From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award

In 1938 the Czechoslovak question once more became an international problem as it had been in 1918 and 1919, when the Czech political emigrants from Austria-Hungary insisted on making it an international affair. The political troubles of the Czechs in the nascent republic were created first of all by the "sister" nation, and a ruling partner nation, the Slovaks. The Slovak politicians who gathered on 30 October, 1918 in T. Sv. Martin (Turocszentmarton), and signed the declaration of adhesion to a common state with the Czechs, did not know of the declaration of the Czecho-Slovak republic two days earlier in Prague. The Czech and Slovak political activists made an undesirable governmental organization for their people without sounding their opinions through a vote. It was an alliance without any semblance of consideration for the common good of both nations, not to speak of the other national minorities forced into that state. The Czechs could refer to the lands of the Crown of Saint Wenceslas in their quest for an independent state, however, the Slovaks lacked such a historical experience, and were ready to share political power with the Czechs. Once occupied by the Czech army units, the Slovaks were split in their political choice between Prague and Budapest. A small minority of them were willing to co-operate with the centralist Czech government in Prague, but the majority were the followers of the clerical Slovak Populist Party, led by Reverend Hlinka. This party was the rallying point of the autonomist anti-Czech Catholic Slovaks, comprising about 80% of their nation. When the Czecho- phile plenipotentiary minister for Slovakia, Srobar, was not able to fulfill the aspirations of the Slovak clergy, and appoint some of its anxious and impatient members to higher ecclesiastical offices by removing the Hungarian bishops from the territory which then became Slovakia, those priest-politicians turned against Srobar and the Czecho-Slovak regime he represented. It was an ideological as well as a political power struggle for influence in Slovakia.(l) Hlinka

became the focal point of the Slovak separatists. The clericals were furious, and their anger was transferred against the Czech freethinkers, freemasons,

Hussites, Czech Brethren and Czech sympathizers among the Slovaks. In the political arena, they left the T. Sv. Martin platform, and promoted a movement for the autonomy of Slovakia. A group of Slovak Catholic priests met at Rosenberg (Rozsahegy, Ruzomberok), the hometown of Hlinka's parish: the outcome of the meeting was the convocation of the convention for formation of the Slovak Populist Party on 18 December, 1918.(2) There was another anti-Czech movement which on 30 October, 1918 formed a Slovak National Council at Eperjes (Presov) in Eastern Slovakia, former Upper Hungary, and on 11 December it declared the independence of Slovakia at Kassa.(3)

A third group, the radically anti-Czech Slovaks were forced into exile. They organized a Slovak revolutionary government at Cracow on 26 May, 1921 under the presidency of Francis Jehlicka and Francis Unger as Minister of Foreign Affairs.(4) The head- quarters of the Slovak Council in exile were established in Geneva, conveniently located for presenting the grievances of the Slovaks in the CSR to the League of Nations. In their memoranda, they demanded the annulment of the Pittsburgh agreement, and enumerated the causes of the Slovak dissatisfaction with the Czech government in Prague: the Czech immigration to Slovakia, employment of Czech civil servants, teachers, professors with salary bonuses in Slovakia. The revision of the treaty of Trianon was, according to them, not only an imperative, but the Slovak demands on the day of the revision presented to the Czechs would amount to 20 billion British pounds sterling, the approximate sum of the Czech loot taken away from Slovakia in the first 15 years of the republic.(5) This council was very active between the two World Wars and known for its anti-Czech and pro-Magyar stand. It is worthwhile to mention that the Plenipotentiary Minister for Slovakia in 1921 disbanded that Slovak National Council which in 1918 signed the declaration in favour of the CSR.

The Slovak Populist Party was fighting on the home front the Czechoslovak government and demanded the federalization of the republic. Jehlicka, the leader of the Slovaks in exile, in 1921, went to the United States of America. In his presence the functionaries of several Slovak associations from New York State and Pennsyl- vania accepted a resolution which declared the Pittsburgh agreement with Masaryk null and void and demanded indepen- dence for Slovakia.(6) At home the Slovaks based their demands for autonomy on the Pittsburgh agreement. Bills were introduced in the Prague Parliament for self-government in 1922 and 1930. Deputy Vojtech Tuka, in 1922, asked Prague to fulfill the promise in the Pittsburgh agreement and lead a satisfactory cultural and economic policy towards Slovakia.(7) The bills for Slovak autonomy were voted down in the Prague Parliament. In this seemingly endless conflict

the Czechs changed tactics by taking some of the autonomist Slovaks and Sudeten German activists in the central government. The Slovaks were bought off for the establishment of a Slovak provincial Diet. This new approach worked for a while, and the Slovak Populist Party was represented in the government with two portfolios for two years, 1927-1929, and the German activists-- Social Democrats, Agrarians, Christian Socialists--from 1926 to 1938, each with one cabinet member. The Slovak Populist Party left the government coalition after the trial which saw the sentencing of one of their deputies to a 15-year prison term for treason. After publishing an article in the Slovak on 1 January, 1928, entitled "Vacuum Juris", Tuka's parliamentary immunity was lifted, and he was put on trial. At the meeting in T. Sv. Martin (Turocszent- marton) of the Slovak politicians on 30 October, 1918, a motion was presented which was discussed but not formally moved, se- conded and voted upon. For ten years Tuka wanted to experiment with the proposed political union in the Pittsburgh agreement with the Czechs in the envisaged common state. The T. Sv. Martin declaration was the cornerstone of the state.(8) In Tuka's opinion the Slovaks had the right to decide, after ten years of partnership with the Czechs, on the desirability of such a political association; therefore, he called the situation arriving on 30 October, 1928 "vacuum juris', a legal status in which the Czechoslovak republic had no longer any legal force over the Slovaks, who would be free to choose their political future. The Czech political, military, judicial, and police apparatus gave a heavy blow to the Slovak jurist for expressing his personal opinion and the aspirations of his nation. With his prison sentence, the Slovak separatists were silenced for ten years.

The Prague government surrounded itself with legislation against the non-obedient minorities with the Law for the Defence of the Republic introduced in 1923 and extended in 1933; also in 1923, laws were passed for censorship, and suspension or suppression of periodicals judged dangerous for the state and, likewise, laws were accepted for the dissolution of political parties dangerous for the government. It is interesting to note that the following quotation appeared in the restored Czechoslovakia after 1945: "In the second half of 1923 there was the first attempt made at the transition to a Fascist dictatorship. A new press law was promulgated which had to prosecute all publications hostile to the government. Furthermore, the offices of Masaryk's republic, which boasted itself as democra- tic, suppressed 38 periodicals, among them the Rude Pravo (Communist), for six months." (9) Among the newspapers repeatedly suspended from three to six months were the Slovak (Slovak populist), Narodnie Noviny (Slovak Nationalist) and the Pragai Magyar Hirlap (Hungarian Opposition).(l0) In addition to these laws, the government' s main support was the army against the hostile nationality bloc which formed the majority of the population. Pragued used a strong hand

policy coupled with intimidation. These

measures did not help to consolidate the fragile state. On the contrary, it brought the Slovaks closer to the oppressed and dissatisfied minorities whose cooperation broke the Czech hege- mony causing the collapse of the republic.

The Slovak Populist Party kept the pressure on the Czechs. In 1933, an opportune occasion arose for anti-government demonstra- tions when, at Nitra, the 1,1OOth anniversary of the consecration of the first Christian church built by Prince Pribina was celebrated in the presence of the representatives of the Prague government, foreign and church dignitaries and an immense crowd.(ll) The autonomists received a wide publicity from this affair. The Slovaks went forward with their movement, and sought political coopera- tion with those parties which stood for the autonomy of Slovakia. This strong Catholic manifestation was directed against the Czechs, who, on 6 July, 1925, had demonstrated against Catholicism in Pra- gue at the unveiling ceremony of the statue of John Huss, an early reformer, in the presence of the government, at which time the papal nuncio had been deeply insulted and had departed for Rome.(l2)

The Sudeten German Question

In April 1920, the appointed Czechoslovak provisional National Assembly was dissolved upon completion of the constitution, and the first parliamentary elections in the CSR took place on 18 May for the Chamber of Representatives, and a week later for the Senate. The Sudeten Germans sent five parties to the elections obtaining the following results: Social Democrats 31 deputies, the National Party and the National Socialist Workers' Party 15 deputies, Agrarians 11 deputies, Christian Socialists 10 deputies and the Democrats 5 deputies. Out of 281 deputies there were 72 Sudeten Germans elected, and of 142 senators, 37 belonged to the Sudeten German parties.(l3) When the Chamber of Representatives met the first time on 1 June, 1920, the German deputies declared that Czechoslovakia was created against their will, and they did not renounce the right of self- determination.(l4) Similar statements were made by the deputies of the Slovak Populist Party and the Hungarian opposition parties. Deputy Lajos Kormendy-Ekes stated in the Chamber of Represen- tatives on 2 June, 1920,--two days before the signature of the Trianon peace treaty--that the Magyars in the CSR were detached from Hungary against their will.(l5) The declarations signed by the deputies and senators of the Sudeten German parties included also the Social Democrats. They rejected the peace treaty of Saint- Germain which stated that the Germans of Bohemia, Moravia, Silesia and Slovakia wanted to unite themselves with the Czechs to establish the Czechoslovak republic. The CSR was, therefore, the outcome of a Czech decision. The Sudeten Germans never had been consulted and the result of the peace treaty can be regarded as an enforcement which never had been legally authorized. Injustice cannot become a law even by a thousand-year practice. The Sudeten

Germans demanded with all their power self-determination for themselves. This declaration was renewed on 18 December, 1925 on behalf of the German parties by Franz Spina, deputy of the Sudeten German Agrarians and Vice-President of the Chamber of Repre- sentatives in Prague, who protested against the violation of the right of self-determination of the German population in the CSR. He declared again that the Sudeten Germans did not recognize the peace treaties of Versailles, Saint-Germain and Trianon as a source of law. The seven-year existence of the CSR with its sytem of government was intolerable for the incorporated people. He further enumerated the grievances of the Sudeten Germans: the import of Czech public employees, enterprises, workers, business and agricultural colonists on the German speaking population. Parallel with these actions, the Sudeten Germans lost their employment. The government closed German schools, unnecessarily establishing Czech ones; through land reform it confiscated the land from the German proprietors and helped denationalize the German area by Czech newcomers. The state should be developed according to the requirements of the citizens. The Sudeten German deputies were determined to defend the free development of their constituents and eliminate the Czech ruling system.(l6) In the meantime, in 1922, the German Social Democrats addressed a memorandum to the Congress of the Socialist Workers International held at Hamburg. It criticized the Czechoslovak government which ruled in a dictato- rial way since the foundation of the republic: political meetings were dissolved, free associations inhibited and newspapers were seized. Politicians of the opposition parties were put on trial for high treason, there were no elections called in East Silesia and Ruthenia, military executions kept whole areas oppressed, citizens were shot down in the streets, all this on the pretext of the national state and its constitution.(17) After the 1925 elections the Sudeten German policy had partially changed. There were signs of differences in opinion regarding internal politics. After the second elections in the republic, the Sudeten German Agrarians and Christian Socialists, and later the Social Democrats, were ready for political cooperation with the Prague government by forming a coalition government with the Czech parties in order to gain some economic and social advantages. These three Sudeten German parties took an active part in the government between 1926 and 1938 each of them with one portfolio. On 14 October, 1926, Prime Minister Svehla had a his- toric meeting with German deputies and decided to open new relations with them in domestic policies as equals to equals in spite of the existing and known difficulties.(18) However, there were no changes in the internal policy of the Czechoslovak government vis- a-vis the national minorities due to this temporary oooperation between the Czech

and German parties. On 7 October, 1933, the Prague government dissolved the Sudeten German National Socialist Workers, Party as a dangerous political association for the state. The abolition of the party took place within 24 hours after the

decision taken by the govemment, and the activity of the local, district, county and national organizations ceased to exist in order to maintain the unity and inviolability of the state against anarchy, disintegration and revolutionary movement.(19) Extraordinary times demanded this from the government--said the official explana- tion. (20) The German National Party was also suppressed. The economic situation of the Sudetenland was extremely bad. Hundreds of thousands were without jobs and starving as a result of the Czech economic policy toward the Sudeten German industry. A few days before the elimination of the two German opposition parties, on 1 October, 1933 Konrad Henlein made a patriotic appeal to the Sudeten German population and announced the formation of the Sudeten German Homeland Front with a program for the protection of the cultural and economic interests of the Germans in the framework of a friendly cooperation with the other peoples of the state.(2l) Henlein's movement united the Sudeten Germans. Six weeks prior to the May 19 elections in 1935, it took the name: Sudeten German Party. Upon his call, the dispersed Germans living in Slovakia formed the Carpatho-German Party, a united body for the defence of their interests.

Henlein displayed a great deal of courage when he entered politics in the camouflaged democracy of the Czechs. He was aware of the Defence of the Republic Act of 1923 which stipulated strict punishments for acts, speeches, articles and pictures used against the republic or its representatives; acts or threats against the ministers, deputies of the Parliament or its committees. For the intimidation of the* political opponents, the authors of this law put into it 306 possible punishments. Furthermore, the adherents of the regime, the army was assured of 25No of the budget.

The Czechs created around themselves a false feeling of security with the adoption of these measures. Paragraph 1 of the Defence of the Republic Act lays down that a person who attempts forcibly to incorporate or detach a portion of the Czechoslovak republic in a foreign state is punishable by 5 to 20 years or life imprisonment.(22) In addition to the Defence of the Republic Act, on 13 May, 1936 Act No. 131/1936 said that unreliable workers, managers and directors must be dismissed.(23) Measures were taken to defend the state against any attack on its sovereignty, independence, integrity, constitutional unity, democratic republican structure and security. The Supreme Defence Council even in peacetime had wide powers. Frontier zones were established under military authority.(24) The Czech democracy slowly was turned into a dictatorship. The Defence of the Republic Act of 30 April, 1937 made Benes a dictator in practice.(25) After his fall in 1938, Benes denounced everybody who was not of the same opinion as he. (26)

The unsolved minority problem arose the interest of the British government. Their ambassador in Prague sent a report to London on 3 March, 1934 regarding the minorities question. He called the republic an unnatural creation. The distance between Prague and

London was less than between Prague and Ruthenia, and the republic with its awkward borders and a strong neighbour was in a difficult position. On the border strip of the state an unloyal population--rightly or wrongly--wished the disappearance of the state at the first opportunity. Only a rational internal political compromise with the minorities could solve the tension. A promise for the correct handling of the minorities was the basis for the creation of the republic. The ruling Czech group was not capable of fulfilling it. Remedy could come only from outside. The status quo of the CSR could certainly not be maintained any longer.(27) After the May elections in 1935 the Sudeten German parties had the following representation in the Prague Parliament: Sudeten German Party (Henlein) 44, Social Democrats 11, Christian Socialists 6, Agrarians 5.(28) The Sudeten German Party received 66% of the German votes and two weeks after the elections the German Christian Socialists and Agrarians joined the SGP. The Sudeten Germans with 55 deputies became the strongest party of the Czechoslovak Parlia- ment. In 1938 only the German Social Democratic Party did not join the United Sudeten German front for ideological reasons but it also gave up its participation in the government coalition. National self conscience was growing and in this political process of transforma- tion among the Sudeten Germans the smaller parties disappeared. The Germans in the CSR did not want to become traitors of their national cause by splitting their political forces and they rushed to Henlein's party which closed the membership applications on 31 May, 1938.29 In 1933, Henlein formed his Heimatfront (Homelandfront). He was for democracy but the party under the influence of events became more and more radicalized. The British govern ment made contacts with the Sudeten German Party, and three months after the landslide victory in the 1935 elections, Henlein was invited to London by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. In his speech given to the members of the Institute, the Sudeten German leader emphasized that the German minority in the CSR demanded only their rights and they were for the democratic constitution of the state but those rights assured in the constitution were not granted. This was the reason for his movement. It had nothing to do with Hitler's aim to unite, in one state all Germans living around and outside Germany. He never saw Hitler, nor did he speak with him, nor had he any correspondence with him, and further, he never had contact with the German government of the day. According to Henlein, the territorial revision was not a solution to the problems. Pan-Germanism was as dangerous as pan-Slavism. The Sudeten Germans were loyal to the state and were ready for cooperation with the government as long as the German population was to receive a better treatment. His aim was to stop radicalism and promote the peaceful development of the German population.(30)

Soon after the Parliamentarv elections in 1935, Henlein began his foreign travels. In that month he went to Switzerland to vacation

for health reasons. In Geneva he had an excellent opportunity to meet several representatives of foreign governments accredited to the League of Nations.(3l) At the end of 1935 the Sudeten German Party started a compaign in Western Europe against the foreign policy of the CSR. In Paris they attacked the Soviet influence in the CSR and the 36 air bases built around Prague and other points for the operations of the Soviet air force against Europe. The most significant action of the Sudeten German Party abroad was the establishment of contacts with British and French political circles. Henlein, during his 1936 visit in London and subsequent travels there, informed the British government of the real situation and complaints of the Sudeten Germans in the CSR. In his interviews he always declared his loyalty to the state and his desire for securing equal rights for his people in the republic.(32) The Czechs replied to this with their remarks that the road to Prague from Sudetenland does not lead through Paris, London or Berlin. One may add to this that during World War I, the road from Prague did not lead directly to Vienna through Paris, London, Washington or Moscow used by the Czech political agents. Henlein visited London several times between 1935 and 1938 and gave interviews to newspapers. The Sudeten Germans opened permanent offices in London and Paris. In Paris the connection with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was of non-official nature through the comte de Brinon.(33) The Sudeten Ger- man deputies also travelled to Switzerland, France, Britain, Sweden promoting their cause and attempting to gain sympathy for their struggle. Sudeten German solidarity was the response to the long Czechoslovak oppression. A Czech interpretation of the democratic principles was eloquently expressed by a former Czech cabinet minister, Rasin, who said during a conversation with a German Social Democratic deputy, Joseph Seliger, on 4 November, 1918: "The right for self-determination is only an empty phrase, but when the entente has won, power counts."(34) Under those circumstances the Sudeten Germans were determined to create an international affair from their domestic struggle. The Czechs created a German problem within the borders of the republic by not granting full citizens' rights to the Sudeten Germans and the other minorities. The British received first hand information of Czech internal problems from a successful Sudeten German political leader.

The Czechs became aware of the German political force within the borders of the state. Hence, the local organization of the Czech National Socialist Party at Liberec (Reichenberg), in the Sudeten district, passed a resolution at a meeting on 17 May, 1937 for the dissolution of the Sudeten German Party.(35) Although the demand was not granted, nevertheless the existence of such a motion demonstrated the fear of the Czechs in Sudetenland. The Sudeten Germans in tum made contacts with other dissatisfied minority groups: the Slovaks, Hungarians, Poles and Ruthenians. By September 1938 there was a united front against the Czechs which led to foreign intervention for settling the problem. On September 13

and October 20, 1935 Henlein's party had two important strategic sessions in order to give directives to the deputies of the party. Lawsuits were started against several members of the SG Party for anti-state activities and the party's journal Rundschau on 25 June, 1935 was suspended for six months.36 In August Benes reacted in the name of the government to the dynamic activity of the Sudeten German Party with a speech which was followed by similar declarations by other members of the government. Benes delivered a speech on 19 August, 1936 in the capital city of Sudetenland, in Liberec (Reichenberg). The essential passages of his remarks did not admit the errors made by the government during the past eighteen years. He added that the national struggles, on all ethnic fronts, are natural and ineluctable, but that the two peoples had reached such a degree of maturity that it is impossible to denationalize them... There was a certain radicalization among the national minorities in every state, not only in the CSR, and it was necessary to study it seriously. According to international law, the national questions, recognized in every state without exception, are internal political questions. Czechoslovakia adhered without any reservation to this principle. Not a single European state had the right to meddle in this question. The CSR as a sovereign state was completely conscious of its dignity and of its rights. The only influence the CSR was willing to accept and respect in these questions was the control of the League of Nations. He declared that in the CSR no nationality was threatened neither in its existence nor in its culture(37} Interesting thoughts from the President of the republic but they came too late. Until he directed the affairs of the state, the CSR was not willing to alleviate oppressive political conditions of the national minorities and secure for them a life worthy of a democratic society. It was impossible to disregard the grievances of the minorities. Prime Minister Hodza announced in the Chamber of Representatives on 10 November, 1936 that the government wanted to solve the minorities problem in accordance with the demands of the activist ministers.(38) The government was willing to deal with handpicked persons and the traitors of the ethnic groups but not with the representatives of the majority of the minorities. Hodza dwelt with the German problem and with the demand of propor- tionality in the Senate on 7 December, 1936 and admitted that the government studied the numerical basis of the matter.(39) He acknowledged that in some branches of public administration the Germans were not appropriately represented but proportionality could not be realized without regard to the attitude of civil servants to the state. On 24 January, 1937 Hodza in his radio broadcast spoke of the perfection of the public administration and of the minority policy. The government has always extended full national justice and its stand has been against Bohemization or Slovakization of the minorities.() Benes, in his radio message on Christmas 1937, promised a slow amelioration of the grievances of the nationalities. With this declaration Benes admitted that discrimination had

existed in the CSR. The President and the Prime Minister knew that it was impossible to continue the dangerous play with the rights of the nationalities. Germany and on a smaller scale Poland and Hungary demanded the solution of the minority problem of the CSR

Foreign Interventions in the Internal Political Struggle

The nationalities, which formed the majority of the population in the CSR, found a common denominator for their demands: it was called human rights. The successful result of their long and difficult struggle proved that the Czechoslovak republic never should have been established with all its component provinces. That state was not the result of a historical development or even historical forces struggling in a closed geographic area. Partly the mismanagement of the Prague administration, partly the natural attraction of the minorities for unification with their own peoples across the border disrupted the republic. In the permanent condition of conflict with the Czechs, the smaller nationality groups received enormous support for their objectives from the largest minority, the Sudeten Germans. The malcontents, with united forces internally and with external assistance, terminated the repressive use of Czech political power. Open interest in the Sudeten problem was stressed for the first time in Germany on 25 February, 1934. On that day Neurath, the Foreign Minister, told Mastny, the ambassador of the CSR in Berlin: "Earlier those were the Poles, now they are the Czechs-- unfortunately I cannot conceal it from you--against whom are di- rected the unfriendly sentiments in the people. It is the Sudeten German question--in my opinion--which on both sides, no doubts, worries us."(41) In soft diplomatic language it was a very serious warning for the Czechs. Henlein's movement had received the support of the Reich government, and a sympathetic reception in England and other European countries.

It was unreasonable to ignore any longer the grievances of the Germans and the claims of the other minorities. The nationalities could not loyally collaborate with the Prague government and support the development of the country in which they were not treated as equals. The mother countries of the Magyar and Polish minorities also watched closely the internal political events in the CSR, and in an opportune moment demanded vigorously the rectification of their common borders with the CSR. The charter of the League of Nations offered a possibility of correcting the in- justices of the Treaty of Trianon, and Hungary could not abandon the likelihood of a peaceful change of frontiers, when millions of Hungarians lived for twenty years along her borders in the adjacent states. The disintegration of the Versailles system, and the strengthening of Germany's military position put the Czechoslovak government in a very delicate situation. Benes, who built up his alliance system with the aim to help the French to encircle Germany, and with the Little Entente to enclose Hungary, found

himself surrounded by the claimants of the territory of the republic on historical and ethnic grounds. Even his alliance with Soviet Russia did not help him. In 1938 the CSR became isolated in her desperate efforts to maintain her impossible political structure. The Czechs, in order to save face, first tried to negotiate with the activists in the minority groups who in the past collaborated with the central government for the amelioration of the living conditiohs of the nationalities. Under the impact of events, the number of activists was diminishing, and drastic changes were needed to satisfy the demands.

The diplomatic history of the pre-Munich days is well known in every European language. It would be repetitious to mention here again the diplomatic exchanges and related events leading to the arbitration of the four Western European powers at Munich on 29 September, 1938, when Czechoslovakia had to give up the Sudetenland to Germany. The Czechs, holding their indefensible position, in spite of the advice of their allies, seemed resolved to provoke a European war for the maintenance of their political system. The official paper of the Czech legionnaires, the Narodni Osvobozenzi, on 31 May, 1938 commented on the return of the chairman of the Parliamentary Defence Committee from a month's visit to Soviet Russia, that the Soviet army would certainly come to the assistance of the CSR if she were attacked. This of course was also duly noted in the Sudeten German press. Several similar declarations and organized mass meetings on the same lines misled the population. The allies of the republic in 1938 decided to follow a policy of peaceful settlement by negotiation and not by armed conflict. The British advised negotiations to the Czechoslovak government with Henlein after this latter's two visits in London in 1938. Prime Minister Hodza himself proposed to Paris the creation of an international commission if negotiations broke down. The British were thinking of offering a mediator as a sign of their interest in the fate of the CSR, but Benes still continued to evade the British advice.(42) Benes made a remark to the French ambassador that he had begun to wonder whether France did not now feel that the CSR was becoming a burden to the English and whether the French government did not contemplate abandoning the policy they had followed for twenty years towards this country.(43) The stage for a peaceful solution of the problem was set, and the

Czechs had to call meetings First with the Sudeten Germans and later with the Hungarians, Poles, Slovaks and Ruthenians. The outcome of these long and painful exchange of demands altered the composition of the first Czechoslovak republic without resorting to a European war.

Contacts Among the Representatives of the Minorities

Before the nationality question arrived at its final stage, the Czechs had ample opportunity to solve the problem internally. On

April 3, 1930, eighty Sudeten German, Hungarian, Ruthenian and Polish deputies signed a petition in which they demanded the formation of a parliamentary committee for the regulation of the minority problem according to article 22 of the rules of the Chamber of Deputies. This motion was not discussed because of the resistance of the Czech parties.(44) The German Christian Socialist Party, one of the activist groups, submitted its demands on 26 June, 1936 to Prime Minister Hodza which contained political, religious, national wishes, equal arrangements for schooling, participation in the state administration, fair share in the economic life, ending the denationalization, reform of the census laws and demand for a German broadcasting station.(45)A similar demand was aired in a memorandum on 27 June, 1937 by all the German activist parties.(46)

The Hungarian opposition parties and the Slovak Populist Party demanded equal rights and autonomy for Slovakia. Autonomy for Ruthenia was still not granted by the Prague government in spite of pressures in this respect. President Benes was not sincere in his Christmas radio speech of 1937 when he promised an improvement in the life of the national minorities and the elimination of the causes of grievances. Two weeks later, Derer, a Czechophile Slovak cabinet minister, went as far in his hatred for the Slovak autonomists that he declared publicly that the collaborators of Hlinka were political snivelling brats and rascals.(47) The ruling class in Prague had no understanding at all for the views of their political adversaries who were forced in opposition because they were not willing to accept Bohemian domination. The minorities were the victims of the change in state sovereignty. They had to unite their actions against the conquerors who subjugated them not on the battlefields but with the help of their supporters at the negotiating tables around Paris in 1918 and 1919.

The Hungarian minority was in a weaker negotiating position than the Sudeten Germans. They were less numerous, and behind them there was a mutilated, disarmed Hungary, surrounded by the triple military alliance of the Little Entente on her borders. Consequently, it could give only a marginal external encourage- ment ta the brethren living in minority status in the neighbouring countries. The CSR, in her constant fear, was heading toward a military dictatorship to intimidate her minorities and neighbours alike by giving the impression of being a heavily armed camp. The government barricaded itself behind a well equipped

army, border fortifications, and oppressive legislation. In 1937 a Bill was introduced in Parliament for national defence education. Reasons for the need of that Bill were given in the deterioration of the external political situation of the republic. Many laws of the CSR deeply interfered with the private rights of her citizens, of their social life, and of the activities of social organizations.(48) Many laws were in contrast with democratic principles and human freedom.

From Trianon to the First Vienna Arbitral Award