In the spring of 1541 Roggendorf, Ferdinand's general, launchedthe siege of
Buda. While the timid and vacillating leadership of theold and ailing
Roggendorf, as well as the usual lack of funds, did notaugur well for the
success of the undertaking, the situation of thedefenders was not rosy either.
Several circumstances hamperedtheir efforts--lack of unity, to begin with. The
tension betweenIsabella and Friar George had reached a breaking point. The
queendowager, in despair, was negotiating with Ferdinand, and evenencouraged
the citizens of Buda to seek contacts with Roggendorf inorder to hand the
castle over. It was only by chance that the designfailed.
The siege had to be abandoned after several fruitless assaultssince the grand
army led by the sultan was approaching. The troops,seized by panic, withdrew
from under the castle in the greatestdisarray, forming an easy prey for the
Ottoman troops camped nearthe castle and the defenders sallying forth from it.
Five days laterthe sultan arrived under Buda and took the castle by
subterfuge.
It is worth examining the account of the occupation of Buda aspresented in the
contemporary and near-contemporary Hungarianand Turkish sources. According to
the contemporary Verancsics fourfactors prompted Suleyman to take Buda: "The
first factor militatingin favor of the capture of Buda by the Turkish emperor
was toprevent some prominent Hungarians acquiring the country." HereVerancsics
was hinting at Maylad's rebellion and his offer to thePorte. The second factor
was the shift of Bishop Frangepan andPerenyi to Ferdinand's side. The third
factor was Ferdinand's attackon Buda, encouraged as he was by Elek Thurzo and
Ferenc Revai: "Ifhe wanted to become king of Hungary, now was the time." After
thetroops of Ferdinand laid siege to Buda, and after the sultan had
beeninformed that Perenyi and Frangepan had shifted their allegianceand that
Isabella was negotiating with Ferdinand, he could hesitateno longer. The fourth
factor were the quarrels between IsabellaFriar George, and Balint Torok. "The
latter two both secretly coveted regency over the prince and the country." [302]
Szeremi, the other contemporary, provides a remarkable accountof Buda's
occupation by the Ottomans. He describes the situation,beginning with the 1540
siege of the city, as follows:
King Ferdinand gave orders that his camp lay siege to Buda and not to
give up the undertaking under any circumstance until the Germans
captured the city. The queen would have preferred to leave Buda and go
over to the Germans, and the Hungarian lords were prepared to allow
it. But every generation is concerned about the fate of the next. The
Hungarians would have liked to hand over the castle of Buda to the
Germans, but three considerations prevented them from doing so.
First, if the Germans were to enter or were allowed in, they would, in
the long run, not be able to defend it against the Turkish emperor.
Secondly, the Germans would not favor the Hungarian lords nor even
the lesser nobility, but would exterminate them to the last man.
Thirdly, by handing over the castle the Hungarians would not be true
to their word given to the Turkish emperor, while the Turkish emperor
had the power to hold Buda against the Germans. [303]
Istvanffy's account is also interesting and provides a more or lessauthentic
account of Buda's occupation. He also refers to a discussion by the Ottoman
leaders concerning Hungary's fate and that ofJohn Sigismund and his mother,
Isabella. After describing how thetroops of Roggendorf quit their siege of Buda
in panic, Istvanffycontinues with a description of how John Sigismund and the
Hungarian lords who had been defending the castle were lured intoSuleyman's
camp. W}mile Suleyman entertained them he sent hisforces into the city on the
pretext of a simple visit. Once inside theyquickly took control of all its
gates and other strategic points andthen commanded that the inhabitants lay
down their arms. WhenSuleyman had been told that the population had obeyed and
that thecity was in his control he sent the infant king back to his
mother.After some delay all of the Hungarian lords who had accompaniedJohn
Sigismund were also allowed to return to the city with theexception of Balint
Torok who was detained by the sultan. Suleymanand his retinue then discussed
Hungary's fate. Istvanffy reportedthat their deliberations were lengthy, but in
the end Suleymandecided to send Isabella and her son to Transylvania, which
theywould be allowed to hold together with "a part of southern Hungary,along
with Lippa and Temesvar, and those salt mines and goldmines which she held in
the lifetime of John." Friar George would bethe infant's tutor and would also
be in charge of the affairs of thecountry. The sultan also promised, in a
letter to Isabella, that assoon as her son came of age, he would entrust Buda
to him. [304]
There are three important points to note in Istvanffy's account ofthe fall of
Buda. The first is his statement that the Ottoman leadersonly reached a final
decision regarding the occupation of the centralportions of the country, and
the separation of Transylvania, afterthey had occupied Buda. This conflicts
with the information obtained from Venetian sources that the Porte had decided
to dividethe country as early as the Fall of 1540. Future research
mustdetermine which report is accurate.
The second important point is Istvanffy's report of the variousopinions
expressed by the pashas in their discussion of Hungary'sfuture. In particular
the chronicler noted the argument made byMehmed that Buda might fall into
Habsburg hands because of thelimited range of action of the Ottoman forces. As
we know, Viennawas much closer to Buda than to Constantinople; hence the
Habsburg menace could be neutralized only by extremely costly campaignswhich
could be mounted in response to attacks only a year after thelatter had
occurred. These strategical considerations were definitelythe reason why
Suleyman opted for the occupation of the city and itscastle.
Finally, Istvanffy reported Suleyman's promise to Isabella andthe Hungarian
lords to return the country to John Sigismund whenhe came of age and the
chronicler saw with his own eyes theilluminated manuscript in which the promise
was recorded. According to Thury, however, there was no such document. With
thepresent state of research it is not possible to determine whetherSuleyman
meant his promise seriously or whether he made it merelyfor the sake of
avoiding complications and in order to reassure FriarGeorge.
At any rate, Ferenc Forgach, a great admirer of Suleyman, categorically
asserted in his work, written around 1570, that Suleymandid indeed intend to
return Hungary to John Sigismund. He wrotethat "everything Suleyman had agreed
to with respect to John wasalso applicable to his son", and he added that
Suleyman had promised to return all territories belonging to the kingdom,
except theSrem, and that John Sigismund need only pay a gift, but no
tribute.His only condition was that John Sigismund should not ally himselfwith
the Habsburgs. "He [Suleyman] decided that he would obtainthe hand of the
daughter of the French king Francis for John IIwithout asking for anything in
return. These intentions are provenby the fact that he had returned Buda,
Becse, and Becskerek to Johnand had a golden crown prepared for John's son when
he went toBelgrade at the time of the siege of Sziget in 1566." He not
onlyencouraged Isabella to make peace with Ferdinand, "demonstratingthereby his
generosity and great love towards John Sigismund", butwould even have allowed
John Sigismund to marry the daughter ofFerdinand, or anyone else, provided
"that not a single stone" ofTransylvania be handed over to the Habsburgs. [305] Again, it will bethe task of further
research to determine the accuracy of thesereports of Suleyman's intentions.
However, with regard to theevents preceding the death of John Sigismund in
1571, the possibility that Suleyman really intended to reunify Hungary cannot
be excluded.
Let me now discuss the Turkish sources. The fethname of thesultan
regarding the occupation of Buda states:
In the preceding years I have conquered Hungary and its capital, Buda
by the grace of God, thanks to my victorious saber; but, since in those
times it was very far from the Moslem Empire, and hence it would have
been difficult to administer it, whereas King John agreed to pay tribute
for it, I transferred the kingdom of Hungary to him and to his son, King
Istefa [John Sigismund] after him. But the king of Germany, Hungary's
neighbor, the unbeliever named Ferandus [Ferdinand] who,
cursed djaur as he is continually at war with the followers of Islam
and has always been a vengeful rebel would have liked to become King
of Hungary. Therefore his unbelieving brother named Karlo [Charles
V], allied to the King of Ispania [Spain] and with the support of other
unbelievers of depraved lives, assembled a huge army from the provinces
that are hotbeds of error, and placed guns and weapons on his
innumerable boats on the Danube. The cursed one named Perenyi, one
of the Hungarian magnates, also joined him. Moving with all these
forces he took power for himself in Hungary and laid siege to the city of
Buda.
Giving an account of the siege of Buda and the retreat of Roggendorf's
forces, the fethname explains that Buda had to be occupied sothat it could be
converted into "one of the homes of Islam" and thendescribes how Transylvania
was given to the son of John. [306]
Two important points in this account are to be noted. One is thatthe
fethname justified bestowing Hungary to John with the argument that "at
that time it fell very far from the Moslem Empire", anargument also mentioned
by Istvanffy. However, since Buda wasjust as far from the Ottoman Empire in
1529 as in 1541, theargument makes little sense. Perhaps it is the result of an
error intranslation. There can be no doubt, however, that this statementbears
on the notion of range of action. The other noteworthy detail isthat the
fethname is silent about the promise made to John Sigismund or, more
exactly, to Isabella.
According to the Ottoman chronicler Ferdi, Suleyman had spokento the Hungarian
lords as follows: "The King of Vienna Ferendianus[Ferdinand] will not allow you
to hold Budim [Buda]; he is constantly disturbing you. Therefore, it would be
more appropriate if Igave you the country of Transylvania and its
appurtenances, andyou go thither to live." [307] Djeladzade, the other Ottoman historian,noted that the
pashas had decided that Buda had to be occupied.
Moreover, he also reported that Suleyman had a contract drafted inwhich John's
infant son was granted a sandjak in Transylvania and,when he came of age, the
kingdom of Hungary, "in place of hisfather." According to Thury's
interpretation, Suleyman's contractwas merely a verbal commitment, adding that
the contemporary ornear-contemporary Hungarian writers were also unaware of a
written promise or document. [308] But, as I
have noted, Istvanffy said thathe had seen the document. Finally, I also note
that Evlia Chelebi,the great Turkish world traveler and historian of the
seventeenthcentury reported that Suleyman occupied Buda and placed it in
thehands of a vezir "in order to avoid so much trouble and worryresulting from
the Islamic troops having to come to the help of thecity." [309]
The true interests of the Ottoman Empire tied it to the Near andFar East and
to the Black Sea area. The affairs of Europe merelydepleted its energies
without offering any significant compensation.
After the capture of Constantinople the Porte could not help butbecome
involved in European politics, because the necessary condition for retaining
the city was control over the Balkans, which inturn unavoidably led them to
Hungary and eventually to confrontation with the Habsburg Empire. Hungary in
the 1520s did notrepresent a threat to the Ottoman Empire, nor did it
constitute aprosperous area worth conquering; its significance derived
simplyfrom the fact that the country could be used as a buffer state
vis-a-visthe Habsburgs. The leaders of the Empire saw clearly that theycould
not compel Hungary to assume this role, since it lay beyondtheir range of
action. Therefore, they sought peaceful means toachieve their end: a
relationship of alliance in which Hungary wouldadjust its foreign policy to
that of the Empire, but would otherwiseretain its independence, its territorial
and administrative integrity.This was the essence of "Suleyman's proposal." If
this concept couldhave been realized, the Ottoman Empire could have avoided
theHungarian wars which proved so expensive and involved so manycasualties. In
the long run these wars achieved nothing; on thecontrary, they contributed to
the decline of the Empire.
The acceptance of the "proposal" would have certainly been advantageous to
Hungary in the short term, because it would have putan end to the war which
exhausted and jeopardized its very existence, while preserving the unity of the
country. Hence, King John'spolicies are justified. The gist of the matter is
not the eventualconsequence of the alliance with the Turk, but rather what
could beand had to be done at the moment for the country's survival.Perhaps the
acceptance of Suleyman's proposal also would havebeen advantageous in the
longer term. With Transylvania as anexample, we cannot disregard the
possibility that Turkish sovereignty need not have entailed a separation from
the civilization ofWestern Christendom. It is not even possible to imagine a
fate worsethan that which actually befell Hungary as a consequence of
therejection of that proposal.
Should we therefore raise the issue of who is to blame, andcontinue to point
the finger at the generation of Mohacs, albeit froman opposite point of view?
To blame that generation either for havingrejected the proposal or for having
lost the battle of Mohacs would beequally anachronistic. Hungary, wedged
between two great powers,was bound to perish. All of Suleyman's wisdom and all
of the powerof his empire were not sufficient to overrule certain objective
andsubjective factors. The range of action of Ottoman forces could not
beextended; hence Suleyman could not provide the defense the countryneeded to
face up to the Habsburgs. Furthermore, he could notconquer the deeply rooted
Hungarian distrust and hatred of theTurks which contributed decisively to the
rejection of the proOttoman orientation in the Hungarian ruling class.
Moreover, thefeudal lords living in the western part of the country could not
beprotected against the attacks of Ferdinand, either by John or bySuleyman;
hence they became pro-Habsburg by necessity.
Does this mean that there was no other option, that everythingwas
predetermined? On the basis of the results of our research I canonly answer
yes, there was no other option. However, this does notmean that the individual
plays no role in history. It does mean,however, that the conclusion I have
reached on the basis of historicalfacts, while not completely excluding the
role of the participants,places them in the background in relation to the
elemental forcesthat constitute the foundation of historical events. If I must
call itfatalism, I still prefer that to the romantic illusions implied in
thenotion of the "stalwart Hungarian nation", or the concept of Szekfu,based as
it is on categories in the history of ideas and vague notionsof national
character, which appeal to the crassest passions of Hungarianconsciousness and
which derive from the wounds inflicted by the Peace Treaty of Trianon.
Moreover, I also am not referring to theelegiac mood conjured by phrases like
"site of mourning reddened bythe blood of heroes." I risked to speak out about
"Optimism Derivingfrom Mohacs" in my essay Az orszagut szelere vetett
orszag [A CountryCast to the Roadside], and I persist in that conviction:
if a nationis capable of surviving such a disaster, then it has every reason
tocontemplate history with healthy self consciousness and look intothe future
with optimism. Both the interpretation of Hungarian-Turkish relations
resultingfrom Mohacs and the issue raised in my monograph titled Az
orszagutszelere vetett orszag [A Country Cast to the Roadside] haveelicited
intense reaction and sharp debate among a considerableportion of Hungarian
historians. [310] I expect, and welcome,
furtherreaction as a consequence of the present work. I await commentand even
criticisms which are not too friendly, with pleasure because,after all, there
is an "issue" involved, and this issue cannot beclarified by one person
proceeding alone. Even from the discussionpresented here it is clear that we
must try to visualize events farapart in space and time, with broad
ramifications, while individualproblems have yet to be resolved. We are facing
an extremely ambitiousresearch program in which the systematic analysis of
archivalmaterials, from Madrid to Istanbul, from London to Rome, will
playdecisive roles. Also, as the present work demonstrates, the
reinterpretation of published sources is an equally urgent task. For bothtasks
we need fresh perspectives, new hypotheses, and a completebreak with rooted
beliefs, a tabula rasa. At this moment it stillseems that "Suleyman's
proposal" is the best working hypothesisbecause, as I have proposed already
some time ago: "Suleyman'sproposal acts like a magnet which arranges and
orients the datawhich at first sight appears unwieldy and even contradictory."
[311]
The other important task is to uncover the nature and impactthe oft-mentioned
"Mohacs complex." How was this complex generated, how did it affect
contemporaries, the chroniclers, and laterhistorians? Present-day researchers
of the Jagellonian period andthe period of Mohacs cannot help but observe, at
every step, thattheir sources are biased. Of course, political and other points
of viewoften played a part, especially in the dispatches of foreign
ambassadors,but the distorting impact of the Mohacs complex is morepervasive.
We should be able to determine the direction of this bias, its angle of
reflection, from case to case. Of course, this can be noeasy task, for reality
can probably be arrived at from a model basedon unquestionably authentic data
and on logical considerations. Ifdubious data were included some logical
contradiction would inevitably develop and interfere with the otherwise
reliable functioningof the model. We can postulate several such models, but
perhaps thisbook already has convinced the reader that one of the most
promising is the model based on the relationship between war and politics.
The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541
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