the very existence of the Hungarian peope, a danger which was ultimately more formidable than that presented by any other state. He had a peculiar dread of seeing Hungary encircled by Germany and squeezed to death between the two arms of German expansion - the one running north, the other south. He thought it essential, if Hungary was to live, to cut these lines, or keep them cut. It was largely this consideration which made him press so strongly for a new policy for Central Europe. He saw a solution to the problems of that area in the formation of a Central European and Balkan bloc guaranteed by Britain,

France, and the United States and stretching from Finland to Turkey. This bloc, he thought, must be anti-Bolshevik; and yet it would be to Russia's interest that it should be formed, for it was the only means of defending the small states from German aggression, and it would be Russia's best protection against German attack. For the purpose of a Central European and Balkan block, Teleki strongly advocated a policy of friendship with Poland and Yugoslavia, even at the cost of sacrificing part of Hungary's revisionist claims. It was his hope to link Hungary with these two states in a North-South "Axis" which would form a barrier at once against Germany and against Russia. Furthermore, he believed Hungary could very easily come to agreement with the Bulgars and the Turks. Teleki was even prepared to offer Rumania a reasonable compromise. Teleki left out Czechoslovakia because he was confident that time would bring about the collapse of the Czechoslovak state. Furthermore, he would never trust Eduard Benes. Once he told one of his friends: "Everything that man touched became a source of catastrophe".⁽³⁾

Besides fearing Germany, Teleki detested Nazism, which he regarded as only one degree less satanic than Bolshevism, and far more dangerous to Hungary, since the attraction exerted by it on the politically significant elements in Hungary was so much stronger Not all aspects of Western culture were to his taste, but he saw in the West the main repository of that Christian culture to which Hungary also was an heir. He also shared Horthy's view that in a conflict between Germany and the West, Germany would be de feated. Both sympathy and calculation therefore made him an "Anglophile", and he was logical enough to apply his conclusions to the question of the revision of the Peace Treaty. He was convinced that it would be fatal for Hungary to associate herself with Germany for revision's sake, since any gains which could be represented

as acquired by German help would only be taken away a few years later as a gift from the Axis. In his revisionist campaigns he therefore concentrated on appealing to the West, and when the crisis came he sought. in fact, to claim no more than he tought the West would approve.

Immediately on taking office, Teleki sent a telegram to London to assure the Foreign Office that .."although Hungary's geographical and political situation compelled her to cooperate loyally with Germany up to a point, the Hungarian Government attached great importance to the understanding and support of the British Government and would never do anything to injure the interests of Great Britain" ⁽⁴⁾

Early in Teleki's period of office came the completion of the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and, during this period, Hungary's foreign political activities consisted of diplomatic preparations for the recovery of Carpatho-Ruthenia. Teleki attached the utmost importance to the recovery of that area because a common Hungarian-Polish border was an essential link in his guiding political concept of a North-South Axis. Although he was anxious to keep the good will of the Western Powers and to give them no excuse to brand Hungary as Germany's accomplice, yet not even for the sake of their good will was he prepared to renounce Ruthenia. Nevertheless, the difficult position of the Hungarian minority in Ruthenia and the impossible geographical and economic effects for both Hungary and Ruthenia were explained to London, Paris, and Washington, all of which showed understanding. The British parliamentary Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, R. A. Butler, explained on February 17, 1939, to the Hungarian envoy, George Barcza, that, in his opinion, Great Britain and France had committed a mistake in not supporting the establishment of a common Hungarian-Polish frontier at the Munich conference. Czechoslovakia, he said, became a German colony after Munich. Thus the attachment of Ruthenia to Hungary would have been in accordance

with British interests. By the same act German expansion toward the Ukraine and the Rumanian oil fields would have been checked. Butler pointed out that it was difficult for him to understand the political blindness which had overlooked these facts. A few days later Sir Alexander Cadogan, permanent Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated to Barcza that he had recently studied the Ruthenian problem and had become convinced that the vital interest of the Ruthenian people demanded their reattachment to Hungary; irrespective of such local interests, the interest of the great powers and European peace demanded that the German push to the East should be barred by a common Hungarian-Polish frontier. He recognized that it would have been to the French-British interest to attach Ruthenia to Hungary and that this interest still existed.⁽⁵⁾

The first American reaction was hostile toward Hungary. William C. Bullitt, Undersecretary of State, sent a sharply formulated telegram to the American Minister at Budapest instructing him: "Find a way to inform the Regent, Teleki, and other Hungarian leaders regarding the evolution of thought in the United States concerning acts of aggression as well as to express the personal hope of the President that Hungary will not again be so unfortunate as to find herself on the side which wins the early battles but loses the war".⁽⁶⁾ Having been informed by the Hungarian Government that the occupation of Ruthenia was against Germany's will, the Department of State showed a better understanding and heeded the warnings of the event. Bullitt's message even offered some help against German pressure. "I believe that the best elements of the country (Hungary) will strongly resist being dragged into war by Germany. I am of the opinion that anything that can be done to strengthen them in this determination would prove helpful in the general interest".⁽⁷⁾

The occupation of Ruthenia (now a part of the Soviet Union on March 15, 1939, was carried out without the knowledge and counsel of Germany and very much against her wishes. It was Poland which urged the establishment of a common Hungarian-Polish frontier, partly in order to prevent the German army, which had entered Slovakia, from moving far east into the back of endangered Poland, and partly because she realized the importance of Teleki's North-South Axis plan. Teleki's plan could never become fact. Nevertheless, the usefulness and importance of this Hungarian move was fully justified by subsequent events when, after the German attack against Poland, Hungary prevented the German troops from crossing this strategic territory and opened up the Ruthenian frontier to more than a hundred thousand soldiers of the Polish Army. These men were well received in Hungary and all but some thirty thousand clandestinely joined the armies of the Western democracies. Polish flyers participated in comparatively large numbers in the famous Battle of Britain in the autumn of 1940, a battle which saved England from German invasion.⁽⁸⁾

After the outbreak of the Second World War, the Hungarian Government issued a proclamation which amounted to a declaration of neutrality. Prime Minister Teleki sought to maintain a non-belligerent status and, in the face of the growing German influence, some measure of independence for Hungary. But German Russian collaboration gradually reduced the possibility of an independent Hungarian policy. The situation was aggravated by the gradual disappearance of Western influence in Eastern Europe. The Western powers ceased to exist as power factors along the Danube, and Hungary was squeezed between overwhelming German and Russian forces.

The occupation of the smaller Western European states by Germany and the unexpected collapse of France caused general

consternation to the Hungarian public. The press manifested a dignified reserve and, when Italy declared war on France and England, Hungary continued her nonbelligerent status.

The Soviet Union reacted to the German victories in the West by the incorporation of the Baltic states, and following a Russian ultimatum Rumania evacuated Bessarabia and Bukovina and ceded these territories to the Soviet Union. After these events Hungary and Bulgaria demanded the settlement of their territorial issues. In August, 1940, the Rumanian Government agreed with Bulgaria concerning the retrocession of Dobrudja, but declined to entertain seriously the Hungarian claims

But now the situation became more serious due to the possibility of intervention by Soviet Russia. Molotov declared to the Hungarian Envoy, Joseph Kristoffy, that the Soviet government considered the Hungarian claims well-founded and would support them at the peace table. "The Hungarian Government", stated Molotov. "may rest assured that the Soviet Government never regarded Rumania of Versailles as realistic, and that it was equally objectionable to Russia, Bulgaria and Hungarv".⁽⁹⁾ Even Stalin invited the Hungarian minister, whom he had never seen before, to call upon him ⁽¹⁰⁾ Meanwhile the Rumanian Government received reports of concentrations of Soviet troops on the Rumanian frontier. Both Rumania and Germany believed that Russia was deliberately fomenting the Hungarian-Rumanian dispute with the intention of then marching into Moldavia and Wallachia, perhaps to wipe out the Rumanian State altogether, seize her all-important oil wells and then

march on Istanbul. If Hungary did not move, the Soviet troops might cross the Carpathians and themselves occupy Transylvania; or they might foment a revolution, resulting in Rumania's turning herself into a Soviet Republic and placing herself under the protection of the Soviet Union.

To prevent such a possibility, Hungary had insisted that negotiations be conducted directly between Hungary and Rumania. King Carol of Rumania, however, requested arbitration from Hitler in order thus to obtain Germany's guarantee of Rumania's new frontiers. Hitler himself could do nothing else but impose a solution which would avert a complete collapse of the whole Rumania and his Balkan politics. On August 28, 1940, an Axis conference was held at Berchtensgaden, attended by Ciano, Ribbentrop, and the German and Italian envoys to Rome, Berlin, Budapest, and Bucharest. Two days later, the Hungarian and Rumanian prime ministers were summoned to Vienna, where another Vienna Award awaited them, this time concerning Rumania. There was a German ultimatum; neither the Rumanian nor the Hungarian delegates were allowed to say a word. Hungary received somewhat less than half of Transylvania and the new frontiers of Rumania were guaranteed by Germany and Italy.⁽¹¹⁾

The new frontiers were unsatisfactory to both Rumania and Hungary. Rumania thought that Hungary had received more than she had ever dreamed of getting. The Hungarians believed the same about Rumania. Furthermore, the new frontier neglected all geographical and economic considerations and, most of all, those of communication. By drafting an impossible new frontier, Germany wished permanently to divide and rule both Hungary and Rumania.

Meanwhile the Western powers indicated their understanding of Hungary's attitude. In July, 1940, Rumania renounced the Anglo French guarantee of Rumania's political independence. Subsequently, the permanent Undersecretary of the British Foreign Office declared to Barcza, the Hungarian Minister, that the British Government fully understood that Hungary was pressing her territorial demands but hoped that these would be realized by peaceful settlement. The Hungarian minister to the United States, John Perenyi, reported that the head of the European division in the Department of State showed an understanding toward Hungary's attitude in the Transylvanian problem and disapproved of the delaying tactics of the Rumanians.⁽¹²⁾

Hungary's position nonetheless was made more difficult after the Second Vienna Award by the pro-Axis reorientation of Rumania's foreign policy. This had been achieved with amazing speed. Rumania resigned from the League of Nations and from the Balkan Entente and began to transform the internal structure of the country according to National Socialist principles. The most dangerous step, however, was the invitation extended by Rumania in early October, 1940, to the German "instructor corps". An entire German panzer division was transferred to Rumania, manifestly as a training unit but in fact for the purpose of preparing the Rumanian army for war. It became clear soon that Rumania as Germany's client was, in the situation of the time, far more dangerous to Hungary than was Rumania as her enemy in the one-time Little

Entente. The situation produced a race for Germany's favor, for which Rumania bid in the hope of securing the reversal of the Award, and Hungary to ensure its maintenance. This rivalry led to Hungary's signing the Anti-Comintern Pact in November, 1940

A secondary effect of the developments which brought about the Second Vienna Award was that Yugoslavia would accept Hungary's friendship. With Czechoslovakia off the map, France out of the picture, and Rumania in the Axis camp, Yugoslavia was almost isolated diplomatically. Yugoslavia could no longer afford to despise an offer of friendship from Hungary, a Hungary which was now very considerably enlarged and strengthened. As for the Hungarians, one of the motives which had first led them to seek a rapprochement was the need for support against Germany and for keeping open a window to the West through Yugoslavia's Western connections. In December, 1940, Hungary signed a "Pact of Eternal Friendship" with Yugoslavia, and although this was sincerely meant as reinsurance against Germany, to give Hungary a "window to the West", it was also concluded on the assumption that Yugoslavia would follow a policy similar to Hungary's own: passively resisting Axis pressure from inside but not actively opposing it. ⁽¹³⁾

But Hitler pressed Yugoslavia too hard; the Opposition revolted, and on March 26, 1941, deposed its government. Hitler in fury prepared to invade Yugoslavia and asked permission to send his troops across Hungarian territory to attack Yugoslavia. Hungary had to choose between complying with or resisting this German request. Teleki sent a special emissary to Mussolini to ask whether Hungary could count on his help. Mussolini, however, refused any assistance. Finding resistance impossible, Count Paul Teleki sought escape from the problem in death, hoping thereby to make the nation aware of the gravity of the situation and the world aware of the tragedy in which the small nations were becoming involved. Teleki committed suicide in the early morning of April

4, 1941. Winston Churchill noted in his memories that "his suicide was a sacrifice to absolve himself and his people from guilt in the German attack upon Yugoslavia, It cleared his name before history. It could not stop the march of the German armies nor the consequences". ⁽¹⁴⁾

Teleki's successor was his Foreign Minister, Ladislav Bardossy, a professional diplomat. Under Bardossy, Hungary's international position rapidly grew worse. It has often been said that the day when Bardossy succeeded Teleki marked a turning point in Hungarian policy: the change from resistance to eager cooperation. There is some truth in this as a long-term judgment. But the view that he was a Nazi is unjust. Bardossy was no Right Radical. He was no devotee either of Germany or Nazism and no anti-Westerner. He was indeed, very attached to England, where he had served and had developed many lasting friendships. But precisely his English experience had convinced him that Britain was bound ultimately to support the re-establishment of that treaty system of 1919 which she had helped to construct. In his view, Hungary could never hope to outbid the Little Entente states in the competition for the favor of the West. Hungary's only course was therefore to cooperate with Germany.

Meanwhile Croatia proclaimed its independence. Hungary, claiming that Yugoslavia no longer existed, was ready to occupy former Hungarian areas assigned to Yugoslavia in 1919. Bardossy sent telegrams to London and Washington insisting that Hungary had no aggressive intentions but was interested only in the fate of the Hungarian minorities in Yugoslavia. He still seems to have hoped that the Western Powers would understand Hungary's policy and not take it amiss. But before the Hungarian Minister in London could pass on the message to the British Government, British aircraft bombed some Hungarian cities and on the same day, April 7, 1941, Sir Owen O'Malley, British Minister in Budapest, notified the Hungarian Government that Britain was breaking diplomatic

relations with Hungary. On the next day, the Hungarian Minister in London received the same notification from Mr. Eden, who told him:

It would be an eternal shame on Hungary that she had attacked a country with which only a few months previously, she had concluded a Treaty of Eternal Friendship. If a State was not master of its will and its actions, let it at least not conclude treaties which it then breaks. Teleki was the last Hungarian whom Britain had trusted. His successors should know that Britain would win the war and would remember this conduct of Hungary's at the Peace Conference.⁽¹⁵⁾

The United States showed more understanding of the position than Great Britain. On April 7, 1941, the Secretary of State told the Hungarian Minister that he wished to speak quite openly and in the strictest confidence. He fully understood Hungary's difficult situation. But nothing was at present more important from the point of view of later developments than the formal attitude adopted by Hungary. It was understandable if the Hungarian Government did everything possible to defend its territory but very important that it should not appear formally as the aggressor.⁽¹⁶⁾

Meanwhile, the day of Hitler's planned attack on Soviet Russia was approaching. Following the outbreak of the German-Russian war, on June 21, 1941, the Eastern European states entered

a new phase of their history. Italy, Rumania, and Slovakia declared war on Russia on June 22. Croatia followed with a declaration during the night. Finland, however, did not enter the war until the 25th; Hungary, not until the 27th. The Hungarian towns Kassa and Munkacs were bombed allegedly by Soviet planes on the preceding day, and Bardossy corsidered this action a casus belli and declared war on Russia without consulting parliament. ⁽¹⁷⁾

Hungary's participation in the Russian war was, however, very limited. Hungary sent only a light armored division, a few infantry battalions, and labor cadres to the Russian front. The light armored division operated in the central Ukraine; the rest of the Hungarian forces were employed in construction work and policing behind the lines. At the end of 1941, the armored division returned to Hungary, and only a very small number of troops remained in Russia.

The most fearful event of the Russian war was, however, that it got Hungary involved in war with England and with the United States. This fact was not without dramatic incidents. When the American Minister to Hungary, Herbert Pell, repre senting British interests in Hungary, handed over, on November 29, 1941, the British ultimatum,⁽¹⁸⁾ Bardossy replied as follows:

Your information comes as a surprise. I never believed it would go that far, not that England could help the Soviets only by declaring war on us... There are no Hungarian forces fighting in Russia now. We have withdrawn our forces from the front. The Hungarian Government is not participating in any direct military action. . . Most of the Hungarians placed their faith in English fairness to judge the present situation. They will feel hurt by such a decision of the British Government.⁽¹⁹⁾

Minister Pell showed a most understanding-attitude toward Hungary. Pell said that he considered the decision of the British Government as his own defeat. Counselor Howard K. Travers stated that the American Legation tried every means of preventing a declaration of war by England on Hungary after the first rumors of such a decision. Pell said that his country and he himself, on his own initiative, had done all they could to stop the British declaration; he (Pell) sent three messages to Washington (one of them directly to Roosevelt) urging that the British note was "most unwise". Another attempt at intervention was made through Vatican channels. Justinian Seredi, Cardinal of Hungary, wrote to the Holy See asking for its intervention. Cardinal Maglione, on receiving Seredi's message (transmitted via the Nunciature in Budapest), had spoken to the British Minister in Rome who gladly agreed to pass the message on, saying that "Hungary enjoyed much sympathy in England" But the news that war was declared came the next day.⁽²⁰⁾

The whole nation heard with profound indignation the British Government's decision. On December 5, the Minister President made a statement in Parliament saying that the British decision, which was "contrary alike to law and justice, was directed not only against us, and those States in a position similar to ours, but against all Europe".⁽²¹⁾

1 One member Or the family, Michael Teleky, played an important role in the history of Transylvania in the seventeenth century; another: Ladislas Telekl, during the revolution of 1848.

2 Kovrig, Hungarian Social Policies, 1920-1945, p. 177.

3 Nicholas Kallay Hungarian Premier (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954), p. 251.

4 Macartney, October Ffteenth, I, 331.

5 Stephen D. Kertesz, Diplomacy in a Whirlpool (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953), p. 44.

6 U. S., For. Rel., Department of State, 864.00/954,.

7 Ibid., 864.00/954, Sec. I.

8 For details on Ruthenia, see P. G. Stercho, "Carpatho-Ukraine in International Affairs, 1938 - 1939" (unpublshed Ph. D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1959) On the treatment of Polish refugees in Hungariy see Kallay. Hungarian Premier, pp. 232-44.

9 Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 418.

10 In Stalin's studio the following conversation took place:

Stalin: Has Hungary given up her claim to Transylvania?

Kristoffy: No, she has not.

Stalin: Why then don't you attack Rumania? Now is the time.

Kristoffy: I shall inform my governrnent.

Stalin: All right. Do.

Quoted in Montgomery, Hungary: The Unwilling Satellite, p. 138.

11 The First Vienna Award on November 2, 1938, restored to Hungary 12,103 square kilometers of territory wlth over one million population from Czechoslovakia. The British Minister in Budapest, Geoffrey Knox, submitted to the British Government the following population data of the returned area: Hungarians - 830,000; Slovaks - 140,000; Germans - 20,000; Ruthenes and others - 40,000.

Hungary occupied Carpatho-Ruthenia by force on March 15, 1939. Ruthenia had a territory Or 12,171 square kilometers and a population of 700,000, the majority of which was Ruthenian. According to the 1930 Czechoslovak census, the number of the Hungarian minority was 121,000.

The Second Vienna Award on August 30, 1940, restored to Hungary an area of 43,492 square kilometers from Rumania with a population of 2,600,000. According to the Hungarian censuses of 1910 and 1941, the number of Hungarians exeeded the Rumanians in this territory, while the Rumanian census of 1930 lndicated a slight Rumanian majority.

12 Kertesz, Diplomacy in a Whirlpool, p. 51.

13 For details, see Macartney, October Fifteenth, I, 44-54.

14 Winston S. Churchill, The Great Alliance (Boston: Mifflin, 1950), p. 168.

15 Macartney, October Fifteenth, II, 8. Churchill's judgment, however, was not so severe. He said on the same day:

"The Hungarian Minister is really right; we English have been guilty of serious faults and omissions in the past. Hungary, after all, always openly maintained her claims to revision, and now, if the Hungarian troops confine themselves to occupying the territories which were formery Hungary, that is, humanly speaking, understandable. I regret that politically it is impossible for me to do otherwise than break off diplomatic relations, but so long as Hungarian troops do not find themselves opposed in the field by British forces, there is really no need for a declaration of war. The Hungarians, incidentally, are very sympathetic people." Ibid.

16 Ibid., II, 9.

17 For details on Hungary's declaration of war on Russia, see among many others, Macartney, October Fifteenth, II, 16 60.

18 The British ultimatum read as follows:

"The Hungarian Government has for many months been pursuing aggressive military operations on the territory of the Union of Soviet Republic, ally of Great Britain, in closest collaboration with Germany, thus participating in the general European war and making substantial contribution to the German war effort. In these circumstances His Majesty's Govermnent in the United Kingdom finds it necessary to inform the Hungarian Government that unless by December five the Hungarian Government has ceased military operations and has withdrawn from all active participation in hostilities, His Majesty's Government will have no choice but to declare the existence of a state of war between the two countries." The text is given by Kertesz, Diplomacy In a Whirlpool, p. 208.

19 Kertesz, Diplomacy in a Whirlpool, p. 55.

20 Macartney, October Fifteenth, II. n. 4, p. 61.

21 Ibid.

Mark Imre Major : American Hungarian Relations 1918-1944