G. Baross: Hungary and Hitler

During the "Kiel days" the foreign ministers of the little Entente invited Gyorgy Bakacs-Bessenyei, our Ambassador to Belgrade, to a conference held at the Yugoslav seaside resort, Bled. These negotiations led to the agreement in which the states of the Little Entente acknowledged Hungary's right to rearm; on the other hand, Hungary renounced all acts of aggression against them, and the text of the agreement stated that other questions of mutual well-being and relations between neighbors were not yet subject to negotiation.

During this time rumors swept the country that London had written Hungary down as one who is inevitably thrown into the arms of the Third Reich; on the other hand, there were also those who pretended to know that the English public opinion was sympathetic toward the Hungarian territorial claims against the Czechs and would accept it if the Slovaks, they so wished, returned to Hungary, the mother country. Hitler delivered a great address in Nuremberg from which some concluded that the Fuehrer was ready to arrange an agreement with Benes on the Sudeten question if the latter would grant him certain concessions which would result, of course, in the complete disregard of Hungarian territorial claims. On the other hand, we all concluded that the British Prime Minister Chamberlain, on his visit to Berchtesgaden, was going to persuade Hitler to regulate the Sudeten, Hungarian-Polish, and Carpatho-Russian questions through peaceful agreements. Somehow certain circles In Hungary knew of a letter sent by Stojadinovic, Yugoslav Prime Minister, to Count Ciano, in which he stated that in connection with the Czechoslovakian affair he would not interfered aggressively against Hungary. Also known were the contents of letters of Mussolini sent to Lord Runciman in which the Duce proposed a popular vote not only in the Sudeten dispute but also In the Hungarian question. According to rumors similar opinions were voiced by Beck, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, concerning the solution of the question of the Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia.

All this unclear and contradictory information reaching the country made the impression In Hungary that our foreign policy reached a cul de sac and that the lmredy government had committed a grave mistake with its indecision. The Hungarian press enveloped itself in great silence. Upon the basis of all this, the Hungarian Government Party (MEP) at its annual convention held in September, issued an address to the Hungarian minorities living In Czechoslovakia in the name of all Hungarians, saying that they should take the settlement of their fate in their own hands; a patriotic association the "Revisionist League" sent wires to all governments of the great powers requesting that they grant to the Hungarian minorities the right to decide about their own fate through popular vote. At

the same time parliamentary circles learned that Foreign Minister Kanya had communicated to the ambassadors of our country in Berlin, London, and Paris, and that he personally had communicated the same to Knox, British Ambassador to Budapest, that Hungary was going to request in a note from Czechoslovakia to allow the fate of those territories in which Hungarians lived in majority to be decided by popular vote and that he had the cooperation of Poland in this matter also. Very little was heard by Parliamentary and press circles from Paris and London about this action (if there were any they must have been very indecisive.) It was learned, however, that Bucharest was spreading the rumor in the capitals of the great powers that Hungary wanted to annex the entire Slovakia.

During this time an invitation from Hitler to Imredy and Kanya to come to Berchtesgaden was received; and Ciano increasingly urged Hungary and Poland to augment their pressure in the question of the Czechoslovakian minorities. Imredy and Kanya traveled to Berchtesgaden, but meager notices were issued as to the happenings at the negotiations. I was told by an acquaintance who was in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (either Count Istvan Csaky or Alfred Nicki) that Hitler had made up his mind to settle the Czechoslovakian question within three weeks and if necessary even by force of arms; and that if Hungary were going to be passive she was going to play away her chances'. I also heard later, from a similar source, that Hitler communicated his decision to the Polish Government and to Mussolini. As a result of the above visit, the Hungarian press dealt at large with all questions of Hungarian minorities and their right to a popular vote decision. The "Revisionist League" and the semi-official "Association of Foreign Affairs" organized mass demonstrations. Some army units were called to arms. Poland ordered army mobilization along the Czechoslovakian border, and there were boisterous mass demonstrations in Warsaw and in other Polish cities.

The Hungarian public opinion was very disappointed to learn that London objected to the Hungarian attitude and opposed the Hungarian "mobilization" and that the Poles obtained similar admonitions from the same source. The Hungarian public opinion also was informed of the fact that Prague declined all sorts of territorial concessions.

At the same time the world famous Hitler-Chamberlain meeting at Godesberg took place and it became known that the English Prime Minister was unpleasantly surprised and was rather excited about Hitler's communiques pertaining to the claims of Hungary and Poland. It also became known in Hungary that the British wanted to deal only with the Sudeten question and that they wanted to postpone all other solutions to a later date. It also became known that Benes had instigated Soviet Russia to interfere with armed forces, and that Russia called the Hungarian claims "follies."

What was done In Hungary? Some advised caution, others advised force; the Government did not cease to repeatedly invited German attention to Hungary's claims against Czechoslovakia and emphasized towards Yugoslavia (from where there were no dangerous moves to be expected) and towards Rumania her peaceful intentions. On September 29, 1938, the "Munich Conference" was opened at which the English, French, German, and Italian Governments participated through their representatives and Hungary and Poland sent observers (Count Istvan Csaky, Deputy Foreign Minister who carried a personal letter of Regent Horthy to Hitler and Major General Vitez Laszlo Szabo, who was our military attached at Rome and an intimate friend of Mussolini). I already stated the details pertaining to the Hungarian question that was at this conference in my study entitled "Hungary and Mussolini."

Hitler brought up the Hungarian claims only after having been reminded of them by Mussolini, trying to manifest through this his mistrust and anger tovards the Hungarians. The decision of the Conference read in one of the annexes as follows: "The modalities pertaining to the solutions of the Sudeten question are going to be applicable in accordance with usual diplomatic procedures to the Hungarian and Polish questions also." This decision by no means satisfied the Hungarian expectations and created new entanglements. It left open the Slovak and Ruthenian questions.

I will attempt to give the details of the situations created which by force led to the so-called "First Viennese Arbitrage." In compliance with the decisions made at Munich by the "Great Powers" [Great Britain, France, China, Italy, USA, Germany, later Russia; here the writer meant England and Germany], the Hungarian Government offered to negotiate with Prague about her territorial claims. The Czechs, however, wanted to postpone the entire affaire We became aware, however, that although the Slovaks were insisting on independence, some circles in their country would have liked to return to Hungary instead. The Slovaks decided at their mass meeting at Zsolna [in Czech, ZIm] to detach themselves from Czechoslovakia and to form an independent Slovak Republic. The Ruthenians formed two groups: the Carpatho-Ruthenians who would have liked very much to join Hungary, and the Ukrainian Slovaks who turned for spiritual leadership towards the Russians. Only a few days after the Munich Conference Poland moved into the territories which she claimed and declared her desire to have a common frontier with Hungary; this would have meant, of course, that the Ruthenian territories would be turned over to Hungary. The Rumanians objected to all territorial concessions made to Hungary, and stated that they were going to binder the annexation of the Slovak and Ruthenian territories by Hungary, even if it meant resorting to arms, Although the Yugoslavs acknowledged the rights of Hungary to the territories where Hungarians were in the majority, they did not

approve of the annexation of the territories inhabited by Slovaks and Ruthenians;

From the English we were informed that London desired a peaceful solution of the Czechoslovakian territorial questions. No Information reached us from the French and the Italians who at first seemed to think well of the orientation of the Slovaks and Ruthenians towards Hungary and later, maybe in view of the Yugoslav objections, pressed for a solution of only the territorial questions which pertained to the Hungarian minority. Hitler immediately declared that he would recognize a Slovak Republic, if formed, averting through this an eventual adherence of the new state to Hungary, and he emphatically advised the Hungarian Government to conduct negotiations pertaining to territorial claims as soon as possible with the new Slovak Government. In regard to the question of a common Hungarian-Polish frontier he expressed mistrust and refused to consider it because he saw in such a move a polish-Hungarian intrigue directed against his interests.

It was under such circumstances that the negotiations were begun by the Hungarian and Slovak Governments in 1938 on a ship anchored at the city of Komarom. The Hungarian Government was represented by Count Teleki and Kanya, and the Slovaks were represented by Minister President Tiso heading the delegation (in which also appeared a Ruthenian political representative.) The negotiations started in a very uneasy atmosphere because Bela Imredy, Prime Minister, had ordered its representatives not to ask but to "demand." Kanya, on the other hand, wanted to negotiate in the French language which was not spoken by any of the Slovak representatives.. Thus, the negotiations ended quite soon without the least results. The Hungarian Government had again turned up a dead-end street.

This situation caused great surprise and ire In Hungarian Parliamentary circles because they did not trust the foreign. political weight of the Imredy Government, because they feared that we would fall out of Hitler's favor completely, that as a consequence of that Mussolini would withdraw, and the sympathetic attitude of the Poles would change also.

My colleagues in Parliament selected me to visit Kalman Daranyi, who had acquired at previous visits certain prestige before Hitler, in order to persuade him to travel to the "Fuehrer" and make an attempt to save what could still be saved. Upon my request Daranyi immediately received me at his residence (as if as I know after me he had a visit from Deputies Janos Szeder and Istvan Milotay). He categorically refused to accept the idea of an eventual visit to Berlin, however, saying that he did not want to interfere with Imredy's political actions. Only after I reminded him that personal controversies should not influence a step to be taken in the interest of the country,

did he reverse his decision; and after having cleared his visit with the Regent and Imredy, he flew to Berlin.

When he returned after a few days he called me and told me the details of his visit. Hitler had received him immediately, and as he paced up and down in the room he had told him in very bitter words about the "mistrusting, uncomprehending, two-faced attitude of the Hungarians," and then stopping in front of Daranyi he had asked him: "Why do the Hungarians not love me?" Daranyi very quietly had answered: "Because why, for instance, do you want to give the city of Pozsony [in German: Pressburg; and in Czech: Bratislava] to the Slovaks?" Upon which Hitler had retorted: "They asked me to do this in a memorandum signed 'by seventy thousand persons." Daranyi had answered: "Do you want to see a memorandum signed by one hundred thousand in which they ask to be attached to Hungary?" Hitler made an angry gesture and then began to smile and asked: "Well, what do you really want?" and then they began to negotiate in earnest and these negotiations promised to clarify the situation. The situation, however, did not clarify itself; on the contrary, it steadily became more and more aggravated.

The Ruthenians requested a popular election, and thus the Czechs sent military reinforcements to Carpatho-Ruthenia and placed the city of Ungvar under martial law. The Poles pressed for a decision in the Hungarian-Polish question; and Hungarian volunteer fighter units ("Guards in rags") drifted into Ruthenian territories and this resulted in skirmishes and great losses on both sides. The Slovaks made proposals to the Hungarian Government but Budapest did not consider them fit for negotiation. Imredy thought to mobilize the Army, in part, but would have liked it if the Munich "Four Power" conference would decide all contested questions. He sent Count Istvan Csaky to Rome to negotiate for a stand to be taken by Mussolini. The Duce was relieved by Hungarian plans to mobilize and by the consideration of the question by the Four Powers'. Ciano contacted Ribbentropp by telephone about this matter. However Ribbentropp was against any decision by the Four Powers because he was assured that London and Paris would take a stand in favor of Prague. This assumption was not quite correct because we learned later that London had been in favor of our solution of self-determination, and that Paris had been sympathetic to a Hungarian-Polish frontier but that both Powers were hesitant to participate in a new Four Power conference. The Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs Beck paid a visit to the King of Rumania but found a rigid withdrawal by the King. Mussolini was then inclined to accept a role in a dual court arbitrage and Ciano made a proposal to Ribbentropp to that effect. But the latter declined this proposition also. In the meantime, the Czechs were becoming more and more aggressive in Carpatho-Ruthenia and the Rumanians threatened to mobilize

completely. In this rather tense atmosphere the Hungarian Government turned to Berlin and Rome and asked them to solve the contested questions with a two-power decision.

On October 30, Ciano and Ribbentropp arrived in Vienna, and there they rendered the first Viennese Arbitrage decision. The Hungarian Government was represented by Count Pal Teleki and Count Istvan Csaky.

At the negotiations an unfavorable impression was created by Ribbentropp's complete silence. It was Ciano who laughingly drew lines of the new Hungarian-Slovakian frontier onto the maps prepared for the purpose. Of the great northern cities, the new frontier left the old Hungarian crowning city of Pozsony [Translator's note: today the Czech Bratislava] to the Czechs but gave to Hungary the center of Hungarian culture, Kassa [at present the Czech Kosice], where lie the ashes of the great Ferenc Rakoczi II. Also returned to the mother country were the cities of Leva, Losonc, Ungvar, and Munkacs; the two latter ones were returned without settling the Ruthenian or Polish-Hungarian border question. Ciano later told the wife of Secretary of State Baron Gyorgy Pronay that he traced the new Hungarian border really only out of gratitude to the Hungarians.

In the meantime, the Hungarians waited tensely to hear the reactions of the English and the French. Soon we were informed that the English Government communicated to our Ambassador to London Barcza that they accepted the news of the Arbitrage with pleasure and contentment. The French official circles did not emit any particular statements, but the French papers emphasized that the Arbitrage decisions eliminated some very grave entanglements. This news only increased the happiness of the Hungarian nation about the return of the Hungarian inhabited territories of the Upper Hungary.

More disagreeable, however, was the news which struck the Hungarian public a few days later that the Third Reich had annexed on Slovak territory the city of Deveny and the village of Pozsony-Iigetfalu, both of which were of mixed Hungarian-German population.

The Hungarian military and civilian Government hurried to occupy those territories which had been returned through tile decisions, but the question of the northern Ruthenian territory and the cities of Ungvar and Munkacs was still open. The Hungarian public and the Polish Government urged that a solution be reached. It was only in the middle of November that the Hungarian Government, in view of the the unrest felt among the Ruthenians, decided to take the necessary steps. It was indispensable to obtain the approval of Berlin and Rome. Berlin categorically opposed everything. Rome, however, was in favor of decisive action and even promised to contribute airplanes and air support to an armed settlement of the question. The Italians retracted their promise once they were informed

of the standpoint of Berlin, and declared that they had to adhere to the decision of the former

Pretty soon a German-Italian mutual diplomatic note was sent to Budapest which demanded that Hungary adhere strictly to the decisions of Vienna and warned her not to count on any help in any aggressive action; she alone would be responsible and the sole initiator in case of doing so.

While the foreign political happenings were rather turbulent, the internal politics largely under their influence - also became the scene of outstanding events. Political circles seemed to observe a cardinal change in the attitude of Minister President Bela Imredy following the first Viennese Arbitrage decision. He, who was considered as a liberal mercantilist leaning heavily toward the opinions of the Entente powers, seemed to bow before the greatness and power of the Third Reich. He exchanged some members of the Cabinet for such personalities who were in sympathy with the polices of Hitler, and thus he replaced the outstanding Minister of Foreign Affairs Kalman Kanya, who never was in the favor of Berlin, with Count Istvan Csaky. He also submitted the draft of a very strong Jewish law to the Houses of Parliament; and in one of the ministerial councils, proposals of a rather totalitarian nature were being made for a change of the Constitution. [Note: these were never acted upon].

These last facts came to the attention of the writer of these lines in the following manner. Late one evening, I was with a few friends of mine (I remember representatives Ferenc Krudy, Janos Szeder, Kalman Shvoy) in the party club of the Government Party and we were discussing the situation in one of the parlors, when suddenly the General Secretary of the Party, Bela Marton, rushed into the room and enthusiastically shouted while waving a bundle of papers in hand: "Gentlemen, Bela decided a change to the Constitution, the text of which is here in my band." He was a well-known sympathizer of the Germans and of German origin. We received this news with great consternation and after a few minutes of astounded silence we fired away with many questions at Marton who became suddenly rather secretive and finally departed. We immediately decided that we were going to do everything to make the plan impossible. To my knowledge it never came to discussion at all.

Very shortly after this, Vitez Gyorgy Bobory, one of the vice-presidents of the Lower House and a very good friend of mine, invited me to visit him in his Parliamentary chambers. I immediately went to see him and he received me with the following words: "Gabor, I have to tell you very disagreeable news. According to some documents given to me by Count Antal Sigray, a representative of the opposition party, Bela Imredy is of Jewish descent, and he asked me to publish those. What shall I do?" Bobory was a very honest and noble

minded gentleman through and through. It was not very difficult to persuade him that in such a case it was best to do nothing.

Sigray and his colleague, Representative Karoly Rassay [Rasch means German version of the name], however, also sent the documents to the Regent who in a very dramatic conversation asked Imredy to reveal the truth of this matter. Imredy could not make a definite denial and he submitted his abdication and gave the reasons for it in a speech delivered to the House of Representatives.

In connection with these domestic political events, I must mention a very important diplomatic step taken prior to the fall of Bela Imredy. Count Istvan Csaky, in his capacity as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, traveled to Berlin and there signed the Italian-German-Japanese "Anti-Comintern Pact." The Imredy Government had decided to take this important step and to create thus a favorable atmosphere for a decision to be made in the Ruthenian question and for its final settlement in Berlin.

On February 16, 1939, the Regent designated Count Pal Teleki to be Imredy's successor in the chair of the Hungarian Minister President. This decision was received with great pleasure and satisfaction everywhere in the country because his personality, his great knowledge and experience, and very valuable foreign connections and patriotism had earned him public respect, trust, and popularity. The English and French press received his nomination with great sympathy, whereas the German press manifested its usual mistrust, assumptions. and disagreeable attitude.

Teleki removed some rather extremist members of the Cabinet but kept Count Istvan Csaky in the chair of Minister of Foreign Affairs even though some people considered him a great sympathizer of the Germans.

These charges were without foundation. The writer of these lines knew the Minister of Foreign Affairs and his entire family. They were an ancient Transylvanian and Upper Hungarian (of the county of Szepes) clan which had given to the country over the centuries many outstanding personalities such as clergymen, soldiers, and administrators. Istvan Csaky was not a friend of the Germans but a Hungarian patriot who in a given situation sought German and Italian support only for the benefits it would bring to the solution and satisfaction of the Hungarian national problems, and this was the game of cards he played. He agreed quite definitely heart and soul with Teleki's idea to form a north-south block, that is to say, a Polish, Hungarian,. Yugoslav, Bulgarian, and Turkish defensive unit. consequently, he was also a follower of the foreign political concepts of Gyula Gombos.

On February 15 the Third Reich moved Into Bohemia and Moravia. These events preceded Teleki's entrance into the office of Minister President, made it possible for Teleki, once in the

office, to follow up immediately on the solution of the Ruthenian question, especially since Berlin and Rome bad communicated to him through their Berlin Ambassadors, both verbally and in diplomatic notes, that since Czechoslovakia had ceased to exist there was nothing to prevent Hungary from satisfying her aims.

It was clear to the Hungarian Government and also to the public that this favorable decision of Berlin was by no means a beautiful gesture towards Hungary, but it was rather a gesture against Poland where the population demanded that the Polish Army should occupy Ruthenian territories but which naturally would have led to disagreeable entanglements between Hungary and Rumania. On February 18 the Regent presided over a Crown Council which decided that the Honved Army Corps of Kassa should occupy within 48 hours the Ruthenian territory and ordered them to do such. The military moves which were started with approximately twenty-five thousand men went according to plan and were terminated in a few days after the annihilation and capture of the Czech units of General Prchala and the bands of the Ukrainian Szics Guardists.

The Hungarian and Polish soldiers shook friendly hands at the historical Hungarian-Polish frontier. The diplomatic circles abroad and the less informed circles in the country itself were rather surprised by the swiftness of the action taken in the settlement of the rather lengthy and drawn out negotiations of many months over the Carpatho-Ruthenian territory. But this swiftness was for good reasons. The competent Hungarian circles knew that the Czechs wanted to prevent the penetration of the Hungarian Army and that the Foreign Minister Csaky had protested such Czech intrigues in a note handed to Czech Ambassador to Budapest Kobn. Also known and threatening was that the Rumanians wanted to occupy some villages inhabited by Rumanians which were across the border and close to the city of Marmarossziget, and had concentrated troops at this sector.

The Slovaks, on the other hand, were afraid that the Hungarians would occupy some Slovakian territory also, and in order to reassure them, the Germans sent troops to the city of Eperjes [today the Slovakian Presov] which was inhabited mostly by Hungarians. Then finally there was another threat by the Ukrainian "Szics" Guardists who, under the leadership of Reverend Volosin, a priest, were organizing for armed resistance. The great speed and able tactics of the Kassa Army Corps, however, stopped all these developments in the making. Minister President Teleki immediately introduced self-government in Carpatho-Ruthenia and asked the Regent to nominate as governor administrator for the territory the outstanding, wise aristocrat with, great social understanding, Baron Zsigmond Perenyi.

The Perenyi family Is an old clan in the Ruthenian territory and centuries ago the fortress of Huszt was in their possession. It was very impressive to see the Ruthenians greet him when on his official travels; how they expressed their love and admiration towards him and how they kissed the seam of his robe in the old Slavic tradition.

The Hungarian public was very interested in the attitudes of other countries concerning the solution of the Ruthenian problem. The Germans were somewhat skeptical. The Italians were happy. Communications reaching us from England said that a high ranking official of the Foreign Office had talked to Ambassador Barcza briefly saying only the following: "It is better that the Hungarians are in Carpatho-Ukraine than the Germans." On the other hand, the Jugoslavs acknowledged the fact without any particular comments and only the Rumanians in Bucharest were rather loud in protesting it.

Before I go into details of the diplomatic activities conducted by the Hungarians in the following two years, it seems to be necessary to give a rough outline of the general international situation developing in Europe.

I. The Munich Conference and the success of the first Berlin decisions and the indecision and impotence of London and Paris boosted to no end the self consciousness of the Third Reich. There were two slogans which were made known concerning her plans for the future: "Sud-Ostraum," which promised the spreading of German political interest in east and south-east of Europe, and the "Grossraum-Wirtschaft" which meant to subjugate this south-eastern territory and bring it into the economic sphere of the Third Reich. These political and economic plans were further strengthened by the so-called "Stahlvertrag," or Steeltreaty, concluded in May 1939 between Berlin and Rome, which regulated the rather entangled South Tyrolean situation with its military and political sanctions, and gave a free band to the Third Reich to realize her great German dreams.

The same aims were served by a treaty concluded in August 1939 between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union, In Berlin and Moscow respectively, which comprised a series of commercial and mutual protection agreements.

The program of the Grossraum-Wirtschaft could be noted by the ever increasing pressure exercised by the Germans on the Hungarian, Rumanian, and Yugoslav production and consumption. The Sud-Ostraum political doctrines resulted in the introduction of terrorism and bloody intrigues in the Polish-German minority disputes and the dispute for the city of Danzig and the Danzig corridor. The writer of these lines often received in the mail, from both the German and Polish sides, Illustrated albums showing the above mentioned brutalities. Poland, who categorically trusted English and French guarantees, refused to accede to the German demands, but even then the armed actions were not far away.

On September 1, 1989 German Army units penetrated the Polish Frontier, and the Blitzkrieg was started. Two days later the French and the English declared war on the Third Reich, and the Second World War began. In the middle of September the Soviet Russian Army crossed Poland's eastern frontier, occupied the so-called Ukrainian (White Russian) territories and moved down to the Carpatho-Ukrainian-Hungarian border. Preceding the Polish military moves, German Army units occupied the Slovakian Republic to secure the strategic Vienna-Pozsony-Galanta-Zsolna-Rutka railroad line. And they also started a very active anti-Hungarian propaganda in Slovakia. The German Army which penetrated Holland and Belgium forced France onto her knees, and in June 1940 concluded an armistice with the French, which split the country into an occupied territory on one side and free territory on the other. In Vichy, the Petain Government was formed.

Hitler would have liked to conclude a treaty with the British but London refused all attempts and communication. On the seas and in the air and because of the unsuccessful Italian Greek war on the Balkans, the German-English power cha-shes were continued.

III. Although the Italians, who were drifting with increasing speed under the influence of the Third Reich, emphasized again and again their peaceful intentions through their refusal to participate in the German-Polish war, they did conduct friendly relations with Yugoslavia and Rumania following the wishes of the Germans. Nevertheless, in April 1939, they attacked Albania with a respectable air and ground force, and after a series of ever changing tactical moves, they occupied it. Victor Emmanuel, King of Italy, accepted the Albanian Crown. In December 1989, the Grand Council of the Fascist Party declared that it did not intend to participate in nor mingle in the German-French-English war. In spite of this, in June 1940, war was declared against France and England.

G. Baross: Hungary and Hitler