The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

Continued...

disapproved of the advice of those who guided the king prematurely so close to the enemy; according to them the king should have awaited the enemy either in Buda or at any other more distant place until all the forces of the country and all outside help were assembled. They requested the king not to engage in battle at least until their arrival. According to the voivode the troops from Transylvania were so excellent in numbers and military potential that the king could have faith in them for victory. But the king remembered the decision of the council, and considering that the enemy was so close, and the troops so eager to fight he knew that if he did not listen they would accuse him personally of bad leadership for missing the opportunity. Hesitating amidst these thoughts he finally decided to attempt to convince at least the magnates to await the voivode and Count Kristof [Frangepan], and to remove the camp to a safer location if hard pressed by the enemy....

When the king received the news of the Turks' crossing of the Drava,he sent Brodarics to the camp to convince the magnates, and especially the commanders, the archbishop of Esztergom and the palatine, to postpone the battle, as he knew that the other dignitaries and the masses were always inclined to follow the guidance of these two. He enjoined the chancellor to convey every message the voivode and Kristof had sent to the king and to enlighten them about the great danger threatening the country should the king and so many great lords, the cream of the Hungarian nation, and its army be exposed to obvious danger. Because should the king happen to fall in battle (and, indeed, given the strength and preparations of the enemy as compared with their own small numbers this was to be feared), what would prevent [the enemy] from taking all Hungary with ease? Moreover, he mentioned that until the arrival of others--the voivode with troops from Transylvania, the ban from Slavonia, Kristof from Croatia, the Czech, Moravian and Silesian soldiers, and all the other auxiliaries expected--it would be better to bring the army into safe positions or, if forced by the enemy, to retreat. Indeed, Hungary would suffer less damage even if the enemy were allowed to roam freely and ravage the area between Mohacs and Pozsony than if this great host, including the king and so many lords and soldiers, were to be wasted in a single battle.

In accordance with his orders, the chancellor communicated these arguments to the leaders, whom he visited in turns during the night, and then to the whole council; but the effect was as if he had brought no message at a]l, so blinded were the soldiers by their eagerness to fight in the vain expectation of victory and by their leaders not daring to dissuade the troops, hell-bent on fighting, from waging battle The king visited the camp at dawn and once more attempted what he had tried to achieve through the chancel]or. The advisers of all estates and nationalities were summoned to the king for this purpose. [424]

Brodarics gives the following dramatic account of this last important meeting:

The king discussed with the advisors and the military men in detail what to do since none of those expected from Transylvania, Slavonia, Croatia, Bohemia, and Germany had arrived. It is certain that most of these will show up soon. On the other hand, the enemy is near, at most two miles from the royal camp, and most likely wants to fight as soon as possible. What do they advise the king to do? Should he relocate the camp to another site with a view to postponing the battle until the arrival of others, or should they test their fortune in battle against the enemy?

Pal Tomori had been called away from the other camp, especially for the purpose of taking part in this meeting. Since it seemed that he also favored fighting the enemy right away, the king asked him, in surprise, in what did he place his hopes? In order to dissuade Tomori from his plan, the king called upon him to report to the whole assembly the number of troops under his command and those of the enemy, for the king knew right well that Tomori had better information than anyone else, since he had many spies in his service and deserters kept reporting to him. In answer to the first question Tomori said that in his opinion there were no more than 20,000 troops in his camp and in that of the king together (for the two were separate, as mentioned earlier). In answer to the second question he said that, according to the best of his knowledge, the enemy had about 300,000 soldiers. But when he noticed that the number of our troops, negligible in comparison with those of the enemy, astounded everyone, he suddenly added that we need not be so afraid of the enemy because this large mass w as mostly unarmed and unable to fight. When the king once again urged him to estimate how many thousands of the enemy consisted of elite troops capable of fighting, Tomori replied that he guessed at 70,000. But they found even this number exceeded our own strength by far, especially when Tomori added that the Turks also had more than 300 major pieces of ordnance.

As they were debating these issues at length, the great majority, partly swayed by the advice of the friar, and partly because of their own enthusiasm, believed the battle must take place, even though there were some who were afraid, for some reason, to express their views openly. In the course of the discussion some delegates came as representatives from the other camp. First they met with the king in a separate room and then, emerging with the king, they advised the members of the assembly, in the name of the others, not to attempt to convince the king to delay the battle, for they were correctly informed regarding the strength of the enemy: while their numbers were great, victory was within reach, all they had to do is take advantage of the good fortune God had placed in their hands. Let them therefore accompany the king and, with the help of God let the two camps unite since they were closer to the enemy and in better position to attack. Should the assembly attempt to dissuade the king they would expose themselves to great danger. Moreover they added that unless the king's troops set out towards the other camp right away, they would turn against it instead of the enemy.

Once these matters regarding the battle had been presented to the members of the assembly even those who thought in simple terms were so terrorized by this terrible betrayal that they unanimously opted for battle. [425]

For centuries public opinion on the subject of the battle of Mohacswas determined by this passage in Brodarics's work, blaming thehotheaded nobility for the disaster and turning Tomori into a scapegoat. Brodarics knew and respected Tomori and spoke kindly of him;in any case, being a gentle person, he related the events in gentleterms and was far from pointing his finger at anyone. It is clear,however, that all the elements for an indictment are present in hisaccount. A few decades later Istvanffy could go as far as stating:

Thus the king nevertheless came to the conclusion that Tomori as we]l as the council and a large fraction of the commanders approved of the audacious and dubious encounter; the notion of battle gripped their soul with fateful stubbornness.... But we must rather condemn the overconfidence and lack of sense of those who should have considered how uneven the fight would be instead of underestimating or despising the power of the mighty enemy and deluding themselves with hopes for victory. They should not have dragged the good and wise king who was reluctant and had practically predicted defeat, into a position from which it became impossible to retreat without obvious danger and great confusion....

This was the memorable yet unfortunate battle of Mohacs by which we lost the former glories of our nation. The flower and elite of the nobility and of the soldiery and everything our country possessed, was annihilated in that single tragic battle. This was the beginning of our inexpiable ignominy; we groaned under the unbearable yoke of the barbarians, suffered servitude under the domination of foreign nations. We are correct and justified, therefore, in condemning the audacious and foolhardy individuals who decided in favor of battle in spite of the unfavorable omens, who threw the brave and gentle young king as prey to the enemy, and sent the fatherland into misfortune and destruction, and in damning them with the most atrocious curses. [426]

Zrinyi, who relies heavily on Istvanffy and to whom the text ofBrodarics was probably also known, divides the blame betweenLouis II and Tomori equally; in fact, he cites them as negativeexamples in his argument on military science. [427] Apparently Zrinyidid not have the opportunity to study the battle of Mohacs in depth,and therefore he accepted the accounts provided by Brodarics andIstvanffy. A more in-depth examination would have shown that atthe military council it was not a clash between cool common senseand blind passion, but rather of two opposing strategic concepts.Louis, concept, which he apparently advocated from the outset andexpressed clearly by declaring that he would surrender the country even as far as Pozsony, was to avoid a battle that was bound to belost. On the other hand, to Tomori and his companions, handing oversuch a large portion of the country as prey to the enemy was anunacceptable alternative, especially if there was a chance of success.

Indeed, the choice was most difficult. It was extremely risky tofight the overwhelming might of the Ottomans without the Transylvanian and Croatian forces and the mercenaries expected fromabroad. However, from the point of view of strength, space, and time,we have seen that even if the battle had been postponed in time--hence in space--it was still most doubtful that additional troops, forinstance from Transylvania, would have been able to take part.Then the battle could still not have been won, but the country wouldhave been ravaged by the Ottomans.

The above-quoted excerpt of Brodarics is one of the most beautifulsections of his work: the tone of the account is exalted, his stylesoaring, and it is carefully composed--it is a dramatic and overpowering scene! No wonder that these pages attracted readers, attentionand left an indelible mark in their memory. There is another section,however, where the issue of responsibility comes up, and this one isfar from being as well written and convincing. There the authorwants to defend the country against those ill-intentioned rumorsand charges which were disseminated throughout Europe in theweeks immediately following the battle and which blamed the Hungarians for irresponsibility, heedlessness, and lack of military competence. Here his style is bland, his whole argument weak.

There will be some who would blame the boldness of those who insisted on battle with so much passion, and will qualify it as great foolhardiness; and indeed there are some who do so. But the accusers forget that there were m any factors in operation which might have persuaded even the wisest and most powerful ruler to act this way--first of all, the wonderful, unique, and almost fateful enthusiasm of the soldiers and the hope of assured victory which lived unshakably in their souls. Added to this were the secret negotiations conducted by Pal Tomori with a significant portion of the foe s army, i.e., with those who were born to Christian parents or were Christians themselves--Germans and Italians employed to man the artillery.

And here Brodarics mentions an argument he had never mentioned before although it is of decisive relevance and was probablybrought up by Tomori and his friends at the military council: "Moreover, a retreat did not seem sufficiently safe because, the foe being sonear, they would have had to retreat from a force which, because ofthe speed of its mounts, was able to do nothing better than carry out a chase." [428] Thus, while in the spirit of the "Mohacs complex" he shiftsthe emphasis from the determining factors to the incidental andpersonal ones, he makes no mention of this extremely importantfactor; but when he has to defend the Hungarians he brings up thisargument from the realm of military science. Indeed, this argumentwas well founded: there can be no doubt that had the Hungarianarmy pulled back, the Ottomans would have exhausted them,ground them up, and harassed them to death with their extensivecavalry.

In any case, how far would they have had to retreat? Where wouldthe other forces been able to join the army of the king? The only forcethat mattered from this aspect was that of Szapolyai, since thetroops of Frangepan and the foreign units could hardly have exceeded 4-5,000.

We have seen that the king sent Bacsy to Szapolyai in late Julywith the final order to rejoin him. We know from Szapolyai's letter,already quoted, that he was indeed on his way towards centralHungary and that he had requested the king, by way of the emissary, to await his arrival; in fact, Szapolyai himself, "boarding alight vehicle", hurried forward, to convince the king personally. Hewas late, however, because "of lack of time, the proximity of theOttomans, and the fatally belligerent mood of the Hungarians...although he was not far away the night of the day on which the kingwas defeated." [429] We do not know just what Szapolyai meant by being"not far away" from the king: one day's march, or two? It hardlymatters. What matters is where his troops were at the time of themilitary council, that is, on August 24-25. All we know is that onAugust 10 Szapolyai was still sending out orders for mobilization,summoning all units to Torda for the 15th. [430] Let us assume, therefore, that Szapolyai left Torda the day after the troops arrived there.In nine days--from August 16 to 25~ounting with a rate of marchof 20 km a day, which, as we have mentioned, was almost a forcedmarch, he could cover a distance of 180 km, reaching the area ofTotvarad in the valley of the Maros River, or the area of Kapolnas,40 to 50 km east of Lippa.

Had the Hungarian army initiated a retreat on August 25, andassuming the Ottomans did not interfere--indeed, a most unlikely assumption--the probability of Szapolyai joining the main forcesmay be ascertained from Table 8 below:

Table 8.
Distances of Major Forces on August 26, 1526

		Distance in km
Forces	Location on August 25	to Tolna	to Buda	to Pozsony
Royal army	Mohacs	60	250	450
Ottoman army	South of the Karasso	100	290	490
Szapolyai's army	Totvarad-Kapolnas	350	380	560

The table indicates that Szapolyai could not have reached Tolna,Buda, or even Pozsony ahead of the Ottoman forces. Nor can weoverlook the fact that even if his forces had been much closer, theDanube would have made it difficult for him to join the king; anyattempt to cross would undoubtedly have been challenged by theOttoman army and fleet. Nor could the king's army have crossed theDanube to unite with Szapolyai's forces with the Ottoman pursuersat its heels.

We know that Szapolyai was a competent leader, but how could heassume he would be able to join forces with the king? It is possiblethat around August 5 when he sent his emissary to the king? he washoping the latter had not advanced beyond Tolna. Perhaps he evenbelieved the king was still in Buda. It is obvious from his messagethat he disapproved of the king's leaving Buda. Moreover, he probably did not expect the Ottoman forces to capture the castles of theSrem as fast as they had and to reach the Drava so soon. In any case,one thing is certain: Szapolyai and Frangepan counted on surrendering the southern portions of the country. This was a more naturaland far more bearable compromise for them than it was for the bulkof the Hungarian nobility.

To sum up: Brodarics's almost incidental comment, to the effectthat it was too late to retreat, refers to a fact that must have hadconsiderable weight in the discussions of the military council; hence,it was not simply out of hotheadedness that the nobility opted forbattle.

There is another striking detail in Brodarics's account, namelyTomori's indecisive, almost unmanly behavior This picture is instark contrast with everything we know about him. He might nothave been a great military leader? but he was a brave man. It is inconceivable that he would have been frightened or that he lethimself be influenced by some loud-mouth petty noblemen. Hencewe must assume that he decided that the battle had to be fought onthe basis of a careful assessment of the situation as his sense andconscience dictated. According to Brodarics's presentation the indecisive, disturbed, tongue-tied Tomori was confronting a sensiblethoughtful king in the debates. But if we take a closer look at thequoted text, and take everything that happened into considerationthe falseness of this presentation become obvious right away. Indeed, Tomori must have felt a moment's hesitation when he had toanswer the kings queries regarding the relationship of forces because the king was not playing fair. There must ha re been twodistinct versions of the strength of the Ottomans--a real one, forofficial use " so to speak, and another which underestimated thestrength of the Ottomans considerably, for the benefit of the troops.When Tomori proposed peace he must have resorted to the officialversion, but the king must have known the other version as wellincluding the function that it played. Thus it was not altogether fairon the part of the king to force Tomori to reveal the actual situationin front of the military council, which, according to Brodarics, included soldiers of lower ranks. The king did not behave wisely onthis occasion. The main issue was whether or not there was apossibility for withdrawal. Since there was not, and the fight had totake place, then, by obliging Tomori to reveal the actual situation,the cat was let out of the bag. The only advantage enjoyed by thesmall Hungarian force was its self-confidence. What good did it do totamper with that?

Another circumstance may also have weakened Tomori's positionin the debate. Perhaps he was in favor of battle not only because ofnegative factors, i.e., the difficulties of carrying out a retreat, butalso because he had a plan that raised the prospect of a victory butwhich he could not mention for the sake of secrecy. We will deal withthis matter later.

Strength of the Hungarian Forces on the Eve of the Battle

After this dramatic war council Tomori hurried back to his troopsalong the Karasso and, as Brodarics writes: managed to convince his troops, with great difficulty, to retreat a little and agree to join the troops of the king. Thus the following day our camp was united with theirs at about half a mile from Mohacs, but in such a way that the soldiers did not intermingle, because a small open space remained between the two camps. [431]

This must have happened on August 25 or 26. By then the Ottomanvanguard had reached the Karasso and from that time until the dayof the battle skirmishes were fought between the Hungarian andOttoman light cavalries.

In the meantime troops were arriving from all corners of thecountry. One of the most significant of these was the Croatian-Slavonian army led by Ferenc Batthyany, numbering about 4,000 to5,000. [432]

Let us now rehearse once more what the size of the army was onthe day of the battle. Brodarics wrote of 24-25,000, but in one of hisletters written after the battle he mentions only 20,000. [433] We havewell-founded doubts regarding the accuracy of these figures. On theone hand, his notion of figures was rather hazy. He kept reportingdata such as: "Along with the troops of Queen Mary and of theArchbishop of Esztergom the king had about 3,000 cavalry andinfantry as he left Buda." But at Tolna "the king had 4,000 cavalryor a little more." The palatine arrived with a "few men"; GyorgySzapolyai arrived with "3,000 cavalry or a little more"; Batthyany"brought approximately 3,000 cavalry and a much smaller numberof infantry", and so on. [434]

The figure 25,000 seems to be a very low estimate; it would meanthat only half of the 50,000 to 60,000 soldiers which, according toIstvanffy, central Hungary could muster, were actually mobilized. [435]There are no data indicating that great lords or noblemen refusedservice in 1526; on the contrary, Burgio writes with great appreciation of the enthusiasm with which the mobilization was carried out.In fact it seemed as if taking part in the battle was a point of honor.For instance, Bishop Varday had a certificate issued stating that heleft the army against his will." [436]

Another argument in favor of a larger number of troops is that theking had called the fifth of the peasantry to arms rather than thecustomary tenth or less. Later he raised the proportion to "everyother man", and, finally, he had the sword dipped in blood carried around in the villages signifying universal mobilization. [437] In fact, hegave special instructions to mobilize the lepers and round them upinto a separate unit. Naturally, not all peasants were actually underarms, but we have no reason to suppose that the southern provincesdid not call a great number of them under the banners.

Even the losses would lead us to not believe the 25,000 figure.Brodarics himself estimated the casualties at 10,000 infantry and4,000 cavalry, [438] which would have meant that half the army remained on the battlefield. Such a rate of casualties occurs mostrarely in history, mostly when the battle involves encirclement orwhen the victors pursue the defeated relentlessly. Neither was thecase at Mohacs. The Ottoman sources estimated Hungarian losseseven higher--at 40,000 to 50,000. This is obviously an exaggeration.Suleyman's clerk writes of 50,000 Hungarian cavalry and 4,000infantry on the day of the battle, but four days later he notes that"they buried 20,000 infantry and 4,000 armored Hungarians", including "about 2,000 who had been captured alive" and beheaded. [439]The burial of the corpses was supervised by the grand vezir, hissecretary, and the defterdar. Since they were the ones to report thesefigures to the sultan these may be considered accurate. But if thisfigure is correct, and if we accept Brodarics's figure of 25,000, thiswould imply that the entire Hungarian host remained on the battlefield, which is impossible.

All things considered, it seems likely that the effectives of theHungarian army were between 50,000 and 60,000, rather than25,000. Of course, one cannot help but shiver at the thought that theHungarian high command itself had no idea how many soldiers wereunder its command. Did they not hold a muster, and did the "quartermasters" of the army not figure out how many rations wereneeded for the men and the horses? Or was Brodarics the only one toremain in ignorance? We have seen, however, that at the last military council on August 24 or 25 Tomori also referred to 20,000 men.It is true that although by then he was commander-in-chief, he wasstationed not with the main body of the army, but at the Karassocamp, where he could not monitor the troops gathering at Mohacs.

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The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541