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The background of the regicide of Marseille, of which only a few details were known in 1934, has been described many years later by the Serbian Viadeta Milichevitch. He spent twelve years in tracking down the Ustashis and their connections all over Europe. His tenacious work brought to light a good many hidden facts, but his narrative is tainted with an obvious anti-Italian and a less pronounced anti-Hungarian bias. I had to balance Milichevitch's proSerbian presentation with statements by Doctor Branimir Velitch,1 the last surviving leader of the original Croat National Movement, present Chairman of the Croat National Committee. The Croat revolutionaries accept the entire responsibility for the murder of King Alexander I, their foremost enemy, killed, in their view, in the Civil War, which was fought by the Croat nation against the Serbs for the restoration of Croat independence.

When did terrorism find its way into the traditionally law - abiding Croat national movement? Milichevitch tells us2 that: "The first ally that Pavelitch found was the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), headed by Ivan Mihailoff." A few weeks after laying the foundation of the Ustasha organization in Vienna, Pavelitch "visited the Mihailoff organization headquarters situated in Banka, Bulgaria, a village near Sophia. It was agreed that both organizations should co - operate in a joint fight against Yugoslavia."

IMRO, the above mentioned organization, had developed in the beginning of the 20th century into a most dreaded secret organization. Centrally located in the Balkan peninsula, the Macedonian people, fiercely nationalistic and politically minded, had been divided up among their neighbors (Serbs, Greeks and Bulgars) when the Turks were driven out of the Balkans. The Macedonians were antagonistic to the Greeks, but hated even more fiercely the Serbs whom they considered as their main enemies after the end of the first World War when the major part of Macedonian inhabited territory was adjudged to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

1 "Fight for the Croat State." Published in the Croat languagc in Munich, 1960.

2 lbid., p.32.


JMRO's leader in the early 20's, Theodore Alexandroff, entrenched in his inaccessible mountain redoubt near the Bulgarian frontier town of Petritch, was conducting savage terrorist raids into Macedonian territory held by Yugoslavia. Partly because many Bulgarians shared in IMRO's ambition to liberate Macedonia from Yugoslav rule and partly because the accepted procedure of IMRO was murder of friend or foe alike if he happened to stand in IMRO's way, that secret organization attained enough power to establish itself in Bulgaria as a state. In 1923, when the Bulgarian Prime Minister, Alexander Stamboliski entered into negotiations with Yugoslavia to work out an understanding concerning the Macedonian problem, IMRO challenged him as "an enemy until death." IMRO did not pronounce idle threats, that same year, the Bulgarian Prime Minister was murdered bestially, in true IMRO fashion.

The sinister role of IMRO in recent Balkan history and the inviolability it seemed to enjoy in Bulgaria, may appear to the Western observer as enigmatic. Centuries of oppression endured under the Turkish yoke; then frustration caused by the dismemberment of Macedonia following liberation; incessant Great Power intrigues preventing unification of the Macedonian people coupled with subversive pressures by the Soviets, in an area which looked up to "Mother Russia" for salvation; these scattered but violent forces were channeled into the secret societies of the Balkans, and account for their murderous dynamism. They also explain why Bulgaria, opposed to the Great Serbian concept extended protection to the IMRO leadership filled with a deep - seated dislike of the Serbs. IMRO enjoyed the sympathies of the simple Bulgarian people and of the patriotic intelligensia. It also enjoyed the friendship of King Boris who extended to several of its members his protection.

In connection with the regicide of Marseille, another Bulgarian association also played a curious role. Peter Danow, the founder of a mystic sect which had connections both with the Soviets and with King Boris, occasionally gave asylum in his temple to notorious criminals also. In the summer of 1934, according to Papasissis,3 Vlada Georgijeff-Kerin, the man who within a few months volunteered to murder King Alexander was residing in the Danowist temple in Sofia with Occultists and Spiritualists, practicing meditation.3

3 Ibid., p.47.


How was it possible for a professional murderer to join such company in a temple? Asked by Yugoslav journalists, Peter Danow gave the explanation: 4"Why should I not take care of a Tchernoshemsky (the alias of "Vlada, the Chauffeur")? I am here to make good men better and to improve the bad ones. I am here to lift up the downfallen." There never was any doubt about the identity of King Alexander's murderer and every detail of his past, was shortly uncovered. Mistakenly, Mr. Eden writes in his Memoirs, Facing the Dictators (page 121) "The assassin was a Croat refugee who had lived for some years at the Janka Puszta camp in Hungary." This is definitely an error. The murderer, Kerin Tchernoshemsky, was not a Croat but a Macedonian and had never been in Hungary. Such an accusation has never been raised in Geneva or anywhere else.

A number of incidents provoked by IMRO in the Yugoslav and also in the Greek border area, convinced the Kremlin that IMRO was an organization to its liking for it would keep the Balkans in constant tension and irritation. The Encyclopedia Britannica relates5 how, in 1924, the IMRO "split over the question whether Russian help should be acepted. Alexandrov was murdered on August 31, 1924, and an internecine feud commenced, in which many of the leaders lost their lives. Band warfare was replaced, in 1927, by bomb outrages and the State of Macedonia, the most disturbing factor in the Balkans, was as far off peace as ever. . . . In 1928, the principal issue of Macedonian agitation - an autonomist Macedonia or union with Bulgaria - again flared up in new violence. The leader of the pro - Bulgarian Party, General Alexander Nicholoff Protogeroff, was killed." The Chief of the opposition inside IMRO, Ivan Mihailoff, then became its leader. He professed that in the fight for Macedonia's unity and independence, all means were justified, and all allies acceptable. He did not refrain from including the Soviets among his allies, and did not exclude Mussolini either.

I briefly described IMRO, the most savage secret organization in modern times. "Vlada, the Chauffeur," the murderer of King Alexander, was not a leader, but a murderous instrument of IMRO. In 1929, when Pavelitch launched his desperate fight against the royal dictatorship,

4 Politika, (Belgrade, October 21, 1934). Tchernoshemsky's real name was: Vlada Georgiyeff-Kerin.

5 London, Chicago, 1947, Vol. 14, p.563.


he automatically became allied with IMRO, the organization which for years had been fighting against the Serbs, from now on their common enemies. Pavelitch also had contacts with prominent Italians whom - as Yelitch told me - he had met in 1928 at a Congress in Paris. Pavelitch was advised by Mihailoff in Banka "to go to Rome, and he went. Once there, he was received without delay by high functionaries of the Italian Ministry. . . . A house was placed at Ante Pavelitch's disposal in Bologna."6 Funds were also provided for the Ustasha in Italy. Milichevitch writes7 that "the head of the Italian Secret Police, Senator Arturo Bochini, detailed one of his Service's best officials, Inspector General Ercole Conti, to the Leader of the Ustasha movement. Conti simultaneously directed espionage against Yugoslavia." These facts published by Milichevitch have - to my knowledge not been refuted.

Milichevitch further relates that8 Pavelitch set up two Ustashi camps in Italy. One of these was in Fontecchio, near Arezzo,9 while the other was in San Demetrio. In these camps, Croat emigrants were accommodated and trained. The last known total of the occupants was 508 men women and children. In addition to these two camps, Pavelitch set up frontier posts near Trieste, Fiume and Zara, whose mission it was to introduce propaganda material into Yugoslavia. Whilst this was going on, Pavelitch's friend and helper, Gustav Perchetch was setting up, with the aid of funds placed at his disposal by Italian authorities, a terrorist center in Hungary.9a It was situated in Janka Puszta, in the vicinity of the Yugoslav - Hungarian border. It appears from Milichevitch's narrative, that Janka Puszta was mainly a station of transit for the Croat refugees on their way to other parts of the world.

In 1931, Milichevitch, in charge of collecting information on the Ustashi abroad, made contact with the Serbian journalist, Peter Gruber, who intended joining the Ustasha, but was persuaded by Milichevitch to support his native Serbian cause. Gruber became an informer on the Ustasha, a role which he adroitly dissimulated. Jelitch tells about

6 Milichevitch, Ibid., p. 32.

7 Ibid.., p. 33.

8 Ibid., p.33.

9 A picture of Arezzo was submitted to the League of Nations in the Yuguslav complaint as representing Janka Puszta.

9a Concerning the Croat refugee camps in Italy and Hungary, Yelitch has informcd me that the Croat refugees arriving abroad, deprived of all means, had to he housed inexpensively. In Italy old buildings, in Hungary a farm - Janka Puszta was rented not for military training but for collective housing purposes.


Gruber that he was a well known member of the Serbian opposition to the King, led by the talented S. Pribitchevitch. He also edited a popular magazine which criticized sharply the dictatorship in Yugoslavia. Collaboration with Gruber seemed therefore interesting to the Croat separatists. But, being a Serb, he never was fully trusted. Soon he was found out to be a double agent and was used therefore as such. Milichevitch, understandably, exaggerates the role of Gruber, his master spy. He writes that in Italy, Gruber was met by an enthusiastic Pavelitch, for Gruber was the only Serb who had joined the Ustasha. After their first talks, Gruber was even appointed a member of the Ustasha's Central Committee. [This, Jelitch assured me was not true.] Pavelitch then ordered Gruber to proceed to Bulgaria without delay, and, in the name of the "Serbian Opposition to conclude a treaty with the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization on joint action."10

As occasionally happens in the devious practice of secret services, so in Gruber's exploit, the tragic bordered on the ridiculous. "Gruber [a Serbian counter-intelligence agent!] was met and solemnly welcomed at the Sofia railway station by a few hundred Macedonians. Receptions and banquets were given in his honor, and the press ran articles on the so-called renegade Serb. . . . At the same time (Milichevitch) sent to Belgrade the original of the agreement that Gruber and Mihailoff had signed in Bulgaria."11

"That agreement settled the details of co-operation between the two organizations for the liberation of Croatia and Macedonia from the Yugoslav yoke. Through the mediation of IMRO, Gruber was granted a secret audience with King Boris, and subsequently taken to Mihailoff's country house near Banka, in which Pavelitch had also lived. Mihailoff showed Gruber the camps in which the Komitadji12 were given their military training and taught to use pistols and handle infernal machines. Several of Pavelitch's subordinate commanders went through these Bulgarian training camps, including those who later took part in the assassination of King Alexander. In Banka, Gruber made the acquaintance of Mihailoff's chauffeur. . . . His real name was Vlada Georgiyeff-Kerin. It was he who fired the fatal shots at King Alexander on October 9, 1934. Even then, be had a number of crimes on his con-

10 Ibid., p. 35.

11 Ibid., p. 35~6.

12 The Bulgarian Komitadji were the same type of professionad freedom fighters as the Croat Ustashis, but they had started that way of life earlier.


science, especially two delegates of the Bulgarian Agrarian Party whom he had murdered because he considered them to be dangerous opponents of his chief."13

Milichevitch gives information on high level political contacts also which Pavelitch established in Italy, (I have not had any opportunity to check these statements.) He writes about a banquet which Pavelitch gave "in Gruber's honor in Ostia. Several official Italian personalities attended, one of them being Italo Balbo, then Undersecretary of State. Before the banquet, Gruber was introduced by Pavelitch to Count Ciano. The latter was tremendously interested in Gruber's stay in Bulgaria, and he let fall a remark concerning the agreement with Mihailoff, whose organization was receiving financial support from the Italian government. Ciano talked at some length on the question of whether Yugoslavia was ripe for a revolution."

Milichevitch also reveals how terrorism was started by the Croat revolutionaries on Macedonian inspiration. The first large scale terrorist action was planned after Gruber's return from his visit with IMRO in Bulgaria. During the first two years of the Ustasha's existence, the Croat Nationalists abroad did not resort to terrorism and obviously, it was the Macedonian example which had adversely influenced the Croat revolution. According to the first plan, international trains were to be blown up, for propagandistic effect by infernal machines, while travelling in Yugoslav territory. This was terrorism - Soviet style. The first attempt succeeded in a suburb of Belgrade causing the death of an entire family, but the second attempt was detected with the aid of the Vienna Police, and the conspirators fled to Italy.

Meanwhile the Croat refugees in Hungary were becoming restless. Unquestionably, Janka Puszta was located too close to the Yugoslav border for security. Months before the Marseille regicide was committed, I had agreed on this with Mr. Yeftich, the Yugoslav Minister of Foreign Affairs, and, at my request, the Hungarian government had expelled the Ustashis not only from the farm but also from Hungary. Nevertheless, Janka Puszta gained notoriety because of gruesome stories fabricated by a Yugoslav spy, Yelka Pogorelec, whose testimony was submitted to the League of Nations. This night club beauty from the Balkans was the only witness to state that Janka Puszta had been a

13 Ibid., p.36.


Who was this Yelka, the star witness of the prosecution, whose testimony was to disgrace an entire nation? I will not quote from Hungarian police reports on the scandalous life which she led while in Hungary. The reader may form an opinion of her from the story which her boss, Milichevitch, the man for whom she had worked as a spy, relates in his book. Milichevitch writes14 that Perchetch, the chief of the Croat refugees in Hungary, had brought Yelka, "his cousin," to a chateau near the farm where, somewhat later, she gave birth to a daughter of his. She also "frequently met a young man by the name of Josip Zarko and fell earnestly in love with him." Zarko himself was a strange character. He had attempted to murder the Yugoslav Minister to Belgium and was helped by the Ustashis to flee across the border. In Janka Puszta, in a state of mental collapse, Zarko shot himself. His suicide "stretched Yelka's nerves to the utmost." She fell ill and finally, with Ferchetch's permission, she visited her sister Mary, a spy in Vienna. As "an act of personal revenge against Perchetch" whom she suspected of infidelity, Yelka accepted Milichevitch's offer to work for him. At his orders, she returned to Janka Puszta to stir up dissension between Perchetch and the Croat refugees. Seven years later, when Pavelitch established his regime in Croatia, Yelka was arrested by the Ustashis and executed. Years earlier, the same fate bad befallen her unfaithful lover. Perchetch was executed, maybe mistakenly, for it was believed that having been Yelka's lover, he had also become a traitor to the Croat cause.

14 Ibid., pp. 40 - 41.


The first attempt on King Alexander's life by the Ustashis was organized a year before his murder at Marseille, when the King journeyed to Zagreb to celebrate the Slava, his family festival. Two selected assault groups were formed by the Ustashi Command for this purpose. One was led by Peter Oreb, coming via Italy, and the other one by Ivan Herenchitch, sent to Zagreb via Hungary. According to Milichevitch1 it transpired at the trial of the conspirators that the Italian Secret Police had given 500,000 lire to Pavelitch to put up as a reward for the King's assassination. (This Yelitch denies.) The police chief of Zagreb, Doctor Vosip Vragovitch, was informed by Milichevitch about the preparation of the crime, but he thought (or pretended) that this was a joke and the measures he belatedly took were ineffective. Nevertheless, the murder attempt failed for such was the confusion of loyalties in the Croat revolutionaries' mind at that time. Standing in a crowd by the King's car, Oreb's hand shook. He felt incapable of hurling his bomb at the King for it might kill innocent Croat bystanders also. So Oreb, with the bomb in his hand, was apprehended and executed. On the other hand, the second Ustashi group foolishly atttacked a police detachment which withdrew leaving two dead on the pavement. This gave the terrorists sufficient time to escape.

Milichevitch writes the following post-mortem on this pathetic interlude:2 "At the beginning of the war, it was ascertained that the chief of the Zagreb police, Dr. Vragovitch, was a tool of the Italians and the Ustashis. It is possible that he actually prevented the arrest of the terrorists. With the ascension of the Communists to power, Vragovitch who, under the Pavelitch government had held a high post in the police, was sentenced to death and hanged." Yelitch denies that the unfortunate Police Chief had ever collaborated actively with the Ustashis, but believes that as a Croat, he sympathized with the national cause and therefore remained passive.

Where does responsibility lie, when an entire nation, driven by despair, decides to revolt against its oppressors? Facing arrest, torture

1 lbid., p.47.

2 lbid., p. 49.


and execution, what means are there available for a patriot to defend the cause of his people? Abandoned by the outside world to evil fate, how long can a downtrodden nation continue to observe patience and tolerance? Can legal order be maintained when it is in lasting conflict with moral order?

I ask the reader to answer these questions in his conscience before passing judgment on the Croat nation's fight for freedom. Crime and heroism; streams of uselessly spent blood and self - sacrificing devotion; human greatness and abject treachery appear in an indissoluble mixture in Yugoslavia's tragic history. In the following, I restrict my analysis to the legal aspects of the Marseille regicide. Hungary was malevolently a used of being responsible for it. If that allegation had been true, Hungary's conduct would have been inexcusable, for the element of self - defense would have been missing in her actions.

What has Milichevitch to say about the question of responsibility? He was the chief investigator of the Marseille regicide and of its political background, on behalf of the Vugoslav government. He supplied much of the evidence for the Yugoslav memorandum presented in Geneva in 1934. In his own words,3 Milichevitch is on the part of the Serbs "the sole survivor and witness capable of giving any information on the investigation that the authorities conducted into this tragedy."

In a chapter of his book, under the title "Preparations for Marseille,"

Milichevitch has published the following unconfirmed data on the background of the crime and the persons implicated in the preparations4:

1. The attempt on the King's life was prepared by the Central Committee of the Ustasha in Bologna, Italy, when the news of the impending visit by King Alexander to France was published. (Summer, 1934)

2. "At the same time, Vlada Georgiyeff-Kerin, known also as Vlado Makedonski, chauffeur to Ivan Mihailoff, and terrorist instructor, made his appearance in the Ustashi Camp in Italy. Kerin was now in charge of firing practice in the camp, with the target used being a silhouette in perfect replica of King Alexander."

3. "About the end of August, 1934, Ivan Mihailoff, head of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, went to Rome

3 Ibid., p. 17.

4 Ibid., pp. 52 - 57.


. . . to arrange with Pavelitch the place, day, and hour of the assassination. He was staying at the Hotel Continental, in which most of the Balkan terrorist organizations had their meetings. Inspector General, Ercole Conti, attended the talks between Pavelitch and Mihailoff." "Count Ciano twice received Mihailoff and Pavelitch together."

4. "Pavelitch and Mihailoff agreed to assemble several groups of terrorists for the actual assassination. The first group was to make its attempt immediately upon the King's landing at Marseille. In the event of the first group's failing, another was to make an attempt with a bomb at a prearranged time. A third group was assembled to operate in Paris. In the event of all three groups in France failing, a fourth group was to operate in England."

5. At Mihailoff's suggestion, it was decided "that the first group be headed by his chauffeur, Vlada Georgiyeff-Kerin, who," he said, "had experienced such assassinations, and would take the first chance he saw."

6. Pavelitch ordered Mijo Bzik, his secretary in the Ustasha camp in Italy,

to assemble several groups of terrorists. Bzik went to Vienna and then

travelled with Lt. Colonel von Perchevitch to Janka Puszta in Hungary.

Perchetch had just been executed and replaced by Vjekoslav Servatzi as

the Leader of the Ustashis in Hungary. Bzik was "now charged with the

task of selecting, with Servatzi's help, the terrorists required, and fitting

them out with false names and forged passports."

7. Milichevitch notes that "none of the members of the terrorist groups chosen knew either the place or the time of the attempt. Those data were kept so secret that even his (Milichevitch's) agents in Janka Puszta were unable to give any precise information." The explanation of this ignorance was given by the Marseille Police, whose investigation established that while in Hungary, none of the terrorists had any idea of what their mission would be abroad nor that they were selected to murder the King of Yugoslavia.

8. Simultaneously, the Ustashis sent their political emissaries to Western Europe to represent the Croat cause there. Andrea Artukovitch, a Zagreb lawyer, was sent to London, (in 1941, he


became Minister of the Interior) while Stephan Peritch proceeded to Brussels; he was later appointed Minister to Italy by Pavelitch. At the end of September, Kvaternik (later Pavelitch's Minister of Police) left Italy for Switzerland where he was to instruct the arriving detachment of Ustashis sent from Janka Puszta.

According to Milichevitch, the scene for the King's assassination was thus set. He accuses Hungary of having participated in it. But he does not mention any Hungarian authority or private person as having been responsible in any way for the Marseille regicide.

Milichevitch, "the sole surviving witness" of the Yugoslav investigation, differs widely in his presentation from the candid admissions of Dr. Branimir Yelitch, the one-time Ustashi leader, "the only Croat still alive who knows all the facts" about the Ustashi revolution.5 In his booklet "Fight for the Croation State" published in 1960, in Munich, he certainly does not shrink from accepting Croat responsibility for the "execution" of King Alexander. But he rejects emphatically that Italy or Hungary had anything to do with it.

I do not hesitate to accept the Croat Yelitch's presentation as authentic when he differs from the story of Milichevitch, the Chief of Serbian Counter - Intelligence. For Yelitch, the well informed Croat National Leader, far from sidestepping the charges brought up against his Croat friends in connection with the regicide at Marseille, explicitly accepts these charges and places the entire responsibility on the shoulders of his two prominent colleagues, Pavelitch and Kvaternik the leaders at that time of the Ustasha. Milichevitch, on the other hand, a Serbian archenemy of the Croat Nationalists, has published his story based on investigation during 12 years. His agents and double - agents - some of them admittedly of a questionable character - have been picking up and embellishing pieces of information which Milichevitch then fitted into a preconceived story. Yelitch has called attention to some thirty incorrect statements in Milichevitch's story. Without producing any evidence, Millichevitch, always loyal to his King, has aspersed with some guilt all the opponents of the Pan-Serbian dictatorship in and outside of Yugoslavia without proper evidence or justification.

Against Milichevitch's story, Yelitch in his publication has clearly

5 Statement from his letter to Dr. Tibor Eckhardt 12 - 14 - 1962.


stated: "There did never exist any Central Committee of the Ustasha in Bologna" (Italy).

The Macedonian Mihailoff did not participate in the discussion or in the decision concerning King Alexander's liquidation. Nor did Mihailoff arrange with Pavelitch in Rome the place, day and hour of the assassination.

Up to 1941, Pavelitch had not been received by Mussolini.

Gruber has never had an audience with King Boris of Bulgaria, and he was not introduced by Pavelitch to Count Ciano, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Count Ciano did not "receive Mihailoff and Pavelitch together" and knew nothing of the preparations for the assassination.

Vlada Georgiyeff-Kerin, the murderer, was not an instructor in terrorism of the Ustashis in Italy.

Besides refuting such false statements and allegations, Yelitch refers to the fact that following the murder of the Austrian Chancellor, Dollfuss, (July, 1934) it became Mussolini's central problem to save Austria's independence from absorption by Hitler. The Austrian National Socialists, compromised in the Vienna Putsch, fled to Yugoslavia where, wearing their Austrian uniforms, they were housed in army barracks at Varazdin. According to Yelitch, Pavelitch became deeply disturbed by the developing Italian desire to placate the Serbs, eventually even to conclude a compromise with the Royal Dictator of Yugoslavia in order to stop him from promoting the union of Austria with Germany. The Croats had not forgotten what had happened in 1923 to the refugees from Montenegro, when Italy shipped them back in cattle cars to Yugoslavia, although the daughter of King Nikola of Montenegro was at that time the Queen of Italy. The Croats felt that the Italo-Serbian rapprochment might spell the doom of Croat independence.

Radical Croat interference with these Italian plans was decided when the Ustasha Command learned that Milichevitch had been charged by King Alexander - on the advice of the Belgrade Police Chief, Zika Lazitch - with the task of having the Croat Revolutionary Leaders abroad murdered. Dr. Yelitch states that Milichevitch, this dangerous opponent of the Croat cause, was responsible for the attempt on the life of King Zogu of Albania in the Vienna Opera House. Probably aided by the Czech police - Yelitch accused him of the


murder of the Croat Lt. Colonel Stevo Duitch, found hanged in his hotel room in Karlsbad. According to Yelitch, Milichevitch organized the attempts against the lives of various Ustasha leaders: Pavelitch in Munich, von Perchevitch in Vienna, Servatzi in Fiume and Perchetch in Budapest. We faced the alternative, wrote Dr. Velitch (in 1960): to kill or to be killed. "Our (Ustashi) leadership therefore gave orders to the Chief of Staff of our (Ustashi) revolutionary action, Longin, (the alias of Eugene Dido Kvaternik who died a short while ago in Buenos Aires) for urgent action" in connection with King Alexander's visit in France. Dr. Yelitch had returned to Italy at the end of October, after an eight - month stay in America. This was following the Marseille regicide which took place on October 9. He was jailed in Torino (Italy) together with Pavelitch and Kvaternik, and it was there that the two Ustasha Leaders informed Yelitch of the background of the Marseille assassinations. Quite recently, he assured me6 that he established beyond all doubt that the decision to execute King Alexander I. of Yugoslavia was made by Pavelitch personally and that Kvaternik was put in charge of that action. Pavelitch, however, was not implicated in the planning and the execution of the Marseille regicide.

Dr. Yelitch finally states that "Belgrade has been accusing not only the Croat emigration but also Italy and Hungary with the organization of the entire Marseille affair. Germany was also mentioned as having aided the Croat National emigration. The fact is that these states were completely guiltless, for no political personality in any of these states, had the slightest intimation of the intended attempt at Marseille."

"Nobody in Hungary knew anything about the plans."

"Nobody in Italy had the slightest idea about the Marseille attempt and Mussolini was completely shocked by it.7"

"It is true that our [Croat] people lived in Italy; they travelled to various European countries, where we established our organization, but neither arms, nor initiative originated in Italy, Hungary or Germany."

Emphatically, Dr. Velitch ends "The execution of King Alexander I. was purely an act of Croat - Macedonian collaboration."

6 In November 1962, when we met in New York city.

7 0n the telegram reporting to him King Alexander's assassination in Marseille, Mussolini wrote the instruction: "Ask our Croat friends who could be the murderer and by whom could he have been inspired?'

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