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as Minister as planned.''11 I was not aware at that time of Szegedy-Maszáks inquiry in the State Department because we did not have contact after our telephone conversation. All the while I tried to convince the Western powers of the necessity to take Soviet abuses in Hungary to the United Nations and prepared a strong denunciation of the Hungarian situation for this purpose.12 After a few days, however, I again received a negative answer through Page, with whom I remained in contact. He assured me that the United States would not cease to support democratic principles in the Danubian area as expressed in the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, but when I asked him about the steps they could take immediately in Hungary, he replied that according to his personal opinion the withdrawal of Western representatives from the ACC might be considered in the case of Soviet violation of agreements. He recognized that this would mean little in terms of practical politics.

In view of the passivity of the Western governments I did not think that a spectacular resignation would bring any benefit to my countrymen. I felt that for a limited time I was in an advantageous position toward the Hungarian government because my designation as foreign minister had been made public in Budapest. I was in a better position abroad than a recalcitrant envoy usually would have been and decided to make the most of the situation. The resignations of my colleagues were greatly publicized and helped open the eyes of the Western world, but did not make the heavy lot of the Hungarian people easier. Influenced by these considerations, I decided to try to exert pressure on the government so as to assure freedom for all political parties before the national elections scheduled for August 3 1 . Considering the desperate situation in Hungary, action along this line seemed the only one that could have brought some benefit to Hungarians, who could not resign or protest but had to live under conditions created by the Soviet occupation. Several of my friends participated in the elections despite physical threats and other risks, and my heart went out for them.

My supposition that Budapest would act for a limited time in a cautious way toward me proved justified by the reaction of the Foreign Ministry to my refusal to obey orders. The acting foreign minister, Ernő Mihályfi in a new cipher telegram of June 1 1 annulled the order to condemn my colleagues. The head of the political division of the Foreign Ministry offered to come to Rome and explain the ''misunderstanding." But by no means did I want to negotiate with him in Rome as his host and suggested that we meet in Switzerland

A few hours before my departure to Switzerland, Borgongini Duca

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telephoned me for an urgent appointment. He came immediately and informed me that a prominent person living in a foreign country had sent me a message through a nunciature. The message was a warning that I should not accept the portfolio of the foreign ministry. He was aware that as a good Catholic I was willing to make this sacrifice for my country, but it was too late at that time for such an undertaking and it would not make sense under the present conditions. I thanked the nuncio for transmitting the message and assured him that things being as they are I had no intention of accepting a cabinet position. To this day I do not know who sent me the message.

I met in Zurich on June 14 the head of the political division and outlined the political conditions under which I would be willing to represent in Rome the new government. I asked for the formation of a real coalition government and guarantees of political freedom and civil liberties during the electoral campaign. Moreover I asked for the real reason of removal of the prime minister and the foreign minister. My colleague from Budapest, apparently instructed to deal with me in a friendly way, promised fulfillment of all my political conditions but emphasized that my influence would be much greater if I would return home for consultation and repeatedly almost implored me to do this. It was clear that he had to follow orders. He said that Gyöngyösiduring his last weeks in office had behaved as if he were Truman's foreign minister and referred particularly to his speech at Nagykanizsa on May 12, 1947. As for Ferenc Nagy, he was not a Fascist but had planned to exclude Communists from the government after the Russian evacuation, and this was equivalent to fascism. This was the enlightening information concerning the removal of Nagy and Gyöngyösi

After my return to Rome, I thought it safer to send the terms of my political conditions and some suggestions to the president of the republic in a cipher telegram. Technically this was difficult because I was on leave and only the Communist charge d'affaires could forward an official message. I decided to cope with the situation and prepared the following text:

Envoy Kertesz asks Foreign Minister to transmit the following message to the president of the Republic:

Every good Hungarian is filled with deep anxiety because of the repercussions of the last weeks' events abroad and in the masses at home. I feel it my duty to propose to the President and to the Leaders of the Parties the following:

1. I agreed in Zurich with the Head of the Political Division that

the government should announce in a public declaration all guarantees

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necessary to assure the purity of the elections, and further announce agreed concrete particulars concerning the independence of Hungarian foreign policy. It is desirable that this should be done as soon as possible and in a very definite form.

2. The coalition government should be enlarged with politicians of the opposition and with non-party men, against whom Soviet Russia could not raise objections and who would represent a guarantee towards the West as well.

3. The police should be reorganized by reliable experts of the Social Democratic and non-labor parties. The present police, and particularly the political police, have the characteristics of a Communist party-formation, which actually, is not a benefit to the Communist Party either.

4. Freedom of the press, of opinion and freedom to form associations should be gradually assured.

5. For the sake of our international prestige it would be important to keep our press and radio up to a reputable standard. It is regrettable that the ever-growing cursings and incitements remind us of the bygone Arrow Cross regime.

The government could regain the confidence of the Hungarian people and of foreign public opinion through the enactment of the above proposed measures and through some energetic reforms putting an end to the abuses of party politics and corruption. Otherwise the abyss between the government and the large masses of the people will but increase. This will make it impossible to govern in a democratic way. Hungary will sink to the level of a dictatorial police-state. This is the unanimous opinion I heard about Hungary in the last weeks from persons with the most varied allegiances.

The recommended reforms are all the more important since cooperation on a realistic basis with our neighbors, and first of all with Soviet Russia, is Hungary's vital interest. This, however, could be achieved only by a democratic government based on the large majority of the Hungarian people. A government without popular support might provoke ultra-nationalist movements. These would shake the confidence in Hungary.

Please present this telegram to the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Ministers. Repeated London and Washington. Kertesz. Code telegram No. 23.

I handed this text to Pödör on June 21 and asked him to forward it immediately. After reading it he turned pale and stuttered that he did not think he could forward such a text. I replied cheerfully that in that case I would send it as an open telegram. This possibility prompted him to immediate action, though I understood later that he did not send copies to our legations in London and Washington

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and he changed the text slightly by putting my request for presentation of the telegram to the prime minister and deputy prime ministers in the first part of the message rather than at the end. Thus the first sentence of the transmitted version asked the foreign minister to transmit the message not only to the president of the republic but to the prime minister and deputy prime ministers. He undoubtedly performed this manipulation in deference to his Communist boss Rákosi, one of the deputy prime ministers, to make sure that Rákosi got the text at the same time as the president of the republic.

In fact it did not matter much whether the helpless president of the republic received my message. It was more important to impress the Communist leaders, the real masters of Hungary, with the necessity of granting some freedom to the people before the elections, which eventually became the second great anti-Communist demonstration by Hungarians against Soviet communism. To influence the Communists, I pointed out in the telegram that these freedoms were necessary for cooperation on a realistic basis with our neighbors and especially with Soviet Russia. Of course the expression ''realistic basis" had a different meaning in my mind than in theirs. "Cooperation'' with Russia was a necessity, not of our choosing. We were thinking in the postwar years of a cooperation similar to the model developed in Russo-Finnish relations. Although Hungary was between Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia on a highway toward western Europe, such wishful thinking was encouraged by the result of free elections in 1945 and the survival of a coalition government for over two years.

On June 25, I received the following answer from the acting foreign minister:

In reference to your cipher telegram No. 23: In accordance with your proposal made to the head of the Political Division, the Prime Minister will deliver a speech on Sunday afternoon. The Civic Democratic Party is again a member of the National Council of Hungary, following the Thursday decision of the latter. Thus it is a member of the National Independence Front. Mihalyfi. Code telegram No. 32.

This reply did not impress me because the Civic Democratic party was insignificant in postwar Hungary's political life and had obtained only two seats in parliament at the 1945 elections. Thus I did not react.

On July 2 the acting foreign minister contacted me by telephone and said that on Sunday the prime minister had delivered a speech containing the announcements for which I had asked in Zurich and in my telegram. He explained that it appeared from my telegrams

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that I had not properly evaluated recent events in Hungary, and he emphatically demanded in the name of the government that I return for consultation. I replied that from Rome I naturally saw events in a different light than did people in Budapest and expressed my views accordingly. I stated that I did not see any reason for return to Hungary before the general election and did not intend to do so in any case before September. Mihályfisaid that he would give my answer to the prime minister and promised to inform me in a personal letter about the political situation in Hungary. I understood later that he actually wrote the letter but it was forwarded to the competent Communist party organ, not to me.

A few days after my conversation with Mihályfi I had a slight hope that Hungary might again become part of the Western community of nations. On July 4 the head of the British political mission in Budapest transmitted to the Hungarian government a joint Anglo-French invitation to take part in the MarshallPlan1">MarshallPlan conference that was to open on July 10 in Paris. Having received this piece of news on July 5, I reassumed my duties at the legation because I intended to exert all possible influence in favor of Hungary's participation in the preparatory conference in Paris. This seemed the last chance for cooperation with the West. In the first days of July this endeavor did not appear hopeless, and in any case this was the only thing that I could do for my country, for it had been made clear to me that the Western powers were not able or willing to give any effective political support to Hungary.

I was informed from various sources that Czechoslovakia and Poland had decided to take part in the conference and that the other Eastern European states did not reject possibility of participation. It was significant that in Prague even the Muscovite Communist members of the government concurred in a unanimous decision of July 4, 1947, to accept the joint British-French invitation to the preparatory conference in Paris. The Western powers hoped at that time that Russia would allow participation of the satellites, at least for tactical reasons. Thus, on the very day of taking over again my position as minister to Italy, I addressed the following cipher telegram to Budapest:

I visited today leading officials of Palazzo Chigi. In the course of my visit, I was informed that the central problem of Italy's foreign policy was full participation in the MarshallPlan2">MarshallPlan. The Italians prepare memoranda concerning Italy's participation in the European reconstruction and concerning her need for the rehabilitation of her own economy The other states follow a similar procedure and they will organically

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complement each other's economy. The deficiencies in the final balance will be covered by the U.S. The head of the political section pointed out to me that they expect from the realization of the MarshallPlan, an unprecedented European collaboration. The Italian government is hopeful as to Hungary's participation. Otherwise Hungary would be completely isolated from the western European states. In view of our difficult situation, we really could not put forward any serious arguments for a refusal to take part in an economic plan which could only help us. If there were difficulties, we could apply for the permission of the ACC. This step could be motivated by our restricted sovereignty. Kertesz. Code telegram No. 31.

With my last proposition I intended to convey a hint to the acting foreign minister that in case of Soviet opposition our request to the ACC would automatically involve the American and British sections of the ACC.

On July 7 a rather encouraging announcement was made in Budapest--the Official Telegraphic Agency reported that great interest was being taken in the Marshalloffer and in proposals for a European economic program, adding cautiously that Hungary ''would have great difficulties in taking an attitude different from other southeast European ex-enemy states." In view of our political situation, this reservation was not out of place. It was also reported from Budapest that the prime minister had decided to ask the ACC for permission to accept the invitation to the Paris conference on United States aid to Europe.13 Having received this information I felt justified in sending another message about our need for Western help:

In reference to the decision to be taken concerning the MarshallPlan3">MarshallPlan I have the honor to recommend for consideration the fact that among the Eastern European states, Hungary is the most vitally interested in the renewal of its industrial equipment. This cannot be carried out without Western help. With our ruined industrial equipment, we shall not be able to fulfill out international obligations. Our isolation from the West could have incalculable disadvantages for our whole economy. Kertesz. Code telegram No. 36.

Unfortunately the East Central European delegations were unable to participate in the Paris Conference, because of Russian pressure. On July 8 a Moscow radio broadcast said that Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia had decided against participating. 14 Next day the Finnish Polish, and Rumanian diplomatic representatives in Paris denied that their countries had rejected the invitations. Warsaw, Bucharest, and Belgrade remained silent or issued denials concerning the Moscow radio statement. 15 Nevertheless that same day the Polish, Bulgarian,

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and Rumanian governments decided to decline the invitation to Paris. The next day Budapest, Prague, and Belgrade made similar announcements, and Helsinki concurred on July 11. In the case of Czechoslovakia, violent pressure was brought on a delegation which left for Moscow on July 8 ''to discuss a trade treaty." The delegation consisted of the prime minister, foreign minister, the minister of justice, and the secretary-general of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry. Stalin received the delegation in the Kremlin on July 9, 11 P.M. Dr. Arnost Heidrich, secretary-general of the Foreign Ministry, made the following report on their discussion with Stalin:

Stalin explained that the aim of the Soviet policy was to get the Americans out of Europe and Asia. Stalin emphasized that the United States pursues, through the MarshallPlan4">MarshallPlan, political and economic aims which are opposed to those of the Soviet Union. This is the reason why Czechoslovakia cannot and should not participate in the MarshallPlan. For the United States the MarshallPlan is only a means to solidify its political and economic influence in Europe. Stalin mentioned that the Soviet Union and its allies cannot have any interest in increasing the political and economic influence of the United States in Europe. Czechoslovakia, therefore, must not assist in the realization of these American plans. The MarshallPlan will lead to a situation in which Germany would be used either as a military or industrial basis against the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia' which is an ally of the Soviet Union with the aim to prevent any resurrection of German aggressive power, cannot be both an ally of the Soviet Union and a participant in the MarshallPlan5">MarshallPlan. It is a question of compatibility. The interest of the Soviet Union and its allies, according to Stalin, is to force the United States to abandon its positions in Europe and, step by step, in other parts of the world. Great Britain and France, if they have to rely on their own resources' are--according to Stalin--too weak to resist the interests of the Soviet Union and its allies. Stalin then emphasized that the United States will be obliged to evacuate its position in Europe, Asia and elsewhere, as a consequence of a deep economic crisis which the American system will be unable to avoid. Stalin did not make any mention of military measures. On the contrary, Stalin emphasized that these actions, the aim of which is to destroy the American power in the world, must not have any military character and must, therefore, not appear in such a way that would awaken the American public opinion--as happened after Pearl Harbor--and, consequently, allow the American Government to start military counter measures.

On July 10' it was announced in Prague that ''the Government held an extraordinary meeting today at which Czechoslovak

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participation in the Paris conference was again discussed. It was ascertained that a number of countries, especially all Slav States and other countries of central and eastern Europe have not accepted the invitation. Consequently, these countries, with which the Czechoslovak Republic maintains close economic and political relations based on treaty obligation, will not take part in the conference. In these circumstances, Czechoslovakia's participation would be interpreted as an act directed against the friendship with the Soviet Union and our other allies. For this reason the Government decide unanimously not to take part in the conference.16

The Hungarian reply handed over to the British political mission in Budapest on July 10 emphasized that

The Hungarian Government fully appreciated the importance of the efforts of European reconstruction, but to its greatest regret, does not see the possibility of being present at the Paris Conference. The previously held French-British-Soviet Conference proved that the Great Powers could not come to an understanding concerning the plan, which will be the object of the Paris conference. The Hungarian Government maintains that it cannot take part at a conference on the object of which the Great Powers concerned could not come to an understanding. This decision of the Hungarian Government does not mean that it wants to keep outside of the great task of European reconstruction and nothing could be farther from its intentions than to reject the principle of mutual aid of nations.

According to this text and a communiqué on the same day, the Hungarian government could not send delegates to Paris because of disagreement between the Great Powers. Allusion to the ''disagreement,, in practical terms meant the Soviet veto. Prior to this veto the Smallholder and Socialist parties had decided that Hungary should send representatives to Paris, and reportedly the Communist party had designated tentatively Ernő Gerő as head of the Hungarian delegation.

On July 13, I was surprised to receive from the acting foreign minister the following inquiry concerning the MarshallPlan6">MarshallPlan:

In reference to your code telegrams nos. 31 and 36, 1 ask you to indicate the sources of your information concerning the MarshallPlan and to explain your information in concrete form. Notably, I ask you to let me know the motives of your suppositions in reference to

1. The U.S. willingness to help the reconstruction of Hungary with industrial equipment or foreign exchange.

2. In which respect could our participation in the MarshallPlan facilitate the realization of the Three Year Plan?

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3. What would be the conditions of the supposed help? Through which organizations would it be remitted, within what period of time, and in which form?

All these facts were not clarified in the press communiqués, in the invitation, and in your telegrams. Mihalyfi. Code telegram No. 44.

Here, of course, was a display of anger and ignorance. But it offered a gleam of hope in the sense that participation of the satellites in the MarshallPlan7">MarshallPlan was still a possibility. I decided to send the following detailed cipher to Budapest:

In reference to your code telegram no. 44, I inform you that I received information concerning the MarshallPlan in the Italian Foreign Ministry, as it appears from my cipher-telegram no. 31. The Secretary General as well as the heads of the political and economic divisions gave me information concerning the Italian views and preparations. A special commission is working day and night in the Foreign Ministry to prepare the material for the Paris Conference.

Economic experts would find an answer in my cipher-telegram no. 31. for the first and second questions. Notably, the European states first will clarify among themselves the possibilities of mutual assistance and the need for the maximum utilization of their economic resources. Thus the European countries first will establish an integrated economy among themselves and will receive help from the U.S. only to cover the remaining needs and necessities. The U.S. gave help until now through UNRRA and through other similar methods. This would be done in the future within a European planned economy. The head of the political division pointed out to me that the MarshallPlan8">MarshallPlan might result eventually in a European cooperation which would not be in America's interest because it would make the European states to a large extent independent of the U.S.

According to the above explained plan, the Hungarian government was expected to make a statement in Paris concerning our capacity to give assistance to the rest of the European states and concerning our need in industrial equipment, capital, and raw material for the increase of our economic output. Hungary, like the other participating states, was supposed to get help from the U.S. only for those necessities which could not be covered in Europe.

For Hungary it is of vital importance to take part in an integrated European economy. Irrespective of our serious war damages, it is well known that we were not able to renew the industrial equipment of our factories and mines at least in the last 10 years, and that only the West could supply us with machines and capital, necessary for the modernization of our productive capacities. Soviet Russia needs the very same things; we cannot get from her anything but raw materials and orders for hired work. Stabilization was made possible only with the

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help of the gold and other goods returned from the West and through the strenuous efforts of the Hungarian people. I refer to the last information bulletin prepared by the National Bank to our foreign representatives. This states that the gravest problem of our heavy industry is the considerable deficit of the factories, which is mainly caused by the deterioration of our tools of production and the present methods of production. The same bulletin designates as the cause of the deficit in coal production the obsolete state of equipment and the lack of important raw materials. The production increases are necessary because of the reparation and for other reasons as well. This will even more deteriorate the machines and will cause a crisis sooner or later. Our high prices of production and, in connection therewith, our weak exporting capacities towards the West, are seriously alarming phenomena.

The renewal of our industrial equipment is all the more important since we pay the major part of our reparation with industrial products. Finland and Rumania deliver more raw materials.

The third question cannot be answered at present, because the USA cannot make a statement before the decisions of the Paris Conference concerning the methods of giving help to the European states. I shall make inquiries in this respect with the Economic Counselor of the American Embassy. Kertesz. Code telegram No. 40.

A few days later I sent the following supplementary cipher:

Referring to the third point of your cipher no. 44 and to my cipher no. 40:

According to information received from the Economic Counselor of the American Embassy, the government of the USA would like to help the European states mainly through the UNO. However' the opposition of the Soviet Union may hinder this. In this case, the USA will give help to those European countries which establish cooperation among themselves in the sense proposed by Marshall The USA in no way intends to interfere with the methods of organization of the economic cooperation of the European states. However' help could not be given but within the framework of a reasonable economic plan; The U.S. Congress would not accept a plan which would only consist in the payments of the bills presented by European countries. This is one of the reasons why the Americans cannot accept Molotovs proposal. Kertesz. Code telegram No. 48.

After my exchange of telegrams with the government, the foreign minister ordered me on July 22 to return to Budapest for consultation. I again refused and asked in a cipher telegram rather to be relieved from my post. Although the consequence of my attitude was clear to me from the outset of the crisis, it was a traumatic feeling to sever relations with my fatherland. I had served to the best of my

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ability, and I preferred the government cut the umbilical cord.

On the same day, the Soviet ambassador to Italy, Mikhail Kostylev, was my guest for lunch. I explained to him the economic plight of my country and our need for industrial equipment and capital from the United States and called his attention to the fact that the USSR would need the same assistance and thus was in no position to help Hungary. Without American aid it would be difficult for Hungary to pay reparation and fulfill other financial obligations as well, I concluded. In his lengthy reply Kostylev forcefully stated that I was wrong. Real planning and economic integration, he said, could not take place in capitalistic countries. The MarshallPlan9">MarshallPlan could not help Hungary because in the capitalistic world only a few capitalists made huge profits and had no regard for the good of the people. Thus the MarshallPlan would be useful for a few American capitalists because it would create markets, but it could not and would not help the masses of people in European countries. Real planning took place only in Soviet Russia and in countries that were its neighbors, and eventually it would help the people much more effectively than intervention of American capitalists, who decided to find an outlet in Europe for their products and create industrial colonies there. It was difficult to argue with him seriously along these lines. Kostylev was an experienced economist and fully understood Hungary's plight and the problems I raised. He concluded with a significant smile that no matter what our personal opinion might be, we were government officials, and thus we had to obey the orders of our governments. Since his allusion to the official party line was clear, there was no reason to continue the discussion. I simply offered a toast to his good health. It was my last contact with him.

In this period, two Communist emissaries arrived and sought to persuade me to return. I said again that I preferred to be relieved of my post rather than return before the elections. I did not want to hide my feelings and explained that I had undertaken to represent a coalition government; now there were signs that the coalition was to be broken by force. I intended to await the elections, the result of which would show whether there were any possibilities for a real coalition government.

I was able to refuse to return to Hungary because, by fortunate coincidence, my family was abroad. My elder daughter Marianne was in a boarding school in France. My younger daughter Agnes had to finish school in Budapest, and my wife wanted to rent our apartment and arrange other affairs before joining me in Rome in late June. I persuaded her to come for a short visit and decide what sort of

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personal effects to bring to Rome. Although my residence at the legation was fully furnished, a few paintings and some small objects would have created a more homelike atmosphere. And so Margaret and Agnes arrived in May a few days before the beginning of the political crisis in Budapest. Had they remained at home, it would have been necessary for me to return when recalled, and the course of my life would have taken a different turn. As Providence arranged, my refusal to return to Budapest had become a new departure in our life.

The Hungarian government waited four more weeks before I was relieved of my post on August 20--not long before the national elections scheduled for August 31 on the basis of a modified electoral law. The government probably suspected that after August 31 I would denounce the result of the elections and many electoral abuses.

While I made farewell visits in Rome, a new foreign minister was appointed in Budapest, Erik Molnár, a member of the Communist party. I left the legation on September 12, and my successor arrived soon afterwards. László Velics a distinguished senior diplomat in the Hungarian foreign service. I went to see him on September 26 to hand over my letter of resignation from the foreign service. Velicsasked me to reconsider my decision, emphasizing that he brought promises from President Tildyand Deputy Prime Minister Rákosi that after my return I would receive an outstanding position corresponding to my rank and later a post abroad. Velicsadded that he personally was willing to guarantee my safety. I asked him what he would do if something should happen to me. He replied that he would immediately resign.

In separate sessions Velicsand his vivacious wife tried to persuade me with a variety of arguments. They referred to my personal relations with Cardinal Mindszentyand other Catholic leaders and argued that it was my patriotic duty to go home and cooperate in the integration of non-Communist forces in Hungary. Mrs. Velicspointed out that her husband was an old reactionary and that he represented the Hungarian people and not the Communists. I replied that I was not a reactionary but that I declined to represent a government unwilling or unable to grant basic human rights and political freedoms to the Hungarian people. Our discussion lasted four hours, during which Velicsrepeatedly refused to accept my letter of resignation. Referring to our old friendship he asked me to reconsider my decision and to come to see him in three days. In view of the futility of further exchange of opinions I departed and sent him

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a letter of resignation through one of the secretaries of the legation, Count Andor Esterházy. This was our last contact.

I understood that Velicss ambition in Rome was to bring about an agreement with the Vatican. This is what he told to several of his colleagues. Hungarian authorities apparently made him believe such an agreement was possible. Early in 1949 he was recalled for consultation and not allowed to return to Rome, and later was pensioned. In 1951 during the barbaric mass removals of people not considered useful in the capital of the country, he was deported from Budapest. Shortly afterward he died in the village to which he was sent.

Notes

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ - Between Russia and the West