The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541

Provisions and Transport of Foodstuff

One of the most serious problems facing the campaigns conductedin this period was how to provide the armies with sufficient food andforage. Under the existing level of agricultural development, andwith the low population density, the armies could not count on theirsoldiers, horses, and draft animals being fed from local resources;the food had to be secured even before the campaign was launched.Of course, locally available food--above all green forage--was utilized, but staple items, primarily grain for bread, had to be broughtalong. All this implied extreme material burdens, because transportation was difficult and expensive, given the poor roads and theprimitive technology. In general, the cost of food and fodderamounted to 15 to 30% of all military expenses.

Simultaneously with the order to mobilize, the Ottoman government began to accumulate the food necessary for the campaign. Theyseem to have intended to send the army into battle with at least twoto three months of food reserves. [69] The Ottoman government organized transport with considerable foresight. Goods and equipmentwere carried by ship, cart, and camelback. [70] Transport by water wasthe simplest and most economical. For this very reason, the captureof Belgrade in 1521 was a significant achievement from the Ottomanpoint of view, since it enabled them to navigate the river throughoutits length within Ottoman control. Until then the grain had to becollected in Sofia and carried to Belgrade by camelback.

The rational approach of those in charge of the Turkish supplyservice, the arpa emini, is demonstrated by their choice of the camelas mode of transport. It is a safe and economical mode, since thecamel is an extremely undemanding animal, tough and well suitedto carry heavy loads. Moreover, it is much faster than the ox andcheaper than the horse. The abovementioned 10,000 cartloads ofcereal could be transported by 30,000 camels. [71]

Usually a cart required a driver and four horses to pull it, whereasa single driver could take care of up to six camels. By using camels,some 5,000 persons and 10,000 horses fewer were needed, not tomention the financial savings, inasmuch as the price of one horse,while it did not equal that of a hundred camels, as Busbeque claims,was certainly equal to that of a dozen. At the same time the choice ofthe camel was also very advantageous from the point of view oftransport and marching technology. One animal could carry a load of200 kg, and since four to six camels could travel side by side on anaverage road, for each kilometer of column 2-300 tons of freight canbe calculated, while carts would have been able to carry no morethan 35 or 40 tons. Consequently the length of the train could bereduced by more than 80%.

Strategy

The strategy applied depends on the relations of power, on spaceand time, but first and foremost, on the political objective of the war.As these factors changed in the course of time, the Ottoman leadership resorted to different strategies in its wars against the Hungarians. For the period from the fourteenth century, to the mid-fifteenth,precisely until the peace of Adrianople (1568), three clearly distinctphases in Ottoman strategy can be distinguished.

First Phase: from 1356 to 1453.

The occupation of Gallipoli in 1356 was a decisive event in thehistory of the Ottomans: they acquired a safe crossover point toEurope. In the following years, the Turks occupied the Byzantinepossessions in Eastern Rumelia, Thrace, and Eastern Macedonia,took the passes across the Balkan mountains, and, in 1383, set footin Bulgaria with the occupation of Sofia. The occupied territories,designated as Rumelia, were attached to the Empire, and, as a resultof the most thorough work of organization, they soon became, inSead-Eddin's words, "safety itself, and the permanent abode of peaceof mind in harmony", where the sultan "was most mindful of maintaining religious peace and organizing a Muslim state, as well as ofpreparing the fight to spread the faith."[73]

In the 1390s the Ottoman forces reached the line of the Danube, and, with the capture of Vidin, Nicopolis, Sistov, and Silistra, established important bridgeheads for their advance into Wallachia. Inthis period they also took Uskub in Serbia; the city became the seatof the sanjak. The Mongolian attack of 1402 put a temporary halt tothe expansion, but it soon started up again with the capture ofGiuirgevo in 1416, of Saloniki in 1430, Janina in 1431, and Krusevacin 1434. By the end of the period the borders of the Ottoman Empirein the Balkans ran along the Danube as far upstream as Orsova.

The speed of conquest was spectacular. The bulk of the occupiedarea fell into Ottoman hands in less than a generation, a significantachievement, even if we know that it was attained at the expense ofthe weak Byzantine Empire and of a Bulgaria and Serbia undermined by internal strife. The systematic nature of the conquest wasreadily apparent as well. To cite Johann Zinkeisen's simile, theacquisitions grew around Gallipoli like annual rings of a tree. Itseems that each step forward was the consequence of careful andrational assessments giving equal weight to political and strategicconsiderations. Except for Galamboc and Szendro the conquestsproved to be lasting during this phase. The Turks undertook nounplanned ventures and, except for the raids designed to obtainbooty and information, they engaged in no large-scale campaignsother than the siege of Belgrade in 1440.

From the strategic point of view the Ottoman state was in a betterposition than the Christian powers during this phase. First of all, itslines of operation were much shorter, which gave them considerableadvantage in concentrating troops and in logistics. In 1389 at thebattle of Kosovo the Ottoman armies were 200 km from their operational base, Philippopolis, as the crow flies, whereas the Hungarianand Wallachian contingents of the Christian host were 400 to 600km from their home. The strategic superiority of the Ottoman forceswas enhanced by the fact that they stood on the interior line vis-a-visEurope or Asia and the Balkan states. Being in the center, they hadlittle difficulty in transferring forces from one trouble spot to another, whereas their adversaries were either unable to unite theirforces--as in the case of Hungary or the principality of Karaman--orcould do so only by lengthy, exhausting, and time-consumingmarches, as in the case of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Bosnia.

While its geographical position offered the Ottoman state considerable advantages already at this early stage, in the fifteenth century, these advantages became even more marked and providedalmost total protection. The Ottomans were able to halt all attacksat the borders, whereas the Christians had to negotiate long marches beyond their frontiers. They had to move more than 400 to600 km to the battle of Nicopolis, the second Kosovo campaign, orduring the ~long campaign,' of 1444; during the campaign of Varna,800 km. Under these circumstances, even if the Christian forces hadscored a victory in one campaign or another, even if the Europeanpowers could have acted jointly, it is still doubtful whether theycould have found the means to carry on a protracted war consistingof several campaigns--on account of the extreme distances and thedifficulty of the terrain--and nothing short of such a war could haveoverthrown the Ottoman Empire.

Partly because of the distance to the theater of operations, butmostly because of delays at the outset, the campaigns of the Christian forces started in the fall and more than once dragged on into thewinter. This late start was due to the slowly grinding mill of thefeudal administration and the need to await the harvest in order toprovide the troops with food and fodder.

Already in this period the significance of the Danube as a meansof transport and communication was apparent. Even though theHungarian fleet on the Danube was still superior to the Ottomanone, by 1440 the latter succeeded in blockading the river at Belgradewith one hundred ships.

Before the capture of Constantinople the Ottoman Empire wasnever quite secure because its European and Asian provinces wereseparated by the sea. The Ottoman fleet was still too weak toguarantee safe crossing from one continent to the other. Even thefortification at Gallipoli could not fully compensate for this weakness. In contrast, Christian fleets could easily sail into the Black Seaand bolster an army which, avoiding the cumbersome mountainroutes of the Balkans, would have reached the coast. All this wastrue in theory only, however, because under the given circumstancesthe maritime powers were unable to conclude an alliance amongthemselves and with a continental power, namely Hungary, whichwould have enabled them to carry out combined military operations.In 1444 it did seem that such a fortunate conjuncture had comeabout, and this was the main reason for launching the Varna campaign in the first place; but the fleet provided by the maritimepowers was not up to the task by a long shot. It was unable toprevent the Ottoman army from crossing the straits, nor could itgive support to the Christian forces at the decisive encounter.

Second Phase: from 1463 to 1521

The capture of Constantinople in 1453 was an epochal date for theOttoman Empire just as it was for all Europe. It put an end to thegeographic division of the Empire and to the defence problems whichthis division entailed. Constantinople itself was an ideal center foran empire which was soon to extend from the River Sava to the Nile.The very position of the city granted considerable economic advantages: the master of the Bosporus controlled the significant commerce in the Black Sea. No wonder that after the shock and consternation caused by the fall of Byzantium, Venice was the first toconclude an economic agreement with the Porte.

From a military perspective Constantinople was an ideal capital.In addition to the fact that its capture unified the Empire, the city,surrounded as it is by the sea on three sides, was very nearlyimpregnable. The only reason the Byzantine Empire, moribund andcompletely unable to defend itself, survived as long as it did, was theexceptionally advantageous strategic location of its capital.

Following the capture of Constantinople, the talented and dynamic Sultan Mehmet II, known in history as the "World Conqueror", kept the machinery of the Ottoman state in high gear,adding huge areas to the Empire: Albania, Greece, Serbia, Bosnia,and Karamania. But the machinery did not slow down even after hisdeath; Selim I extended Ottoman power to Syria, Egypt, and Mesopotamia. The economic, political, and military power of all otherstates paled in comparison. The two most directly concerned andrelatively strongest powers, Venice and Hungary under MatthiasCorvinus, were forced into the defensive.

The direction of Ottoman expansion in Europe became clearlyvisible: while Serbia and Bosnia were absorbed into the Empire,Wallachia, the Tartar Khanate of Crimea, and eventually Moldaviawere merely converted into vassal states. It is not clear why thesultan did not attack Hungary and why he gave up the idea ofadvancing in that direction after his unsuccessful siege of Belgrade.Perhaps the mishap at Belgrade indicated that the Empire could notexpand further until Serbia and Bosnia were transformed into asecure base of operations. After these two countries were occupiedand converted into military bases, further expansion was hamperedby Ottoman involvement in the Near East. Furthermore, the significant political and military power of Hungary under Matthias Corvinus no doubt had something to do with this hesitation.

Recently Inalcik has expressed the view, very probably true, that Mehmet II was not in the least interested in occupying Hungary andregarded the Danube and the Sava as the definitive boundary line ofhis Empire. [74] I believe that Mehmet's objective was merely to convert the Balkans into an organic part of the Empire, which naturallyled him to strive to limit Hungarian and Venetian influence in thearea. From this perspective the siege of Belgrade in 1456 cannot beregarded as the first stage of a grand design on Hungary; it wasmeant merely to deprive the Hungarians of this essential base forattacks against the Balkans. At the same time, the fortress was alsothe most appropriate base for attacks against Hungary: its lossrendered the country altogether defenseless. Whatever the case, onething was certain: the balance of power had tipped definitely in favorof the Ottomans; to expel them from Europe had now become ahopeless endeavor. This realization determined the policies of theEuropean powers. Even Matthias gave up the concept of a great waragainst the Turks because he felt his own strength insufficient andhe could hardly count on outside help.

A memorandum addressed by Pope Leo X to the European powersillustrates well the impossibility of a great European cooperativewar aimed at the expulsion of the Ottomans. [75] It is worth dealingwith this text in some detail, for it contains much more militaryrealism than the fantastic projects put forth time and again in thisperiod. The memorandum also sheds light on the political difficultieswhich needed to be overcome in order to launch such a majorundertaking. The pope raised several questions: Should a war belaunched against the Turks? If yes, should it be an offensive or adefensive war? What were the obstacles to the war and how couldthese be overcome? Should all rulers participate, or only some--andwho would those be? By what means and modes should the war bewaged?

The answer to the first question was a definite yes. According tothe authors of the memorandum there was no doubt regarding thesecond question either: the war had to be an offensive one. The thirdquestion raised the greatest number of problems, because the primeobstacle to the war was the disharmony and jealousy among theChristian countries. A general peace, or at least an armistice, wouldhave to be declared, and the sources of disagreement would have tobe entrusted to arbitration by the pope and the college of cardinals.It would be most advisable to bring about a Holy Alliance, the members of which would obligate themselves to intervene againstthose who disturbed the peace. The answer to the fourth questionwas that the emperor and the king of France should bear the majorpart of the burdens of war, and all other rulers should participate inthe joint effort in an appropriate manner.

The bulk of the memorandum was taken up with a discussion ofthe means and manner of conducting the hostilities. Most importantwas to raise adequate funds. Eight hundred thousand ducats wouldbe needed, and its provision was regarded by the authors withsomewhat excessive optimism: one part of the sum would come fromthe personal income of the rulers, another part from the nobility andthe clergy, and a third part from the commoners. One third of themoney would be earmarked for fielding and equipping the army,two-thirds for its upkeep. As regards the army itself, 60,000 infantry, 4,000 heavy cavalry, and 12,000 light cavalry would be required.The infantry would be supplied by Switzerland, Germany, Spain,and Bohemia, the heavy cavalry by France and Italy, the lightcavalry by Spain, Italy, Albania, and Greece. Venice, Naples, Genoa,France, Portugal and Spain would contribute to the fleet. Since theOttomans had 300 warships, the Christian states would need atleast 150.

The authors of the memorandum believed that results could onlybe obtained by forces operating under a joint command; dissipationof the forces must be prevented at all cost. The direction and objective of the attack would be Constantinople. Three routes of deployment came under consideration: through Hungary along the Danube, along the coasts of Dalmatia and Illyria, or from Italy toGreece by sea, then on foot along the coast, through Macedonia, toConstantinople It would be advisable if Hungary and Poland undertook diversionary attacks against the border provinces of the Ottoman state while the army was marching on Constantinople. Finally,the memorandum mentioned the issue of the division of the reconquered territories, but stopped short of making specific recommendations, entrusting the solution to meetings following the hostilities.

The project met with cool reception at the courts of Europe. Theking of France replied after almost a year's silence, and even thenonly at the prompting of the pope. In his reply he greeted the planwith enthusiasm, yet he essential]y rejected it. In particular, heexpressed doubts about the financial aspects. He felt it would beentirely hopeless to extort money from the people because they nolonger trusted their governments: they had been fooled by referencesto a campaign against the Turk on so many previous occasions. Nor was the king in favor of using the forces jointly because, according tohim, this would inevitably lead to rivalry between the nations.

The emperor took even longer to answer. Then the reply wasprepared with typical German thoroughness; it included what practically amounted to a counter-proposal. This proposal was motivatedprimarily by envy of the king of France. The emperor proposed thatthe English and French rulers be omitted from the venture, at leastin the first year, because they would need all that time to cope withthe unrest provoked by the proclamation of the war-tax. His ownplan was just the opposite of the one the pope had suggested andconsidered primarily the interests of the Holy Roman Empire. Rather than a one-time blow, he proposed the division of the war intofour campaigns with the following objectives: in the first year thereconquest of the lands held by the Ottoman Empire in Africa andSyria; in the second year the recovery of its holdings in Europe; inthe third year the siege of Constantinople; in the fourth year theoccupation of the Asian territories.

All this demonstrates how impossible it was, already at that time,to block the expansion of the Ottoman Empire and consequently howinevitable was the fall of Hungary in the following period.

The Fall of The Medieval Kingdom of Hungary: Mohacs 1526 - Buda 1541