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Toward a New Central Europe |
THE peoples in the Danubian area situated between Germany and Russia have always led an eventful life. They witnessed historic turning points long before their conversion to Christianity prior and around the millennium. It is worth mentioning that their conversion to Christianity was the first significant step in laying down the foundations Of a Central Europe. During this period, roughly between the middle of the 8th and the end of the 11th centuries, Central Europe, historically speaking, took the final shape it was to maintain in the coming centuries. The characteristically Central European feature for the first time in history was reflected in the area's foreign policy constellations as promoted by its leading dynasties: the Czech Premyslides, the Hungarian Arpads, and the Polish Piasts. Their dynastic policies indeed aimed at the founding of an independent Central Europe, and there were moments when the realization of that design seemed to be imminent. But their dreams could not come true. They went too far to the East, as in Poland's case, or else failure came about as a result of the lack of cooperation of internal forces or of some unfavorable interference by the West or the Oriental hordes of the Tartar invasion ( 1241-1242) and the Turkish yoke.
For the sake of objectivity, it should be remembered that there was one workable scheme emanating from a German source which could have been acceptable to both Germany and the other nations of Central Europe. But the premature death of Otto III (980-1002) prevented its realization. Emperor Otto III under the influence of his tutor Gerbert of Aurillac, who later became Pope Sylvester II (999-1003), tried to reestablish a Roman Empire extending not only over the West but including also all the Slavs, Hungarians, and other ethnic elements east of the Oder and Leitha rivers. This projected
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empire would have revived the classical Roman Empire as envisaged by Constantine the Great. Despite the new turn of events, the notion of organizing a strong Central European power never died. It was resurrected in the 13th and 14th centuries by the rulers of the Luxembourg and Anjou dynasties, especially Louis the Great, King of Hungary and of Poland (1342-1382). Jiriz Podebrad, King of Bohemia (1458-1471), and Matthias (I) Corvinus, King of Hungary (1440?1490) understood very well the true mission in Central Europe and made serious efforts to create a federation in that part of the Danube Valley. In the center of these efforts stayed Hungary, Bohemia, and Poland. The advantage of those countries of belonging to a federation was appreciated by their ruling circles when after the death of Jiri z Podebrad and Matthias Corvinus, their countries, along with Poland came to be ruled by the descendants of Jagello. Vladislav II (1471-1516) and Louis (1516-1526). Known as the Jagellon Federal Union, this federation which was later reinforced when Vladislav II was made King of Hungary in 1490, came into direct contact with Central Europe and it had every chance for further development. But it was wrecked by religious disunion on one side and by the military victories of the Ottoman troops on the other.
For centuries to come, the idea of the Holy Roman Empire was the most devastating single factor which stood in the way of making a well-organized Central Europe. This ideal dates back to Charlemagne, king of the Franks, who was crowned emperor of the West, in Rome, in 800, and was continuous until its end under Francis I of Austria, in 1806. The concept of the Holy Roman Empire was too Western oriented and ignored the interests of the vast regions east of the Leitha, Oder and Neisse rivers, that is, roughly the present-day Soviet orbit in East Central Europe. This imperial idea has been partly responsible for the Western prejudice which has ever since looked down on the nations of East Central Europe and the Balkan Peninsula as inferior to them. As I have mentioned previously, the national dynasties of Bohemia, Hungary, and Poland failed to erect a durable, federative political structure in the heart of Europe. Afterwards the Habsburgs proceeded to build up their own Empire the heart of which were the Alpine lands west of the Leitha, Oder and Neisse rivers. The ideal of the Habsburgs stemmed from the centuries-old imperial idea and leaned far to the West. This one-sided orientation prevented them from devoting sufficient attention and energy to Poland which for centuries has been the common target of the Russian Rurik and the Prussian Hohenzollern dynasties. Hungary and Croatia also remained outside of their particular sphere of interests and were left alone in resisting the Turks. I have already referred to the Habsburg idea of mission which looked exceedingly westward and, therefore, was unable to cope with
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the new situation. The Habsburgs reacted positively to the Turkish menace only after their own capital, Vienna, was besieged by the enemy for a short while. They mobilized the whole of Christian Europe to liberate Vienna in 1683. And, after the liberation of their Eastern territories from Turkish rule, they introduced, chiefly during the second half of the 18th century, a new settlement policy. As a result, many compact German (not Austrian) colonies were established everywhere east of the Leitha. These newly created German settlements were designed to secure the German character of the westward-looking Habsburg Empire and to keep the rebellious Hungary and other non-German ethnic regions under their firm control. These German settlements later posed a serious problem for the governments of East Central Europe especially during the Hitler regime. Later, under the Kremlin's pressure and the Potsdam agreement (1945). local governments were compelled to expel these German minorities, and did so using inhumane methods. This transfer of German minorities from the Danubian states and the so-called exchange of population between Czechoslovakia and Hungary proved to be one of the most shameful chapters in the history of the nationality question. Instead of severely punishing all Nazi collaborators, German minorities were held collectively responsible for war crimes and expelled from their native countries into Austria and the German occupational zones .
In the 19th century little was done to improve Central Europe's political stature. The old imperial idea survived in the form of Gesamtmonarchie at least until the historic Battle of Koniggraetz in 1866 where Austria was defeated by Bismarck's Prussia and thus became a vassal state in foreign affairs of the German Reich up to its disintegration in 1918.
The Uprising of 1848-l849 clearly showed that non-German elements (Slavs, Hungarians, Rumanians) were not ready at that time to even discuss their common problems, with the exception of a few exchanges of views in the post-Revolutionary period when nothing could have been done effectively anyhow in order to rearrange their coexistence. Yet, one lesson could successfully be drawn from the Uprising and from the defeat at Koniggraetz: namely, that a federation-like union between Austria and Hungary in the form of the 1867 Compromise could be successfully established. But this form of coexistence included two nations only: Austrian-Germans and Hungarians. By all means, it was a giant step forward and the dynasty finally gave up its outmoded doctrine of the medieval imperial idea. This dual Monarchy existed for half a century and collapsed only as a result of its war partnership with Hohenzollern Germany. The unsolved nationality questions constituted only a secondary cause relating to the disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy. The broadening of the Compromise to include Slavs and
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Rumanians in a future federative system was under discussion and only the outbreak of the First World War put a stop to it. At the last moment, Karl I, Emperor of Austria (1916-1918) made an important effort to save the Monarchy from disintegration but failed. His Manifesto was designed to meet President Wilson's requirements: the Poles were to go their own way, and the rest to form a federal state in which each nation was to formulate its own constitution on its own ethnic territory. 1
The destruction of the Habsburg Monarchy was against the real interests of the nations of that area. Without the interference of the victorious powers it would have been possible to reorganize the Empire in a democratic way as a republic of all nations concerned which would have blocked the way of the expansion of the Third Reich and of the Bolshevik Russia. In addition, the tragic foreign policies of the French-led Little Entente completely poisoned the atmosphere and prevented the regrouping of the Danubian nations to protect their own interests in the coming struggle. Instead of reorganizing Central Europe as a whole, the great powers created a series of small states which were unable to resist any outside influence coming from either Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia.
This system of small states created from the ruins of the Habsburg Empire produced constant crises in Europe and in world politics and led finally to the Munich four-power agreement of 1938 and the outbreak of World War II. And as the aftermath of the War, the right of self-determination was again denied to the Danubian nations .
The postwar treaties repeated the tragic errors of the first Paris treaties with one essential exception: since 1945 not France but the USSR has been the sole leading power taking charge of reorganizing Central and Eastern Europe. Dealing with the newly created situations, Clayton Fritchey, a noted columnist of the Evening Star shares the opinion of the majority of diplomatic historians in stating2) that "It is hardly a secret that the United States, in looking the other way over Czechoslovakia and Hungary, recognized Russia's hegemony in eastern and central Europe." General Charles de Gaulle3) went even farther that "the armed intervention by the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia shows that the Moscow Government has not freed itself from the policy of blocs that was imposed on Europe by the effect of the Yalta agreements..."
Undoubtedly, since the end of World War II all efforts starting with Yugoslavia's split with the USSR in June, 1948, through the East German Uprising in 1953, and the Polish and Hungarian events in 1956, through the present-day Czechoslovak crisis and the Rumanian attitude toward the Kremlin have sufficiently proven that there have been popular movements in that area to free the peoples
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from the bonds which were imposed on them by balance-seeking great power politics. All these popular efforts have clearly pointed to one direction: to the establishment of a Central Europe free from the influence of East-West rivalry.
Cultural Background
The making of present-day Central and Eastern Europe started with their conversion to Christianity between the 8th and 11th centuries. Systematic attempts at Christianization of the Slovenes were begun after 743 by the Bavarians who had forced the Slovene Duke Borut to submit to them. The missions were directed by the bishops of Salzburg, and many Irish monks.4) It was not until nearly five hundred years later that the conversion of the Slovenes and the incorporation of their territory into Christian Western Europe were finally completed.5) The Slavs of Great Moravia, Czechs, and Slovaks, after an early conversion to Byzantine Christianity, were ultimately drawn into the orbit of Rome. Poland received the Roman religion from the Czechs at the marriage of its first historical ruler, Miesco I (962-992), to a Czech princess.6) Byzantine Christianity was introduced into Moravia by Saint Cyril and Saint Methodius in the second half of the 9th century. But Svatopluk, ruler of Great Moravia (870-894) put an end to Byzantine (Slavonic) liturgy.7)
In the last quarter of the 10th century and decades afterwards there took place the conversion of the Hungarians to Christianity. The chief architect of their conversion to Rome was Stephen I (Saint), first king of Hungary (d. 1038) who promoted the Western branch of Christian civilization. By this he strengthened the Hungarian state so efficiently that it has since been able to withstand all disasters caused by a series of foreign interventions. The conversion of Hungarians to Western Christianity and the founding of their Christian state had dual significance. First of all, it eliminated the remnants of Byzantine Christianity from Central Europe. Secondly, the founding of the Hungarian state separated the two groups of the Slavs, the Western and the Eastern (or Northern and Southern), and thereby helped preserve Western Christianity among the Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Croats, and Slovenes. According to the Czech Frantisek Palacky ( 1798-1876), the establishment of Hungary was a cataclysm for the Slavs because it separated the Slavic tribes forever.8) The Russian Vladimir Ivanovich Lamanskii (1833-1914) argued quite contrary to Palacky's standpoint. According to Lamanskii, the newly founded Hungarian state was the only effective obstacle for centuries to come against Germany's Drang nach Osten. Accordingly, only the Hungarians were able to prevent the complete
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Germanization of the Slavs in the Danube area. Indeed, the Hungarian state was a bastion of Westernization, and to a great extent it also defended the region against the German expansion more effectively than any other nation in this part of Europe.
Its first king, Stephen I, laid down the foundations of medieval Hungary, some elements of which survived even in later centuries. From the point of view of Christian civilization. the most essential principle of Stephen's reign was his unique conviction that a "unilingual country with the same, homogeneous manners and customs is weak and fragile.9) This unique principle of nationality policy preferred the multilingual state over the unilingual one and this was in line with the needs of the young Christian state which badly needed more and more foreign-born priests, missionaries, teachers and other learned men to build up a new civilization, new socioeconomic structure, and political system on a Christian foundation. This then unique nationality policy was also intended to keep under control the influential Hungarian pagan groups which frequently revolted against foreign-born elements upon seeing the latter in high-ranking positions.10)
The introduction of two different forms of Christianity deepened the already existing gap among the Slavs. Czechs, Poles, Slovaks, Croats and Slovenes finally accepted Western Christianity while all other branches of the Slavs-Russians, Bulgarians, and Serbs, etc.ó became associated with the Byzantine form of Christendom. This religious division of the Slavs became distinguished outwardly as well, since the Roman Church used Latin speech and liturgy while Byzantine Christianity used Slavonic speech and liturgy. The distincion between these two forms of Christianity extended far beyond the language of liturgy and church organization. It entered the fields of political development, cultural philosophy and national characteristics. While Western-oriented Slavs took part for centuries in each and every cultural movement that the West produced, the Slavs of the Byzantine sphere remained willfully impervious to them. It is interesting to note that Russians, Bulgarians, and to a lesser extent, Serbs, were not affected by such important movements as the Renaissance with its focal point: humanism; the Reformation; Counter Reformation; the Enlightenment; and democracy.
It is of utmost significance that all these anthropocentric and humanistic movements could not penetrate regions situated east of the Habsburg Empire. As a consequence, the peoples living east of the Empire were not in a position to get acquainted with the freedom concept of the West, and the Byzantine cultural sphere to this day is unable to understand the notion of individual freedoms so deeply rooted in the Western, especially Anglo-American, philosophy of life. Summarizing, we can say that those nations of Central and Eastern Europe which were converted to the Roman Church were thoroughly influenced
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by Western learning while the Byzantine Christian nations could not enjoy the blessings of Western civilization. The spiritual and cultural progress of the Danubian nations was affected by those two spheres of civilization which had centers in Rome, Paris, several cities in Germany and Austria, Italy, and Byzantium. Their cultural ideas and customs deeply affected the national entity of those nations. Their cultural efforts resulted in a longlasting coexistence between the religious and national elements. Literary activities were based for centuries upon the Bible and the first products of their literary languages were the Bible translations. Until after the middle of the 18th century, the national consciousness of a nation in the Danubian area was formed and cultivated by the frequent use and application of the Holy Scriptures. The symbiosis of religion with patriotism was so natural in that age that the motto of "bulwark of Christianity (or of Western civilization)" against anti-Christian Turkish imperialism became a common heritage, a widespread phrase for peoples from the Balkan Peninsula up to the boundaries of Western Europe. The formative influence of the Christian faith remained so strong that until about the French Revolution it governed not only the domains of philosophy, belleslettres, and all of the humanities, but it permeated even scientific activities. With the exception of Bulgaria and to a lesser extent, Serbia, no Russian intellectual influence penetrated deeply and lastingly the cultural life of Central and Eastern Europe until after the revolutions of 1905 and 1917. The systematic Russian cultural effect started only in 1945.
In comparing the occupational policies of the Ottoman Empire with that of the USSR, we arrive at the following conclusion. While the Turkish were almost exclusively interested in economic and military exploitations of the oppressed nations, the USSR from the outset exerted its influence in all possible directions, in all human activities. Since the end of the last war, the USSR has forcibly tried in occupied countries to eradicate Western-based traditional values of patriotism, the philosophy of life, and most of all the freedom idea, through promoting dialectical materialism in thinking and injecting Moscow-centered socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism into everyday life. The chief criterion of this policy has been the forced idolizing of everything which is the product of Soviet-Russian communism and labeled with the trade-mark Made in Russia. This consistent and ruthlessly applied politics has been chiefly responsible for all revolts aiming at the overthrow of the establishment in the Danubian regions. In these revolts the traditional Western philosophy of life and its freedom concept settled deeply in the minds of East Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Southern Slavs, and Rumanians clashed with the Kremlinrepresented Byzantine and caesaropapistic heritage.
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Conclusion
In order to better understand present situations we must unearth their roots in past history. To see them in totality we must view them not in isolation but in their full historical context. In other words, when viewing present-day topics in historical perspective, we are able to draw very important lessons from them. In so doing we see as evident that some history-making forces of the past have almost totally disappeared on the scene and failed to play any role any more. Let us refer to three such main factors of the past: Pan-Germanism; Pan-Slavism, and; the idea of the nation-state. It is now crystal clear that because of the inhuman acts of Nazism and the catastrophic defeat of Hitler's Germany, the oldfashioned Pan-Germanism has lost its attraction for the Germans. The same can be said about the attraction of Pan-Slavism for the Slavs. The "idea vzajomnosti" (Slavic reciprocity) as a consequence of Russia's ruthless expansionism has also lost its impetus. Most recently, the Sovietled Communist invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and its subsequent occupation were a deadly blow to the historic idea of Slavic solidarity and caused the disillusioned Czechs, once the standard-bearers of pro-Russian Pan-Slavism, to return to the heritage of their outstanding political philosopher, Karel Havlicek-Borovsky (1821-1856). Havlicek-Borovsky, after completing his extensive tour of Russia, became so much disillusioned with the Russian way of life that he categorically stated: "I am Czech and I am never Slav... The power of the Austrian Empire is the best guarantee of our ( Czech) nationality . . ." 11)
The third factor, the idea of the nation-state, not long ago so powerful and closely interwoven with the threads of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism, is dead. It seems to be a historically proven fact that there never has been and there is not now a Czechoslovak nation or a Yugoslav nation, but instead the reality of several ethnically distinct entities such as Czechs, Slovaks; or Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, etc. This is perhaps the greatest lesson we can draw from current events. Indeed, we are now witnessing the historic process of correcting an old blunder when before our eyes in both countries the system of federation is replacing the artificial, rigid and imperialistic concept of Ceskoslovensky narod (Czechoslovak nation) and Jugoslavenski narod (Yugoslav nation).
The existence of and the right to self-determination of smaller nations cannot be denied any more. Ironically enough, the Communist Dr. Gustav Husak is doing the same which was done 30 years ago by Dr. Jozef Tiso, then President of the Republic of Slovakia. Both their conflicting ideologies stemmed from the same ideological roots, according to which the Czechs and the Slovaks are ethnically distinct nations. Similar distinctions are being made in Tito's Yugoslavia. Their leaders correctly diagnosed that some kind of federalization
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is the right answer to the burning questions of their multinational states. They can now recognize that in the center of the Danube Valley ethnic (language) boundaries are inevitably crossing the state boundaries and the historical conditions prevailing there have never favored the implementation of the nation-state. Obviously, the significance of the above-discussed factors which once played a decisive role was greatly diminished, if not eliminated, for a long period of time. This fact in itself can pave the way toward a federative solution in that multinational region. Besides that, certain other symptoms also point to the possibility of this new solution.
In the post-1945 period, far-reaching political, socioeconomic changes and gigantic industrialization have occurred, all of which have resulted in a never-before-seen social mobility, an entirely new social stratification. The old bourgeois society has been transformed into a socialist nation. It can be said that this new social structure in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe reflects very similar social stratification. This necessarily means that the social and political views and interests of those peoples hold much more in common than ever before. It is an established fact that in the past social dissimilarities prevailing between ethnic groups and nations greatly aggravated nationalistic (racial) tensions and conflicts and, to a lesser degree, even determined the nature of international relations. The new, more homogeneous structure of the society, in my observation and judgment, can be regarded as a positive factor in promoting the idea of federalism. It is not accidental that the peoples of the Danube area are turning toward the solution of federalism. It was one of the central themes of the Hungarian revolution of 1956, and this is the main stream of public activities in current Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. This idea has long been ripe in the minds of the peoples and its materialization is now solely a matter of improved relationships between the small nations and the great powers. If the territories of the Danubian small states can be removed from the arena of great power contests, if the great powers will cease to measure the value of smaller nations as a direct function of quantity (geographical size, number of inhabitants) then the last barrier is eliminated on the road to federalism. After so many centuries of fruitless experimentation, this alone has been left as the sole means of rearranging multinational areas in line with the interests of all the nations concerned.
1) C. A. Macartney: The Habsburg Empire, 1790-1918. New York: Macmillan Co.,
1969, p. 830.
2) C. Fritchey, "Spheres of Influence in Europe and Asia," The Evening Star,
Washington, D.C., October 11, 1968, p. A-17.
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3) Avram G. Mezerik, Invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia and the UN;
stands of Warsaw Pact invaders, Czechoslovakia in the Security Council and in
Prague, positions of Romania, Yugoslavia and European Communist Parties, etc.
New York: International Review Service, 1968, p. 5.
4) Cf. Francis Dvornik's "Introduction,' in Aloysius L. Kuhar's Slovene
Medieval History; selected Studies. New York-Washington: Studia Slovenica,
1962, p IX.
5) Aloysius L. Kuhar, The Conversion of the Slovenes and the German Slav
Ethnic Boundary in the Eastern Alps. New York-Washington: League of C.S.A.,
1959, p. 213.
6) Roman Dyboski, Outlines Or Polish History. London: George Allen & Unwin
Ltd., 1941. Pp. 15, 17.
7) See Franc Grivec, Slovanska apostola Sv. Ciril in Metod. Ljubljana, Izdalo
Apostolstvo Sv. Cirila in Metoda. 1927. 180 p., and F. Grivec, Slovanska
blagovestnika Sv. Ciril in Metod, 863-1963. Celje, Izdala Mohorjeva druzba v
Celju, 1963. 241 p.
8) Cf. Frantisek Palacky, Dejiny narodu ceskeho v Cechnach a na Morave. 1st
ed., 1848.
9) "Nam unius linguae, uniusque moris Regnum; imbecille & fragile est."
par. 3 of Sancti Stephani primi regis Ungariae, Decretorum Liber Primus Ad
Sanctum Emericum Ducem. De acceptione Exterorum, & nutrimento Hospitum.
Caput 6 in Corpus Juris Hungarici, Tyrnaviae, Typis Academicis Societatis Jesu,
1751.
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Toward a New Central Europe |