From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award

The radicalization of the internal political situation in the CSR worried the British and French governments. Benes, in confusion and desperation, lost his good judgment, and one day before the communal elections one class of reservists and some special units were called to intimidate the population, although, in reality, the government was apprehensive of outbursts of violence. The mobilization was accompanied with an anti-German press campaign. Germany answered this with a political counterstroke. Deterring the population was not necessary, revolution was not in the making. The use of force in peacetime produced a reaction in the elections, and the opposition augmented its seats in the municipal councils and mayoralties. A sober solution in such an overcharged climate must have come from other responsible sources. In Berlin the British ambassador made efforts to moderate the German press. In Prague the French and British ambassadors urged Benes to come to a speedy and comprehensive settlement.(1) The idea of recommending a mediator appointed by the British government occurred to ambassador Newton in Prague. With such a step, Britain indicated her interest in the Czechoslovak problem, although Benes continued to avoid his advice and observations.(2) Capt. Plugge asked the Prime Minister in the British Parliament whether he would consider calling a conference dealing with longstanding grievances of the Hungarian minorities in the countries surrounding Hungary, with a view of removing the cause of unrest since Britain signed the peace treaty of Trianon. No conference was planned but the view was expressed that the Hungarian minority and the Hungarian government were resolved to negotiate and not to resort to force in arriving at a just settlement. The Hungarian minority endured misfortunes unparalleled in history, and time had come to correct the injustices of Trianon by legal and peaceful means.(3)

The Anschluss gave Germany a preponderating economic influence on Hungary, but Hungary's sympathies were directed towards England. In spite of Hungary's well-intentioned plan for rapprochement with Western Europe she was left in the German political orbit, abandoned diplomatically by the West.

The Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs had delivered a copy of the first plan of the nationalities statute to the British ambassador on 22 April, one month earlier than it was presented to the leaders of the autonomist parties. In his speech at Tabor, Bohemia, on 20 May, Beneb mentioned the preparation of a plan for a far-reaching solution of the minorities question based on the principle of equality among equals.(4) The government contemplated introducing certain changes but, according to the constitution--it was impossible to touch territorial integrity of the state. The following day a partial mobilization was ordered by those who were supposed to start negotiating in bona fide with the opposition. In such an atmosphere the Sudeten German Party refused to confer with the government unless its attitude showed an improvement.(5) The second Defence of the Republic Act 131/1936(6) included enactments against any kind of threat to the republic. Paragraph 138 of Section 7 described the creation of the highest state defence council with members of the government and the president. In exceptional circumstances this council could issue decrees with the consent of the president which in 14 days had to be presented to the Parliament. The law also included the punishments for offences against the law which gave dictatorial power to the government. Another law, 132/1936, dealt with the dissolution of political parties.(7) In July the British observers in Prague reported to London that there was a possibility of a military dictatorship in the tSR. They regarded it as a weakness of Benes' decline to accept an agreement with the Sudeten Germans in a false optimism regarding British and French support. There were reports of deliveries of Soviet aircrafts to the CSR. Benes of course, did not want to grant autonomy to any ethnic group. The Czech intransigence opened the way for Henlein and the Slovak nationalists to Hitler.(8) On July 6 ambassador Kennedy sent the following telegram from London to the Secretary of State in Washington "As to the Czechoslovak situation, the Czechs tell him they are making real concessions to the Sudeten, and the Germans tell him the Czechs are doing practically nothing. However, he is convinced that nothing is going to happen unless some unfriendly incident occurs such as the shooting of a couple of Germans or Czechs at the borders."(9)

The possibility of the services of a British mediator was mentioned to Benes and Hodia on July 1, if the need for them should arise.(l0) Benes was informed that in the event of a deadlock the only British course would be to intervene with the proposal for a plebiscite with the object of detaching portions of the Sudeten areas from the CSR on the German frontier.(ll) Benes was known in international diplomatic circles as follows: "He was the quickest and ablest

man in words and formulae but he was also a gambler without a real sense of responsibility."(l2) The Czech intransigence brought forth a Sudeten German patriotism. The British, given the Czech stubborness, did not lay idle and made preparations for the selection of a mediator should the Czechs and Sudeten Germans be interested in it. Lord Runciman accepted the role of an independent mediator if the above condition was met. He studied the problem, and on August 3, accompanied by Lady Runciman and his staff, arrived in Prague. At the railway station there was no official welcoming ceremony because the Lord did not go to Prague in an official capacity. The President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister sent their representatives; and two Sudeten German deputies, the mayor of Prague and the staff of the British embassy were present.(13) The Runciman mission was the central interest not only in the Czechoslovak capital but also in other European chancelleries. The first task of the mediator was to reach a peaceful solution of the Sudeten German problem backed by a government of 70 million people. The Hungarian minority could not line up such a strong assistance. Yet, the Hungarian government expressed its willingness to establish normal relations with the CSR and the other members of the Little Entente to secure an amelioration of the treatment of the Hungarian minorities. The efforts of the Hungarian foreign policy received a valuable recognition in the Journal de Geneve. It praised the policy-makers of Hungary who succeeded in maintaining a balance of flexibility in a wise and temperate conduct of foreign policy between Rome and Berlin. The Axis did not exercise an exclusive influence on Hungary, and this careful line gained the sympathy of Britain for Budapest.(14) The Hungarian question in the CSR was not among the priorities of the British delegation, because the relations between Czechs and Sudeten Germans caused more worries to the Czechs than those of the Magyars. The ideological direction of the Magyars was national and Christian. Both tendencies were on a collision course with the aims of the German government, and in spite of this, the question of the revision of the Hungarian borders without the support of Berlin would have been lost. The contacts with Italy were less dangerous because of geographic distance, and a less harmful possibility of the penetration of Fascist ideas in Hungary. As a result of the power politics, the Runciman mission occupied itself primarily with the Sudeten German question, although the Hungarian minority leaders were asking for the same concessions for their fellow countrymen as Lord Runciman was prepared to recommend in Prague for the Sudeten Germans. The Executive Committee of the United Hungarian Party, with nine deputies and five senators in the Prague Parliament, did their utmost to be received by Lord Runciman, and to be included in his schedule for discussing with him the demands of the Magyar population. The parliamentary caucus of the United Hungarian Party enclosed in its letter to the Lord a bilingual welcoming article published in the official paper of the party (See Appendix 7). They

desired to make sure that it reached the members of the British delegation.(l5) They did not know that the article, immediately after its publication, was read by all members of the British mission at their headquarters. In Prague, only the Pragai Magyar Hirlap had the courtesy to salute Lord Runciman with an article written in English. The delegation was emotionally touched by that gesture all the more because they received a silent and cool reception from the public in Prague.(l6)

There was feverish activity behind the scenes in government circles, including negotiations and meetings with recently discovered individuals among the various nationalities. The first day of Lord Runciman's stay in Prague was very busy with official visits to the President of the republic, to the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the afternoon they gave a social getacquainted reception to the negotiating team of the Sudeten German Party.(17) The British had to know the positions of the opposing parties before they started to negotiate with them. Yet, the key to the problem was in the hands of Hitler. The outcome of the mediation efforts depended on the political strategy of Germany. In the Sudeten German Party, several individuals had been found who seriously believed in an agreement with Prague, and did not want to become citizens of Nazi Germany. They, however, remained in the background. It was suspected that Hitler was not willing to accept any kind of solution in the Sudeten question until the Czechoslovak government renounced the treaty of alliance with France and the Swoviet Union. He demanded the change of the foreign policy of the CSR.(18) Under international pressure the government also initiated talks with the other nationalities. At the end of August, Hodza informed Esterhazy, and even a member of the Hungarian Parliament, George Apponyi, that as soon as the Sudeten Germans had received the outlines of an agreement, he would start negotiations with the United Hungarian Party.(l9) All the autonomists wanted to see Lord Runciman as soon as possible, and present him their plans for a just solution of their grievances. The Slovaks, the Poles, the Ruthenians decided to inform the Lord in detail of their situation.(20) Negotiations between the British delegation and the government constituted the main point of events. The government wanted to debate the issue initially on the basis of its plan, the nationalities statute, and later on some proposals. Negotiations with the British delegation were regarded confidential, and communiques were not published on the discussed topics. In reply to the Hungarian request, Lord Runciman received the representatives of the Hungarian minority for the first time on August 12. After the meeting the bureau of the British mission issued the following press release: "Friday at noon Lord Runciman received the delegation of the United Hungarian Party, Dr. Geza Szullo, Andor Jaross and Janos Esterhazy, and talked over with them certain questions included in the memorandum which earlier had been handed over to him."The first meeting with the British

delegation ended at 1:30 p.m. After lunch Szullo was invited for a coffee by Lord Runciman. Lady Runciman had known Szullo from international meetings of the League of Nations.(21) The minutes of this first meeting say that the United Hungarian Party received the Prime Minister's project in regard to reforms only about a fortnight before, but they were told that these were not final. Consequently, the party could not comment on the non-existing proposals. The well-known Hungarian complaints were discussed with the British mission: domination of Czech officials in the Hungarian districts and in their financial administration, excessive taxation, restriction of the use of the mother tongue in contacts with the courts and public administrative offices, and great difficulties in obtaining the citizenship papers, agricultural and industrial losses, requested compensations for damages suffered since the end of the war, lack of Hungarian administrators, Czech colonization in Hungarian districts, and the problem of education. Jaross added that the Czech majority formed a kind of dictatorship. It was impossible for the Hungarian minority to live forever in the CSR; but the party was prepared to accept a modus vivendi for the present.(22) In the same month, a congress of national minorities in the Swedish capital studied the preservation of ethnic culture and economic power.(23)

During the intervening time the British delegation was engaged in talks with Prime Minister Hodza and the Sudeten Germans, because the latter submitted an answer of 14 pages to the proposals of the government which according to informed circles were qualified as sharp and demanded the renewal of the Karlsbad points. The British mission had to withstand a test of their mediation efforts. It was expected that the Sudeten German Party would reject the conditions of the government. The unsettled question was the British attitude towards the possibility of a German invasion of the CSR if the Sudeten German demands were not granted. German troop concentrations along the Czechoslovak border could be regarded as an ill omen.(24)

The Hungarian opposition party was assured by deputy Frank that the Sudeten Germans would accept only such an agreement which would include the Hungarians, Slovaks and Poles.(25) The Budapest government observed the events with close attention. Prime Minister Imredy and Foreign Minister Kanya discussed the relations between Hungary and Czechoslovakia and the Little Entente at their visit in Rome on 18 July with Mussolini and Ciano. According to the Italian leaders, the territorial gains of Hungary were in the interest of Italy, and they promised an intervention in Yugoslavia to restrain her government from attacking Hungary in case of an armed conflict between Hungary and the CSR.(26) Hungarian diplomacy tried to divide the Little Entente by setting different conditions to the solution of the Hungarian minority problems in those three states. The Little Entente, at their conference held in Bled, Yugoslavia, recognized Hungary's right to rearmament, and declared the reciprocal renunciation of use of force

between Hungary and the three states in question.(27) Several questions remained in limbo mainly because of the Czechoslovak crisis and the rights of the Hungarian minority in the CSR. On 21 August, during the Bled conference, Horthy left for an official visit to Germany. He was accompanied by Prime Minster Bela Imredy and Foreign Minister Kalman Kanya. The Regent's wife christened in Kiel a new German cruiser the "Prinz Eugen." The trip of the Hungarian statesmen to Germany ended in a fiasco. During their stay in Germany, the communique from the meeting of the Council of the Little Entente was published simultaneously in Bled and Budapest, and its contents were discussed among Horthy, Hitler, Imredy, Kanya and Ribbentrop. The Germans were uneasy in the belief that Hungary was looking for an agreement with the Little Entente thus thwarting the German plans against the CSR. The Germans tried to persuade the Hungarian delegation to march into Slovakia when the German army entered Bohemia, and to cooperate with the German plans for the liquidation of Czechoslovakia. But the Hungarians refused to consider military cooperation emphasizing the weakness of the Hungarian army, and they did not want to fight simultaneously on three fronts. The rearmament of the Hungarian army had just started. Hungary wanted a peaceful revision of the Trianon borders. The news from Bled caused disappointment in Germany. Not only Hungary's right to rearmament was recognized by the Little Entente but also certain concessions to the Hungarian minorities in the three allied countries were promised. Hungary formally declined to deploy forces against the Little Entente. This did not mean that Hungary gave up her claim to the revision of her common borders with the neighbours. Hungary was not willing to participate in a military adventure with Germany against the CSR, and therefore two months later she lost Germany's support for the reposses6ion of territories from the CSR. It was the comment in Prague after the Little Entente conference that Hungary had shown political independence from Germany at Bled.(28) In August 1938 Hitler was willing to give Slovakia to Hungary as a reward for a joint armed attack on the CSR.(29) The result of the state visit in Germany was the loss of German support, and an objective German evaluation of the border problem between the CSR and Hungary. In Prague, on 24 August, Lord Runciman requested a written reply from Esterhazy concerning the views of the United Hungarian Party on the Bled agreement.(30) The relations between Hungary and the CSR developed more slowly than with the other two neighbouring countries. A possible revision of the borders was rebuffed by the Czechoslovak government.(3l) Lord Runciman's negotiations with the Sudeten German Party reached a deadlock. On 18 August, Benes decided to take over the direction of the dealings with the Sudeten Germans.(32) He did not agree with the line Hodza was pursuing. Benes was working on a thid plan for the nationalities. Henlein had a long conversation with Lord Runciman on August 18,

regarding the political and economic situation of the Sudeten Germans. They had to be defended against the formidable government sponsored Czech invasion of the Sudeten areas. The only remedy was the separation of the Czechs and Germans. Henlein wanted to achieve this by a negotiated settlement or through a plebiscite. He said, he was for peace and was determined to hold back his people in spite of Czech provocations. He was not absolutely committed to his terms pronounced in Karlsbad. Those terms were vague to allow room for compromise so that the frontiers of the republic would not be broken up. He was concerned with the high unemployment rate of the Sudeten population.(33) On 16 August, the riots in the industrial town of Brux demonstrated the tension which could erupt during a riot. The police gave permission to the Sudeten German Party to hold a rally on the installation day of the new mayor. Brux had a population of 30,000, two thirds of them German, the remainder Czech. About 5,000 Germans took part in the parade, and they were halted by about 1,200 Czechs on the market place. These were no shots fired, but a great deal of fighting and stone throwing took place resulting in 32 injuries on the same day, and 12 on the following day. The Sudeten Germans accused the police of complicity with their opponents.(34) A few weeks later, a more serious incident led to the breaking off of negotiations between the government and the Sudeten German Party.

This very difficult political situation was looming in the background when Lord Runciman received for the second time deputies Esterhazy and Jaross who on 25 August, had first informed him of the Hungarian grievances and desires. The allocation of government posts in the Hungarian districts depended on political considerations; the Czechs used the Hungarian activists, and Hungarian language newspapers they published against the interests of the majority of the Magyar population. The Hungarian nationals desired to control their schools and wanted a redistribution of land. The appointment of teaching personnel was decided on three levels. University professors were appointed by the Minister of Education in Prague, high school teachers and principals by the provincial offices of education, and elementary school teachers by the local boards. There was no Hungarian language university in the CSR, and even the chair of Hungarian literature was occupied in Prague and Pressburg by a non-Hungarian professor. The deputies admitted that the knowledge of Slovak was desirable but did not agree that Hungarian should be taught in Slovak. The Hungarian minority was also ready to accept that the ministries of foreign affairs, defence and finance should be left under the control of the central government.(35)

In London the Foreign Office informed the Polish ambassador that Lord Runciman made arrangements to receive the representatives of the Polish minority on 25 August. The Polish government informed London that it did not wish Lord Runciman to act as a mediator but rather to secure the equal treatment of the Polish

minority with the Sudeten Germans in any eventual settlement. Assurances were given that this assertion would be brought to Lord Runciaman's careful consideration.(36) The political situation and the claims of the Polish minority were presented on 25 August at 11:00 a.m. by deputy Wolf. They were similar to those of the other nationalities. The Poles wanted to settle the problem of their minority in the CSR in lines similar to the Sudeten Germans but independently of Hitler.(37) After the failure of the mission of Lord Runciman, the Polish government considered the demand of the border revision with the CSR under the provision of Article XIX of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Poland was even determined to take the territories inhabited by the Polish speaking population from the CSR by force.(38)

The British mission kept London informed of the proceedings in Prague, and one of their members was sent there to the meeting of the Council of Ministers. He informed Chamberlain of the attempt of Lord Runciman to work out a plan, and influence Hitler for moderation in order to break the deadlock of the Prague negotiations(39) The third Czechoslovak plan recommended the restoration of the county system which existed in the CSR before 1927 in lieu of a centralized government(40)

The powerful silent partner in the negotiations with the Sudeten Germans was the government of Germany. Berlin had been kept informed by Henlein of the course of developments. Lord Runciman wanted to assist both sides in reaching an agreement; therefore, he asked Henlein to convey the message to Hitler that he would like to bring the Czechs and Sudeten Germans together on the basis of the Karlsbad points, and the proposals of the Prague government. He was anxious to get Hitler's approval for that direction of the negotiations. On September 1 and 2 Henlein talked to Hitler and Ribbentrop. No clear-cut answer was given to this plan, and Henlein had two alternatives: negotiate for an autonomy within the CSR or ask for a plebiscite. During Henlein's visit in Germany, the representatives of the Sudeten German Party described to Lord Runciman their unsatisfactory conversation with Benes. The President did not go far enough on the points discussed. Hitler sent a note to several European governments assuring them of his peaceful intentions; but if the settlement of the Sudeten question should be delayed for a long time, he could not do otherwise but give them aid with all possible means. There was increased diplomatic activity in connection with the Sudeten problem, and the committee of the coalition parties in Prague dealt with the solution of the nationality question of the republic.(4l) Europe was expecting concessions from Benes to alleviate the tense international situation and the serious internal conflict. There were no signs of change in the twenty-year old Czech obstinance, therefore, Britain decided to negotiate directly with Germany on the Sudeten German question which from then on was tightly connected with the events that took place in London and Berlin.

From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award