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Continued...

As for Charles V, he explicitly warned Ferdinand against war andwrote:


Charles V added that he could provide no assistance whatsoever,except by showing good will to those Hungarian lords counting onhis support, ';but even if he definitely declared that he would come totheir aid, that would be a most difficult promise to keep.'' [280]

Bishop Frangepan, who usually did not mince his words, alsowarned Ferdinand against the senseless undertaking:


Frangepan proposed that Ferdinand should give encouragementand arms to Hungary in order to unite the efforts for liberating thecountry from the Turkish yoke, rather than devastate with theirforces even those parts of the country hitherto untouched by thelurks. [281]

This wise advice, however, had no effect. Ferdinand's mind wasmade up; in fact, in his blindness he even believed he could obtainthe sultan's backing for his plan. Therefore, he sent an emissary toConstantinople in the spring of 1537. When the emissary presentedhis request the grand vezir responded: "Yesterday I read the letteryour king had written to me, in which he is making a not toohonorable request.... Not so much in my own name, but rather at thecommand of the emperor [that is, the sultan], I say to you that he ismost amazed that King Ferdinand should lay claim to territories which the emperor had acquired, by the grace and will of God, byforce of arms, and which he regards as his own. In fact, the emperoris at a loss to understand on what grounds Ferdinand is claimingHungary." The right of inheritance to which Ferdinand had madereference, continued the grand vezir, had lapsed the moment thesultan occupied Hungary. [282] Ferdinand could have found out, beyondany reasonable doubt, that the sultan insisted on backingJohn; furthermore, the Porte had decided that when John died theHungarians might elect anyone they liked for their king, exceptFerdinand. Also, the general political predicament did not favorFerdinand. Hungary under a Turkish protectorate was not only acceptablebut even desirable, to several European powers. In addition to thesympathies of French diplomacy and, to some extent, of the Polesand the English, Ottoman domination was not without its attractionseither in the Holy Roman Empire or even in the provincesunder Ferdinand. Ferenc Frangepan's letter of 1537 to Elek Thurzois relevant; he explained that should the news spread that the Turkswere authorizing free royal elections in Hungary, the Hungarianswould naturally prefer to survive under a ruler chosen from theirown nation rather than perish under Ferdinand. The Bohemiansthe Moravians, and the Silesians would be most pleased becausethen, instead of having to fight against so powerful an enemy as theTurks, on behalf of Ferdinand, they "could spend their time fishingpeaceably in their ponds." The German estates also felt that theyhad been paying the Turkish tax for the defense of Hungary entirelyunnecessarily since Hungary could fend for itself under a Hungarianking just as well as under the protection of Ferdinand, and perhapsbetter. [283] The great Mediterranean War broke out soon after these diplomaticpreliminaries. In July Ottoman forces invaded Italy fromsea, counting on French support. However, the French did not liveup to their commitment as allies and the Turks had to give up theirundertaking. Soon thereafter peace negotiations began betweenFrance and Emperor Charles V, and Venice decided to join theImperial side. [284] In Hungary, too, the sounds of war carried the day. Towardsend of the summer of 1537 Ferdinand dispatched not one but two armies into the country. The private armies of the aristocrats tookpart in the ensuing conflict and inflicted a great deal of suffering onthe poor, but their depredations were far exceeded by the havoccaused by Ferdinand's unpaid and starving German, Italian, andSpanish mercenaries. The diets echoed the complaints of the population. Let me cite one of their complaints: if the army goes unpaid, "itis forced to live from the tears shed by the population of the provinces, as has become the custom in our land. Indeed, the troops leavenothing behind for the miserable masses except their naked andbattered bodies." [285]

It may be said that this unbridled abuse on the part of the troopswas inevitable, given the almost insoluble problems of supply. Butthe horrors were exacerbated when the commander explicitlyauthorized the troops to wage war without mercy to terrorize theenemy and to oblige it to sue quickly for peace. In 1537 Ferdinandinstructed his commander, Lenart Fels: "You must carry out yourfeats with toughness and resolve, in order to cause confusion andgreat fear in the Voivode [John] and among his leading men, andthus procure all the more favorable terms for an honorable peace." [286]

At first the troops under the command of Fels, advancing towardsnorthern Hungary were successful, but the attack soon bogged downand then came to a complete halt. The soldiers were not receivingtheir pay, and the army disintegrated. Ferdinand's second army,advancing towards Eszek under Katzianer, was annihilated by theOttomans. These failures convinced Ferdinand that his objectivewould be obtained only through peaceful means. He renewed negotiations with John, and the resultant peace of Nagyvarad was signedon February 24, 1538.

The Peace of Nagyvarad

[287]

The peace of Nagyvarad was in reality a compromise reached bytwo disenchanted kings: Ferdinand was frustrated in his efforts toreach a military decision, whereas John was disappointed in hishopes for Ottoman protection. They agreed, therefore, that Johnwould remain king of Hungary as long as he lived, but that after hisdeath the crown would revert to Ferdinand regardless of whether John left a male heir. The two parties were committed to secrecy, inorder to avoid Ottoman reprisals; but, in case the agreement came tolight, and the Turks took up arms against John, Ferdinand committed himself to come to John's defense.

The treaty was based on the rather risky illusion that the militarypower of the Habsburgs was sufficient to withstand the onslaught ofthe Ottomans and to preserve the territorial and administrativeintegrity of the country. This illusion proved fateful, for it causedSuleyman to withdraw his proposal; in other words, the treatybrought about precisely the situation which it was meant to preventand made matters worse by turning the country into a battlegroundfor a century and a half.

The treaty of Nagyvarad was the first serious, specific warningSuleyman received that his "proposal", which had been accepted byJohn and his supporters only with all kinds of reservations, and theresulting alliance could only offer a temporary solution, ready to bedenounced at the first opportunity. In any case, both parties regarded the treaty as little more than a scrap of paper almost from themoment of signature.

Yet, in the short term, the treaty of Nagyvarad did have significance; in fact, we may even assert that John derived more than alittle benefit from it. Apart from the risk entailed by possible reprisals on the part of the sultan, the contract provided him withsomething which had become a matter of survival: peace. We haveseen above that John needed peace to consolidate his rule. Morethan once Ferdinand had launched campaigns that were bound tofail. Nevertheless these efforts did succeed in weakening John'sposition.

Moreover, the contract made it possible for John to marry thePolish princess Isabella, whose parents had made it a condition ofmarriage that Ferdinand recognize John's rule. A heir might wellresult from the marriage, and, the treaty of Nagyvarad notwithstanding, the newborn had a far better chance of acquiring the crownthan Ferdinand, especially since the Porte would never consent torecognize Ferdinand's rule. Thus we may rightly suspect that Johnhad masterminded the treaty with political wisdom as well as a fairdose of guile. It may even be said that he had led Ferdinand by thenose.

Incidentally, the events immediately following the conclusion ofthe treaty gave a tangible demonstration of its value. The treatystipulated that, if revealed, and if the Ottomans should attack JohnFerdinand was obliged to come to his assistance. Only a few weeks

after signing rumors spread that Suleyman, having found out aboutit, was getting ready to march against John. In fact, shortly thereafter, specific information regarding the sultan's preparations arrivedalthough some of the intelligence indicated that the attack was to bedirected against Moldavia.

Since John's conscience, and that of his followers, was not entirelyclear--after all, they had broken the treaty concluded with thesultan--they assumed, in their fright, that the attack was aimed atHungary. Therefore they ordered mobilization and, most importantas regards our issue, asked Ferdinand to send help. From thatmoment the worthlessness of the treaty of Nagyvarad was madeabundantly clear because Ferdinand sent a ridiculously small contingent, no more than a few thousand mercenaries. Fortunately forthe country, the intelligence regarding the attack against Moldaviaproved to be correct. In August 1538 the Ottoman army invaded theprovince. The sultan appointed a new voivode, added the southernparts of the province to his empire, then headed home with the army.According to Ottoman sources, the attack was prompted by Moldavia's alliance with powers opposed to the Porte. [288] This was indeed the situation since, as we have seen, the voivode of Moldaviahad entered into an alliance with Ferdinand in 1536. Suleymanwanted to deprive the voivode of any opportunity to act against theinterests of the Ottoman Empire.

Moreover, I must mention again, for the sake of a more realisticperspective of the relations of forces, that all the happenings inHungary were of only secondary concern for the Porte. Far moreimportant events were taking place in the Mediterranean and theNear East; all of which entailed a fair amount of danger. In February, the "Holy League", the alliance of Charles V, the pope, andVenice, was born, with the express objective of breaking Ottomanpower in the Mediterranean Sea. The allied fleet began to assembleat Corfu in the spring. In the summer Suleyman received information to the effect that the emperor and the king of France hadconcluded the Peace of Nice.

The year 1539 brought no dramatic developments; but an incidentboded ill for John, as well as for the country as a whole. Ferdinandonce again indulged in subversion at the Porte, going as far as toreveal the contents of the treaty of Nagyvarad. Suleyman reacted tothe news: "Indeed, these two faithless kings do not deserve the crown!" [289] Suleyman's indignation was entirely justified. After all,John did owe his crown to Suleyman, who refrained even now fromdoing what he could have done already in 1526: annex the country,or any part of it.

The Death of King John

[290]

The following year, 1540, was far more eventful. The rebellion ofIstvan Maylad in Transylvania threatened John's rule from within.This most restless and unreliable grandee first turned to the Portefor help. He offered a yearly tribute should the sultan agree to theseparation of Transylvania from Hungary. He attempted to gain thePorte's support for his plan by hinting at the possibility that theestates of Hungary, Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia would excludeboth John and Ferdinand from the throne, and would offer theirloyalty to the sultan instead. Nothing reveals the unreality of theplot better than the somewhat tongue-in-cheek reply from the Porte:the sultan could obtain everything that Maylad now proposed betterand more securely from John directly.

Rejected by the Porte, the rebels now turned to Ferdinand. Theyrequested military assistance, offering that Transylvania might joinFerdinand. King John immediately recognized the danger, and,though suffering bad health and with his wife in an advanced stageof pregnancy, he nevertheless set out to restore order in the province. His appearance on the scene was immediately effective: theSaxon towns--the main source of the rebellion--sent a delegation tohim, and Maylad's co-commander, Imre Balassa, begged for mercy atJohn's feet.

An emissary arrived from Charles V while John was staying inTransylvania. He assured John of the emperor's sincere good will,referring to Hungary as the "defensive bastion of Christianity."Since he had reliable information regarding Ottoman preparationsagainst Hungary, he requested John's permission for an Imperialguard to occupy Buda, its salary to be paid by Charles. If John didnot dare take this chance for fear of the Turk, let him reinforce Budaand provide it with a strong Hungarian garrison at the emperor'sexpense. [291] In 1536 John himself had requested that the emperoroccupy Buda and Temesvar. At that time Charles was unable to comply because of the unfavorable diplomatic situation, but now,since he had been able to settle disputes with the king of France afew months earlier, he had the freedom to act against the Ottomans.

John rejected the proposal for several reasons. On the one hand,when the emissary, dispatched in April, had reached Gyulafehervar,the relationship between the emperor and the king of France haddeteriorated once again. On the other hand, the extents since thetreaty of Nagyvarad proved clearly that the Habsburgs could not berelied on for protection from the Ottomans. He decided that thetreaty of Nagyvarad itself had become moot on account of Ferdinand's betrayal of it; using the betrayal as an excuse, he wanted tomake sure that the child soon to be born would received the crown.Thus, he needed Suleyman's continued protection.

John left Gyulafehervar for Szaszsebes, where the good tidingsreached him: on July 7 Isabella had given birth to a male heir.Heartened by the news the ailing prince mounted a horse in order toannounce the birth to the townspeople. But soon he fell seriously ill.Feeling the approach of death, John willed the following: let hisfollowers protect his wife and son and let them place the crown onthe child's head if they saw fit; but, no matter how things stood, letthem not choose a king from the House of Habsburg, in order to avoideven more serious trials than what the country had already undergone under his own rule. Let them remain under the protection ofthe sultan, for this was the only way to preserve the integrity of thecountry, the only way to restore order, and the only way the fate ofhis wife and son would be assured. His conviction was that "theycould expect the good of their country and of themselves only fromSuleyman." He would not have come up with such an idea if thecountry could have expected salvation from Christian rulers, butthere was absolutely no prospect for such an eventuality. [292]

John was a ruler with a tragic fate. We must recognize that he wasimbued with a sense of great responsibility towards his country.Moreover, he assessed the situation with clear-sighted political acumen and used the limited means at his disposal well, sometimesbrilliantly, on behalf of the country. He hit upon the only possiblesolution of the problems resulting from Mohacs: the political andterritorial integrity of Hungary required the protection of Suleyman.While his policies became indecisive in the mid-thirties, in the lastfew years of his life he once again returned to the path he had embarked upon at the beginning. Death prevented him from achieving his ends. In the fall of 1539 the papal nuncio, Rorario, wrote:


Significantly, the same sentiment is reflected in poems of the age.A preacher in 1538 wrote: "Our good king saw clearly/ The greatstrength of the pagans/ Wisely did he act then/ Making peace withthem."

After John's death opinion was divided three ways regardingHungary's fate. Those on Ferdinand's side felt that the treaty ofNagyvarad should take immediate effect. Those on John's side, withFriar George in the lead, knowing well that the observance of thetreaty would result in immediate intervention on the part of thesultan and that the Habsburgs could not expect any help to withstand that intervention in the near future, felt that the right movewould be to delay the execution of the treaty and elect the son ofJohn as king. The third camp, composed of Perenyi, Frangepan, andothers, wanted the treaty to become effective, but only on the condition that Charles V and Ferdinand provided serious military assistance forthwith.

The third party met at Eger, and they sent from there the following letter, dated August 30, to Charles V:


Hence Charles should strive to occupy the country, which could beaccomplished in one of two ways: by concluding a treaty with theTurks in exchange for tribute or by waging war. For this purpose,however, it would be necessary to sign peace with the king of France.

Although Your Majesty might have to sacrifice something for thebenefit of the Most Christian King you would gain it back with usury[that is, with interest] if you could obtain Hungary freely and in whole.But if Your Majesty does not wish to resort to either of those means--something we would most regret--then we beg him, for the love of God,not to want our perdition, but rather persuade your brother to give upthat portion of the country he now holds; and then we would attempt topreserve our country, by hook or crook, on our own... [294]

In this confused situation the onerous burden of the country'ssalvation fell on the shoulders of Friar George, who already hadplayed a decisive role during John's lifetime. Though he was fullyaware that the lords looked askance at his growing influence, he feltthat the best way to gain followers for his policy was to appeal to themost powerful to assume the duties of governor next to the infantking and Isabella. He selected Perenyi over Werboczi, Balint Torok,and Peter Petrovics, for he knew that Perenyi wanted the treaty ofNagyvarad to become immediately effective. He hoped to win Perenyi over by such an offer, and others along with him. Since hisrelationship with Perenyi was tense, he did not think it advisable toapproach him directly. He requested the beg of Belgrade, Bali, to actas intermediary, since the latter had treated Perenyi well when hewas a captive and had maintained good relations with him eversince. Though Bali Beg accepted the mission, Perenyi rejected theoffer; moreover, he passed Friar George's letter to Bali Beg on toFerdinand. According to Mihaly Horvath, Perenyi rejected the offerbecause he was convinced that it "would not be possible to defend thecause of the prince against Ferdinand." [295] No doubt Ferenc Frangepan must have seen the situation in the same light because, in earlyAugust, he held discussions with several magnates at Gyongyos andsided with Ferdinand, appealing to the estates of Transylvania to dolikewise. Friar George not on]y saw matters clearly, but also tookaction with vigor and dispatch. The most urgent task was to reassure the sultan that the death of John entailed no change. For thisvery reason the very young John Silismund was quickly elected king. The coronation ceremony was omitted, since they did not wishto disregard the treaty of Nagyvarad completely, and a coronationwould have implied the exclusion of Ferdinand from the inheritanceof the throne, whereas an elected king could resign at any time. Theomission was intended to assuage Ferdinand and to prevent armedintervention on his part.

The prerequisite for the success of this strategy, however, wasthat Friar George have Buda firmly in his hands. His control of thecity was all the more essential since it was rumored that Ferdinandwas preparing to conquer it. In August, therefore, Friar Georgedispatched his loyal follower, Gyorgy Horvath, the captain of Nagyvarad, to Buda, with reliable troops, and adopted special safetymeasures for the castle's defense. Friar George himself traveled withthe body of John and the treasury from Transylvania to Szekesfehervar, where burial took place in the tomb of the kings. Shortlythereafter John Sigismund was proclaimed king on the field ofRakos. The estates assembled there resolved that they would notelect a king from the House of Habsburg even if some evil shouldbefall John Sigismund.

Furthermore, Friar George sent an emissary to the Polish kingSigismund, asking him to reassure Ferdinand that the treaty ofNagyvarad was still valid and his right to the crown uncontested. headded a warning to the effect that Ferdinand should not cause anytrouble and by trying to prevent the election of the king, in consideration of the Turks. Far more important, however, was the delegation sent to the Porte, the task of which was to obtain the sultan'sconsent to the election of John Sigismund.

The news of John's death had prompted Ferdinand to engage infeverish activity. He believed the time had come to obtain all ofHungary As had occurred so many times in the past, however, hedid not assess the situation realistically; he paid no heed to thedifficult situation of the country, in the shadow of the Ottomanmenace, and, continuing to underestimate the power of the Ottomans in spite of his many bitter experiences, he once again began tochase the "mirage of a settlement of accounts by arms." [296] Ferdinanddid all this despite the fact that, because of Charles `s passivity andthe sorry state of his own finances, he should have expected lesssuccess than ever.

He also had an altogether mistaken view of the position of thePorte. He believed that the sultan would give in and agree to hisrule. He refused to believe Friar George who had told Ferdinand'semissary that the treaty of Nagyvarad was not timely and whobegged for patience. He was convinced that the sultan had droppedJohn already in his lifetime; hence Isabella and the infant had noprospects in Hungary; furthermore, they would have to flee thecountry for their lives (in which case he would have had the addedbenefit of not having to pay the widow the compensation mentionedin the treaty). Prompted by such vain hopes Ferdinand caused FriarGeorge a great deal of trouble. He sent an emissary to convinceIsabella who, in any case, was hesitant, capricious, and hated FriarGeorge passionately, to abdicate the throne in the name of her son.Negotiations were conducted with the Hungarian lords, several ofwhom, Frangepan and Perenyi included, went over to Ferdinand'sside. In the meantime, Maylad was once again growing restless inTransylvania.

The most serious threat to Hungary was Ferdinand's militarymoves. His general, Fels, advanced upon Esztergom, Visegrad, andthen Buda. It was the Hungarian councilors, more particularlyThurzo, Revay, Frangepan, and Perenyi, who persuaded him toundertake this move, although it was not alien to his temperament.The stand taken by the Hungarian lords was motivated to a largeextent by the consideration that with the loss of Buda the situationof Isabella and John Sigismund would become altogether hopeless--as a consequence of which they would not even have to return theSzapolyai estates in their possession.
The immediate excuse for launching the campaign was the election of John Sigismund and the decision not to elect a king from theHouse of Habsburg even if some evil should befall him taken by theassembly at Rakos. The troops under Fels began their maneuvers atthe beginning of October. Having taken Esztergom, Visegrad, andVac, they marched under Buda and began its siege. But the undertaking, inadequately prepared in every respect, soon had to beabandoned. The consequences of this poorly conceived move weresoon felt. Lasky, who was busy at Constantinople at this time, wroteto Ferdinand as follows: "Your Majesty should know that neitherpeace nor armistice can be obtained; that tomorrow the Sultan isalready heading to Adrianople [that is, the assembly point for campaigns against Europe, usually launched in the spring].... He isheading there with the intention of securing Hungary for himself.Your troops have spoilt everything, as I had predicted orally and in writing to Your Majesty, but you preferred to follow a differentcounsel...." [297]

The delegation Friar George had dispatched to the Porte in October 1540 was received most courteously by the sultan. The sultanratified the election of John Sigismund and gave him the country torule. At the same time he sent Maylad and the Transylvanians awarning in no uncertain terms--for the latter had not given up theiradventurous design--that they should put an end to their separatistaction and obey the government functioning by the side of JohnSigismund. Yet Suleyman's recognition of John Sigismund's rulewas no longer sincere. He had given up his original strategy and haddecided to annex the central portion of Hungary.

Suleyman indicated his change of policy by making Peter Perenyi's son, whom he held as a hostage, into a renegade. Lasky, stillambassador at Constantinople, gave the following account of thisevent: 'Yesterday the son of Peter Perenyi was introduced to theGreat Lord and will undergo circumcision at Adrianople." [298] PeterPerenyi had been in Turkish captivity on two occasions, and on bothoccasions the sultan had released him on condition he serve John. Aswe know, the sultan was not prompted by humanitarian considerations,but by cogent political reasons: he meant to consolidateJohn's rule. He retained Perenyi's son as hostage to ensure thefather's loyalty. Now, by making his son a renegade, he gave incontrovertible evidence that he no longer attached importance to Perenyi's allegiance; consequently, neither did he care whether themagnates of Hungary supported John Sigismund or not.

Moreover, we have far more direct proofs that Suleyman was nolonger speaking sincerely. The French ambassador to Venice reported on September 25, 1540: 'The news we have is that theKingdom of Hungary has been divided into three parts [by thesultan]."[299] In another letter, dated October 8, describing the extensive war preparations of Charles V, the ambassador reported thatthe emperor was undertaking an expedition the like of which hadnever been seen, and if Venice did not conclude peace with theTurks--something Venice had done already, by the way--the emperor would corner the sultan, for "the sultan had never been in sucha tight spot, considering that the Persians are restless, and he hadlost John." Ferdinand too was counting on the support of the Hungarian lords. Then followed a section which contradicted the preceding ones to some extent, for the ambassador wrote that the emperor'spredicament was not quite so favorable, but what really matteredwas the ambassador's statement "that the promise the Emperor hadgiven to help the Hungarians serves only to incite the Turks to movein and enslave this country [Hungary] and place a pasha at itshelm" [300]

It becomes clear from this report that the sultan had not onlydecided to occupy Buda, but also that he was in a difficult positionbecause of the chaos in Hungary: the pro-Ottoman party had sidedwith Ferdinand, whose troops were besieging Buda. Moreover, theforces of the emperor might also arrive on the scene. The probabilityof Friar George coming out on top had diminished considerably,particularly since there were irreconcilable differences betweenhim and Isabella to the point that the queen was negotiating withFerdinand and even contemplating handing over Buda. Here thenotion of range of action enters into the political balance with all itsweight: regardless of the danger, the Ottoman forces, with theexception of some smaller units, could not have reached and relievedBuda, besieged by Ferdinand's forces, before July or August of thefollowing year. It was essential, therefore, that Friar George be ableto hold out in Buda until the sultan's army reached the city, and, inorder to encourage him, the sultan had to make him believe that his"proposal" was still valid.
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