The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

Continued Endnotes

[256] Ibid., 139.

[257] Thury 1896, 2: 206.

[258] Kaldy-Nagy 1974, 97-98.

[259] Torok 1930, 68.

[260] See above, p. 28-38.

[261] Thury 1896, 2:93; Suleyman's diary also mentions the fall of Choron (Ibid.,1:359)

[262] Ibid., 2: 93.

[263] My account is based on Jorga (1908/11, 2 363sqq); Kretschmayr 1920,2:77 sqq.; Bardossy 1943, 133 sqq.; and Kaldy-Nagy 1974, 97 sqq.

[264] Szalay 1865, 143 sqq.; Fraknoi 1899, 289 sqq.

[265] Szalay 1865, 143.

[266] Kretschmayr 1920, 2:91.

[267] Quoted in Bardossy 1943, 127.

[268] Quoted in Kretschmayr 1920, 104.

[269] For Gritti's plans see Kretschmayr 1920; Barta 1983 and Szakaly 1986.

[270] Quoted in Szalay 1865, l65.

[271] Ibid., 164.

[272] Ibid.; Regarding Ferdinand's opinion see Kretschmayr 1920, 138 and Bardossy 1943, 160.

[273] Verancsics 1857, 1:37-38.

[274] Szalay 1865, 170.

[275] CJH 1899, Art. 1: 1536.

[276] Bardossy 1943, 176.

[277] Quoted in Bardossy 1943, 179.

[278] Verancsics 1857. 1: 40.

[279] Bardossy 1943, 193.

[280] Ibid., 192.

[281] Soros 1917, 462-3.

[282] The letter is published in Bardossy 1943, 182.

[283] Karolyi 1878, 814.

[284] Vaugham 1954, 122 sqq.; Bardossy 1943, 201.

[285] CJH 1899 Art. 26: 1536.

[286] Quoted in Karolyi 1878, 718.

[287] Cf. Szalay 1865; Karolyi 1878; Fraknoi 1899; Acsady 1897: Szekfu s.d.; and Lukinich 1918.

[288] Kaldy-Nagy 1974, 144.

[289] Fraknoi 1899. 306-07.

[290] Refrences as in n. 154 above.

[291] Lukinich 1917, 14.

[292] Horvath 1866, 187; the will's Latin text is published in Verancsics 1857, 1: 151.

[293] Quoted in Bardossy 1943, 234.

[294] Quoted in Szalav 1865, 213.

[295] Horvath 1866, 194.

[296] For the expression quoted see Szekfu s.d., 31.

[297] Szalay 1861, 193.

[298] Ibid.

[299] Charriere 1848-60, 1: 442.

[300] Ibid., 446-50 .

[301] For the following see above all Szalay 1865; Acsady 1897; Bardossy 1943; and Sinkovics 1986.

[302] Verancsics 1857 2: 77 sqq.

[303] Szeremi 1979, 314--15.

[304] Istvanffy 1962, 176 sqq.

[305] Forgach 1977, 571, 648, 665.

[306] Thury 1896 1: 180.

[307] Ibis., 2:29.

[308] Ibid., 2: 230-2.

[309] Evlia 1904, 1: 228.

[310] Perjes 1976, 110.

[311] Ibid., 7.

[312] Burgio 1926.

[313] Brodarics 1690 and 1908.

[314] Burgio 1926, 37.

[315] Ibid., 92-93.

[316] Szalay 1865, 9.

[317] For one thing, in this case it would have to cross the Danube twice at Petervarad and at Pest. For another, in those days the left bank of the Danube, all the way from Domsod to Bacs, was bordered by an unmanageable swamp, about 10 to 25 km wide, which would have cornpletely separated the army from the fleet.

[318] Gyorffy 1963, 61; Gya1okay 1926, 200-2. Marsigli (1726) gives a good description of the swampy terrain along the left bank of the Danube, though his map is most distorted.

[319] See above, Chapter II, p. 48.

[320] Clausewitz 1976 Book VI Chapters 18 and 19. Clausewitz illustrates the problem with the following example. If 24 hours are needed to build a bridge, and if it is possible to send 20,000 troops into the bridgehead during this time, whereas the defence can appear at any point on the riverside with 20,000 troops within twelve hours then the crossing must fail, since the attack would only be able to transport 10,000 soldiers into the bridgehead during the same period. In twelve hours it is possible to cover four miles, including the time it takes to receive reports of the crossing, to issue orders, and dispatch the troops. If the length of the river sector to be defended is 24 miles, then the units of defence must be placed at intervals of 2 x 4 = 8 miles; if the total effectives of the army are 60 000, then each unit would consist of 20,000 men. Converting all these figures into contemporary units(1 Prussian mile =7.53km),the length of the sector to be defended would be 24 x 7.53 = 180 km; the distance between the subdivisions would be 60 km and the distance to be covered (4 miles) equals 30 km; the rate of march per hour would be 2.5 km.

[321] Brodarics 1908, 25.

[322] Istvanffy 1962, 104.

[323] Kemal Pashazade, Suleyman's diary, and Djeladzade write of 800 boats. Thury's (1896, 1: 217, 307; 2: 60, 152) account of the Hungarian losses at the battle of Mohacs mentions 200 Hungarian vessels. Acta Tomiciana s.d., 8: 229; on Ottoman boat-construction, see Monumenta Vaticana 1884, 90 and Thury 1896, 2: 57.

[324] Thury 1896, 1: 312.

[325] Ibid.

[326] Roder von Diersburg 1842, 2: 57-58. This may be an error in translation, and the other two operations refer to the bridging of the swamps bordering the northern bank of the Drava. We do know however that in the times of Miklos Zrinyi the permanent bridge built by the Ottomans was also composed of two sections: a pontoon bridge and fillings. The construction of the bridge we are concerned with took 12 to 18 hours. Circumstancial evidence points towards the lower figure: in 1688 it took the imperial forces crossing the Sava at the Gypsy Island near Belgrade 12 to 14 hours to build a military bridge across the main branch of the rover; 350 to 400 meters wide and the secondary branch, another 150 meters.

[327] Generarlstabshandbuch 1914, 290; Berger 1930, 1: 139. Since we could find no pertinent contemporary figures, we must refer to the data provided in recent technical manuals (of course, only in manuals not concerned with mechanized transport). The turnaround time of units using pontoons, barges, and other craft--the echelons of crossing--is ten minutes for every 100 meters. (By turnaround time we mean embarkation, rowing across, unloading or disembarking, and rowing back). To this figure we must add the time needed to compensate for the current, which is one minute for every 50 meters If we take the width of the Drava as 200 meters, the turnaround time would be 20 minutes. The drift usually amounts to about one-half or one-third of the width of the river--thus, in our case, it would be 70 to 100 meters; but this figure has to be doubled, since the drift applies in both directions. If we figure on 200 meters, the time needed to compensate for the current is 4 minutes. All in all, we must figure on about 25 minutes for the crossing of one echelon.

[328] Thury 1896 1: 217; 2: 103.

[329] I expounded my views on the defense of the Drava and Sava in a shorter essay (Perjes 1976). Imre Nemes (1977) rejected my data, my conclusions, in effect, my entire concept, as fundamentally incorrect. He also rejects my notion that the defense line of the Drava was 100 km long when he writes that I considered it "unnecessarily long." Nemes is certainly a well-trained technical officer, but he is not familiar with river defense, particularly with questions of forced river cross in historical times. Not to mention the fact that with the modern development of fire power, motorization, air support, etc. the parameters of the operations have fundamentally changed. In former times the defending side was at a disadvantage, as a consequence of which it had to undertake defense along an extended line. This was the reason for Clausewitz s suggestion of 180 km. Both Frederick the Great and Napoleon understood and accepted the wide expanse of river line defense as logical, and that is why the former considered such river defense "obviously impossible" and the latter called it "dangerous", see Baills 1929, V-VI. I replied to Nemes in Perjes 1977. Incidentally, the Ottomans were in an exceptional position from the point of view of craft, since their Danubian fleet could row up the Drava to deliver the crafts wherever needed. Normally the crafts had to be transported by land, and that is a most arduous task, limiting their number and capacity.

[330] Brodarics 1908, 38.

[331] Istvanffy 1962, 106.

[332] Brodarics 1908, 15.

[333] Burgio 1926, 58.

[334] Ibid., 49.

[335] Ibid., 78.

[336] Ibid., 85.

[337] Istvanffy 1962, 94-95.

[338] Ibid., 34-35.

[339] Burgio 1926, 100.

[340] Ibid., 106.

[341] Ibid., 108.

[342] Ibid., 111.

[343] Istvanffy 1962, 99, 104.

[344] Sanuto 1878, 380, 382. A brief hypothetical count: if 8-10,000 Hungarians had attempted to take up battle with Ottoman troops crossing to the northern bank of the Drava they would have been faced with 6,000 men crossing in one echelon, i.e. 10-12,000 in one hour. If exceptionally lucky, the Hungarian forces would be concentrated precisely at the spot where the Ottomans attempted to cross and might have just about matched the enemy. But should the crossing take place anywhere close as was most likely, this force would arrive too late. And if the Hungarian forces were distributed evenly along the bank, then the Ottoman echelons would everywhere have the numerical advantage.

[345] Thury 1896, 1: 235.

[346] Ibid., 2:66.

[347] Mohacs Emlekezete 1976, 81-3.

[348] Fraknoi 1896, 493.

[349] We shall come back to this matter later.

[350] Szakaky 1975, 30.Some historians argue that initially the Hungarians wanted to fight at Tolna but this plan was discarded because this densely inhabited region was not seen suitable for cavalry charges.

[351] Mohacs Emlekezete 1976 81-83.

[352] CJH 1899, Article 13: 1526.

[353] Brodarics 1908, 27-8.

[354] Pataki 1967, 26-7.

[355] Istvanffy 1962, 101.

[356] Pataki 1967, 22.

[357] Ibid., 21.

[358] Burgio 1926, 80.

[359] Bodarics, 1908, 30.

[360] Ibid., 29-31.

[361] Ibid., 28.

[362] On Hungarian intelligence gathering see Brodarics 1908, 45; Burgio 1926, 32, 41, 42, 50; Istvánffy 1724, 1962; Artner 1926, 84, 86, 90, 92; Gyalokay 1926, 199, 258; Mohacs Emlekezete 1976, 88 89; the yearly meeting of the national Diet in 1525 ordered that the "captains" should keep their own spies. CJH 1899, Article 35: 1522 .

[363] Pataki 1967, 25.

[364] Burgio 1926, 33.

[365] Ibid., 80.

[366] Pataki 1967, 23; Burgio 1926, 152.

[367] Burgio 1926, 38.

[368] Ibid., 44.

[369] Ibid., 102.

[370] Mohacs Emlekezete 1976, 80.

[371] Burgio 1926, 49.

[372] Sanuto 1884, 350; Burgio 1926, 76, 78; Fraknoi 1896, 494.

[373] Fraknoi 1896, 16.

[374] Mohacs Emlekezete 1976, 80.

[375] Brodarics 1908, 16.

[376] Burgio 1926, 56.

[377] Ibid., 50-1.

[378] CJH 1899, Article 16: 1526

[379] Ibid., e.g. Articles 8-10: 1526.

[380] Burgio 1926, 56-7.

[381] Ibid., 62.

[382] Ibid., 85.

[383] Ibid., 119.

[384] Thury 1896, 1: 203, 301; 2: 11, 58, 147.

[385] Ibid., 1: 301; 2: 58, 149.

[386] Ibid., 1: 302.

[387] Ibid., 1: 150, 205, 302; 2: 58.

[388] Ibid., 2: 150.

[389] Ibid., 1: 302-303, 2: 58-59.

[390] Ibid., 2:59.

[391] Ibid., 1: 208.

[392] Ibid., 2:59.

[393] Ibid.

[394] id., 1: 210, 303.

[395] Ibid.

[396] lbid.

[397] Ibid., 2: 13.

[398] Ibid., 1: 211, 306, 2: 60, 150.

[399] Ibid., 1: 307.

[400] Ibid., 2: 61.

[401] Almost identical folmulation by the fethname issued in 1526 and by Djeladzade. Thury 1896, 1: 380; 2, 152.

[402] Ibid., 1 : 306.

[403] lbid., 1: 214, 217, 307.

[404] Brodarics 1908, 33; Mohacs Emlekezete 1976, 93; Fraknoi 1896, 495.

[405] Thury 1896, 1: 12, 227, 311. Burgio (1926, 108) reports on August 5 that Uljak may have already fallen.

[406] Thury 196, 1: 230, 312; 2: 12, 65.

[407] Burgio 1926, 111.

[408] Thury 1896, 1: 234, 235, 312, 313; 2: 12, 66.

[409] Burgio 1926, 86.

[410] Ibid.. 97; Brodarics 1908, 28.

[411] Burgio 1926, 88.

[412] Ibid., 97, Brodarics 1908, 28.

[413] Burgio 1926, 2, 84.

[414] Ibid., 50.

[415] Ibid., 106-7.

[416] Brodarics 1908, 34-6.

[417] Burgio 1926, 111.

[418] Ibid., 115.

[419] Brodarics 1908, 36 sqq.

[420] Thury 1896, 1: 312.

[421] Brodarics 1908, 39-40.

[422] Burgio 1926. 71-2.

[423] Brodarics 1908, 40-1.

[424] Ibid., 41-4.

[425] Ibid., 44-6 .

[426] Istvanffy 1962.

[427] Zrinyi 1958 1:, 445.

[428] Brodarics 1908. 47-8.

[429] Pataki 1967, 16.

[430] Ibid., 18.

[431] Brodarics 1908, 48.

[432] Fraknoi 1896, 504.

[433] Brodarics 1908, 50; Acta Tomiciana s.d., 8: 229.

[434] Brodarics 1908, 29, 33, 43, 49.

[435] Istvanffy 1962 80.

[436] Fraknoi 1896, 505.

[437] Burgio 1926, 82, 84 86, 155, 156.

[438] Acta Tomiciana s.d. 8: 229.

[439] Thury 1896, 1: 315.

[440] Galacz 1976 1.

[441] Brodarics 1908, 54, 58, 61.

[442] Galacz 1976, 1.

[443] Properamus igigtur per aequa et iniqua, Brodarics 1690, 565.

[444] Brodarics 1908, 54.

[445] Gyalokai 1926, 262.

[446] Brodarics 1908, 54-8.

[447] Pecsevi 1860, 32.

[448] Thury 1896, 2: 15-6.

[449] Galacz 1976, 5.

[450] Thury 1896 1: 314.

[451] For this very reason the practice in former times was to set up camp on the eve of the battle in such a way that the troops would occupy roughly the positions designated for them on the battlefield the following day. On the day of the battle they would start out from the camp in the so-called deployment formation--i. e., the units would advance in battalions, in column formation, at intervals which corresponded to the width they were expected to occupy during the battle. Of course the army had to advance not along roads, but as the crow flies, across-hedges and whatever else lay across their way. During the advance painful care had to be taken to ensure that individual units maintained their respective positions, with the predetermined interval between them. Since the terrain was usually uneven and included trees, bushes, perhaps patches of forest, structures, etc., the relationship of the units to each other became inevitably modified, and the march had to be halted again and again to allow them to reorganize. Consequently the pace was much slower than during a normal advance. When they arrived within 1.5-2 km of the enemy, the troops would "deploy" for battle executing complicated maneuvers and detours--that is, would set up the final order of battle before advancing any further. At this point the advance would become even slower and more arduous since the lines had to remain straight as arrows.

[452] Perjes 1963, 49 sqq.

[453] Kapolnai-Pauer 1888, 27; Kuppelweiser 1899, 240; Ortvay 1910, 35.

[454] Gyalokai 1926, 211; Halmay 1926, 25.

[455] Thury 1896, 2: 14, 66, 157.

[456] Bende 1966, 534.

[457] Gyalokai 26, 221.

[458] Brodarics 1908, 52.

[459] Thury 1896, 2: 16-7, 67.

[460] Ibid., 2: 16.

[461] Brodarics 1690, 568

[462] Brodarics 1908, 52.

[463] Istvanffy 1962, 115.

[464] Brodarics 1908, 52.

[465] Ibid., 51.

[466] Istvanffy 1962 114.

[467] For the following the main sources are the Ottoman records; Kemal Pashazade (in Thury 1896, 1: 326 sqq.); Suleyman's Diary (ibid., 314 sqq.), the fethname of 1526 (ibid., 379 sqq.); Lufti (ibid., 2: 15 sqq.); Ferdi (ibid., 66 sqq ); Djeladzade (ibid., 157 sqq.). CF. also Pecsevi 1860, 31 sqq.

[468] Brodarics 1908, 55, 59.

[469] For the following see Brodarics 1690, 565 sqq.; 1908, 55, 68.

[470] Istvanffy 1962, 116.

[471] For the following the main sources are the Ottoman records, Kemal Pashazade (in Thury 1896, 1: 326 sqq.); Suleyman's Diary (ibid., 314 sqq.), the fethname of 1526 (ibid., 379 sqq.); Lufti (ibid., 2: 1S sqq.); Ferdi (ibid., 66 sqq.); Djeladzade (ibid. 157 sqq.); Brodarics 1690, 565 sqq.; 1908, 55, 58. Cf. also Pecsevi 1860, 31 sqq.

[472] On the casualties, see Brodarics 1908, 63-4; Acta Tomiciana s.d., 8: 222.

[473] Brodarics 1908, 62.

[474] For references see above, n. 28 p. 239.

[475] Thury 1896, 1:379.

[476] Ibid., 2: 70.

[477] Ibid., 1: 316.

[478] Ibid., 255.

[479] Ibid., 315.

[480] Ibid.

[481] Brodarics 1908, 62.

[482] Thury 1896, 1:241.

[483] Papp 1960, 1962.

[484] This can be assume on the basis of one of the mass graves discovered so far where in a ditch about 20-22 m long and 2.5 m wide--an area of about 50 m squared--250 bodies have been found. Assuming 35,000 casualties, the bodies would occupy an area of 7,000 square meters. Since presumably all these were buried in ditch-like graves because that was the easiest way to get rid of them, and assuming the width of the ditch to be invariably 2.5m, its length should be 2.8 km. In order to execute the work as economically as possible, that is, to avoid having to carry the corpses any distance presumably several smaller ditches were dug around the battlefield. If we assume that four such ditches were dug, the length of each would be around 700 meters. Since the mass graves discovered so far were at a depth of 1.5 m, the shoveled earth amounted to about 1,000 m cubed. According to contemporary military norms, an experienced person would be able to shovel 3 m cubed of earth a day with average soil conditions (Berger 1930, I: 199). Thus about 3,300 persons were needed to dig the ditches. It was easy enough for the Ottoman army to muster the required labor, or even more; hence it is quite possible that the burials were carried out within a single day.

[485] Istvanffy 1962, 117.

[486] Brodarics 1908, 67.

[487] Thury 1896, 1: 318.

[488] Szeremi 1979, 124-6.

[489] Thury 1896, 1: 318.

[490] Brodarics 1908, 67.

[491] Thury 1896, 1: 256.

[492] Ibid., 318.

[493] Ibid., 319.

[494] Pataki 1967, 42.

[495] Thury 1896, I: 320.

[496] Ibid.

[497] Ibid., 322.

[498] Brodarics 1908, 59.

[499] Ibid., 59-61.

[500] Burgio 1926, 122.

[501] Sarffy's report is published in Mohacs Emlekezete 1976, 122.

[502] Kiss 1976, 511.

[503] Thury 1896, 1: 384.

[504] Salamon 1886, 87.

[505] Barta 1983, 30.

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541