Toward a New Central Europe

In 1956

Number of Books *
Translated from into Hungarian into Czech into Rumanian
Serbian 4 2 1
Polish 5 16 3
Czech 10 - 2
Rumanian 4 - -
Bulgarian 2 3 4
Slovak 1 16 -
Hungarian - 9 13

In Rumania the same year there were:
26 German
75 Hungarian
12 Serbian language publications

In Czechoslovakia:
19 Hungarian
6 German language publications(38)

In 1958

Number of Books *
Translated from into Hungarian into Czech into Rumanian
Czech 9 - 6
Serbian 6 2 1
Polish 5 10 5
Rumanian 3 2 0
Hungarian - 5 18
Bulgarian 1 - -

In Rumania the same year:
47 Hungarian
7 Serbian language books were published

In Czechoslovakia:
18 Hungarian language books were published(39)

1959 figures are available from Hungary only.

Language
translated from Into Hungarian
No. of Books Combined
Circulation
Czech 16 101,300
Rumanian 6 56,900
Serb and Croatian 4 38,500
Polish 7 82,100(40)

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It should be noted, that the first two charts include all books translated in the respective countries. The last three charts include only the literary works.

The Communist emphasis of classless society, the persecution of the former leading classes, the admission policies in the institutions of higher learning, made the social stratification in all satellite countries similar. Except for the hatred against the Communist "New Class" there is little or no class antagonism left in East Europe.

The peoples of this area have one common enemy, the Soviet Union, and if there is some lack of brotherly love among the East European nations, the fellowship of common bondage is undoubtedly present. The best evidence for this fellowship is the Hungarian Revolution in 1956, when the people of Hungary, liberated from the Communist Russian bondage, chose freely the path leading to an eventual free federation of Danubian nations. The unpopular Communist puppet governments, on the other hand, lapsed into chauvinism and used it as a weapon to silence and kill the real desires of the East European peoples.

G. The Ideas of Federalism in the Hungarian Revolution.

The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 is important for this study because it was the first opportunity, in a long time, for a Danubian nation to speak out freely, to express its desires, opinions and formulate its goals. Although there were only a few days of freedom in Hungary, public opinion was surprisingly active. Student and worker committees and other political councils were formed together with political parties. In most cases these committees and councils, which were more active than the parties, were elected or appointed by the politically more active element, or as in the case of the National Council of County Vas, and many others they "were formed from representatives of the former coalition parties", obviously drawing their authority from the last free election in 1945, or in some cases the quasi free election in 1947.(41) There the Peoples Democratic Party appealed "to the country as a whole, and primarily to those 800,000 constituents who voted for us in 1947 despite terror and election fraud "(42)

The parties, national councils and committees first formulated their demands and programs and these were supposed to be, according to unanimous agreement, laid before the people which would decide as soon as possible, in a free election. These demands and programs. because of their similarity, can be regarded as the true expression of public opinion. Do they prove the proposition that the Danubian nations desire a closer cooperation? That there is little or no chauvinism? That the emotional precondition for federation is present? As far as Hungary is concerned the proof is convincing. Hugh Seton-Watson

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even claims that the behaviour of Hungary's neighbors is also a proof for this new friendliness of Danubian nations.(43)

The first mentioning of a federal solution in East Europe comes from the joint meeting of the Student's Parliament of Miskolc on October 26, 1956. Among their 18 demands! number eight states: "Our country should become a member of the Danubian Federation proposed by Kossuth."(44 These demands were broadcasted from Budapest through Radio Free Kossuth.

The Veszprern county Revolutionary National Council issued a proclamation in which point 4 demands:

The Hungarian Government should turn more attention to Hungarians living outside the Hungarian border and should get in contact with these minorities. The Foreign Policy Committee of the Parliament should initiate the reconsideration of the Warsaw Pact and should propose the formation of a Danubian Confedera tion. ( 45 )

Radio Free Miskolc on October 30, sent this appeal to Hungary's neighbors:

Slovaks' Rumanians! Serbians! Blood is flowing from our wounds and you are silent. We are fighting for liberty and you call us Fascists... We see that you too are groaning under the yoke we wish to throw off... We are fighting for you too, for peace, for Socialist truth, for the guarantee of free development of our peoples. Help us in our fight! (46

The Magyar Szabadsag, a newly published newspaper, on November 1, 1956 wrote a first page editorial emphasizing the need for cooperation with other East European nations.

The most important basis of our foreign policy must become the friendship and cooperation with the neighboring small nations. The lack of our independence hindered this, although the close alliance of the Danubian nations already has been Kossuth's idea. Yes, Hungary, from now on, has to work for the establishment of Kossuth's great legacy, the confederation of the Danubian peoples. This must be the most important demand of our foreign policy because only this way can the small nations, living in this area. permanently safeguard their independence.(47)

The Council of Free Trade-Unions had the following published in its official paper:

As of today we are no longer the tool of a colonialism disguised as socialism, nor a figure on the chess-board of some conqueror or other.. .

We are extending a friendly hand towards all peoples-to our neighbor, neutral Austria, and to free Yugoslavia which remains

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outside any blocs, towards Rumania, Czechoslovakia and the peo ple of the Soviet Union, we hope that their Governments will un derstand our little nation's thirst for freedom and national life . . .(48)

On the third of November, Free Radio Kossuth reported that the following gift consignments arrived in Budapest by air in recent days: "20 plane-loads from Poland, 26 plane-loads from Vienna, 9 plane-loads from Switzerland, 7 from East Germany, 2 from Bulgaria, 2 from Czechoslovakia and I each from Rumania, Yugoslavia and Belgium."(49)

Cardinal Mindszenty in his broadcast the same day said:

We.. . desire to live in friendship and in mutual respect with the great American United States, and the mighty Russian Empire alike, in good neighborly relationship with Prague, Bucharest, Warsaw and Belgrad. In this regard I must mention that for the brotherly understanding in our present suffering every Hungarian has embraced Austria to his heart.(50)

Radio Miskolc and Nyiregyhaza sent the following message in Slovakian and Rumanian languages.

Rumanian and Slovak brothers! We are bleeding and you are silent? We are fighting for freedom and you call us Fascists?... We are not fighting for irredentism, we proclaim friendship. When we visited you this year you welcomed us with friendship. We saw that you were suffering from the same thing we are now trying to get rid of. Now, to serve foreign interests they want to incite you against us. They lie and slander us... When we are talking about a confederation, we want friendship!... For us, brotherly nations, we want free development in a neutral political system (51)

The reaction of the other captive nations to the Hungarian events in 1956 gives little indication of their true feelings. The official Communist press, with the exception of Poland and Yugoslavia, echoes the Moscow line and describes the revolution as a reactionary plot of former landowners and aristocrats, incited by Western capitalists to overthrow the People's Democracy of Hungary. But, the New York Times reports that in Rumania "protest demonstrations" broke out among "Hungarian-speaking and Rumanian-speaking students." Also "Factory workers and railway employees... were known to have expressed open dissatisfaction.î (52)

There were several messages of sympathy and friendship from Poland. Even the official press did not come out openly against the revolt. Trybuna Ludu wrote the following on October 28:

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Many of us are asking ourselves the dramatic question: How has it come about that under the conditions of peopleís rule a considerable part of the Hungarian people has come out armed in opposition?... Although, as usually happens... irresponsible and in some case reactionary elements joined in action, they do not constitute the backbone of such long-lasting and intense struggles. The answer to the question posed should not be sought in a simplified version about "alien agencies" nor in looking for counter-revolution at every step...(53)

Or, as M. Bielicki wrote in Po Prostu: "the whole nation is on the side of the insurgents... and on the other the Stalinist faction of the Government and the AVO."(54)

Hugh Seton-Watson, professor of Russian History at the University of London sums up the attitude of Hungary's neighbors:

The neighboring small nations did not fight against Hungary in 1956 as they had done in 1848-49 and in 1919. Certainly the Hun garians gave them no excuse, for during these weeks there was no sign of nationalist claims against Slovaks, Serbs or Rumanians. On the contrary, repeated appeals for friendship and help were heard. An unconfirmed report states that the Soviet leaders asked the Rumanian government to send forces against Hungary and that it refused on the ground that it could not count on the obedience of its army. Student demonstrations took place in some Rumanian cities, both in Transylvania and in the Old Kingdom, and it seems there was some unrest among workers in Bucharest. The Yugoslav government expressed sympathy for Nagy in the first days, then justified the second Soviet intervention. In Czecho slovakia there was no sign of activity. At least these countries did not join in the repression.(55)

During the Hungarian Revolution, one does not find any utterances of revisionism or demonstrations of hatred against the other Middle Zone people. This is surprising, because the three million Hungarians living outside the border of this country constitute a fact which normally could cause great bitterness. This lack of hostility can be attributed to the growing spirit of reconciliation among the peoples of this area. It is not important whom to credit for this new spirit.

The long and unhappy story of federalist aspirations in East Central Europe seems to have several implications. It indicates, for example, that a political system, just by appearing theoretically the best solution has no guarantee for its successful establishment. There must be circumstances, conditions, rational and irrational factors, sociological, economic, and other forces present, which would make a certain political solution inevitable and successful. There seems to

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be convincing proof that in this case the heart of the matter is not legal or constitutional technique, but the pattern of given conditions.

During the Habsburg rule the pattern of given conditions did not promote the success of a federal solution. This was the age of growing nationalism, the belief in racial supremacy. Cultural differences were overpowering among the diverse nationalities. The social structure of the different nationalities caused enmity between ethnic groups, and, finally, the democratic basis was not present. What little democracy was introduced, under Joseph II, was developed along the Jacobin, centralistic lines, detrimental to federalism.

The nation-states, after the First World War, established a variety of political systems. This was one of the greatest obstructions to unity. Tremendous hatred was whipped up by the unfortunate peace settlements which punished and rewarded nations regardless of the consequences. As a result, nationalism degenerated into ugly chauvinism, and irredentism emerged. Regional solidarity was turned into regional enmity. New conflicts grew with the number of new states and the small East Central European nations had "their weapons pointing and eyes fixed on one other . . ." There was little or no desire for unity as a result of chauvinistic propaganda and hatred campaigns launched against each other.

After the conclusion of the Second World War, despite the efforts of several groups and individuals, the Nation-state system was re-established. The Soviet Union was against any kind of federal solution which would have endangered her divide et impera policies and E. Benes, the most influential Middle Zone exile politician, was advocating the homogeneous nation-state solution. This solution, borrowing from Nazi ideology, advocated collective punishment of "guilty" nationalities. E. Benes, who had the ear of Western leaders became the errand boy of Stalin in order to achieve the homogeneous Czechoslovakia, creating thereby a renewed feeling of hatred and revenge in East Central Europe, ,paying for it with Carpathian-Ruthenia, which he cynically delivered to the Soviet Union, completely disregarding e desires and wishes of the population of that land.

After the Iron Curtain fell and the nations of East Central Europe found themselves in a common prison, the pattern of conditions changed. The aggressive nationalism of these peoples turned against the common enemy. The seemed to develop understanding and even tolerance to each other. This was fostered by the nationality laws forced upon them by Soviet Communism. Common fate and common suffering started to wash out the greater differences among ethnic and national groups. In the early days of the people's democracies, ethnic minorities sought refuge in the Communist Party against persecutions. the Communist nationality policy, at this stage of development, was rather tolerant. It allowed the national minorities their more or less nominal national identity, the use of their own language, the development

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of their own culture, under leaders, who cooperated with the regime. Of course, the freedoms of local autonomy and administration could go only as far as the Party permitted it, but the fact is that chauvinism has become a term of disapprobation and the "brotherhood of Socialist Peoples" is an often repeated slogan.

The most convincing empirical evidence of the lack of chauvinism seemed to be the rather surprising statements of the Hungarian Revolutionary Committees and Councils and Russia's failure to incite Hungary's neighbors against that rebelling country.

The revolutionary pronouncements also showed that there was a desire for unity, at least as far as Hungary was concerned, and it also indicated that a new feeling of equality has developed among the peoples kept in common bondage.

The equalizing effect on the social, political, cultural and economic life under Soviet domination and the Communist system in East Central Europe seems obvious. When and if the land and waterways, the energy supply network, the systems of economic cooperation and productive specialization will be integrated to a high degree, when the industries. agriculture and other productive factors will be interwoven and linked together among the Middle Zone countries, regional solidarity will not be just a desire, but a necessity, an inescapable fact, an ideal precondition for federation.

Today, the practicality of a federal solution seems more clear than ever to the people in this part of Europe. These obvious practical values could be summarized the following way:

1.) The advantage of bigness to small nations, politically meaning more security against foreign attack and domination. economi cally the blessings of a large free market area.

2.) More effective safeguards for the liberty of the individual and the group (nationality, religion, regional interest).

3.) The advantage of peace over national antagonism.

4.) The advantage of a free, democratic society, based on consent and collective purpose.

These values and advantages, which already have been so well formulated by Madison, Jay and Hamilton in the Federalist Papers are more clear to the East Central European peoples, because they have behind them the sad experience of centralized, nonvoluntary union, the chaos of the nation-state system and the yoke of foreign domination.

(1) Hobbes, Leviathan, Part I, p. 115.

(2) Ibid, p.116.

(3) Felix Gross, Crossroads of two Continents, p. 2.

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(4) Ibid, p. 1

(5) K. C. Wheare, Federal Government, p. 11.

(6) W. Garner, Political Science and Government, p. 280.

(7) Freeman, History of Federal Gov., pp. 2-3

(8) Lufer Posener, Bundesstaat und Staatenbund, p. 15.

(9) D. G. Karve, Federations, p. 9.

(10) Reginald D. Lang, "European Federalism" in E. Gross, European Ideologies, pp. 960-965.

(11) Sobei Mogi The Problem of federalism, p. 1]11.