From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award

question.(99) After these interventions, Hitler refused the proposition to sign the guarantee of the CSR's borders without the participation of Poland, Hungary and Italy.(l00) The Polish government wanted to gain the support of Rumania and Yugoslavia for the revision of the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border by giving Hungary back Southern Slovakia. (101)

In Czechoslovakia the government lost its good judgment, martial law was proclaimed for three months, and letters for abroad had to be mailed unsealed. The parliamentary caucus of the United Hungarian Party held a meeting in Pressburg, and issued the following declaration: The Magyar ethnic group in Czechoslovakia has been living on the territory of this state for twenty years as a consequence of the enforcement of the peace treaty of SaintGermain-en-Laye but it never felt any doubts that it wanted its share in all rights which are due to all nations and nationals expressed in divine, human and moral laws. The Hungarian ethnic group for twenty years fulfilled its duties as one of the most disciplined nations of the republic, because it was convinced of the necessity of peace for healing the wounds caused by the World War. For twenty years the possessors of power in the state never took into consideration the interests of different ethnic groups, among them those of the Hungarians. With their legislative enactments, they served exclusively the idea of a Czech national state. It was an erroneous policy which created an international situation which became part of a European political concern and threat to world peace. The British mediation wanted to expand the conditions of the coexistence of the Central European nations on a new and secure basis. The Magyar ethnic group in the CtSR wanted to take the direction of its own future into its own hands, and obtain the right that was given in 1918 only to some nations, that is the right of selfdetermination.(l02)

On the same day, the Hungarian government instructed its ambassador in London that Hungary would have territorial demands if the Sudetenland were ceded to Germany.(l03) Warsaw, Rome and Paris also were notified of the Hungarian standpoint.(l04) This was done on the advice of Goring given to the Hungarian ambassador in Berlin. Furthermore, the necessity of demonstrations, provocation of incidents armed clashes, and strikes by the Hungarian population in the CSR, and the intensification of the press campaign abroad was counselled by the German government.(105) The British government finally notified the Hungarian government that it completely understood the interest of Hungary in the fate of the Magyar minority in the CSR, and the Hungarian point of view had been placed on record, and would receive consideration at the appropriate time.(l06) The same day the Hungarian ambassador in Prague delivered a note to the Foreign Ministry in which the Hungarian government demanded equal treatment for the Magyar minority in the CSR with the Sudeten Germans. It was made known in a memorandum in London by the

Polish ambassador that Poland requested similar solutions for the territories of the Polish and Hungarian minorities as granted to the Sudeten region.(l0)7 The Polish envoy emphasized the same thing in Germany, and added the necessity of a common border between Poland and Hungary by the annexation of Ruthenia to Hungary as defence measures against the spread of bolshevism.(l08) For the Sudeten German question a joint Anglo-French solution was recommended on September 19 to Prague. It contained the transfer of districts to Germany with absolute German majority without plebiscite, and international guarantee for the reduced fontiers of the CSR. Two days later the CSR complied with the Anglo-French demands. On September 23, at his second meetingw with Chamberlain, Hitler demanded more territories from the CSR by October 1, and handed a map to the British Prime Minister delimiting the territory to be occupied immediately, and the districts where holding of a plebiscite was required before November 25. Hitler also demanded self-determination for the Hungarian and Polish minorities. Total mobilization was the Czech reply, and the Hodia government resigned. The Parliamentary caucus of the United Hungarian Party sent a message to the Magyar population in the CSR through its newspapers that every grievance should be announced to the secretariat of the party for possible protection of the Magyar interests due to the difficult situation caused by the extraordinary measures taken by the government.(l09)

Benes once again addressed a radio message to the population in which he asked for the preservation of calm and national unity. He had plans for every possible emergency, and wanted to reach an agreement leading to a general reconciliation among the powers and between the CSR and her neighbours. If it is necessary, we fight, if it is necessary, we negotiate--he said.(ll0) He did not fight,and the Munich conference of the four Western European powers on September 29 drew a new borderline between Germany and Czechoslovakia by awarding the Sudeten German districts to Germany. The political position, the historical importance, and the humanistic principles of the CSR were not that powerful that other nations would be willing to defend them. For the Hungarian minority the declaration attached to the Munich agreement was of vital importance. (Appendix 9) The heads of governments of the four powers declared that the problems of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, if not settled within three months by agreement between the respective governments, would form the subject of another meeting of the heads of the governments of the four powers present in Munich.(lll) It made possible the revision of the border the Hungarians waited for twenty years.

From the Munich Conference to the Arbitral Award of Vienna

Three days before the Munich conference Krofta called the Hungarian ambassador to the Foreign Ministry, and read him a

declaration that the Czechoslovak government was ready to engage in friendly negotiations with the government of Hungary. He added that the Hungarian nationals in the CSR would be granted the same rights in the nationalities statute that had been worked out with the Sudeten Germans.(1l2) The French alliance did not function in the most crucial moment, and in-Geneva, Litvinov declared that the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of alliance of mutual aid lost its effect in consequence of the Czechoslovak acceptance of the Anglo-French ultimatum.l(l3) The new Prime Minister, General Syrovy, a former Czech legionnaire in Russia, was a willing tool of Moscow, and, with Benes, wanted to prevent the annexation of Sudetenland by Germany in the last moment at the cost of a European war. Soviet officers and bolshevik agitators arrived in Ungvar (Uzhorod) in Ruthenia. (114) The CSR had confidence in her fortifications and in her eastern ally which, indeed, did not intend to fight in her defence. The Czechoslovak defence plan was partially based on the border fortifications and on the army, which since September 23, had been fully mobilized. Its discipline became loose for many soldiers--even Czechs deserted to German territory in Austria.(1l5) The journal of the Association of Czechoslovak Army Officers, the Dustojnicke Listy, strongly attacked the Hodia government before its resignation for its stand on the minority question. The powerful army saw in it the weakening of the government's position.(1l6)

In Munich a new European balance of power was created. It took into consideration the right to self-determination of oppressed minorities. The League of Nations was not willing and was not able to apply the principle of self-determination. It did not initiate the peaceful change of the dictated borders after World War I. It is an irony of the human rights movement that the totalitarian dictatorships, the anti-democratic governments, forced the application of the ethnic principle in the redrawing of the Czech mosaic state frontiers. British and French statesmen were just assisting them in that process because of their military unpreparedness. Their attitude towards the minorities of the CSR was not sincere. Recognition must be given to the British and French delegations at Munich for adopting the arrangements moved by Mussolini for the solution of the demands of the Hungarian and Polish nationals in the CSR within three months by direct negotiations among the involved governments. On September 29, State Secretary Csaky was sent to Munich by Imredy as an observer. He was equipped with statistics and a letter of accreditation from Horthy to Mussolini requesting the inclusion of Hungary's territorial demands in the agreement.(ll7) In Munich there was the last chance to include the situation of the Hungarian minority in the CSR in an international treaty. Two days before the Munich conference, Dorothy Thomson, the famous American publicist in New York, supported the Polish and Hungarian claims for the territories inhabited by them in the CSR which needed similar treatment as the Sudeten Germans.(1l8)

After the Munich conference Poland did not wait for the willingness of Prague to meet her demands. Warsaw sent an ultimatum to Prague and demanded, in 14 hours, the transfer of Teschen to Poland by noon of October 2, and the evacuation of the Frysztat district in 10 days. The demand was granted on October 1, (ll9) and by October 4 the Polish inhabited districts in the CSR were occupied by Polish armed forces. Hungary did not imitate this course of action. She was waiting in a chivalrous manner, and hoping for the victory of justice and fair play, but soon had to learn with bitterness that in international politics justice did not count. Germany used threats in her demands for the acquisition of Sudetenland. Before the Munich conference the Hungarians were told by Berlin that they might be left out of the deal if they did not join an eventual military action against the CSR on the side of Germany.(120) After Munich Germany did not want to support an excessive strengthening of Hungary.(l21)

Imredy told the Italian ambassador in Budapest that Hitler wanted a war against the CSR for reasons of prestige; the Hungarian army was not ready to fight a war at that time.(122) After Munich when the Magyars needed Germany's pressure on the CSR, Goring told Daranyi, the former Prime Minister who visited Germany, that Germany had demobilized and could not offer any help to Hungary.(123) Germany, after the Munich conference, wanted to win over to her side Czechoslovakia, a former adversary, and changed her political strategy. Berlin was against such new frontiers which would include a common Polish-Hungarian border, presenting an obstacle in German expansion.(124) In October 1938 Hitler and Goring were ready to turn against the Hungarians.(l25) In Budapest the government evaluated the Munich agreement from the point of view of the Magyar demands for the rectification of the borderline between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The representatives of four powerful European states acknowledged the collapse of the Versailles system in Central Europe, and the failure of Czech imperialism. The Czechoslovak government was forced by external intervention to give up territories on which the population would not tolerate further brutal and extended political oppression disguised as democratic rule. Hungary wanted to obtain the same treatment for the Magyar nationals in the CSR as the Sudeten Germans and Poles received. She proved several times her willingness to achieve her goals by peaceful means. The Western European democracies obeyed only the demands of a militarily-strong Germany. The Magyar nationals in the CSR demanded only self-determination, simple ballots, not an award or arbitration from the more numerous armed nations of Europe. Hungary expected justice from the great democracies, but on the contrary, it was tossed into the arms of Fascist and Nazi governments. Hungary had to accept the support of the two totalitarian states, although she almost lost the active aid of Germany for not being willing to participate in a planned German war adventure against the CSR. After Munich, Germany did not

need Hungary's alliance against the common enemy, the Prague government, and what is even more strange, Berlin reproached Hungary for thinking of a safe, common border with Poland which was interpreted in Germany as a possible front against the Nazi government. Rendering justice and giving consent for the selfdetermination of the Magyars under Czech rule was expected in vain from the Western democracies or from the League of Nations which made only five decisions, out of 852 grievances brought before it, between 1929 and 1935.

Hungary had the support of Poland, for the rightful retrocession of the Magyar populated part of the former Upper Hungary. Mussolini supported the Hungarian claims for the reason of Italy's political and economic penetration in the Danubian basin. Stressing her case, the Hungarian government had to use, in addition to diplomacy for creation of tension, irregular bands on Czechoslovak territory to force action from the signatories of the Munich agreement for her territorial demands. The Czechoslovak army was still fully mobilized, and Budapest had to take similar countermeasures.

On October 1, 1938 a Hungarian note in Prague demanded the opening of the negotiations based on the Munich decision for the self-determination of the Magyar minority in the CSR.(126) The same day at 11:00 a.m. the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs notified the Hungarian ambassador in Prague that his government was ready to open negotiations to arrive at a friendly agreement concerning the Hungarian minority in the CSR.(127) The Hungarian government was urging Prague to initiate the negotiations, but Benes was still in office, and the old tactician once again talked of the nationalities statute and the extension of full citizenship rights to the Hungarian minority but not the granting of self-determination. The Magyar ethnic group wanted to rid itself of the Czechoslovak rule. As to the Slovaks, Hungary agreed to grant them the right for self-determination. The Slovaks themselves were undecided as to what course to take; they negotiated with the Czechs, Poles and Hungarians. Every political orientation had its followers in the small Slovak nation. Some of them would have remained in the CSR with an autonomy, others would have have joined Poland, and yet others would have returned to Hungary. In 1918 they were not satisfied with Hungary, in 1938 they were not satisfied with Czechoslovakia, and in 1945 they were not satisfied with Germany which helped them create a so-called independent Slovakia. The Slovak Populist Party at the end of September held two cards in hand; one playing with Prague, the other with Budapest. The Slovaks, in case of joining Hungary, stated their conditions as follows: administrative and executive power for Slovakia with the use of the Slovak as official language; legislative power for internal affais, education and judicial matters, their own budget. Hungary accepted those conditions and kept them secret to avoid possible persecution or assassination of the Slovak leaders by Prague.(l28) On

October 3, Hungary directed diplomatic efforts through Prague for making preparations for a settlement by asking for these steps: the release of the Hungarian political prisoners, the discharge of soldiers who were Hungarian nationals, the setting up of local detachments for the protection of life and property, the transfer of two or three cities in the frontier zone of Czechoslovakia as a symbolic gesture for further territorial concessions, and occupying them by Hungarian troops. Six communities were named for this purpose. The suggested date, time and place for commencing the negotiations was: October 6 at 4:00 p.m. at Komarom (Komarno).(129) The dangerous three-month time limit determined in Munich was successfully reduced by the Hungarian diplomacy to one month. Twenty years after Trianon, the graveyard prepared for Hungary was opened. A twenty-year period of Czech occupation of Upper Hungary could not serve as a legal basis for the possession of Magyar land if a thousand-year old common historical past could have been disregarded in the treaty of Trianon doomed to failure.

The City of Komarom, divided by the Danube river, was chosen as the scene for the bilateral negotiations. In Trianon, the city was cut in half. Its northern part was given to the CSR, the southern remained in Hungary. The headquarters of the Hungarian delegation were established on a steamer in the port of Komarom. The negotiations took place in the Hotel Central in the Czechoslovak part of the city. The radio stations in the CSR informed the population of the exchange of diplomatic notes, and of the granting of the same treatment to the Magyar minority as the Sudeten Germans had received. The Rumanian and Yugoslav governments were notified of the decision by Prague.(130)

Ciano informed the Hungarian ambassador in Rome that Hungary could count on one hundred Italian fighter planes to defend Budapest with the requisite pilots due to the proximity of the mobilized Czechoslovak army.(13l) The Italians were willing to support Hungary. In their evaluation a successful military action from the part of Hungary was impossible. The army was not sufficiently equipped, and there were two lines of fortifications on the Czechoslovak side of the border. One immediately close to the state border (3 km), and the second line extending from the Little Carpathian Mountains to Nagyszombat (Trnava), Nyitra, Leva, Losonc, Kassa.9l32)

Csaky, from the Foreign Ministry, went to Warsaw at the beginning of October to talk over the problem of the common border with Poland. The Poles developed very intensive diplomatic activity for the renewal of the traditionally friendly border with Hungary. The Polish ambassador in Berlin described Hungary as a stabilizing force in the Danubian basin.(133) The Germans became suspicious of the Polish-Hungarian cooperation, especially after the occupation of Polish Silesia by the CSR at the beginning of October. Ribbentrop noted to Ciano that the ambassadors of Britain, France and Italy in Warsaw should have prevented Poland

from sending an ultimatum to Prague and regulate the Polish problem in the CSR. Ciano said that many Poles were expelled from the CSR and 240,000 Germans were forced out by the Czechs before the Munich conference.(l34) The Germans themselves wanted to occupy parts of Silesia but the quick action of Warsaw prevented them from taking over the Polish population and the important railway centre of Oderberg (Bohumin).

Signs of easing the tension were shown by the decision of the police in Pressburg to return 15,000 radio receivers to their owners. The "enemies of the state" could not listen to the news from Budapest, Vienna, Berlin, Paris, London or Warsaw during the long political crisis in the CSR. The possession of a radio receiver by a "non-reliable" citizen in the opinion of the Czechoslovak authorities put the republic in danger. The political leadership in Prague also saw the necessity of solving the Slovak problem. The negotiating team of the Slovak Populist Party found the concessions offered by the Czechs unsatisfactory, therefore, the national executive council of the party was summoned for October 6 to Zilina (Zsolna, Sillein) to report on the results of the negotiations, and ask for further recommendations.(135) The Czechs, with Benes at the helm, were clinging to their position but the tactics for gaining time and creating a fait accompli did not always work. The Slovaks had to play a twenty-year waiting game for their autonomy until the nationality problem of the republic reached a decisive stage. The real obstacle of a peaceful internal political development, Benes, had finally disappeared from the political scene. In the evening hours of October 5, General Syrovy, the Prime Minister, fulfilled "the most difficult task of his life," and read on the radio, broadcasted by all Czechoslovak stations, the letter of President Benes, informing the government of his decision to resign and the reasons leading to his decision. The historical events forced Benes out of office. Defenestrations of politicians in Prague had occurred at different intervals: in the Hussite period, at the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, and after the Communist coup d'etat after World War II. Benes accomplished his own moral elimination. In 1938 he did not wait for his physical removal from the Hradsin. The obstructionist of the harmonious political development of the state, the founder of the dictatorial government gave up his office. Then the Slovaks, autonomists and former anti-autonomists, dared to formulate their common demands: a wide autonomy with their own government.

After his resignation, Benes stayed in the CSR for three weeks, and in the greatest secrecy escaped to London. He cautiously prepared his departure from Prague to London through Rumania. On October 22 two aircrafts arrived in Croydon from Rumania to camouflage the flight of the fugitive ex-President. The fear of Benes was exaggerated but characteristic of his lack of courage. The ambassador of the CSR, Jan Masaryk, had to extend his apologies to the British government for the late notification of the arrival of Benes after his

landing at the airport of London. The ambassador explained that Beneswas not able to see anyone immediately because he had been sick from his birth, and had always suffered from trouble of the tympanum.(l36) Perhaps it was a diplomatic sickness to cover the embarrassment caused by his escape.

The Slovaks before their meeting at Zilina demanded the recognition of the legal personality of the Slovak nation, the official use of the Slovak language, and a Slovak Diet with ample administrative and executive power, except in the functions of finance, defence and foreign affairs. After Zilina, the Slovaks formed their own government. At Zilina, three Slovak political parties met: the Slovak Populist Party, the Agrarians and the Slovak National Party. Even the Ruthenian representatives were invited to the negotiations.(l37) A delegation, consisting of Czechophile Slovak politicians, was sent there by the Czechoslovak government. The fusion between the autonomist and centralist parties deprived the Czechs of their support in Slovakia. The Slovaks introduced a one party system in their new autonomous province, released the Slovak political prisoners retained by the Czechs, and ordered the arrest of their political enemies. On the order of the new Slovak Prime Minister, Mgr. Tiso, during the night of October 22 in Pressburg alone, about 30 persons were taken into custody. In many communities there were anti-Jewish manifestations.(138) There were also in Prague anti-Semitic demonstrations in the streets and public places. The first autonomous Slovak government dissolved the masonic lodges. In Pressburg alone there were nine lodges: two Jewish, one Czechoslovak, two Slovak, two Hungarian and two German. The most valuable part of the lodges was a historical museum with documents for the relations with masons in other countries. The Slovak Populist (Hlinka) Party and the Hlinka Guard installed their offices in the occupied temples. (139) The Slovak politicians, after the resignation of Benes, were not afraid of their physical elimination or imprisonment: they then turned against their political opponents. On October 14, the presidents of the coalition parties in Prague had a meeting where Sidor represented the Slovak Populist Party. An agreement was reached in principle for the personal background of the candidates for the presidency of the republic. It was decided that the new president had to be a civilian, and in consideration for the Slovak Populist Party, should be Catholic. The new president of Czecho-Slovakia could not be a Socialist nor a mason.(l40)

The Czecho-Slovak government used delay tactics(l4l) in starting the intergovernmental negotiations with Hungary, but with Benes out of the picture, they agreed that their delegation would meet the representatives of the Hungarian government at Komarom on October 9 at 19:00.(142) Czecho-Slovakia was represented by Tiso, the newly formed autonomous Slovakia's Prime Minister, Durcansky, Slovakia's Minister of Interior, Parkanyi, Minister of Ruthenian Affairs in Prague (he did not go to Komarom), and Krno, a

diplomatic advisor.(l43) Members of the Hungarian delegation were: Kanya, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Teleki, Minister of Education, Pataky, Secretary of State, Pechy, Secretary of State and several experts. According to Ciano, it was a great mistake on the part of Hungary to negotiate with the Slovaks rather than with the Prague government.(144) Since the Munich conference, only ten days earlier, the political constellation changed to the detriment of the Hungarian claims. The sublime ideas of national self-determination evaporated, and political interests superseded them. Germany had plans for the domination of the rest of Czecho-Slovakia, and she became the defender of the diminished Bohemia. The Germans found an ally in the Slovaks who wanted their own state without Czechs. Hungary was not satisfied with those new developments, and the Regent asked the British Prime Minister in a personal letter for his assitance in those hours of great importance for Hungary.(145)

The mechanism for the inter-state meeting was set up, and seeing the German and Polish examples, a similar solution was expected in Hungarian circles on both sides of the international border. The convocation of the conference was a sign of hope among the Magyar nationals in the CSR. The legislators of the United Hungarian Party of the Prague Parliament and of the Provincial Diet of Slovakia at their meeting in Pressburg on October 7 decided to form a Hungarian National Council for the direction of the Magyars' fate in the CSR. This message was broadcasted the same evening along with the declarations of the Slovak Populist Party by Mach, and by Halprecht for the Germans lving in Ruthenia. On behalf of the United Hungarian Party Esterhazy expressed his thanks to the signatories of the Munich conference who embraced the cause of the Magyar nationals, and helped their liberation. He predicted that in several days the Magyar minority would be united with Hungary but calmness was required to ensure the smooth progress of negotiations. Both countries would have minorities, it was impossible to draw the border on the exact ethnic line. Even if there was a frontier line between the Slovaks and Magyars, the two nations should cooperate under the changed circumstances. When Jaross stepped to the microphone, one of the employees of the radio station wanted to prevent him from reading the proclamation of the Hungarian National Council. After the incident, Jaross read the resolution which asserted that the United Hungarian Party, already on September 17, asked for the right of self-detennination and plebiscite. Since then the events shook the foundation of the Czechoslovak republic. The annexation of German and Polish inhabited areas was in progress by Germany and Poland. The CSR had notified Hungary that it was villing to negotiate the fate of the Magyar populated territory. The Hungarian National Council demanded the immediate handing over of the territory in question to Hungary, the evacuation of that territory by the Czechoslovak army, the cessation of billeting of troops with Hungarians, and paying of indemnity for the damages caused by them, the transfer

of the control of administration to the United Hungarian Party, the restoration of the freedom of expression and assembly, and the free wearing of the Hungarian tricolour. The resolution was announced to the Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments, to Poland, and to the signatories of the Munich agreement.(146) The leaders of the Hungarian minority were too optimistic in their expectations because the retrocession of their territory to the fatherland was delayed for a month due to a new deal in store between Czechs and Germans on the one hand, and between Slovaks and Germans on the other. These factors were not present in the preMunich days, and hindered the smooth transfer of power of the claimed territory to Hungary.

From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award