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Suleymans Second Peace Offer, Its Rejection, and the "Punitive Expedition of 1526

[184]

The assault on Rhodes, planned already in 1520, but delayedbecause of the urgency of the Hungarian problem, was launched bythe Ottoman army and fleet in the summer of 1522. The Knights ofSaint John waged their heroic battle by themselves, abandoned bythe Europeans, and had to give up the hopeless struggle in December. Thus this extremely important island, of key strategic value forthe domination of the Eastern Mediterranean, fell under Ottomansovereignty.

Now Suleyman was definitely determined to settle conditions inSyria and Egypt; he probably contracted peace with Persia in orderto ensure his rear. The objective, to restore the spice trade, whichhad been interrupted by the Portuguese, was supposed to be the taskof Ahmed Pasha, appointed governor of Egypt in 1523. The Ottomanleadership had probably drawn up the rough outlines of a plan; itwas elaborated shortly thereafter in detail by Selman Reis andsubmitted to the sultan, via the Grand Vezir Ibrahim, in 1525.Selman Reis proposed tough intervention against the Portuguese,but, because of the already discussed shortcomings of the fleet,warned against a clash on the open seas. Instead, he proposed tostrengthen the base at Jiddah and increase the size of the fleet. Wehave seen that the construction of vessels ran into difficulties because of the lack of raw materials; hence the execution of the planwas postponed.

The realization of the plan was also impeded when Ahmed Pasharebelled and proclaimed himself the ruler of Egypt. Although thisrebellion was suppressed in the spring of 1524, the sultan had tosend his favorite courtier, the very talented Ibrahim, recently appointed Grand Vezir, to settle matters once and for all. Ibrahim setout for Egypt in December 1524 and disarmed the restless withextremely clever measures. Having consolidated Ottoman rule, hereturned to Constantinople in September 1525.

In the meantime, in 1524, disturbances broke out once again in Syria; hence the Ottoman leaders had every reason to focus theirattention and energies on the affairs of the East, yet were preventedfrom doing so by the European situation. The war between theemperor and the king of France continued, but, while it was notpossible to predict the outcome, the balance seemed to tip in favor ofthe emperor. Ottoman policy was now stymied: in order to preventCharles V's hegemony over Europe--first of all, of course, overHungary--it would have to intervene swiftly, but could not do sobecause of Eastern affairs. In the East it should have reestablishedthe spice trade, which guaranteed a fabulous income, but it wasprevented in this endeavor by developments in Europe. This explains the respite of five years granted Hungary after 1521, eventhough the Ottomans had voiced their designs against Hungaryopenly, as we know from the report of Marco Minio. [185]

Consequently, the Ottoman leaders could do no better than towear down Hungary's resistance by constant raids and at the sametime prepare the attack against Hungary by politically and strategically significant campaigns in such direction where they could expect the least resistance. Two states came under consideration:Wallachia and Poland. To obtain firm control over Wallachia wouldserve the double purpose of applying political pressure againstHungary and of obtaining a base for military operations. Hungary'sinfluence over the area had to be short-circuited. From the manyvoivodes and voivode nominees competing against one another, theOttomans had to promote the one who would be capable of reestablishing order in the country and also willing to accept the sultan'ssovereignty. In 1522 the Empire struggled almost continuouslyagainst a rapid succession of voivodes, yet was unable to achieveresults, to large extent because of Szapolyai, who intervened in thestruggle with his Transylvanian forces. Since it was a principle ofOttoman policy vis-a-vis Wallachia not to annex the country, butmerely to draw it into a relationship of vassalage, when Radulfinally emerged victorious among the voivode nominees in 1523, hewas allowed to retain his office.

The conquest of Poland was never a political objective of the Porte.The Porte merely wanted to neutralize the country in view of thefinal confrontation with Hungary. The Ottomans waged a war withthis limited aim against Poland, and not with their own forces, butby proxy, with the forces of the Khanate of Crimean Tartars who were their vassals. As a consequence of their destructive raids, KingSigismund himself initiated peace in 1525.

The Hungarian government was fully aware that the intermissionmerely provided a breathing space; it entertained no illusions regarding the ultimate goals of the sultan. Louis II wrote to the king ofPoland in that vein in March 1522: having received reports of thevast preparations undertaken by the Turks, he requested that Sigismund meet with him personally in order to discuss the matter or, ifthat were not possible, that Sigismund also send delegates to theImperial council, about to meet in Nurnberg, and at which theOttoman threat was on the agenda. Louis had already sent twoemissaries: "Both are quite familiar with the border counties andtheir state of alert; in fact, one of them has even fought against thefoe." According to reports the Ottomans were preparing to attackalong three directions: in Transylvania; from Belgrade, "since, without doubt, they cannot advance anywhere except along the Danubebecause of their enormous fleet; and towards Slavonia." [186]

We have seen that Hungary could not do without foreign aid. Butwhat kind of aid could Hungary count on in this period? Charles V,given his war against the French, could provide nothing. He madethis clear already in 1521 when he advised Louis II to sign anarmistice with the Ottomans. Ferdinand of Habsburg could givesupport only to the extent of intervening at the Imperial diet onbehalf of Hungary. Moreover, he assumed some of the burden of thedefense of the Croatian castles by sending funds and troops there,which, of course, enhanced his political influence in the area as well.Hungary expected help from Rome, more than from any other sourcebecause first of all, the precondition of foreign aid was that theEuropean powers cease waging wars against one another: the Hungarian government might have hoped that an appeal by the pope,head of the Christian world, who was at the moment not directlyinvolved in the conflicts, would be heeded by the warring states. Ofcourse, while this was mere illusion on its part, there is no doubtthat the popes were motivated by idealistic considerations. Furthermore, the papacy had helped before, and with not inconsiderablefunds, and it would be blindness on our part to disregard the factthat the Ottoman menace was a threat to Italy itself, includingRome. Pope Adrian was no less frightened by an Ottoman attackthan his predecessor, Leo X, was. When, in 1523, reports to the effect that the Hungarian to compromise with the Turks reached Rome,the pope and his entourage were seized by outright panic.

The Hungarian emissaries also continuously lobbied for assistance at the Imperial diets. At the diets of 1522 and 1523, as well asat the meeting of Wiener Neustadt in 1523, where military expertsdelegated by the Imperial diet negotiated with the Hungarians, thefollowing was made crystal clear: the empire could not contributebecause of the emperor's war; there could be no question of regularhelp, only of occasional assistance; but even occasional help wasbound to arrive late in a given crisis, because the specific unit ofassistance--the so-called "Romzug" or "Turkenhilfe"--was grantedfor only six months. Deducting the month and a half or two monthsrequired for marching to the area of conflict and back, this impliedonly four months of actual fighting. The bond uniting the Imperiallands, never strong to begin with, was becoming increasingly looserbecause of the progress of Protestantism. Luther himself, while hedid not reject the notion of an anti-Turkish war outright, wasagainst the idea of such a war being led by the emperor or pope. TheGerman troops refused to accept their salary in Hungarian coinssince their intrinsic value had diminished by one half as a result ofthe debasement of the currency. The estates within the Empiretotally distrusted the Hungarian government on account of theanarachy prevailing in the country. Ferdinand of Habsburg himselfdid not expect much to come out of Imperial assistance. In May 1523he wrote to Louis II: "both of us are lost, because it is impossible toresist such a powerful enemy as the Turk.... As for the assistancefrom the Empire, well, it is not worth a wooden penny." [187]

Poland, whose ruler was tied to the king of Hungary by closekinship relations, would have been the most natural ally, all themore so since Sigismund was just as worried about Habsburg ruleover Hungary as Suleyman was. On one occasion he averred: "Wewill take care not to allow anyone [but specifically Ferdinand ofHabsburg] to usurp the rule of our cousin [Louis II], especially notsomeone of whom we disapprove." [188] We have seen, however, whatpressure the Ottomans had applied to Poland, pressure compoundedby the kings confrontations with the Teutonic Knights and theRussians.

The interests of Venice and the Ottoman Empire were not at odds;in fact, they coincided entirely. Both were directly concerned when the European balance was upset by Charles V. Moreover, only theOttomans could help Venice displace the Portuguese from the spicetrade, whereas the Ottomans could not do without the expertise ofthe Republic's experienced merchants. Venice, which until then hadmade considerable sacrifices to help defend the castles of Dalmatiaand Croatia, was now contributing, but only reluctantly, whereasmore than once she had provided the Turks with outright support forone or another of their undertakings.

Thus the diplomatic situation was at its very worst from theHungarian point of view, and it was made worse still by the economic depression within the country. The losses of territory merelyincreased the expense of maintaining the castles and the alreadylopsided imbalance in state revenues.

The royal council briefed Bishop Brodarics, Hungary's ambassador to Rome, as follows:

In this hopeless situation, negotiations with a Turkish emissarywere renewed in Buda in February 1524. It is not possible to deter-mine whether the emissary had arrived just recently, or whetherthis was the same person who had arrived in 1520 and who might have been kept captive every since. [190] We do know, however, that thenegotiations were conducted in secret and that the emissary wasunder guard, presumably to prevent him from communicating withthe uninitiated. [191] Secrecy was so well maintained that only one ofthe diplomats stationed in Buda, the nimble Venetian ambassador,well endowed in funds, and an expert in such matters, got wind ofthe negotiations. He reported the matter to Venice, whence the newsspread, via the court in Rome, to Ferdinand of Habsburg. Ferdinandfelt hurt and wrote to Louis II in an unusually tough tone: "According to my information the secret peace negotiations" had advanced toa point where "they say they are near conclusion", but let Louis noteven think of signing peace because, even if there were no treaty ofalliance between them, kinship would suffice in itself to oblige himnot to reach agreements without consulting the other. Let him,therefore, refrain from taking this step "as a result of which he[Louis] would get into a predicament from which there was noreturn. If it was a matter of those conditions that have been reportedto us by the Pope, then it would merely prepare for your and yourcountry's demise." [192]

Furthermore, Ferdinand rudely admonished Schneidpock, hisambassador in Buda, for not having obtained knowledge of theaffair. [193] Schneidpock defended himself, and it is thanks to his replies, discovered only recently, that historians have been able togain some insight on the negotiations. Towards the end of AprilSchneidpock wrote a letter to justify himself to Salamanca, Ferdinand's chief minister; in it he described the information that theHungarians wanted to sign a treaty of alliance with the Porte as"empty prattle." In the following days he reported directly to Ferdinand, informing him that he had made inquiries of the Hungarianking, the queen, as well as the papal nuncio, yet none of them knewanything about the matter. In a further letter to Ferdinand, dated May 4, he reported that: the papal nuncio refused to disburse themoneys allocated to the Hungarians by Rome whereupon theythreatened to accept the stipulations of the Porte, which includedpaying tribute and allowing the Ottoman armies the right of transit.But the same false rumors were spread by the Hungarians atNurnberg, in order to extort as much money as possible from thediet. Schneidpock concluded his letter: "From all this Your Majestywill understand how this rumor arose. I get along well with theKing, Queen, and some of the secret councilors as regards theaffairs that are settled here, but none of them knows anything aboutthe matter; finally, an individual told me about the origins of therumor, just as I had described it here." [194]

However, Schneidpock's information about the negotiations ishard to believe in its entirety. I am skeptical when he writes thatneither king nor queen knew anything about the matter; the issuebeing top secret, they had to deny everything by virtue of their office.To say that the royal couple was ignorant of the matter provesnothing. It is obvious that the ambassador was quite uninformedand irresponsibly concocted false stories regarding the extortionindulged in by the Hungarians in order to mislead his superior(s)and to cover up his mistake.[195]

I am of the opinion that the secret negotiations did indeed includethe topic of tribute and the right of free passage for the Ottomanforces. This assumption is confirmed by the fact that, on June 19,Burgio appealed to the Hungarian grandees not to conclude a peacetreaty. On December 29 the nuncio informed Rome that, according toTomori, the Hungarians could obtain peace if they would only allowthe Ottomans to cross Hungarian territory. [196]

Edgar Artner writes, apparently on the basis of a document in theVatican archives, that Tomori went to Buda in January 1525 topersuade the government to conclude a peace, even at the expense ofallowing the right of transit. The following year, a month before thebattle of Mohacs, he again appealed to the king to conclude a peacetreaty. [197]

Also, we know that Tomori had negotiated with Bali Bey, thecommander of Belgrade, on two occasions. According to Artner: "Thewhole thing was, in fact, a ruse concocted by Bali Beg, to obtainHungarian secrets, as Campeggio had suspected all along." [198] It isdifficult to accept, albeit not impossible, that Campeggio saw matters in this light, for it is unlikely that he would be kept informed ofthe nature of the negotiations. But the historian cannot be satisfiedwith such an explanation. There are two things we cannot assumeabout Bali Bey, who happened to be one of the most outstandingsoldiers of the Empire. One is that he had no recourse other than toobtain secrets from Tomori, while he himself was in charge of anexcellent intelligence service collecting information about Hungary.The other unbelievable notion is that Bali Bey should deem his greatand much-feared adversary Tomori, the one so feared by soldiers, asthe kind or person who would blabber about state secrets. It is morelikely that the two leaders were appointed by their respective governments to meet and to discuss some especially important topic,and this topic could only have been peace. If these negotiations led tono results, the reason ought to be sought in the fact that Bali Beg, oninstructions from his government, continued to demand the right offree transit, something Tomori could not grant without royal authorization.

The dispatches from Bishop Brodarics for this period are highlyrelevant. Brodarics had been sent as ambassador to Rome. Theobject of his mission was to convince the papal court to restore peacein Europe, as well as to solicit financial assistance. Viewing mattersfrom closer up he noted, with growing pessimism, that there wasalmost no hope of obtaining financial help. Brodarics related hisexperiences in several letters to the king of Poland, with whom hewas on good terms. Thus, in the summer of 1523, he wrote: '"There isalmost nothing left of the hope of peace among the Christian rulers,',whereas the financial assistance, although often discussed, wasnowhere in sight. The news from Buda was that they intended toconclude peace with the Turks, something that considerably worriedpeople in Rome. Papal envoys promised "heaven and earth", butgave nothing. Brodarics, therefore, requested that Sigismund talk toLouis about seeking a solution "rather than count on peace [amongEuropean rulers] or financial assistance, and lose the country as aresult, God forbid!" Indeed, it is amazing that Louis would not listen to Sigismund, and "conclude peace or armistice especially since theChristian rulers are at war with one another, and there is absolutelyno hope for help." And Brodarics formulated that great truth ofRealpolitik: he who gains time, gains life. "It would be advisable toconclude an armistice, and both majesties [Sigismund and Louis]would then be free to settle matters to their satisfaction....,[199]

Indeed, Poland was able to conclude peace with the Ottomansunder different circumstances; yet it appears that Brodarics felt thatpeace was the only chance of survival for Hungary, even consideringthe far more burdensome stipulations the Hungarians had to face.when, after Mohacs, peace was concluded between Suleyman andKing John at the price of those very conditions, Brodarics wrote thathe stuck to his opinion, already expressed to the late King Louis,that "Hungary's only refuge is friendship with the Turks." [200]

A serious imperative must have prompted Brodarics, one of themost honest figures of the generation of Mohacs, to write such words.This imperative could have been nothing else than a wish to save thecountry from annihilation. Szekfu did not recognize this--or refusedto recognize it--when he wrote: 'This respect for and inherited fearof the Turks was derived from his south Slav lineage, for the Turkshad been torturing the Southern Slavs for two hundred years; thiswas what clouded the lucidity of Brodarics' political judgment, andconverted him into the foremost theoretical and practical advocate ofan alliance with the Turks." [201] Apart from the fact that such a thesisis inadmissible from a methodological perspective because it makesuse of the vague motion of national character (not to mention itsnationalist overtones), it is also vulnerable because it entirely disregards political reality, that is, the fact that the Hungarians shouldindeed have explored every avenue for a modus vivendi with theTurks. Instead, Szekfu seems to expect some romantic, unrealistic,almost Don Quixotesque attitude from the generation of Mohacs.This perception has become practically the ideology of Hungarianhistoriography since the nineteenth century. For example, accordingto one of Hungary's greatest historians, Laszlo Szalay:

Help was needed once again. And let the young reader not think thatthere was something humiliating for the nation in this constantbegging for help. Far from it. The solution Venice, France, and KingSigismund had found, to conclude peace and even an alliance with the Turk, and thus to be safe from his might, was likewise available to theHungarians. Such overtures were indeed made to the court at Buda bySuleyman, as well as by his predecessors; the haughtiness with whichthe ambassador of Wassily who, in the name of the tsar wanted toconclude close friendship with the Sultan, was turned away, would nothave applied in the case of Hungary. But the proud nation refused toturn unfaithful to its traditional policy, even in its decline and fall; evenin its misery, brought upon it by the government and the oligarchy, itinsisted on continuing to serve the cause of Christianity and civilization. [202]

One is simply astonished; here we have a vision of the "proudHungarian nation" which, knowing no compromise or humility,bares its chest and shouts to the world "thrust your dagger here!"This attitude--the oft-mentioned Mohacs complex--has been passedon from generation to generation. It was the attitude of Pal Torok inhis discussion of the peace proposal of 1524 and his refusal toconcede the possibility of a proposal from the Süleyman to Louis II. [203]

It is a fact that there is no record in writing of the conditionstipulated by the sultan, the right of transit. Yet, in the knowledgeof the circumstances, I assert with conviction that the sultan couldnot have asked for less. As regards the declaration, although warwas never declared formally, both times after the proposals of peacewere turned down the Ottomans actually launched a war--in 1521after the proposal of 1520, and in 1526 after the proposal of 1524.

Pal Torok states correctly that Brodarics made no mention of theOttoman peace proposal in his description of the battle of Mohacs.Istvanffy and other historians of the past 150 years also skirt aroundthe issue, and Szalay, as we have seen, does not mention it explicitly.Fraknoi and Szekfu are totally silent about the matter. Since we arefamiliar with Brodarics's attitude from his correspondence the question remains, why did he keep silent about the matter in his Descriptio? (We shall see, further on, that this description is unreliable, fora number of reasons.) One reason is that it was actually meant as adefensive response to the accusations Cuspinianus had raisedagainst the Hungarians. [204] Moreover, the first representative of the"Mohacs complex" was precisely Brodarics. The tendency to seek theexplanation of the demise of the powerful Hungarian state of theMiddle Ages in the personal weaknesses of its rulers (unless he doesthis in spite of his personal convictions) is already manifest in his writings. He avoids the notion that this demise might have been historically determined or produced by other factors.

As noted, Pal Torok states that the Ottomans asked for the rightof free passage only across Croatia. It is difficult to see why theTurks would confine themselves to this request which, at best, mighthave facilitated a decisive assault on Italy but not a campaignagainst Austria or the Holy Roman Empire. Because of the Alps theonly possible line of attack against Austria led across the Hungarianplains, especially since the Turkish army could hardly have donewithout the Danube as its main line of supply.

There are two other relevant developments in the period 1522 to1526. One of these was the peace treaty the Poles signed with theTurks. King Sigismund wanted to include Hungary in the treaty; hewrote to the Primate of Esztergom, in the summer of 1525: "We havebeen waiting rather a long time...for His Majesty King Louis toconsider and conclude a peace with the emperor [Süleyman], butsince all this time we have been unable to obtain assurances in thatregard from His Majesty we decided to send our own ambassador tothe Emperor of the Turks." [205] He did instruct his ambassador, however, to represent the cause of the Hungarians as well and to try toinclude them in the treaty. He informed the pope of the dispatch ofthe ambassador: '<Your Holiness may recall that your predecessorshave promised, to me and to His Majesty King Louis that, bringingabout peace among the Christian rulers, preparations would bemade for the great campaign; trusting in this promise I and mymajestic cousin [Louis] have both suffered considerable damages...."Hence, he states, he had no choice but to conclude peace with theTurks. [206]

Brodarics reported to Sigismund regarding the effect of this measure on diplomatic circles in Rome: everyone understood his decisionand would not be surprised "if Hungary were to follow the exampleset by your Majesty." [207] Indeed, the Polish emissary did bring up atthe Porte the matter of concluding peace with the Hungarians,although we do not know whether he had authorization from theHungarian government. The Ottoman leaders, however, insisted theHungarians sue for peace via its own emissary.

The other development closely related to the events precedingMohacs, while of an internal and economic nature, transcended these to become a European affair. [208] The episode began as early as1495. At that time Janos Thurzo signed a contract with the Fuggerfamily to exploit the country's richest copper ore resources atBesztercebanya and vicinity. Implicit in this joint enterprise wasparticipation in the exploitation and minting of silver. This "jointenterprise", however, was canceled temporarily by the Diet atRakos, held in the summer of 1525. This diet declared, on the onehand, the cessation of minting the nova moneta, introduced in 1521,worth less than its face value, and raised completely groundlessaccusations of fraud against a Christianized Jew, one Imre Szerencses. On the other hand, the contract with the Fuggers (or theFukars--the "stingy ones" as they were called in Hungary) regarding the exploitation of the mines was denounced. In fact, the Fuggerswere required to pay damages. The diet went even further. Themasses were instigated, according to contemporary reports, by the"Hungarian lords and their party followers," to plunder the house ofSzerencses. This was followed by an assault on the depots in Buda aswell and the confiscation of the moneys found there, including thepapal aid which had been deposited by Burgio. A few weeks later, atthe gathering of the lesser nobility in Hatvan, Imre Szerencsesturned from accused to plaintiff and, citing figures out of the blue,enumerated the damages the Fuggers had caused the country. Theroyal court, and probably some foreign entrepreneurs competingagainst the Fuggers, backed Szerencses. So it happened that theagent of the Fuggers at Buda, now held captive, was forced to writea promissory note to the effect that his masters would reimburse theHungarian government for the damages caused. Of course, thehouse of Fuggers, more precisely Jacob Fugger, did not leave thematter at that. Denying the claims of Szerencses, he wrote his agentat Cracow: "I will demand that everything taken from me be returned. Let them cover the debt owed by the king, as well as thesums I had paid out to the Hungarians on the basis of the contract,and furthermore, [demand] that I be reinstated in the business." [209]He added:

I have already arranged that Hungarian copper not be transportedacross Austrian lands, and I will try, and I hope will succeed, inpreventing copper from crossing German lands as well.... Insofar asyou can, stop shipments of lead to Hungary.... Production will soon haltin the gold mines; we have already ordered such a halt in our own mines. We can see that not much more than half the previous rate isbeing produced in the silver mines. Thus, our business will be increasingly missed, day after day, and the country of the Hungarians will seehow far it can get by its methods. [210]

Jacob Fugger also resorted to political pressures. He solicitedmoral support from practically every court in Europe, and indeed hegot some. Everyone from the German emperor to the pope took upthe Fuggers' cause; Charles V even threatened to mobilize his wholeempire against the Hungarians. The pope warned Louis: "Demandand insist that justice be done to the Fuggers." [211] Even Ferdinand ofHabsburg blamed his brother-in-law, Louis. Finally, the Hungariangovernment was forced to back down. It restored the rights of theFuggers and paid damages, while the government received a loan of50,000 forints. To quote Hermann: "Giving an account of this 50,000forint loan Dernschwam [the agent of the Fuggers] observed: 'thiswas the small sum of money available to King Louis to prepare forthe Turkish attack., Suleyman's army started out from Turkey theday after the contract was signed." [212]

We must consider, moreover, the political struggle waged withinthe country which had almost completely paralyzed the government.At Hatvan the lesser nobility expelled Bathory from his office ascount palatine and placed Werboczi in his stead, but the latter had toflee for his live in the summer of 1526, leaving the office once againin the hands of Bathory. Thus, on the eve of Mohacs, Hungary wasleft to its own devices, struggling with a thousand political andeconomic ills, militarily unprepared. The Ottomans, on the otherhand, had created a clear-cut situation, diplomatically and militarily.They had concluded peace with all potential enemies: Persia, Venice,Poland, and Wallachia. The army too had done good work. While itwas unable to capture Jajce and some other castles, it did takeOrsova and Severin. These two castles were significant because theyhad provided the Hungarians with a base for expeditions againstWallachia; moreover, they controlled Danubian shipping, not onlyfrom a military but also from an engineering point of view.

The Ottomans had responded to the rejection of their first peaceproposal with the occupation of Belgrade; now, in 1524, no one,whether in Hungary or elsewhere in Europe, doubted that theHungarian reluctance to sign for peace would elicit yet another

Turkish attack. This came only in 1526, the cause of the delay being,almost certainly, the need to consolidate control over Egypt, economically so critical for the Empire. The importance Suleymanattached to this control was demonstrated, as we have seen, by hisdispatch of the grand Vezir himself to Egypt. Having returned fromhis mission in September 1525 Ibrahim reacted to the situation byimmediately presenting to Suleyman the plan against the Portuguese elaborated by Selman Reis. The divan, however, decided thatthe Hungarian issue had to be resolved first. [213]

Indeed, the resolution of the issue brooked no further delay. InFebruary 1525 Francis I suffered a decisive defeat at Pavia, the kinghimself falling into the hands of the emperor. There can be no doubtthat Suleyman quickly learned of the events and that he recognizedtheir implications. what he, along with several other Europeanrulers had feared now came to pass: Charles V, having defeated theFrench, was absolute lord over Europe. However, we may take it forgranted that the attack against Hungary was not decided on therequest of the king of France. The statement of Kemal Pashazademust be given a broad interpretation: "One of the reasons, amongseveral, for this great campaign, was the promise given the king ofFrance, who had shown inclination and friendship towards theexalted Porte, regarding his liberation from the oppression of Hispania's ruler [Charles V]." [214] France had sent two emissaries torequest assistance: one was killed while crossing Bosnia--hencethat request did not reach the Porte--while the other arrived inDecember 1525, the campaign having been decided upon long ago; infact, the army was already mobilizing. The mobilization before theemissary's arrival must be emphasized because the interpretation isoften given that the policies of the Turks were strongly influenced byFrench diplomacy. My conviction is that this was not the case. I tendto agree with those who claim that the Porte derived greater benefitsfrom Franco-Turkish collaboration than did the French. [215]

Thus the campaign of 1526, leading to the Hungarian defeat atMohacs, got under way. A detailed account of the campaign will befound in the second part of our work.

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