The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

Continued...

As to Kosary's assumption that the Hungarian government mademistakes in assessing the circumstances, I believe this to be mostunlikely. We have seen how clearly the Hungarian government hadassessed the situation over the preceding thirty years, and howcleverly it navigated between the Scylla and Charybdis of peace andwar with the Ottomans. Is it possible that all this ability andexperience had suddenly vanished in the Hungarian leaders of the1520s? Not likely! In my opinion, they were fully aware of theseriousness of the matter and decided to request help in spite of allthe negative experiences of the past. What else might they havedone, once they felt they could not possibly agree to the stipulationsof the Porte? [158]

Realizing the reasons that prompted the Hungarian governmentto reject peace, our task now is to examine why the Porte came upwith such a demand at this particular time. There must have beensome imperative reason that impelled them in this direction sosuddenly. We can think of only one possibility, namely, that theHabsburgs were about to preempt the Porte's influence over Hungary, perhaps even to take over the country. We have mentionedthat, like other powers, the Ottoman state was aware of the dangerto the European balance of powers of Charles V's imperial election.From the Ottoman point of view this danger was further enhancedby the fact that, as a result of the marriage and inheritance treatycontracted by the Habsburgs and the Jagiellos in 1515, Hungarycould turn into a Habsburg province at any moment. [159] In addition,there was the danger that, with his great power and prestige,Charles V might succeed in bringing about a European alliance, theprerequisite for the oft-mentioned crusade. [160] All things considered,therefore, to lift Hungary out of the Habsburg orbit was an essentialrequirement for the Ottomans, and the condition of the peace offeredby Suleyman must have been that Hungary should break, or at leastloosen, its ties to Habsburg.

As further proof there is the fact that the sultan brought thematter to a head at a time when he had every reason not to getbogged down in Europe. For one thing, there was the rebellion inSyria, and, even if putting it down did not seem an overwhelmingtask, it nevertheless did require the presence of part of the army. Farmore important, a great deal of organizational work remained to bedone in the recently acquired and economically significant Syria andEgypt. Liaison with those territories had to be maintained militarily. This latter reason explains why the Porte had decided, already in1520, to launch an invasion against the Knights of Saint John ofRhodes who, with their piratical attacks, endangered shipping between Constantinople and Syria and Egypt. Moreover, the Knights had been the instigators of all the rebellions that threatened thesecurity of the Empire, including the one by Djanbedri Ghazali. [161]

That the issue of Hungary, in and of itself, was completely insignificant in comparison becomes most evident if we consider theeconomic aspects. As mentioned earlier, Kaldy-Nagy had demonstrated that the conquest of Hungary cost the Turkish treasury anadditional expenditure of 300,000 gold pieces a year. We have alsoseen in contrast that from the surplus in the budget of Egypt, half amillion gold pieces could be brought to Constantinople. If, nevertheless, the Porte gave precedence to settling the Hungarian issue,there must have been some weighty reason.

Given the relationship of forces between the two contending sides,a further question comes to mind: why did Suleyman choose apeaceful solution rather than imposing his will upon Hungary byforce, since there could have been no doubt about the outcome of aneventual war? In order to answer this question, we must make abrief excursion into the realm of military science, calling uponClausewitz for guidance. The objection that we should not apply atheory of war elaborated in the modern era to the distant past, orhorribile dictu, to the 'barbarian" Turks, may be dismissed bypointing out that Clausewitz elaborated his theory of war on thebasis of a thorough study of military history; even if he did not dealwith Turkish wars explicitly, this does not mean that his lessons donot apply.

As already quoted the cornerstone of Clausewitz's theory is that"war is nothing but the continuation of policy by other means." [162]Thus the objective of war is always determined by politics, whereaswar itself is nothing but a means of attaining this objective. Therecan be two kinds of war: all-out war and war with limited objectives.All-out war is a far more certain means of attaining the politicalobjective because, if it succeeds, the victor can impose his will on thedefeated enemy without reservations. But there are three prerequisites for all-out victory: the destruction of the enemy's armed forces.the complete occupation of his country; and the breakdown of themoral resistance of its inhabitants. If it is clear from the beginningthat any one of these requisites cannot be achieved, there is no pointin waging an all-out war of annihilation.

If all-out war cannot be achieved, then a war with limited objectives becomes the appropriate means. Limited war is a matter ofcompromise: the aggressor prescribes certain conditions which, ofcourse, are far milder than in the case of an all-out war, and the pricethe other party has to pay is lower than the cost of waging war. Thecost is the destruction of its army, the loss of certain provinces, orboth. Moreover, once the war is lost, the defeated party, of course,has to carry out the stipulations the aggressor proposed at thebeginning. As we can see, this kind of war does not include two of thecriteria associated with a war of annihilation: the occupation of theentire country, and the breakdown of moral resistance. Thus, despite the losses suffered, the country may still continue the fight.Hence limited wars harbor two unforeseeable factors: final success isnot at all guaranteed, but merely probable, while from the side of thevictim, it implies making a highly subjective assessment that cannotbe guessed by the aggressor--namely, at what point does the victimized country feel that the cost of war exceeds the cost of peace, apeace that is tantamount to carrying out the political demands of theaggressor. Napoleon's Russian campaign is a classic example of theuncertainties involved in attaining one's political goal by means ofwar with a limited objective.

The goal was not the annihilation of Russia. As a soldier Napoleonfelt this to be impossible and, as a politician, superfluous and evenharmful. Rather, his goal was merely to detach the tsarist government from its British ally and to bring the tsar to the French side inorder to render the continental blockade complete and effective.Consequently, Napoleon's objective was the defeat of the Russianarmy in a decisive battle. He felt it likely that the destruction of thearmy would compel the Russian government to sue for peace. Hiscalculations proved wrong, because Kutuzov and the tsarist government felt that the damage suffered by Russia, even after forfeiting agood part of the country and losing the battle of Borodino, was stillless than the damage it would suffer if it complied with Napoleon'sdemands. [163]

Süleyman was confronted basically with the same dilemma. SinceHungary lay beyond his army's range of effectiveness, he could notlaunch a war of annihilation against her. Indeed, he could defeat theHungarian army, but could not occupy the entire country; consequently, he was unable to destroy the morale of its inhabitants. Theonly option left, therefore, was limited warfare, all the uncertain factors notwithstanding. It is understandable, therefore, that Suleyman should prefer a peaceful solution.What has been said about limited wars may be applied, point bypoint, to the 1521 assault on Belgrade. By capturing the castleSuleyman certainly achieved two things: first he rendered the probability of an ultimate victory by the Hungarians minimal, since thecountry had become defenseless; second, the continuation of the warwould result in destruction far exceeding the price asked for thepeace offered. In addition to the fact that Hungary lost the prosperous province of Srem, practically in its entirety, a good part of thecountry became exposed to Turkish raids. Suleyman had a right tobelieve, therefore, that the Hungarian government would rather optfor peace.

Let us review the events which preceded Hungary's decision. It isunlikely that the Turkish emissary to Hungary was killed, as Istvanffy claims, because the Turkish chroniclers would surely havementioned it. It seems more likely that he was detained. Djeladzademerely writes that Louis II "showed weakness by detaining theemissary sent to him and by failing to receive him honorably." [164] Weshould note that Djeladzade was a clerk of the divan, and later, assecretary of state, a member of the same body; hence he was in aposition to know the inner springs of the decisions taken by theSultan. Thus, when he writes of "laying the foundations of peace andfriendship" we must take him seriously and grant his words at leastthe power to enhance our interpretation: that is, that the emissarycame not with the usual offer of peace, but in order to arrange adefinitive and peaceful settlement of the relationship with Hungary.

The Hungarian government did not respond to the peace offer buturgently dispatched emissaries of its own to request help fromvarious foreign powers. Of course, Suleyman interpreted the rejection of his offer as a declaration of war, yet he could not embark ona campaign until the situation in Syria had been resolved. He musthave learned of the defeat of the rebellion and of the death ofDjanbedri Ghazali, (which occurred on February 1) in the first daysof February. Then, as the Turkish sources indicate, he issued theorder for mobilization. Ferdi writes categorically that the Sultanopted for war in the spring of 1521; "then, as the pillars of the stateand the grandees of the Empire came to the court...holding a meeting of the exalted Divan, the high-ranking vezirs beheld the Sultan; the unalterable command, that the aforementioned campaignshould by all means be prepared, was issued." [165]

Ferdi discusses the process of mobilization, which we have described in Chapter II. According to Djeladzade, as soon as the Sultanfound out that the "grumblings of the sami [Syrian] rebels had beenstilled, he decided on a campaign with a victorious outcome." [166] Thefethname issued on the completion of the campaign, announcing thevictory, presents the events in much the same light. According tothis document, the war against Hungary had been decided, "but,since that leader of the rabble, Djanbedri...began to incite to rebellion, the world first had to be cleansed from its dirty body." Therefore, the sultan sent the army of Anatolia to Syria, and, in the courseof battle, "the band of rebels fled, and the head of Ghazali wasbrought to my throne. Even before these forces returned to join myvictorious army I set out on the campaign, complementing thedivision of Rumil with the guard at my high court...." [167]

These sources reveal the following substantive points. The Portehad decided on the Hungarian campaign in January or in earlyFebruary at the latest. Mobilization started only in February andMarch. Only the forces of the Rumelian province and the sultan'sregulars took part in the campaign. Ferdi informs us that the reasonfor the last point was that the Syrian campaign had pretty muchworn out the Anatolian army; it would not have been possible toredeploy this army for the European theater of operations in time. [168]

All this proves beyond doubt that Suleyman felt the showdownwith Hungary to be of utmost importance; it was almost unprecedented that the army should begin to mobilize as late as spring, orthat only the Rumelian army and the regulars should take part inthe campaign led by the sultan himself. Because of these verycircumstances it was essential to carry out the attack by surprise.Secrecy surrounded the preparation of the campaign, especially asregards its destination. Generally the Porte hardly worried aboutkeeping its preparations secret--which, in any case, given the measures necessitated by mobilizing the enormous army all across theEmpire, would have been rather difficult. In fact, more than once theSultan had sent a message to his foes warning them of his coming"visit." This time, however, he took great precautions. As recorded by Djeladzade, no one outside the narrowest circle around the Sultan knew the objective of the campaign, even as late as the day ofassembly at Adrianople: "until that time it was not known where thepadishah, blessed by fortune, would direct his victorious campaign,because it was concealed by a veil of secrecy; the only thing knownabout it was that it would be directed against the infidel Hungarians." [169]

Although the army started off from Constantinople on May 18, itwas only towards the end of June and the beginning of July, oncethey left Nis, that the supreme command prescribed individual tasksto the components of the army. Some of the janissaries and theGrand Vezir Ahmed were dispatched, on "forced march,', againstSabac; as for the Grand Vezir Piri Mohamed, he was ordered toproceed to Belgrade and to begin the siege. At the same time thetroops of the sanjak of Bosnia and the akindjis received orders tolaunch attacks against Srem, Croatia, and Transylvania--a moveprobably aimed at disguising the true purpose of the expedition. [170]We shall see further on that this strategem succeeded, since for along time the Hungarian government had no idea which was themain thrust of the attack.

Furthermore, it should be clear from all this that the objective ofthe campaign was not to mete out a decisive blow against theHungarian army, nor was it the capture of Buda, as the Hungariansbelieved and as several Turkish sources claim, but merely the capture of Belgrade and Sabac and control over the region of Srem. Wemay assert this all the more safely since, in 1526, when the objectivewas indeed the capture of Buda and defeat of the Hungarian army,the Anatolian army also took part in the operations, although it isnot likely that the Porte deemed Hungary stronger than it had beenin 1521.

Moreover, the Turkish military leadership picked the most opportune moment for the attack since Hungary could not expect helpfrom any quarter. The war between Charles V and Francis I had juststarted and strong Tartar forces were devastating Poland, whereasVenice, disturbed by Charles V's excessive power as much as anystate in Europe, was courting Turkish friendship, if only for reasonsof security. Even economic interests dictated that Venice shouldadopt a pro-Turkish attitude. Selim had allowed Venice to retain the leading role in the spice trade, and Suleyman did not intend tocurtail it. The Venetian ambassador to Constantinople negotiated atreaty with the leading Turkish statesmen which proved advantageous and which did not hurt, but rather bolstered Venetian participation in the Near Eastern trade. The Venetian moves were severelycondemned in Buda, and the Venetian ambassador there had tolisten to grave reproaches. The republic was even accused of havingabetted the Turks against Hungary. [171] It is quite possible that therewas a kernel of truth in the accusation since Venice had alreadyrecognized that, as regards Hungary, its interests were basicallycompatible with Ottoman interests. The presence of the Habsburgsin Hungary was at least as dangerous for them as it was for theTurks.

The organization and execution of the Ottoman campaign of 1521may be deemed a military masterpiece. Although the main objectivewas the capture of Belgrade, the Ottomans, having learned theirlesson in 1456, strove to prevent relief from reaching the castle by allthe means at their disposal. This was why they simultaneouslybesieged Belgrade and Sabac and occupied Zimony, Szalankemenand other castles of Srem. In order to prevent the Hungarian flotillafrom intervening, a sizeable Danubian fleet, reinforced by janissaries, was kept in a state of readiness. Raiding parties enabled theOttomans to keep the main Hungarian forces under observation.Their scorched earth policy in Srem made it impossible or at leastvery difficult for the Hungarians to penetrate into that area. Oursources are all agreed regarding these factors. In connection withthe capture of Sabac, Istvanffy writes: "He [Süleyman] did this withthe aim of closing down all avenues of approach, to prevent anyonefrom reaching Belgrade, and of delivering food or other necessary supplies by sailing down the Sava." [172] Regarding the capture ofZimony the diary of Suleyman relates:

The aforementioned city was located in the province of Srem, rightacross from Belgrade; this castle constituted the best support and helpfor Belgrade by supplying it. . .. The capture of this castle cut off suppliesfrom Belgrade and, while it had not been possible to travel betweenSabac and Belgrade, now even parties of one could do so safely. [173]

Although the troops of Piri Mohammed surrounded Belgrade already in early July, the actual siege began only later, after the unitinvolved at Sabac could be redeployed. Some Ottoman sources explain this relatively tardy redeployment by the fact that the bridgeconstructed at Sabac had been carried away by the flood, as aconsequence of which the troops were unable to cross the Sava. It isalso possible, however, that the Turks wanted to make sure theHungarians did not cross at Eszek--where their bridge had alreadybeen erected--and attack in the direction of Sabac. [174] It is quitefeasible to reach Belgrade along the southern banks of the Sava as,indeed, the Ottoman train had done, according to Ottoman sources.It seems that the army was ordered to advance towards Belgradealong the northern bank of the Sava for reasons of safety.

Despite the heroic resistance of its garrison, the besieging army,strengthened by the units moving in from Sabac took Belgrade onAugust 29. The area, together with part of the Srem and withBelgrade as its center, was organized into a sanjak, to be governedby Bali Beg The damages Belgrade had suffered during the siegewere quickly repaired. About 2,000 peasants from the area wereenlisted to work on the project, and 20,000 gold pieces were paid outfor labor. A garrison of 3,000, including guns and several hundredjanissaries, was left at the castle. The army marched away from thecastle on September 14, homeward-bound. [175]

Having dealt in such detail with the campaign of 1521 from theOttoman point of view, I should now analyze the events from theHungarian side in comparable detail. Unfortunately, it is not possible to do so because of the present state of research: even the most basic issues have not been clarified. Thus I can do no more than callattention to certain diplomatic and military events.

I have mentioned that after the court did not respond to the peaceproposal delivered by the Ottoman emissary, it urgently requestedhelp from foreign powers. According to some sources, the Hungariangovernment was very optimistic, in the early months of 1521, mainlybecause of Syrian developments; it felt a decisive attack against theTurks could be launched. Such optimism, considering the state of thecountry and of European politics, must seem incomprehensible;indeed, I cannot believe it. Some sources mention that the king, inthe course of conversations with particular ambassadors, expressedgreat hopes of receiving help from the emperor, the pope, andVenice. [176] My feeling, however, is that he may have spoken in optimistic terms regarding the help he was expecting from the Emperoronly to encourage the Republic to rise to the occasion and meet thechallenge. He did the same, mutatis mutandis, with other ambassadors. Whatever the case, nothing of this optimism was left was leftby mid-April.

The emissaries returning from abroad reported the complete failure of their mission; even more disheartening was the news, received on April 19, that the Turks had put down the rebellion inSyria. [177] Given the fact that the Ottoman rear was now secure,everyone faced the terrifying thought that they might take theadvantage and attack. The foreboding was validated by all thereports received. The Ottoman army was not preparing for war butrather was already on its way against Hungary. Frightening reportscame in from Croatia as well.

The Ottomans were threatening the Croatians, and the latter, tobe left in peace, were willing to allow the Turks free passage acrosstheir territory. At the same time Moldavia, Wallachia, and Transylvania also felt threatened and were asking for urgent help. [178] Theletter Louis addressed to the Venetian Council on June 29 manifestsutmost anxiety. The Turks arecarrying out the greatest, incredibly vast military preparations on landand water; they intend to pour into the kingdom, a, visit us, to comestraight to Buda. They have sent Mehmet Bey at the head of an armyof 80 000 across Wallachia against our province called Transylvania; the aforementioned leader of Wallachia, although our subject, wascompelled by force and driven by fear to provide 40,000 soldiers tothem. They are also keeping armies ready to invade Croatia andSlavonia. [179]

Louis was requesting help from Venice, expecting it, together withthe pope, to convince the emperor and the king of France to desistfrom their war and to turn their forces on land and on water againstthe Turks. No proposal could have been more naive.

Sabac had already fallen when the Hungarians began to mobilizetheir forces. On July 31, Louis informed Sigismund, King of Poland,that it was rumored that the Turk was heading towards Buda,while the Ottoman Supreme Command had already pinpointedtwenty way-stations along the road. Furthermore, Belgrade was inmortal danger. Two armies were being formed in Hungary: one wasunder the command of the count palatine at Zenta, the other, atBuda, under the king's own command, soon to march to Tolna. [180]Incidentally, it should be noted that Süleyman had no mind toadvance to Buda at this time; yet the rumor was not entirelywithout substance since it was deliberately spread by the Ottomanleadership, apparently to confuse the Hungarian government and tocause chaos. [181]

The mobilization of the Hungarian army proceeded rather slowly.Only on August 8 was the king able to leave Buda with his forces,whereas Szapolyai was still issuing orders for the troops fromTransylvania, on July 26, to assemble at Szaszsebes by the end ofthe month. [182] A week before the fall of Belgrade, that is, on August22, the situation of the Hungarian army was as follows: the king wasstanding at Tolna with about 20,000 troops, Bathori was at Titelwith about 17-18,000, and Szapolyai at Lippa with 20,000. Thebridge at Eszek must have been readied about this time. Two pointsmay be concluded from this information: one, that because of theraids carried out by the Ottomans, from Wallachia to the AdriaticSea, the Hungarian high command did not dare unite its forces intoa single camp; two, that the Hungarian army intended to cross theDrava at Eszek to relieve Belgrade.

In the last week of September, when the army of the sultan wasalready heading home, the Hungarian high command held a war council at Bata. (By this time the royal army had reached Mohacs,Bathori was at Petervarad, and Szapolyai reportedly had reachedUjlak.) The question was whether to launch an attack to recaptureBelgrade. \0;e are not familiar with the arguments pro and consounded at the meeting, only the conclusion: the attack would not belaunched. Indeed, Hungarian historians have not missed this opportunity to scold the Hungarian leaders for being remiss. For instance,Ferenc Szakaly writes: "The Hungarian army did not go into counterattack, and thus it missed the only opportunity to recapture thefallen castle." [183]

If Szakaly had taken a closer look at this so-called opportunity, hemight have come to the conclusion that it would have been no simplematter at all to carry out a counterattack and that, had the attemptbeen made, the entire Hungarian army might have perished underthe walls of Belgrade. The Hungarian troops had been visited by theplague. Since the most effective means of controlling epidemics inthat period was to avoid gatherings, it was obvious that the armyhad to be disbanded immediately. Moreover, the Ottomans hadthoroughly fortified Belgrade. The Hungarian army had no siegeguns; by capturing Sabac, Zimony, Szalankemen, and other castles,by blockading the waterways, and by their scorched earth policyacross a good part of the Srem, the Turks had made it most difficultto approach the castle and supply the troops during an eventualsiege. Thus it is almost certain that the siege would have extendedinto the winter--something which, according to the lessons of military history, generally ended with the rout of the besieging army.We may thus conclude that, had the Hungarian army attempted toretake Belgrade, it would have most likely perished and the castlewould have still remained in the hands of the Ottomans.

In summary: Suleyman launched the campaign of 1521 with alimited objective, presumably in order to convince the Hungariangovernment to settle Ottoman-Hungarian relations peacefully, onceand for all. Indeed, he assumed that with the fall of Belgrade theHungarians would recognize that their chances for an ultimatevictory had been drastically reduced, whereas the damages theywere liable to suffer in the course of armed resistance were fargreater than the cost of making peace. We shall see that he was notdisappointed in his expectations because his renewed offer of peace in 1524, unlike the proposal of 1520-21, was given serious consideration by the Hungarian government.

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541