Toward a New Central Europe

SCANNING THE HORIZON: WORLD POLITICS AND CENTRAL EUROPE

TIBOR ECKHARDT

As far as my old country, Hungary, is concerned, the recent overall trend was correctly grasped by Max Frankel, when he stated (New York Times, January 18, 1965) "that Hungary is the best example of how far de-Stalinization can proceed without much significant desatellization." At Khrushchev's initiative, in recent years, the personal life of the average Hungarian has unquestionably improved. But the change is superficial, not basic, and can be reversed anytime at Moscow's orders. For Soviet control of the Hungarian state apparatus has not been relaxed, in fact, Hungary's dependence on the Soviets has been expanded through Comecon in the economic field. Moscow is also pressing for a strengthening of the Warsaw Pact's military ties. Anyway, the passing of time in Soviet servitude cannot be considered by us with indifference, for in several connections irreparable damage is being done meanwhile to the entire structure of the Hungarian nation. The almost total collectivization of the farmland has ruined rural life beyond recognition and has brought it down to the lowest proletarian level. Even more appalling is the decline of the birthrate. Abandoned by the West and utterly hopeless, the Hungarian youth refuses to raise a family. Decimated by staggering losses during two world wars, followed by persecution, revolutions and deportation, the Hungarian nation is on the way of losing position in the Carpathian Basin. The fate of the Hungarians in Transylvania is the worst. Almost for half a century, they have been living under foreign domination, aggravated since 1945 by Communist persecution. How long can the old oak survive this tempest?

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Such is the truth, and Hungarians back home and in the Free World must face adversity without wishful thinking. For unless some unexpected turnabout occurs, Russian domination in the Valley of the Danube may be continued for quite a while. Not as if the Soviets were stronger than the Free World, but because will-power is a more effective force than physical power in the shaping of human history. 1956, Hungary's Fight for Freedom, was the last opportunity when without going to war, the West could have achieved the liberation of at least Central Europe. Since then, the Western will to resist has been further weakened and the intent to coexist with Communism has been strengthened. By now we have passed beyond .he point of no return.

A few aspects of this situation deserve to be scrutinized:

I) The Marxist World Revolution has lost in Russia some of its messianic urge, but it has not given up its main purpose: domination of the entire world. Everywhere in the Free World, we still find Communist planning and incitement in the background of the subversive movements, and this applies to South Vietnam just as much as to Harlem in New York. These destructive influences do not create the threat of an atomic war, but they cause a continuous erosion in the Western positions, usually ending in retreat. Lacking in initiative, the West has lost its recuperative power and is pursuing a purely defensive strategy. United action by the International Communist forces against the opulent West is giving way gradually to diverse aggressive initiatives by the "have not-s" which serve Soviet or Chinese national aggrandizement, known in the past as imperialism. Wishful thinkers rejoice over the split between the Soviets and Red China. I wonder if extreme nationalism added to Communist messianism will improve the security of the West. In 1939, the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement seemed even less probable than an eventual alliance between the two Communist super-powers would appear to be today.

2) With the hasty withdrawal of Western colonialism from most of its positions, Communist imperialism is now penetrating into the vacuums thus created. Unable and unprepared to solve their own tangled problems particularly under a democratic form of government, several new would-be nations have become ripe for the imposition of the Communist discipline which, in its brutal way, replaces intolerable anarchy with the Communist straightjacket. Former colonials have very little reason to stand for capitalism which meant to them foreign interference into their lives. Ties with China may seem welcome to some of them, since the Chinese do not belong to the white race.

American policy, still under the influence of its colonial memories, often has been promoting prematurely the acceptance of the democratic form of government, increasing the confusion of the former colonies unprepared for democracy. No human society is able to endure permanent disorder. In Asia and in Africa a number of doors

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have been thus thrown wide open for penetration by the Communists.

Due to the human mass controlled by China with an iron fist, and also to their capacity for modern development, the awakening of the Chinese people as a Communist great power has started a new chapter in the history of mankind. More than a decade ago, Admiral Radford, then Chairman of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, recognized the rising menace and favored American Aid to be given to France in the war against the Viet Cong. He predicted that if America allowed enough time and leisure to Red China to develop an armament industry as up to date as that of the Soviet's without a war America would be licked. Chinese revolutionary exaggerations have saved the world until now from that catastrophe. But China is learning her lesson and is catching up rapidly in production of the atom-arm also. China's pressure on her extended common border with the Soviets is growing and this may explain the greater reserve of the Soviets observed lately in their foreign policy toward the West.

3) The history of the first half of our century consists mainly of the Civil War of Europe fought in two installments and ended with the post-war French-German Treaty of Cooperation. "United Europe," of course, is still a long way off, for even if the present free zone of Europe becomes united, without its Eastern half Europe remains incomplete. The Common Market, however, a long step in the right direction, already acts as a magnet toward the nations locked up behind the Iron Curtain. There can be little doubt that once the seven states of the European Free Trade Area join the six of the Common Market, their joint power of attraction will prove to be stronger than the Soviet endeavor to keep them isolated and in bondage .

During the period of gradual unification some temporary solutions, probably in line with neutralism, will have to be worked out for Central and Eastern Europe. There is no chance for the lasting maintenance of the present division of Europe, for the great German people cannot accept partition as the final solution of Germany's fate. The reunification of Germany, however, only becomes feasible, if Europe is being united. the lamentable fate of Hungary is thus strictly tied up with the problems of European unification. There is no separate Hungarian question, but there exists a burning problem of Central and East European emancipation from under Soviet rule of which the Hungarian question forms a part, including the rectification of the mistaken Paris peace treaties. In l 956, the Hungarian youth presented to the world such a glorious example of its selfsacrificing love of freedom, that at the first opportunity, when the present structure of partitioned Europe is corrected, the sun of freedom will rise again over the blood-soaked Hungarian soil.

A thorny problem retarding the final organization of United Europe is the uncertainty about where does Great Britain belong? Obviously,

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the agricultural production of the British Commonwealth cannot be fitted into the much too limited European Common Market, particularly since the United States demands similar easy terms for her agricultural exports. Furthermore, up to 1966, according to the Rome Agreement, each member-state in the Common Market retained its right of veto. Premature inclusion of Britain would thus lend her a much too strong bargaining position for satisfying British special interests. After 1966, however, decisions could be made in the Common Market by a majority vote. According to the existing powerful trend, British foreign trade will be increasingly directed meanwhile toward the successful Common Market. The time can be foreseen, when Britain will prefer to renounce her preferential tariffs with the Commonwealth in order to allow her to join the more profitable Common Market.

4) In spite of the United States atomic superiority, the monopoly of American political leadership is nearing its end in the Free World. With generous American aid not only prosperity but also self-reliance were restored to the Old Continent. By winning the war America won friends and much prestige in the world which she has been losing in later years by thumbing the peace problems. Lavish spending of foreign aid will not help; peace cannot be bought, it must be deserved.

It is an unfortunate coincidence that America is being now confronted with arduous tasks in the international field while internally she is passing through an awkward phase of her democratic institutions. Just as has happened in France, two hundred years of wear and tear have used up much of the energies and values on which inspired political leadership could be based, able to solve the present global problems of unparalleled magnitude. The running of the democratic political machine in America has become excessively time-, money- and energy-consuming. Initiative in international affairs has been thoughtlessly replaced by tardy appeasement; image making substituted for policy making; and the favor of public opinion sought on the lowest common denominator. The "wall of shame" was erected in Berlin and President Kennedy drifted to the brink of the precipice, with no other choice left for him in Cuba than the deadly threat with the atom-bomb. Led by the New York Times, powerful media of communications tried to condition American public opinion for accomodation with a leftist world opinion arbitrarily made up by those media. Public life was being paralyzed by a philosophy which calls itself "liberal" - but favors Marxism, particularly in its British form of "Fabianism."

Healthy reaction has quite obviously started against this decadence denounced in America. An honest order is just as important in a nation's life as is freedom and the American political order !nay not differ from the moral order bestowed upon us by our Creator. There is nothing wrong with the American people, they are resilient and

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well-intentioned. The want of success in the postwar era was caused in America in every instance by the failure of political leadership.

5) There is much conflict in the present world, not only between the two, ideologically opposed camps, but also within each camp because of national divergencies. This has helped to reduce the danger of an atomic war. Leninism-Stalinism has failed to achieve its basic goal: a monolithic world empire built up around the Kremlin. At Yalta, Stalin may have agreed with Roosevelt to partition Europe into two spheres of influence. Nevertheless, Western Europe is only loosely tied to America, while in Eastern Europe nationalisms and their selfcentered policies are moving towards polycentrism, away from Muscovite dictation. The breakdown of the two power world concept has lessened the danger of a major war which appeared very real as long as only two super-powers were confronted day by day with their inescapable conflicts, entrenched in rigid positions with no room for maneuver.

There still exists, however, among American Leftists - some of them indeed in high positions, - a nostalgia for Roosevelt s two-power world concept, which by now appears foredoomed for:

a) Red China systematically and inevitably is building up an Asian Empire of her own.

b) Whatever difficulties may still be encountered, the unification of the European Continent is making progress. That powerful unit will have to be welcomed as a partner by the United States of America in a not too distant future in order to help hold the balance against upcoming Red China.

c) Great Britain, even if led by the Labour Party, has not become resigned to the role of a second-rate power. She may have lost much of her prewar political and economic influence, but she has retained the know-how in political matters and has not forfeited her ability as a trader. Britain is prepared to make her presence felt as a middleman, throwing her weight on the side of one or the other superpower as her interests, particularly security, demand.

Several power-political units have thus emerged onto the international scene, which provide more flexibility in the international situation than had existed shortly after the World Wars end. Possibilities for diplomatic maneuver have improved and the danger of atomic war has been reduced. Even if the West appears to be unwilling to exploit its superiority, the balance of power at least can certainly be maintained. The danger of a third World War could only be roused by a tragic slackening of Western preparedness, or by some senseless aggression by Red China. Such abnormalities however, I prefer to eliminate from my computation.

6) Although the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe are becoming gradually stabilized, I do not doubt that every

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day life may further improve as years go by and experience demands. A regime is most cruel when it feels insecure. Every revolution slows down in time and even the pitiless Chinese Communists will lose momentum, though ,t may take considerable time. A return to brutal Stalinism is most improbable in Russia just as much as in the captive countries, for the people almost unanimously would resist that relapse. Nor can Soviet colonial exploitation under Comecon auspices be continued indefinitely. The subservient Janos Kadar accepts this Soviet abuse; trade with the Soviets cost the Hungarian people 263 million dollars in a single year (1962) if compared with free market prices. But national resistance against Soviet colonialism has successfully been launched by Rumania already and it is bound to spread and become general behind the Iron Curtain. The captive nations - each in its own way - are seeking ways and means leading to emancipation from colonial rule.

It seems important to note that geographically and politically also, Hungary's road toward the Free World leads through Vienna. In the Moscow Protocol on Austria (October, 1943) the Soviet Union agreed that after the cessation of hostilities Austria would renew her prewar connections with the neighboring states. This stipulation is still valid and could be used to better advantage. Hungary does not have to rely on Red China, if and when she decides to loosen her economic ties with the Soviets.

Communism has failed in our time not only politically and economically, but morally also, as an incurable evil. Resistance to that malignancy must continue unhesitatingly. But our struggle must be intelligent, above all, mindful of the international situation which may bring success or defeat. The main lesson to be drawn from the present state of world affairs can be condensed in a single sentence: the road to take by European captive nations is evolution, not revolution. This is particularly true as far as Hungary is concerned.

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Toward a New Central Europe