From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award

borderline north at points some 30-40 km from the existing line along the Hungarian inhabited belt. Under German pressure, Hungary had to sacrifice Pressburg and its immediate vicinity. Even a plebiscite was not allowed there by the German "allies". With the support of Ciano, the Magyars wanted to obtain some villages around Nyitra where the Hungarian district reached north of the city. The Slovaks thought that, they could keep Nyitra (pop. 21,000), the seat of an old Roman Catholic bishopric, through the intervention of the Vatican.(44) Esterhazy demanded for the Hungarian minority, which would remain in Slovakia after the arbitration, cultural and religious rights, guaranteed in an international treaty, and enforced by the Slovak autonomous government. He had a long and frustrating experience in the CSR for securing the minority rights guaranteed in the peace treaty of Saint-Germain, and disregarded by the Prague government.

Following the visit of Ribbentrop to Italy, Ciano was informed by the German ambassador in Rome that the German Foreign Minister had agreed to give Kassa, Ungvar and Munkacs to Hungary.(45) The Duce approved the strategy for the Vienna conference. With these preparations, Ciano was ready to defend once more in Vienna Hungarian interests based on the ethnic principle contrary to Ribbentrop's malevolent idea of using the conference as a vehicle to place the small nations in Central Europe under direct Gertnan control.

While the Axis governments formulated their positions, the two governments directly involved in the transfer of territory exchanged diplomatic notes. On October 28 Prague informed Budapest that it was ready to agree in advance with the decision of Germany and Italy, and proposed that within 24 hours the governments of Budapest and Prague would ask Germany and Italy to arbitrate their dispute.(46) The same day Chamberlain answered Horthy's letter of October 8, in which the British Prime Minister expressed his hope that the two interested governments would solve the problem by direct collaboration, and he offered his good offices if his assistance could be used for arriving at a solution.(47) The Budapest government asked the two powers for arbitration on October 29 and requested Prague to do likewise within 24 hours.(48) On the same day, Prague applied for the arbitration of Germany and Italy, and the following day replies of acceptance arrived in Budapest and Prague.(49) In those days, the Hungarian experts gave a detailed briefing to Ciano on the ethnic composition of the disputed zones. The Italian Foreign Minister could not promise in advance the securing of all demanded territories to Hungary but he was well informed of the existing situation, and was able to defend the Hungarian position against the Czecho-Slovak desires at Vienna. On October 31, Ciano had the opportunity to announce confidentially to the Hungarian ambassador in Rome, that Ribbentrop had given his consent to the retrocession of Kassa, Ungvar and Munkacs to Hungary.(50) All parties

involved in the process of arbitration were ready to travel to Vienna.

The First Vienna Arbitral Award

Belvedere Palace was the scene of the Elrst Vienna arbitration dealing with the first revision of the treaty of Trianon of 1920, concluded between Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and dictated by the Allied and Associated Powers after World War I. The choice of the site was appropriate to the importance of the event, and it also had a symbolic meaning. The palace originally belonged to Prince Eugene of Savoy, the great seventeenth century soldier and commander-in-chief, who reconquered Hungary after a century and a half of Turkish occupation. In 1938 the conference at Belvedere Palace was the first stage in the peaceful reconquest of the lost Hungarian territories to the successor states after World War I.

On November 1, Ciano and Ribbentrop had a preliminary meeting at which the German Foreign Minister tried once again to keep Munkacs in the CSR as an important administrative and economic centre of Ruthenia. The ethnic principle was again ignored by Ribbentrop. Goring denounced the Hungarians in the presence of Ciano as unreliable people who promoted common interests with the Western powers.(5l) At the end of September, the Germans demanded the recognition of ethnic settlements in Sudetenland at the drawing of the new border. On November 2, the two arbiters, Ciano and Ribbentrop, conferred again before they met the foreign ministers of Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia. Items discussed at the meeting and the working schedule are shown as follows:

The agenda for the Vienna conference on

November 2, 1938

9:30 Preliminary talks of Ciano and Ribbentrop.

12:15 Beginning of the arbitral conference with the inclusion of the

leaders of the Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak delegations to explain their standpoints.

14:00 End of the conference which was declared completed.

14:15 Lunch offered by Ribbentrop for all four delegations.

16:30 Final arbitration of Ciano and Ribbentrop in the presence of their close collaborators.

17:30 End of conference; the experts drafted the documents.

18:00 Acceptance of final draft; drawing of the map.

18:45 The Hungarian and Czecho-Slovak delegations arrived from their hotels to Belvedere Palace.

19:15 Announcement of the arbitration, signing of the minutes. Official statements.

19:45 The delegations left Belvedere Palace.(52)

The heads of the four delegations met.in a joint meeting at 12:15 when once again each had the opportunity to express their views on the delimination of the ethnographic border between the CSR and Hungary.

The complete list of delegations follows:

The German delegation: Goring, Minister President of Prussia; Ribbentrop, Woermann, Under-Secretary of State; Altenburg, Privy Councillor, Kondt, Councillor of Legation, Gaus, Department Head, Ambassadors Mackensen (Rome) and Erdmannsdorf (Budapest); Charge d'Affaires Hencke (Prague); Doernberg, Chief of Protocol; and Minister Schmidt, interpreter.

The Italian delegation: count Ciano, Ambassadors Attolico (Berlin), de Facendis (Prague) and Gicliucci Vinci (Budapest), Magistrati, Councillor of Legation.

The Hungarian delegation: Kanya, Teleki, Minister of Education, Csaky, Chief of Cabinet, Pataky, Secretary of State, Ambassadors Villani (Rome), and Sztojay (Berlin), Kuhl, Councillor of Legation. Sebestyen, Councillor, Szegedy-Maszak, Secretary of Legation, Ujpetery and Zilahy-Sebes, Draughtsmen.

The Czecho-Slovak delegation: Chvalkovsky, Krno, Political Director, Masarik, Chief of Cabinet, Tiso, Prime Minister of Slovakia, Volosin, Prime Minister of Ruthenia, Teplansky, Economics Minister of Slovakia, Durcansky, Minister of Interior of Slovakia, General Viest and several experts.(53)

Ribbentrop in his welcoming address to the heads of the respective delegations mentioned that Hungary and Czechoslovakia requested the arbitration of Germany and Italy for the delimitation of the border between their countries. Germany and Italy fulfilled this request, and their task was now to find the final border on an ethnic basis. Hungary and the CSR already had agreed on essential points but he deemed it advisable from their part to summarize their arguments to extend complete consideration. Ciano added that when the Berlin-Rome axis accepted the honouring role of arbitrators according to the wish of the governments of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, it was done with the aim of contributing to their efforts to rebuild Europe and to achieve peace.(54)

Kanya and Teleki defended the Hungarian proposal, the cities in question, including Pressburg (pop. 150,000) which in 1910 had a relative Hungarian majority. Chvalkovsky and Krno submitted a Czecho-Slovak report. Tiso and Volosin were not admitted to the negotiating table at Vienna. The Prague government repeated its earlier argument that there would remain more Slovaks in Hungary --including those who lived for centuries far from the border-zone in Southern Hungary--than Magyars in Slovakia if the Hungarian proposal were accepted. Teleki argued that the principle of reciprocity was not involved in the present problems but rather the future of the Hungarian population in the border-zone of the CSR adjacent to Hungary.(55) During lunch, offered by the German delegation, all members of the four delegations had opportunities for private con

versations. Karmasin, the leader of the German minority in Slovakia, was given a chance to ask Ciano and Ribbentrop to leave Pressburg and the German enclaves of the border area in Slovakia. The final arbitration took place between 16:30 and 18:00 hours in the Golden Chamber of the palace with the participation of Ciano, Ribbentrop and their close collaborators. The Italian Foreign Minister dominated the meeting due to his preparation and knowledge of the problem. He was able to trace the new borderline easily, with the exception of several disputed zones, fulfilling the desired Hungarian claims.(6 )Legal experts formulated the arbitral decision and the accompanying protocol.(57)

At the end of the first World War, the Western democracies did not request the opinion of the involved population when they delimitated the frontiers. Twenty years later the two dictatorships were willing to listen to the arguments of the involved nations regarding the correction of the borderline. In 1938 the Western democracies did not want to be involved in a diplomatic process of the peaceful revision of borders, preferring their own dictated peace treaties of 1918.

In Vienna Hungary received from her lost territory according to the ethnic settlements 12,700 km2 of land and 1,030,000 persons including: 830,000 Hungarians, 140,000 Slovaks, 20,000 Germans, 40,000 Ruthenians and others.(58) In 1938 the CSR gave up her districts populated by Germans, Poles and Hungarians, and contributed thereby to the easing of tensions. Its policy for twenty years was an eternal struggle to keep German, Polish and Hungarian territories. The positive aspect of the first Vienna arbitration for the CSR was that there were no obstacles for the republic to achieve good neighbourly relations with surrounding nations. The Little Entente fell apart in Vienna. Hungary repossessed its nationals who for two decades were not abandoned by the mother country. A cabinet post was created in the Hungarian government for the administration and smooth integration of the returned territory to the fatherland. Many Hungarians and Germans were left several kilometers north of the Slovak side of the border. They would have preferred to live in Hungary. Telegrams were sent to Hitler from Mecenzef (Nizny Medzer), Stosz (Stos) near Kassa, from Pozsonypuspoki (Biskupice nad Dunajom) and from other villages in the Csallokoz calling for adjustment of the border by the Mixed Commission in favour of Hungary.(59) Forty-seven villages from Verchovina, in Ruthenia, sent telegrams to Ciano and Ribbentrop after the Vienna decision demanding the annexation of their province to Hungary.(60)

The territory on the adjusted map had to be handed over, with unimpaired installations built there, to Hungary between November 5 and 10, the modalities of which were to be worked out by a joint Hungarian-Czecho-Slovak military commission. The reactions were different after the announcement of the outcome of the arbitration.(6l) Kanya expressed his satisfaction to Magistrati, an assistent to Ciano; many Hungarians were moved, Villani wept. The

Czecho-Slovak delegation was disappointed; Chvalkovsky told Ciano: "I shall have to resign tomorrow. No government could survive such a blow."(62) In Vienna Kanya thanked Esterhazy and Jaross for the generous work they did on behalf of the Hungarian minority in the CSR. Jaross put into words the thoughts and feelings of those who on the retrocessed territory were liberated from two decades of Czechoslovak occupation and unjust treatment, thanks to the relentless diplomatic efforts of the Hungarian government.(63) In Budapest Prime Minister Imredy, after receiving the news from Vienna, in his radio speech thanked the powers for taking on themselves the difficult and delicate task of arbitration. He emphasized that the conditions of peaceful coexistence had been created with the CSR, and outlined the historical significance of the day. The Hungarians were overjoyed wherever they lived. Tiso also made a radio speech after his return to Pressburg from Vienna. He said that everything that could be retained for Slovakia was to be attributed to the Munich agreement because without it Slovakia would have been divided among its neighbours. He encouraged the Slovaks on the territory to be handed over to Hungary to stay there, not to opt for Slovakia. The intelligentsia was especially encouraged to remain and not to leave the Slovaks without any leadership in Hungary.(64) The Hungarian government officially expressed its gratitude to the Italian and German governments for the solution of the border question and the award.(65)

The Polish government used again, to its advantage, the border dispute of the CSR as it had during the Sudeten German crisis. When the convocation of the Vienna conference became known through the news, Poland claimed from Slovakia the Polish-inhabited districts of Orava (Arva), Cadca (Csadca), the western part of the Javorina mountains and Zips (Szepes, Spis).(66) On October 31, an ultimatum was sent to Prague and Pressburg for the transfer of these territories to Poland.(67) The CSR accepted the Polish demand; the requested districts were placed under Polish control. The protocols of the transfer of territory were signed by the CSR and Poland in the Polish resort town of Zakopane on December 1, 1938.(68) The area in question covered 221 km2 with a population of 9,914. It is characteristic for the whole Polish--CSR territorial controversy that each country used the local population to their advantage in census statistics. They are called Gurals, and speak a local dialect which is close to both the Slovak and Polish; it is not a literary language. On March 21, 1938, Beck, the Foreign Minister of Poland, in his interview with a correspondent of the Daily Mail declared that within the CSR lived 250,000 Poles.(69) It was more than three times the actual number of the Polish nationals in all provinces under Czech control. The autonomist Slovaks were bitterly angry at the Poles for taking away from Slovakia the districts of Cadca, Javorina, Orava and Zips. The settlement of the Polish question was also part of the Munich agreement

Solemn Reception of the Hungarian Army on the Re-ceded Territory

Between November 5 and 10, 1938, Hungarian troops took possession of the former territory of the Hungarian kingdom awarded to Hungary in the first Vienna arbitration. The Regent, Horthy, and the Minister of Defence, Ratz, issued a general order to the army on November 4. They proclaimed that the home defence forces cross the Trianon border which had always been regarded in Hungary as temporary. One million of their brethren were waiting for them on the other side of the border. After two decades of grave sufferings, the Hungarian soldiers represented for them the fulfillment of their hopes. The land of Upper Hungary had many times been consecrated with the blood of the ancestors of the nation. The members of the armed forces had to enclose in their hearts all the inhabitants, Hungarians, Slovaks, Ruthenians and Germans, of the regained Hungarian soil. The Prince-Primate of Hungary, the Cardinal of Esztergom, with the consent of the conference of bishops, ordered the churches to toll the bells for half an hour from 10:00 A.M. on Saturday, November 5 when the troops started their solemn march into liberated Upper Hungary.(70)

On the northern side of the Trianon border, in the Hungarian populated belt of Southern Slovakia, the inhabitants were waiting joyfully for the arrival of the Hungarian forces. There were improvised public rallies organized for the reception of the Magyar army units. Triumphal arches were erected in many municipalities in a very short period of time between the departure of the evacuating Czecho-Slovak border police, and the arrival of the Hungarian soldiers. The reestablishment of the Hungarian state sovereignty went according to the arranged time-table worked out by joint military experts of both sides. In two cities, on November 6 in Komarom, and on November 12 in Kassa, joyous festivities took place on the occasion of the entry of the Regent, Admiral Horthy, on his famous white horse into the returned cities. According to Hungarian mythology, the pagan priest-magicians sacrificed white horses to obtain the favour of the Lord God of Hosts. In modern Hungarian history the white horse again became legendary when Admiral Horthy rode into Budapest in 1919 after the victory of his forces against the first Soviet republic on Magyar land.

The great enthusiasm with which the Regent was received at Komarom and Kassa could have persuaded the arbiters of Vienna that their decision was just. Both cities are sacred historical places to the Magyars. Komarom heroically resisted the troops of the Habsburg emperor-kings during the 1848-49 Hungarian fight for freedom; in the cathedral of Kassa are buried the remains of Prince Francis Rak6czi II, the 18th century leader of the fight for freedom against the oppression of the Habsburgs of Vienna. At Kassa the Regent with a gracious gesture greated the returned Slovaks, as equal partners, in their own language. It was greatly appreciated by the Slovak population present at the occasion. The cathedral of Kassa was

the scene of an emotional ceremony commemorating the peaceful revision of the border. Present were the two houses of the Hungarian Parliament, the government and accredited diplomats. Lord Rothermere, the owner of the Daily Mail, and the first open supporter of the Hungarian revisionist claims a decade prior to the Vienna arbitration, sent a telegram to the President of the Hungarian Revisionist League, Francis Herczeg, the well-known novelist, and expressed his sincere joy on the retrocession of the Magyar Upper Hungary to the homeland.(71) Lord Rothermere was also invited to the ceremony at Kassa, and was seated in the diplomatic gallery. The Regent and Prime Minister Imredy thanked Mussolini and Hitler; as Kanya did Ciano and Ribbentrop for their support of the Hungarian claims for redressing the wrongs of Trianon without bloodshed.

A Bill was introduced in Parliament which provided for the representation of the population returned to Hungary. This Bill recommended that the elected representatives who served in the Prague Parliament and became Hungarian citizens be invited by act of Parliament to become members of the Hungarian Parliament.(72) The deputies elected by the population living on the retroceded territory remained the representatives of their constituencies until the next elections. In contrast to this democratic solution, the newly created autonomist government of Slovakia introduced a one-party system. Elections were held in Slovakia for the only official ballot on December 18 which resulted in a 98% majority for the government. The Slovaks opted for a Fascist-type constitution. On December 31, the Slovak government ordered a census with an anti-Hungarian fury, followed by anti-Hungarian radio propaganda.(73)

In the series of border revisions affecting Hungary important changes occurred between 1938 and 1941. During that period Hungary partly regained the territories and population lost after World War I. In 1939, Ruthenia was retaken by armed intervention, and the desired Polish-Hungarian historic and amicable border was restored. In 1940, part of Transylvania inhabited mostly by Hungarians, was awarded to Hungary from Rumania by the second Vienna arbitration. In 1941, the Hungarian part of Southern Hungary, under Yugoslav occupation for 23 years, was reincorporated into Magyar sovereignty during the German-Yugoslav war. As an aftermath of World War II, the political map of Europe was drastically changed to the detriment of Hungary. Before touching upon this question, it is appropriate to examine the activities of the Czech master plotters in exile during the second World War, and the outcome of their intrigues concerning Hungary.

Footnotes

1. A muncheni egyezmeny... II, No. 514.

2. DBFP, III, Vol. 3, 159.

3. Macartney, History of Hungary, 287.

4. PMH., October 13, 1938.

5. Ibid., October 14, 1938.

6. A muncheni egyezmeny... II, No. 522.

7. ADAP, IV, 65.

8. Ciano, L'Europa verso la catastrofe, 162.

9. ADAP., IV, 72.

10. Ujsag, October 25, 1938.

11. ADAP., IV, 72, 78.

12. PMH., October 22, 1938.

13. Ciano's Diary, October 14, 1938.

14. Affari Esteri, No. 12332/PR/C, October 21, 1938.

15. Gazeta Polska, October 15, 1938.

16. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, Fascicolo Nr. 5778/1938.

17. Pesti Hirlap, November 6, 1938.

18. Affari Esteri, October 17, 1938.

19. A muncheni egyezmeny... II, No. 566.

20. Affari Esteri, October 22, 1938.

21. A muncheni egyezmeny... II, No. 548.

22. Ibid., No. 553.

23. Ibid., No. 558.

24. Batowski, H., Le voyage de Joseph Beck en Roumanie en

octobre 1938, 137.

25. A muncheni egyezmeny... II, No. 583.

26. Ibid., No. 544.

27. Suddivisione etnica della populazione delle citta sttentrionali nel

1910-1930, Affari Esteri, No. 489/1938, 4.

28. Affari Esteri, No. 166068/PR/C.

29. Gazeta Polska, October 26, 1938.

30. Affari Esteri, No. 3005/335.

31. Suddivisione etnica, Op., cit., 8.

32. Affari Esteri, No. 1602/126.

33. A muncheni egyezmeny... II, No. 577.

34. Ciano's Diary, October 22, 1938.

35. A muncheni egyezmeny... II, No. 578.

36. ADAP., IV, 99

37. A muncheni egyezmeny... II,No.585.

38.DBFP.,III,Vol.3,202-203.

39. A muncheni egyezmeny... II,No.588.

40. Affari Esteri, No. 5662, October 24,1938.

41. Ibid., No. 574/I.R., October 24,1938.

42. Ibid., No.5519, October 28,1938.

43. Ciano's Diary, October 28,1938.

44. Hoensch, J., Op., cit.,193.

45. Ciano's Diary, October 30,1938.

46. A muncheni egyezmeny... II, No. 602.

47. Ibid., No. 603.

48. Ibid., No. 604.

49. Ibid., No.612,61C,617.

50. Ibid., No. 615,618.

51. Ciano's Diary, November 2,1938.

52. PMH., November 4,1938.

53. Ibid., November 3,1938.

54. Ujsag, November 3,1938.

55. ADAP., IV, 99.

56. Ciano's Diary, November 2,1938.

57. A muncheni egyezmeny... II, No. 621,622.

58. Chaszar, E., Op., cit., 55.

59. Affari Esteri, No. 2860/312.

60. Pesti Hirlap, November 6,1938.

61. PMH., November 4,1938.

62. Ciano's Diary, November 2,1938.

63. Uj Magyarsag, November 3,1938.

64. PMH., November 4,1938.

65. A muncheni egyezmeny... II, No. 625.

66. ADAP., IV, 98.

67. Ibid., V, 94.

68. BDFP., II, 381.

69. Hyndrak, V., Polsko a Ceskoslouenska krize na podzim 1938,

Hist. Vojenstvi, Vol.8,1938,91.

70. Nemzeti Ujsag, November 5,1938.

71. Budapesti Hirlap, November 4,1938.

72. Magyar Nemzet, November 4,1938.

73. Kulpolitikai adatok az 1938. evro1, 46-47.

From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award