G. Baross: Hungary and Hitler

III. in 1939, a new threat appeared on the European scene: the Soviet Russian Empire. We have seen already that, in spite of the English and French attempts, they had concluded a political and military pact with the Germans in August 1939. As a result of this she participated in the German-Polish war and was able to acquire Poland's Ukralnian territories. A second

consequence was that in September and October, with the usual Communist methods, she was able to put her hands on the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. These countries, made docile by their new governments, were, in the middle of 1940, incorporated into the Soviet Union.

in April 1939, the Soviet demanded frontier adjustments of Finland. The Finns refused to satisfy such claims and upon this the Red Army penetrated into Finland in spite of the sharp protests of President Roosevelt and the League of Nations. After battles in which she suffered great losses, Finland was forced to conclude peace, and Russia acquired the district of Karelia with the city of Vipurii (or Viiborg).

in the summer of 1940, the Soviet Union sent an ultimatum to Rumania requesting her to cede to Russia Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. The Rumanians were prepared to comply to this request since London had informed Bucharest that in the event of an attack by Russia on Rumania, she would not be able to support them. The two territories were consolidated under the name of Moldva and became a Russian member republic. in November of the same year Molotov, Soviet Russian Foreign Commissar, visited Berlin and exhibited a great interest in the affairs of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and the Dardanelles (or Bosphorus).

IV. The value of the Hungarian relationship with London and Paris remained rather dubious. Although Czechoslovakia had ceased to exist on the map, under the leadership of Benes, the Czech emigrants, using the old connections and sympathies of England and France, developed lively political activity in the interest of the independence of Czechoslovakia. When Lord Halifax, who had little sympathy for the Hungarian cause, ceded his portfolio of Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Eden, whose Czech sympathies were known, the British Government, early in 1940, officially recognized the Czechoslovakian committee and Chamberlain made a statement recommending that Czechoslovakia be reconstructed. The atmosphere in France was also favorable towards the cause of Benes, but favorable voices also were heard for the Hungarians; Count de Vienne, French Ambassador to Budapest, was sent on a secret mission to the Hungarian capital, but I will give those details later.

What were the aims of mutilated Hungary in the international political scene and in all these clashes of interests and powers which were pushing Europe to her final annihilation? All Hungary aimed to do was to keep the Hungarian nation out of all war conflicts and to reacquire the territories which were separated from her. We will see in the following how Count Pal Teleki, Minister President, and Count Istvan Csaky, Minister of Foreign Affairs, acted in the realization of these alms.

After the successful settlement of the Carpatho-Ruthenian question, Hungary withdrew from the League of Nations. Two factors brought on this decision: first, the Hungarian Government

wanted to liberate herself from this absolutely impotent body and the barriers it imposed; secondly, she wanted to make a friendly gesture towards the Third Reich, who had left it earlier. The Hungarian Parliamentary circles accepted this move of the Government with great stoicism and demonstrated little interest; the press barely mentioned it. In April 1939, the Minister President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Rome. During the negotiations, which lasted only a few days, the Hungarians were left with the impression that the official communiques which stated Italy's aims to maintain peace and guarantee Yugoslavia's territorial inviolability were hiding something because Italian interests were also mentioned in Yugoslavia.

What were these interests? In the official communique the Hungarians stated that they strictly were adhering to the policies of the Axis. What was the meaning of such a statement at a time when the German-Polish relations threatened to break out into war in which the Hungarians could not get involved because of moral factors. Hungary not only did not want to participate but she was against permitting German troops to transit Hungarian territory in a move against Poland. This was the reason why Parliamentary circles received this communique with great concern, and the press gave only scarce details about it.

In these conditions, Teleki and Csaky traveled to Berlin at the end of April. The Government Party usually gave a fare-well dinner at such occasions and It was the task of the writer of these lines to greet the Minister of Foreign Affairs in a speech before the Party. At his request I spoke about certain points of Hungarian foreign policy which were enveloped in a mist and upon this, in his answer, he expressed the hope that this mist be dispersed in the course of the negotiations. Verily Berlin did not insist and/or demand the use of Hungarian railroad lines leading to Poland (because apparently the Slovakian railway line mentioned previously was quite adequate for the purpose) and did not demand further government actions in connection with the Jews. However, they did request some more concessions to be granted to the Hungarian Schwabs (ethnic Germans who migrated into the country during centuries of Hapsburg rule). Apparently Rumania and Yugoslavia were not a topic of discussion at the talks but Berlin and Budapest were rather secretive about them. Ribbentropp expressed his friendly feelings towards Hungary and so did the German press.

Very shortly after their return, Csaky delivered a report to the Foreign Policy Committee of the House of Representatives giving details of the Berlin negotiations. In the course of debate Count Istvan Bethlen, former Minister President, quoted the expression used by me, "misty points," and requested further and more detailed information from the Minister. He avoided all firm statements, however, and repeatedly said that Hungary's

independence is by no means limited in any respect.

After these negotiations there was every reason for the Hungarian public to be very optimistic on one side and very pessimistic on the other. The writer of these lines had the opportunity to talk to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for over an hour and we discussed the neutrality to be maintained by Hungary at all cost. Csaky deliberated about the possibilities and stated that there would be no war because London was going to be able to prevent such an event. Balint Homan, former Minister of Education and outstanding historian, explained at length to a very close group of friends in the presence of this author that the German "Sud-Ostraum" policy presented tremendous dangers and was a threat to Hungary's independence and her role in Europe.

It was in this rather unbalanced stage of public opinion that the Hungarian nation was informed of the treaties concluded between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union in Berlin and in Moscow, and also that Hungary had entered into diplomatic relations with Russia. Barely two weeks later the German Wehrmacht started tactical moves against Poland; and London and Paris declared war on the Third Reich.

in the gradually worsening, rather distorted European political situation which sprang out of the Munich Conference, the relationship of Hungary to her immediate neighbors was the following:

I. After the settlement of the Carpatho-Ruthenian question, provoking intrigues were felt in Slovakia. During this time the writer of these lines, being a descendent of Szekely settlers in the valley of the River Vag, often traveled about the homely countryside of the upper Hungarian territory and through many friendly conversations became convinced that the hostile attitude was not a reflection of public opinion but was a result of politics. The Deputy Foreign Minister of Slovakia Dr. Istvan Polyak, a former officer of the Hussars, an estate owner and a good friend of mine of pre-war times, communicated to me that Sanyo Mach, Slovak Minister of the Interior, was the leading spirit behind their policy and was drawing regular salary for this from the Germans. Polyak was ready to turn over to me some receipts signed by Mach.

I got another hint as to the intrigues against the Hungarians instigated by the Germans while having lunch at a hotel in the city of Trencsen. There, seated at a long table, were about fifteen or twenty young boys speaking German and being rather loud. I asked the waiter if they were Germans. He answered: "oh, by no means. They were Slovaks who are learning German and for that they receive twenty crowns and lunch daily." Soon a gentleman at the table next to mine, came over and introduced himself as the district medical head of the county of Trencsen, and in a broken Hungarian he made the following statement: "You see what the Germans do to us; it would be

much better for us to learn Hungarian; and the county had made such a proposal to introduce Hungarian language courses again. We lived together for one thousand years, and we have absolutely nothing in common with the Germans."

I also had the opportunity to talk to Bela Tuka, Slovak Minister President, and to Tisso, Secretary to President of the Slovak Republic, and both gentlemen expressed their great sympathy for the Hungarian nation; during my travels the same impression was made on me by broad sectors of the population.

II. The Hungarian Government did not cease to demand from Rumania that the territorial disputes and claims be settled on the basis of the Munich decision. The Rumanians rigidly refused to consider even the disputes or a settlement and it was also Hitler's opinion that the maintenance of peace was by all means desirable in order to secure shipments of oil and grain (cereals) undisturbed. London and Paris, on the other hand, were of the opinion that the territorial integrity of Rumania was a "European interest." Italy had no interest in Rumania, and Mussolini, as I already stated in my study entitled "Hungary and Mussolini," was inclined to support the Hungarian claims, although his voice fell on deaf ears in Berlin.

The Hungarian Government and Pal Teleki sent memorandum after memorandum elaborating on the Hungarian rights and their rightful claim to Transylvania; a tremendous amount of supporting evidence contained in several cases was shipped to London. (Those boxes somehow disappeared entirely, leaving not a trace.) in his memoirs Teleki set the Hungarian territorial claims at 78 thousand square kilometers, at the minimum, (as opposed to the 103 thousand square kilometers of territory forfeited in 1919) and presented sufficient proof and evidence that for the security of Europe it was imperative that the eastern Carpathian Mountains and their valleys be in Hungarian hands. (The evidence documenting this was transported in January 1940 to Paris and London.)

In November 1939, there came a definite turn in this series of rather lengthy debates', bargaining and negotiations when the world was informed by the Russian press that the Soviets had made claims on Bessarabia and Bukovina. It was immediately proposed by the military circles of Hungary, or at least by part of them, that the Hungarian Army should move into Transylvania and occupy the Eastern Carpathian Mountains. in the early part of January 1940, Csaky met with Ciano in Venice and asked for Ciano's support and aid in Bucharest and asked him to communicate to the Rumanians that If they would satisfy Hungary's territorial claims, Hungary would remain neutral in the event that the Soviet Union attacked Rumania. The intervention by Ciano, if it happened at all, was fruitless. As a matter of fact, Gafencu, the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that Rumania had Germany

as a mighty protector against the Hungarians. The Hungarian Ambassador to Berlin Sztojai reported to Budapest that if Rumanian oil fields would be threatened German armored divisions would hurry to their defense, taking the shortest route, and the Germans were already preparing some troops in eastern Slovakia for such a purpose, and it only gave incentive to the idea of an armed solution to the problem of Hungary.

Among these saber rattlings, memorandums and futile negotiations in the summer of the year 1940, the press and radio publicized that Molotov wanted to realize the claims of the Soviet Union against Rumania. Well-informed politicians also learned the top secret that Molotov had invited Kristoffy, Hungarian Ambassador to Moscow, to a talk with him and communicated to him that he wanted to support Hungary's territorial claims against Rumania. This immediately presented two new questions for the Hungarian Government to face.

What would be the Government's attitude towards the Soviet Union: to accept a sympathetic attitude seemed impossible, for there was also the threat that the Red Army would also enter into the eastern Carpathian in their advance.

What could hasten the immediate solution of the Transylvanian territorial claims? An eventual action by the Soviet Union would perhaps bury the solution of the question especially now that the new Minister President of Rumania Gigurtu had renounced the friendship pact with England and France, which had guaranteed Rumania's frontiers for twenty years, and wanted to place his country under the! protection of the Third Reich. Hungary under pressure of the double threat made a decisive move. After the solution of the Carpatho-Ukrainian problem, she had fortified her troops, moved them up and lined them along the Rumanian border; and now she communicated to Berlin and Rome that under the present situation she was ready to solve her problem by force of arms. Upon this Hitler invited Te!eki and Csaky to Munich and there, in the presence of Ciano, the Hungarian claims were rehashed; however, it was under new light now that Teleki had threatened an armed solution; whereas King Carol of Rumania requested in a private letter to Hitler a final refusal of the Hungarian claims and the guarantee of the Rumanian frontiers. The negotiations ended with a recommendation to the Hungarian Government that it should attempt to renew negotiation's and Hitler also promised that he would influence the Rumanian King to be more receptive and polite.

At this time came also a territorial claim from Bulgaria requesting from Rumania the reconstruction of her old frontiers in the Dobrudsa.

In compliance with the decision of the Munich negotiations the Hungarian Government invited the Rumanian Government to a parley. But no reply to this invitation was ever received. The Hungarian press withdrew in a great silence in order not

to influence public opinion which was rather anti-Rumanian anyway. But the well informed knew that King Carol sent a new letter to Hitler in which he offered a few thousand square kilometers of land to the Hungarians and requested that the Fuehrer should put an end to the Hungarian claims in the future and should guarantee the remaining Rumanian territory. The Hungarians, of course, declared King Carol's offers to be unacceptable and in a letter Hitler communicated to the King that he was ready to guarantee the Rumanian frontiers only if Rumania reached a final settlement with Hungary and Bulgaria on disputes.

After this the Rumanians finally made a proposal for a population exchange and in the middle of July 1940, in the city of Turnu-Severin, located on the Danube River, a Hungarian-Rumanian delegation sat down to negotiate. The Hungarian delegation was led by Andras Hory, Ambassador and Minister Plenipotentiary, and also among the members of the delegation was Laszlo Bardossy, Hungarian Ambassador who later became Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister President. The Hungarians lived on the ship Zsofia which was in the Danube in front of the city. The negotiations were interrupted twice but ended finally without any results.

At the end of July highly informed circles learned that the Soviet Union was concentrating troops on the Rumanian border and that Molotov had communicated to Kristoffy, Hungarian Ambassador to Moscow, that he considered the Hungarian claims against Rumania well founded and just and that he was ready to support them. Moscow obviously was preparing to attack Rumania. At that time Hungary also concentrated about 400 thousand troops on the Rumanian-Hungarian border Hitler was rather upset and excited about this news (fearing for the Rumanian oil wells), and Ribbentropp in an urgent manner, took up negotiations with Ciano in order to solicit his cooperation for settlement of the above questions and to reach a final decision.

On August 29, 1940, the two statesmen met in Vienna and there they presided over the socalled "Second Viennese Arbitrage," which I mentioned in my study entitled "Hungary and Mussolini." This "Second Viennese Arbitrage" made a bad impression on Hungarian public opinion because It brought to light the point of the so-called "Goring-Bucht;" that is to say, the very noticeable break in the tracing of the new Hungarian-Rumanian border east of Kolozsvar [Translator's remark: the present Rumanian name Is Cluj]. This bay-like indentation, demanded by the Germans, behind the ancient capital of Transylvania was the site of the natural gas and oil wells of Sarmas and of several gold and alabaster mines. The decision left them in Rumanian hands. in those times I had business connections with the "Hugo Stinnes G.M.B.H., Muelheim An Der Ruhr," a German finance concern which was third in their nation after Krupp

and Goring-Werke, and maintained friendly relations with its head, Hugo Stinnes. He related to me the history of this "Goring-Bucht." [Translator's remark: Goring-Bucht means Goring Bay] Gigurtu, the Rumanian Minister President, was personally interested in the economic exploitation of the above territory and should this territory come under Hungarian rule he would lose a noticeable income. Therefore, he offered to the German Government the business firms working in the territory. The German Government channeled the offer over to the Goring-Werke and Stinnes GMBH financial concern for further negotiation and finalization. The Stinnes concern only received the invitation of the German Government quite late and thus, missed the opportunity. Hugo Stinnes added to his statements: "Believe me, Mr. Baross, if we would have been the purchasers, this territory would not have stayed with the Rumanians."

Out of gratitude to the Third Reich and its cooperation with the settlement of the Transylvanian territorial disputes, the Hungarian Government gave far concessions to the Hungarian and Transylvanian ethnic German groups and allowed them to enter into the "Folks Bund der Deutschen in Ungarn," which was an organization directly under the influence of the Third Reich, renewed tile privilege of the use of their language (which had never been barred to them), expressed again that they were equal to Hungarians in public office (this had never been disputed) and that if they had changed their German name to a Hungarian one, they were allowed to change it back. Another expression of gratitude, or at least the press interpreted it as one, was that in November Hungary joined the signatories to the German-Italian-Japanese Tripartite treaty. The international political consequence of this was that the Third Reich gained confidence in Hungary, and the domestic political consequence was that the German Government seemed to decrease her support to ethnic German and right wing movements in the country.

Once the Rumanian troops had ceded the Transylvanian territories, following exactly the stipulation of the negotiations, Hitler communicated to the Rumanian King that he was guaranteeing the new frontiers. A few weeks later Carol abdicated and ceded his throne to his son, Michael. The Rumanian Government also abdicated and Gigurtu was replaced by General Antonescu, and these changes shifted the entire Rumanian policy and political life over to the German line. After this, upon advice of Hitler, Rumania also ceded the northern parts of Bukovina and Bessarabia to the Soviet Union, and the Soviet troops immediately occupied the said territory. Bulgaria regained from Rumania the Dobrudsa frontier lines of 1918.

In the meantime, German Army units moved into Rumania to secure and defend the oil wells. (These. troops. were sent in great secret in locked railroad cars also through Hungary.)

G. Baross: Hungary and Hitler