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The new emergency in Russia gave the Rumanians the opportunity to press for the execution of the February 26 Paris decision concerning the withdrawal of Hungarians beyond a new demarcation line. The same day Berthelot lost his Russian command, a member of the Rumanian delegation to the Peace Conference, Victor Antonescu, sent a memorandum to Clemenceau stressing the obvious--the possibility of an attack on the Rumanians by the Bolsheviks. He asserted that, according to Rumanian intelligence reports, the Hungarians had reached an accord with the Bolsheviks in the Ukraine and were about to launch their own offensive against Rumania. This claim was completely baseless, but it provided the grounds to argue that Rumania was now encircled and was the last bastion against Bolshevism. Antonescu therefore requested stronger Allied support for Rumanian needs.

Having identified the Hungarians as allies of the Reds, Antonescu's memorandum went on to complain of Franchet d'Esperey's slow handling of the Peace Conference's decision of February 26. He claimed that while Franchet d'Esperey was looking for a suitable French officer to supervise the Peace Conference's order, the Hungarians were stripping Transylvania and spreading Bolshevik agitation. These charges were also baseless, but they bolstered his request for immediate action vis 6 vis Hungary. Antonescu reasoned that, since the Reds in the Ukraine and the Hungarians were allies, a commander was needed who would be in charge of southern Russia, Transylvania and Hungary. There is little doubt that Antonescu wanted to see Berthelot expand his independent command to Hungary. At this juncture it is evident that Antonescu was not aware of the fact that the Hungarophobe and Rumanophile General Berthelot was relieved of his duties in Russia on the self-same day of the delivery of the Rumanian memorandum. Nevertheless, in the atmosphere of anti-Bolshevik hysteria in Paris, Antonescu's arguments had their effect. That very day Clemenceau sent new orders to Franchet d'Esperey about the February 26 decision. Using almost exactly the same words as Antonescu's memorandum, Clemenceau's new orders referred to the Hungarian scorched-earth policy in Transylvania and urged Franchet d'Esperey to put the Peace Conference's decision into effect without further delay. Clemenceau also proposed to organize a mixed commission of French, Hungarian and Rumanian members to see that his orders were executed. [94.]

The reason for Clemenceau's sudden support for Rumania's appeal for the swift implementation of the February 26 decision is clear. In the light of Franchet d'Esperey's reports, it is unlikely that he was taken in by the invention of a Hungarian-Bolshevik alliance. Rather, the French leader wanted to make sure the Rumanians were rewarded for their intended support of the troubled Allies in southern Russia. The price for Rumania's loyalty was the speedy occupation of areas accorded to them by the Peace Conference. Thus while such a lesser American official as Colonel Yates saw salvation in the new crisis in southern Russia through the postponement of the transmission of the February 26 decision, the powerful French leader's solution was to the contrary.

With his new orders from Premier Clemenceau, Franchet d'Esperey proceeded to carry them out. On March 19, the Commander in Chief ordered General de Lobit in Belgrade to transmit the February 26 decision to the Hungarians. At the same time he appointed General de Gondrecourt to deliver the Allied demarche to President Karolyi. De Gondrecourt was also put in command of the neutral zone. [95.]

The boundaries of the neutral zone troubled Franchet d'Esperey as they troubled de Lobit, who as early as March 7 had proposed extending the zone to the Hungarian frontier in the Carpathians. Their reason was to prevent a Rumanian-Hungarian clash in Ruthenia, above the neutral zone designated by the Peace Conference. Franchet d'Esperey therefore ordered de Lobit to extend the neutral zone all the way to Galicia, [96.] including the city of Munkacs (Mukachevo), an area claimed by Eduard Benes for the Czechoslovaks.

Franchet d'Esperey's order enlarging the neutral zone should have been cleared by the Peace Conference first, but there was no time for that. Clemenceau's order brooked no delay. So Franchet d'Esperey asked Clemenceau to have the change in the neutral zone approved by the Peace Conference ex post facto, and make it appear to the Hungarians that it was part of the original Allied demand. [97.] In his zeal to execute Clemenceau's wishes and to ensure that Rumanian troops would be available to fight the Russians and not the Hungarians, he wanted Clemenceau to present the Allies with a fait accompli. This way it would be the task of the Allies rather than French troops to coerce Hungary into accepting the ultimatum. [98.]

Once the order had been issued for General de Lobit to begin putting the provisions of the memorandum into effect, General Franchet d,Esperey embarked on an inspection tour of Odessa on March 19. But his order hit a snag, for General de Gondrecourt was not in Budapest to hand the memorandum to the Hungarians. For General de Lobit time was pressing and rather than allowing time for de Gondrecourt to reach Budapest, he ordered Colonel Vix to transmit the order to the Hungarians. It seems that de Lobit's undue haste was motivated by his assumption that the Yates encounter with Karolyi was leading to the organization of Hungarian resistance. At the same time he ordered Vix to take action he also sent an explanation to Franchet d,Esperey:

While transmitting the information, I draw your attention to the drawbacks of the missions of various nationalities, traveling without checks and, as it may be without mandates. They forewarn about decisions often in contradiction to the will of that authority qualified to give them. In the present case, the intervention of Colonel Yates shall have had the result of warning the Hungarians in advance about the intentions of the Congress of Paris and giving them time to prepare resistance and objection. [99.]

Subsequently, Franchet d'Esperey approved de Lobit's change in the procedure as he (Franchet d,Esperey) reported to Clemenceau that the American might have given the Hungarians advance notice. When de Lobit ordered Vix to hand the memorandum over to the Hungarians, another order of Franchet d'Esperey was overlooked. Franchet d'Esperey had told de Lobit to extend the neutral zone into Ruthenia, but de Lobit ordered Vix to deliver the original text of the memorandum which defined the neutral zone. [100.] Vix was instructed to present the memorandum on March 20, giving the Hungarians forty-eight hours to reply. [101.] He was also informed that if the Hungarians refused to accept the decision of the Peace Conference, no immediate war-like acts would be instituted against them. [102.]

Upon the receipt of the new orders, Vix immediately contacted all Allied representatives whom de Lobit was so critical about. Vix invited them for a meeting that was to take place on the following morning, the 20th of March. Lieutenant Goodwin, who was just leaving for Paris, could only guess the purpose of the briefing session: rightly, he thought it would be about the neutral zone. When he arrived in Paris on the twenty-second, still unaware of the most recent Hungarian developments, he expressed his opinion that the memorandum's transmissions to Ka'rolyi was inadvisable and warned the American plenipotentiaries of the consequences of the terms of the memorandum:

The results of this order will be extremely serious. It places a large number of Hungarians under Rumanian domination, and is likely to arouse the national feeling of the people to a greater extent than any other act which has taken place up to the present time. [103.]

The only thing that Goodwin failed to perceive was that Vix called the other Allied representatives together in order to have them present when he gave the memorandum to President Karolyi. He claimed that their presence was needed for proof that the decision of the Peace Conference was taken by the American, French, Italian and British governments in unison. Captain Nicholas Roosevelt, the newly arrived representative of the Coolidge Mission in Budapest, however, was uncertain of the propriety of his presence at the transaction. For this reason, he telephoned to Vienna for instructions, but he was unable to reach Professor Coolidge. Being at a loss as to what to do, he finally succumbed to the urgings of his Allied colleagues and went with them to meet Karolyi at ten o'clock in the morning. Captain Roosevelt's final decision thus played right into the hands of Vix, who was now able to parade before Karolyi as a man who had solid Allied backing in his present endeavor.

Vix and the other representatives found Karolyi alone in his presidential office. Upon the receipt of the memorandum Karolyi read it halfway through and then asked Vix if he could send for his minister of war, since the withdrawal was of a military nature. Vix suggested that Karolyi send for his prime minister as well, implying that the pullback had political significance too. At this juncture Katrolyi remarked with some rancor that the Allies might make Hungary a French colony or a colony of Rumania or of Czechoslovakia. [104.] Karolyi said that the ultimatum was unacceptable for it clearly showed that Hungary was to be dismembered. Any government that signed such a document, he added, would not last a day.

Bohm and Berinkey joined the discussion. With the two ministers present, Karolyi went on to question the sincerity of the memorandum which was to separate the Rumanians and Hungarians while drawing no zone in Ruthenia, where, as Karolyi claimed, the Rumanians and the Czechoslovaks could join forces and press for more Hungarian territory. Berinkey reinforced his president's argument by saying that indeed the Rumanians received the green light to do exactly that. [105.]

Apparently Vix was unaware that it was precisely along this Hungarian line that Franchet d'Esperey argued in his request to Clemenceau to extend the neutral zone to the Carpathians. Had Franchet d,Esperey had more time to work out detailed military plans for the neutral zone, the likelihood of the Czechs and Rumanians permanently linking forces in northeastern Hungary would have been reduced, the fears of the Hungarians allayed and the collapse of the Karolyi regime prevented.

The Hungarian Minister of War, Vilmos Bohm, insisted the new line was contradictory to the Belgrade Convention. Vix repeatedly asserted that the new line had nothing to do with the cease-fire line but was a decision of the Peace Conference--though he stressed the decision was by no means final. Bohm, with Katrolyi acting as interpreter, declared that the Communist Party would gain 200,000 new members in protest of the Allied demands. When Karolyi asked what happened if the government refused to heed de Lobit's orders, Vix replied curtly "Alors nous ferons nos malles." [106.] Since the original responsibility of the Vix mission was to oversee the armistice, the threatened withdrawal of the mission, in the presence of other Allied representatives, was tantamount to the resumption of hostilities. Since Vix was aware that the Army of the Orient was in no position to fight and that, upon the rejection of the memorandum by the Hungarians, he was ordered to do nothing, his threat could be considered as a bluff. At this juncture it is puzzling why Karolyi did not inform Vix that he was aware that the Allies were in no position to start a war against Hungary. Rather than doing that, Karolyi proceeded to threaten Vix with his resignation. Thus a bluff was answered with a bluff. Previously such threats did move the Vix mission to moderation and apparently Karolyi thought that this old routine could move Vix to suspend negotiations and ask for new instructions from Belgrade.

Indeed, according to de Lobit's communication, upon Hungarian rejection of the memorandum, Vix should have followed such procedure. The French officer clearly acted in excess of his instructions. [107.] He threatened war with Hungary without indicating that such act required the sanction of the Paris Peace Conference. Before leaving Karolyi, Vix added to his dictatorial posture by reducing the grace period from 48 to 30 hours. Moreover, he insisted that Karolyi had no other choice but to accept or reject the memorandum. This way the de Lobit memorandum became the Vix ultimatum. The encouragement that Vix received from Franchet d'Esperey to act on his own now reached tragic proportions. The limited time that was given to the Hungarians to answer the ultimatum was leading to a new governmental crisis.

That same morning, after the Vix encounter, Defense Minister Bohm called on his two chief military advisors, Colonels Stromfeld and Tombor. He asked them to prepare a map with new borders and to give their advice on how acceptable they were. Within half an hour they suggested the rejection of the Vix ultimatum, claiming that the new borders would result in the complete economic, political and military destruction of Hungary. At the same time Bohm was informed that, if the ultimatum were accepted, the crack Sekler Division in Transylvania would refuse to follow orders. Colonel Tombor added to the collective decision an appeal for an eastern orientation of the nation's foreign policy and for a mass levy to defend the country. He told Bohm that a socialist government capable of organizing the masses had to be formed. He also suggested a compromise with the communists so that there could be cooperation with the Soviet Russian forces in Galicia. [108.]

In the afternoon the Social Democratic Party central committee held an emergency meeting to discuss what had transpired. It was Bohm who took the floor first. He unfolded the map prepared by his advisors and

j reiterated their conclusion. He moved for a socialist take-over of the government on the grounds that the present cabinet would not be able to lead the country in a fight against encirclement. He also advocated an immediate understanding with the communists to avoid "a stab in the back." [109.] His proposals were discussed but the committee decided to postpone a decision until after the emergency cabinet meeting that was to take place that evening. Meanwhile, one of the socialists, leaders, Jeno' Landler, was sent to Kun's prison to find out the communists, reaction to the Vix ultimatum and their position on the possible establishment of a socialist dictatorship. [110.] Landler considered his mission of utmost importance and, with Kun, began to negotiate a socialist-communist understanding. [111.]

At the emergency cabinet meeting Karolyi stated his position, which was similar to that of the socialists. He spoke of the need to form a socialist cabinet in place of the coalition. He admitted that his proAmerican policy had been defeated and emphasized the necessity to marshal forces that would save the country. He called on his socialist ministers to come to an understanding with the communists, since a life-and-death struggle for the country was about to take place against the imperialist powers. He volunteered to remain as president until the situation had stabilized. Bohm endorsed Karolyi's proposals but made the formation of a socialist cabinet contingent on the communists, support for the socialists. Kunfi, on the other hand, suggested that the coalition should remain in power and should make a final attempt to open the Allies, eyes to the consequences of the Vix ultimatum. Erno' Garami reminded the ministers of the failure of their Western policy and saw no justification for putting any further effort into appeals to the Allies. The President of the National Council, Janos Hock, in the name of the Karolyi Party announced the party's withdrawal from the cabinet in order to make it easier for the socialists to come to an understanding with the communists. The other nonsocialist ministers were also willing to resign in favor of the socialists. The council finally decided on the rejection of the ultimatum and the resignation of the cabinet. ln place of the coalition a socialist ministry would be formed under Karolyi. [112.]

The news of the Vix ultimatum was greeted with defiance by the populace. On the morning of the twenty-first, a meeting at the industrial suburb of Csepel of representatives of the biggest factories of Budapest demanded an immediate change of Hungarian foreign policy and an alliance with Russia. Representatives of soldier councils were also present at the meeting. They also supported the resolution. As a sign of defiance some soldiers began to drag cannons to the top of St. Gellert Hill, a nine hundred foot high mountain in the middle of Budapest. Such an act was an sanctioned by the government, even though the Soldiers' Council that met at three in the afternoon approved the action.

Crowds on the main thoroughfares of Budapest participated in spontaneous demonstrations and many of the civilians carried rifles and other weapons ready to defy Allied authorities. The powerful metallurgical union started to fulfill Bohm's stark warning of the previous day as 30,000 of its members voted to join the Communist Party. [113.]

The socialists also met in the morning to consider the cabinet's decisions. With the exception of a few moderates the overwhelming majority of the party's central committee accepted the proposals for a socialist government and for unity with the communists. During the committee's discussion, Jeno' Landler was able to report that the communists did not oppose union with the socialists. In the wake of Landler's report a five-man delegation was set up to return to prison to continue talks with the communists. The delegation consisted of Kunfi, Landler, Pogany, Weltner and Haubrich. [114.] The communists were represented by Kun, Rabinovics, Vago, Vantus, Seidler, Jancsik and Chlepko.

Their meetings were extremely brief. The socialists explained the government's predicament and claimed that the situation could be solved only by unity among the workers' parties and by their joining the Third International. The communists accepted the socialists' offer and a joint communique was drafted. It was agreed that the newly united party would temporarily take the name of the Socialist Party of Hungary until the Third International had decided on a final name for it. Communists were to receive posts in the government while the "dictatorship of the proletariat" would be assured through the workers' and soldiers' councils. The plans for a national election were abandoned. The concluding sentence of the joint communique pointed to what the government's new foreign policy was to be: "For the assurance of proletarian rule in the struggle against the Entente imperialism, a complete military and ideological alliance must be achieved with the Soviet Russian government." [115.]

lt is likely that in addition to the written agreement the communist and socialist leaders decided to make their take-over really "revolutionary" by removing Karolyi. The purpose of this would be to dispel any notion that the socialist take-over was merely a cabinet shake-up without socio-political consequences. It is also likely that foreign-policy considerations played a part, for it was known that the Russians considered Karolyi a lackey of the Allies. The likelihood is strengthened in the light of the fact that when the cabinet met at five o'clock the socialist ministers informed neither their colleagues nor Karolyi that the socialists and communists had succeeded in coming to an understanding as has been suggested.

They evidently refrained from telling Karolyi about the accord because they did not wish to let him know that his dismissal was part of it. [116.] Since only the previous evening Karolyi had declared his intention of remaining president, the socialists may have feared that he would refuse to step down. The cabinet's resignation became effective at six o'clock, when the time allotted in the Vix ultimatum expired. Karolyi then officially informed the French representative that the cabinet had chosen to resign rather than accept the ultimatum. The last order issued by his ministers came from Sandor Juhasz Nagy, the minister of justice, who ordered the chief prosecutor, Albert Vary, to free Bela Kun and the remaining imprisoned communists. With the written resignations in his hands, Karolyi turned to Zsigmond Kunfi to form a socialist cabinet. Kunfi still failed to apprise Katrolyi that the power to appoint a new prime minister was no longer in his grasp. [117.]

At six o'clock the Workers' Council met also. It was urged to accept the cabinet ministers' resignations. Originally it had been hoped that the council would nominate Kunfi as prime minister, a decision that would then be handed to Karolyi who was waiting for it at his office in the Sandor Palace. The council meeting was opened by Sandor Garbai, who declared:

The imperialists of the Entente took democracy and national self-determination as their slogans, but since victory they have acted differently. Our hope for peace was destroyed by the ukase from Colonel Vix. There is no longer any doubt that those gentlemen in Paris wish to give us an imperialist peace.... From now on we must look to the east for justice, as it has been denied to us in the west. [118.]

Garbai then informed the delegates of the fusion of the two Marxist workers, parties. The purpose of the union was the formation of a socialist government which could identify itself with the interests of the Bolsheviks, government of Lenin and which could offer and gain a military alliance with Soviet Russia. [119.]

The resistant mood of the Workers, Council was reflected by the enthusiastic reception of Garbai's speech. The council, which only weeks before ejected its communist members, now applauded the newly-welded Marxist unity. Moreover, with its newly recovered legislative authority, the council called for the establishment of the Hungarian Soviet Republic.

National indignation over the Vix memorandum thus turned the delegates into supporters of Bolshevik internationalism. The meeting was closed with the words of the Socialist Dezso Bokanyi who noted that the decision of the council was "the greatest and most sacred goal of the proletariat." [120.] In the light of the above discussion, however, Bokanyi's words had a hollow ring to them.

After the Workers' Council had decided to create a new governmental system, the telephone rang in Karolyi's residence. His secretary Henrik Simonyi answered it and, as if following prearranged plans, rushed into Karolyi's study and handed him a typewritten sheet, asking him to sign it without delay. The document was Karolyi's resignation. Katrolyi refused and asked who had written the document since he had not done so. Simonyi then admitted that it was he who had drawn it up in collaboration with the socialist journalist, Pal Keri. He justified his action by saying that he wanted to avoid an intraparty fight at the Workers, Council meeting between Karolyi's supporters and the others. [121.] Karolyi still refused to sign. Simonyi then left Karolyi's study but returned a few minutes later saying that the morning papers were already on the streets and wall posters had been pasted up announcing the resignation and the proclamation of a proletarian dictatorship. Faced with a well-organized coup, Karolyi accepted the fait accompli and signed "his', resignation rather than risk causing worse confusion. [122.]

That same evening at nine o'clock Kun, now at liberty, met with the other communist and socialist leaders in the office of the now defunct Social Democratic Party secretariat. They proceeded to form a provisional Revolutionary Governing Council. The new cabinet had two communist commissars. To counter-balance the socialist majority, the other commissars' assistants were also communists. [123.] The direction of the new government's foreign policy was made evident by the appointment of Bela Kun as commissar of foreign affairs. The other communist commissar was Karoly Vantus, who was commissar of agriculture. The inclusion of the minister of Ruszka-Krajna, Oreszt Szabo, in the cabinet, now also with the title of commissar, indicated the determination of the socialistcommunist union to continue Hungary's fight for territorial integrity. On the morning of March 22 a communique' of the Revolutionary Governing Council informed Hungarians of the changes. Printed on posters under the slogan "To Everybody," the communique declared that "the country could be saved from collapse and anarchy only by socialism and communism.,, lt explained that with the borders proposed in the ultimatum Hungary would have been economically strangled. A dictatorship of the proletariat was therefore necessary to save the Hungarian revolution. The manifesto called for iron discipline and promised death to looters and counter-revolutionaries. As far as the foreign policy of the new government was concerned, the manifesto declared:

It [the government] will organize a gigantic proletarian army that will strengthen the dictatorship against the Hungarian capitalists and magnates as well as the Rumanian boyars and Czech bourgeois.

It [the government] declares complete ideological unity with the Soviet government and offers the proletariat of Russia a military alliance. It sends brotherly greetings to the workers of England, France, Italy and America and urges them not to permit villainous military intervention against the Hungarian Soviet Republic by their capitalist governments. [124.]

The new leaders, appeal was a mixture of nationalist desperation and Marxist ideology, and as a result even those with little sympathy for Marxism declared in favor of the socialist dictatorship. The bourgeois daily Nyugat best summed up the reaction of the majority of Hungarians to the Vix ultimatum: "Not that! Rather Bolshevism a thousand times over!" [125.] The communist paper Voros Ujsag gave an ideological justification for preserving territorial integrity in an article entitled "The Entente against the Proletariat,,:

ln power the Hungarian petite bourgeoisie could not answer the Vix ultimatum. They were forced to recognize that only the proletariat could oppose imperialism victoriously. The territorial integrity policy of these petite bourgeois parties, which aimed to protect their markets, gave way to the right of self-determination of the proletariat. [126.]

The first cabinet meeting of the new government took place on March 22. The cabinet decided to notify Russia of the changes that had taken place in Hungary and to ask for a military alliance. [127.] At the same time Vix was ordered put under close surveillance. The order was issued in response to a telegram that Vix sent to Belgrade allegedly requesting General Franchet d,Esperey for 15,000 troops to crush the revolution. The cabinet also ordered the telegrapher who cooperated with Vix by sending the telegram over Hungarian government cables to be court martialed. [128.]

The ministry of foreign affairs was occupied by Kun on March 22, though the formal transfer of office from Harrer to him did not take place until March 24. An aid to Kun, Erno Por, pointed up the magnitude of the change to Harrer by comparing Kun's arrival at the ministry to Trotsky's arrival in the Russian revolution. Kun was less fulsome and told Harrer that they would have occasion in the future to cooperate. This promise went unfilled, but Kun did have occasion to work with the former foreign minister, Mihaly Karolyi.

On March 26, the day the Vix mission left Hungary, Kun contacted Ka'rolyi, asking him to transmit a Hungarian offer to the Allies. Kun asked Karolyi to go to Vienna to contact the allies. Kun wanted to make a deal with them. In return for a guarantee of Hungary's integrity, Kun volunteered to mediate differences between the Allies and Russia. Kun also pledged that Hungarian forces would not link up with the Russian Red Army and the government would not disseminate propaganda abroad. For their part the Allies were to promise that plebiscites would be held in the disputed areas and food aid would be given to Hungary. Katrolyi accepted the mission and left for Vienna on March 30. He accomplished little as the Allies were busy assigning a representative to go to Hungary to investigate the new situation. [129.]

The Allies were very preoccupied by events in Hungary. On March 25 the Council of Four met to discuss them. President Wilson was at a loss as to how the Allies should deal with the socialists in Hungary, a country he considered friendly. Clemenceau vehemently denied that the Hungarians were friends of the Allies. He argued that, while the other Austro-Hungarian peoples had fought against the Allies in spite of themselves, the Magyars and their leaders, including Tisza, were directly responsible for the war. [130.] Two days later President Wilson criticized the interventionist policy of the French and suggested that the Allies should keep their hands off Hungary if "Bolshevism,, was to be contained within its borders. He was supported by Lloyd George, who was against intervention on the grounds that few countries in Europe needed a social revolution as badly as Hungary. [131.]

Later, on March 29, when the Hungarian problem was on the agenda again, the British prime minister asked why the Magyars and Croats should not receive the same treatment when they had fought against the Allies with equal vigor. He said that Clemenceau was wrong in declaring that the Magyar electorate was limited. Now, months too late, Lloyd George wanted the Allies to establish relations with Hungary:

We maintain relations with the Croats and the Slovenes although they have on their conscience the death of innumerable Allied soldiers. Why not make contact with the Magyars as well? [132.]

Thus Allied recognition, which had been withheld from the Karolyi regime, was now proposed by the Anglo-Americans for the Kun regime. On March 31, Lansing even admitted that the Allies had a certain responsibility for what had happened in Hungary. It seemed as though diplomatic contact with Kun was to be an atonement for the mistakes of the past. Even at this stage, however, the French were against any dealings with Hungary. Pichon was at pains to remind his colleagues that "Bela Kun was the friend and accomplice of Lenin.'' [133.]

On March 31 the Council of Four decided to send South African General Jan Christiaan Smuts to Hungary to investigate the situation. At last an emissary of the Big Four was to visit Budapest. But even before he was appointed to head the mission to Hungary, Smuts had pinpointed the reasons for the collapse of the Karolyi regime when he wrote to Lloyd George:

We cannot be blind to what has just happened in Hungary. Karolyi was favorable to us and endeavouring to work with us, but found no encouragement. Rumania and Serbia had to be placated with Hungarian territory. Result: Hungary is now joining hands with Bolshevist Russia. . . [134.]

Smuts' observation justly summarized the cause for the Hungarian crisis. The revived hopes of mid-February that the Allies would finally pay some attention to Hungary's cause gave way to despair in March. Abandoned by the West, the Vix ultimatum served to count out the Frostflower Revolution. Kunfi's ominous warnings that Hungary could choose between Lenin and Wilson were borne out. Thus it was no mere accident that this Hungarian Cassandra was one of the leaders to institute Hungary's volte face. The Hungarians felt that their ideals were betrayed by Wilson--they turned to Lenin for deliverance.

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