A Case Study on Trianon

The century preceding the outbreak of World War I was characterized by the spreading and intensification of nationalism on the one hand, and by the determined, sometimes ruthless, campaigns for the suppression of national movements on the other. Consequently, at the outbreak of the war the nationality question was one of the major unresolved problems in international relations and one of the most burning domestic issues in multi-national states. In order to satisfy nationalist aspirations at the war's end, the principle of national self-determination was brought to the fore. According to a perceptive observer, the Paris Peace Conference "allowed and sponsored the operation of that principle in a number of cases, chiefly where it worked to the disadvantage of the defeated powers, but admitted other factors as coordinate and, in some cases, overriding elements in the determination of frontiers. The principle of 'one nation, one state' was not realized to the full extent permitted by the ethnographic configuration of Europe, but it was approximated more closely than ever before."¹

Unfortunately the half-hearted attempt to apply the principle of national self-determination did not eliminate the nationality problem. In fact, by permitting, or contributing to, the creation of new national minorities, it may have aggravated the problem. The case of Hungary serves as a good example.

The victorious Allied and Associated powers dismembered the Austro-Hungarian monarchy by creating a number of so-called "successor states." The idea was to replace the multi-national monarchy with smaller national states, who would jealously guard their newly won independence and thereby prevent a possible future expansion of Germany into East Central Europe. History was to prove twenty years later that instead of ensuring peace for generations to come, the peacemakers created a settlement that carried within itself the seeds of the Second World War and the Cold War. For the "successor states," were the least capable of checking Nazi aggression. Unwilling

to satisfy the aspirations of their inordinately large national minorities, and concerned with preserving their territorial gains, they easily fell prey to Hitler's divide and conquer strategy, offering little significant resistance. Together with the greatly weakened and separated Austria and Hungary, the "successor states" became pawns on the chessboard of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

Beyond doubt the Treaty of Trianon was the most severe of all post-war treaties. Its territorial impositions, disregarding the ethnic or linguistic borders, converted millions of Hungarians into minorities in supposed nation states. Before 1914 Hungary had a territory of 125,600 square miles. This is roughly half the size of Texas, or three times that of the state of Ohio. By the terms of the Treaty Hungary lost 89,700 square miles, or 71.4 percent of her former territory. Of her population of almost 21 million, 63.6 percent, including 3.3 million Hungarians, were detached. The inhabitants of dismembered Hungary numbered only 7.6 million on a territory of 35,900 square miles-the size of the state of Indiana. Romania alone received 39,800 square miles (almost the size of Ohio), more than what was left to Hungary. Czechoslovakia was presented with 23,800 square miles (equal to the size of West Virginia), and Yugoslavia received a similar slice, including Croatia-which for 800 years was associated with Hungary. Even Austria was allotted 1,500 square miles of Western Hungary, a slice of territory slightly larger than Rhode Island.²

By comparison, the Treaty of Versailles detached from Germany no more than 13 percent of its territory and 9.5 percent of its population. (The Peace of Frankfurt ending the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, had cost France a mere 2.6 percent of her territory and 4.1 percent of her population.) Having decreed that a multi-national state such as Austria-Hungary was not worthy of having a life of its own, the victors of World War I set up states such as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Romania, which were multi-national states not unlike the old Empire.

Thus, the redrawing of the frontiers of the great polyglot empires of Eastern and Central Europe, and the limited reshuffling of populations, did by no means solve the problem of national minorities. The powers, in violation of proclaimed Wilsonian principles, handed over masses of people to alien sovereignties. Inis L. Claude, Jr. estimates the number to have been between 25 and 30 million, and a British authority on the question of national self-determination

wrote as follows: "It was ironic that a settlement supposed to have been largely determined by the principle of nationality should have produced a state like Czechoslovakia, with minorities amounting to 34.7 percent of its population, quite apart from the question of the doubtful identity of nationality between Czechs and Slovaks. Poland was not much better off with minorities amounting to 30.4 percent, or Romania, with 25 percent."³

Altogether the "successor states" found themselves with 16 million persons belonging to national minorities, out of a total population of 42 million, while Hungary's new borders were far more restricted than the reach of her nationality. With her loss of territory, Hungary surrendered 1,663,576 Hungarians to Romania, 1,066,824 to Czechoslovakia, 571,735 to Yugoslavia, and 26,225 to Austria. Nearly two million of these lived just across the newly created borders, thus forming an integral part of the Hungarian ethnic bloc in the Danubian Basin, but now separated from it. According to Charles Seymour, the American delegate to the Peace Conference, the boundaries of the successor states in many cases did not even "roughly" correspond with ethnic or linguistic lines. In short, national self-determination was denied to the Hungarians.

A great deal was alleged about the treatment of the national minorities in Hungary. However, compared to the situation prevalent in the old Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the lot of the new national minorities was (and continues to be) miserable. "Is it not scandalous"-exclaimed Sir Robert Cower, Member of the House of Commons in Britain some 15 years after the peace settlement-"that a European reconstruction, loudly hailed as one that was going to liberate the national minorities, should have resulted in their persecution, the severity of which is such that there is no parallel to it to be found in the ancient Kingdom of Hungary, where the nationalities had been treated with infinitely more benevolence."⁴

Of the defeated, Hungary was punished the most severely. Furthermore, none of the inhabitants of historic Hungary was given the right to decide his fate. When the Hungarian Peace Delegation was handed the terms of the treaty for signature, the chief of the delegation suggested that in accordance with the principle of self-determination the population affected by the treaty ought to be consulted through plebiscites. "Ask the peoples themselves," exclaimed Count Albert Apponyi to the assembled delegates of the victors; "we will accept their verdict." This, indeed, would have been entirely

consistent with the Wilsonian idea of self-determination. The reason for its disregard was revealed bluntly in La Paix (Peace) by Andre Tardieu-who was to become Prime Minister of France twice between the wars-in the following terms: "We had to choose between organizing plebiscites or creating Czechoslovakia."⁵

Perhaps the most important reason why the principle of self-determination was ignored at Trianon was that by the time the peacemakers turned to the treaty with Hungary they were bored with the entire process. In the words of one of the participants: "I am reliably informed that the delegates, and particularly the representatives of the Western Powers, are frightfully bored with the whole Peace Conference ... Especially since we presented our notes and memoranda they have begun to realize that the Hungarian question should be examined from many angles for which they have neither time nor patience."

On the strength of the argument that Germany had been accorded the right of self-determination with regard to Schleswig-Holstein, Silesia, East Prussia, and the Saarland, the Chief Delegate of the Union of South Africa, General (later Prime Minister) Ian Smuts demanded that in connection with the proposed dismemberment of Hungary plebiscites be held in Transylvania, Slovakia, Ruthenia, and Croatia-Slavonia. At first a lone voice, he was later supported by the other British Dominions, as well as by Japan, Poland, and Italy. The fear of plebiscites, however, prevailed and they were denied. Some years later the Swiss historian and expert on minority affairs, Aldo Dami, wrote: A plebiscite refused is a plebiscite taken in fact."⁶

The Treaty of Trianon was signed on June 4, 1920. One year later, on June 7, 1921, the Reverend Father Weterle (for many years the protesting voice of Alsace in the German Imperial Parliament) declared in the French National Assembly: "I am profoundly convinced that had plebiscites been held, neither the Serbs nor the Rumanians would have received more than one-third of the votes cast. People have been pushed against their will. There can be no doubt about that."⁷ Father Weterle spoke from experience; after all, the Alsatians, although of Germanic origin and language, desired to be French.

The Paris Peace Conference confused the concept of a people's right to self-determination with the principle of defining nationality on the basis of language. The two are by no means identical: an ethnic group may well prefer to belong to a national sovereignty

whose majority is linguistically different from its own. The Treaty of Trianon did in fact flout both principles by cutting off large blocs of purely Hungarian inhabited territories and awarding them to Hungary's neighbors for economic or strategic considerations, "The borders drawn at Trianon," asserts Aldo Dami, "excluded from Hungary a first zone of Hungarian territories, plus a second zone inhabited by non-Magyars whose interests were, however, so closely entwined with those of Hungary that there could have been no doubt of their decision, had they been consulted. Hence, the Peace of Trianon is based neither on ethnography nor on popular sentiment, nor even on the interests of the population concerned-which the latter are sure to know best."⁸

The concern with the protection of minorities originated in the religious sphere. Historically, international efforts to protect religious minorities against persecution took the form of ad hoc intervention by states on behalf of their co-religionists in other countries. Later practice included guarantees of freedom of religion for inhabitants of territories transferred to other countries by voluntary or forced cession. Occasionally, when religious division was identical with national division, such guarantee protected an entire nationality within a state.

The first express recognition and international guarantee of the rights of national minorities is found in the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna, in which Russia, Prussia, and Austria undertook to respect the nationality of their Polish subjects.⁹

The systematic protection of national minorities did not become a reality until the end of World War I and the establishment of the League of Nations. Even this system was limited in scope and applied only to special cases. A more comprehensive system, one with wider application, has not been established to this day.

As Clemenceau pointed out to Polish Prime Minister Ignacy Paderewski in his oft-quoted letter justifying the imposition of restrictions upon Poland's handling of national minorities, the Allied and Associated Powers felt a solemn obligation to protect those peoples whose future minority status was determined by decree. A plan for the international protection of national minorities appeared to be the only solution, and such a plan evolved out of a multiplicity of conflicting interests and points of view, and utilized an unprecedented set of international machinery: The League of Nations.¹⁰

The basis of the League of Nations system for the international

protection of minorities consisted of a series of treaties, declarations, and conventions whereby particular states accepted provisions relating to the treatment of minority groups and at the same time recognized the League as guarantor.

The international instruments, containing stipulations for the protection of minorities placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations, may be classified as follows:¹¹

"Minorities" Treaties signed at Paris during the Peace Conference

Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland, signed at Versailles on June 28th, 1919.

Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, signed at St. Germain on September 10th, 1919.

Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Czechoslovakia, signed at St. Germain on September 10th, 1919.

Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Romania, signed at Paris on December 9th, 1919.

Treaty between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Greece, signed at Sevres on August 10th, 1920.

Special Chapters inserted in the General Treaties of Peace

Treaty of Peace with Austria, signed at St. Germain-en-Laye on September 10th, 1919 (Part III, Section V, Articles 62 to 69).

Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, signed at Neuilly-sur-Seine on November 27th, 1919 (Part III, Section IV, Articles 49 to 57).

Treaty of Peace with Hungary, signed at Trianon on June 4th, 1920 (Part III, Section VI, Articles 54 to 60).

Treaty of Peace with Turkey, signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923 (Part I, Section III, Articles 37 to 45).

Special Chapters inserted in other Treaties

German-Polish Convention on Upper Silesia, dated May 15th, 1922 (Part III).

Convention concerning the Memel Territory, dated May 8th, 1924 (Article II, and Articles 26 and 27 of the Statute annexed to the Convention).

Declarations made before the Council of the League of Nations

Declaration by Albania, dated October 2nd, 1921.

Declaration by Estonia, dated September 17th, 1923.

Declaration by Finland (in respect of the Aaland Islands), dated June 27th, 1921.

Declaration by Latvia, dated July 7th, 1923.

Declaration by Lithuania, dated May 12th, 1922.

Although different in form, all these instruments aimed at safeguarding the rights of "racial, religious or linguistic minorities." And the architects of the system made it clear that they regarded this designation as synonymous with "national minorities."¹²

The rights guaranteed to national minorities in the treaty-bound states fell into two categories: the rights of individuals as such, and the rights of individuals as members of a minority group. The safeguarding of the first category of rights demanded a system of negative equality-protection against discrimination. The second category required, in addition, a regime of "positive equality"-provisions for the equal opportunity of minorities to "preserve and develop their national culture and consciousness."¹³ Nevertheless, these were still individual rights, arising out of membership in a minority and facilitating the maintenance and development of group life. Wilson and his fellow architects were too much imbued with the individualist traditions of liberalism to accept the concept of "group rights," The documents mentioned carefully avoided terminology from which it might have been inferred that minorities as corporate units were the "intended beneficiaries of the system."¹⁴ Claude notes only a few exceptions, such as Articles 9 and 10 of the Polish minority Treaty-which could be interpreted as indirectly granting recognition to groups per se.

Claude's cautious interpretation of the nature of minority rights is not shared by all. On the contrary, some say that the rights protected by the League were, at least in part, rights accorded to minorities as groups. Thus, Andre Mandelstam in his La Protection des Minorites distinguished between rights of minorities on an individual basis-religious liberty, freedom of using their own language, freedom of education in their own language, freedom of association-and rights of minorities as collective entities-proportional representation in elective bodies, and autonomy.¹⁵

The League guarantee was collective; the task of enforcing the obligations of the concerned states was assigned to the organization, more specifically to the Council. In addition, although judicial procedures were available through the Permanent Court of International Justice, the guarantee, as established, was basically political in nature. It was part of a larger system designed to facilitate the maintenance of international peace.

In order to discharge its functions as a guarantor, the Council of the League developed certain operating procedures empirically (one

might say "on a trial and error" method), starting with the suggestions contained in the Tittoni Report of 1920, and concluding with the 1929 report and the recommendations of a special committee headed by Adatci, the Japanese representative, who served as the Council's Rapporteur on minority questions.¹⁶

In its final form the procedure consisted of five successive steps, namely:

Acceptance of Petitions (from minorities);

Communications to the Government concerned for any Observations;

Communication to the Members of the Council;

Examination by the Committee of Three (Council Members); and

Replies to Petitioners

Given the stringent qualifications that had to be met for each successive step, and the half-hearted support the system enjoyed in the Council, this so-called "petition system" functioned with only limited success. Its failures and deficiencies were numerous. According to one of its many critics: "It is impossible to maintain that the minorities obtained an adequate and impartial hearing of their grievances and demands, or prompt, effective, and reliable measures of protection ... The League system was superior to possible alternative arrangements relying exclusively upon internal constitutional guarantees of minority rights, or resting upon bilateral agreements unsupported by an international guarantee, or leaving the protection of minorities dependent upon the unregulated and capricious intervention of kin-states; but it was unable to solve the difficult problem with which it came to grips."¹⁷

Basically, the League system was unpopular with all those concerned for a variety of reasons. The states with minorities disliked it because it limited their "sovereign rights." The minorities disliked it, because it was cumbersome and did not provide the protection desired. The kin-states were dissatisfied with the system because they were excluded from it altogether. Moreover, it was a system affecting a few states only, rather than a general one affecting all. This proved to be very irksome to those who were placed under its obligations, while other nations, though they possessed minorities, were totally excluded. Czechoslovakia for one was willing to cooperate, Poland was resentful, and produced, in 1934, a statement that amounted to a virtual denunciation of minority obligations. On September 13, 1934, Colonel Beck announced to the Assembly of the

League that "pending the introduction of a general and uniform system for the protection of minorities, his Government was compelled to refuse, as from that day, all co-operation with the international organizations in the matter of the supervision of the application by Poland of the system of minority protection."¹⁸

Following this declaration, the League system of minority protection became increasingly ineffectual, until it was ultimately swept away by the events of World War II.

As a result, hundreds of thousands of Hungarians have been expelled from lands where they were born and where they lived, and millions of others remain oppressed minorities. Their case has been presented repeatedly to the United Nations and other international forums. The U.S. Congress held numerous hearings on the subject. Documents, letters, memoranda smuggled out from Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union, tell of wholesale violation of human rights of the national minorities.

Deeply moved by the plight of the oppressed East Central European national minorities, and in possession of overwhelming documentation to plead their case, spokesmen for the American Hungarian community, in observing the sixtieth anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon, called on the President and Congress of the United States to do all that is possible for the protection of human rights and the rights of national or ethnic minorities in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia. as well as in the Soviet Union. "Let the United States continue to be the champion of freedom and human dignity in the world, so as to maintain in high

esteem the country and the ideals admired by the oppressed everywhere."¹⁹

One glimmer of hope for the protection of national minorities on a world-wide basis appeared on the horizon in May, 1978, when the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva transmitted a number of documents dealing with minority rights to the governments of the member nations. One of the documents was a "Draft Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities," submitted by the government of Yugoslavia for discussion.²⁰

It will be years before we know whether the proposal for a declaration on minority rights has sufficient world-wide support to survive the cumbersome and politically motivated procedures of the United Nations system. It if does, it will be only a first step toward creating a more binding international convention. Nevertheless, after a rather long period of neglect, the sentiments of the international community at present appear to be on the side of minorities.

Notes

1. Inis L. Claude, Jr., National Minorities: An International Problem (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955), p. 12.

2. For additional comparative data see Yves de Daruvar, The Tragic Fate of Hungary (Munich: Nemzetor, 1974), pp. 99-106.

3. Alfred Cobban, The Nation State and National Self Determination (London: Collins, 1969), p, 86.

4. Sir Robert Gower, La Revision du Traite de Trianon (Paris, 1937), p, 16, quoted by Daruvar, p. 111.

5. Quoted by Daruvar, p. 92.

6. Ibid.

7. Daruvar, p. 93.

8. Aldo Dami, La Hongrie de Demain (Paris, 1932), p. 133, quoted by Daruvar, p. 93.

9. For the wording of this undertaking in the original French see C. A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities, 2nd ed. (New York: Russell, 1968), p. 160.

10. The text of Clemenceau's letter is reproduced in Oscar I. Janowsky, Nationalities and National Minorities (New York: Macmillan, 1945), p. 179-84.

11. Pablo de Azcarate y Florez, League of Nations and National Minorities (New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1945), appendix. A complete collection of these instruments is found in League of Nations, Protection of

Linguistic, Racial and Religious Minorities by the League of Nations, 1927. I.B.2.

12. Claude, p. 17, referring to The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, I. 463, 543.

13. Pablo de Azcarate y Florez, p. 82.

14. Claude, p. 19.

15. Andre Mandelstam, La Protection des Minorites (Paris: Hachette, 1925), p. 53-70.

16. Adatci's Report is reproduced in full in the Appendix to Pablo de Azcarate y Florez, League of Nations and National Minorities (New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1945). Azcarate was head of the League's Minority Section.

17. Claude, p. 30; and see his Chapter 3, "The Failure of the League Minority System." Detailed criticism is also offered by Macartney, Chapter 10, and by F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), Chapter 34. The operating procedure is described in detail in the Adatci Report. A good legal analysis of the Minority Treaty obligations is to be found in Andre Mandelstam, La Protection des Minorites.

18. Macartney, p. 503.

19. U.S. Congressional Record, Vol. 126, No. 118 (July 28. 1980), p. E 3633.

20. United Nations Document E/CN.4/L.1367/Rev. 1, The Draft Declaration was discussed at the 34th Session of the Commission on Human Rights in the spring of 1978. Eventually, after each government reacts in writing, it will reach the General Assembly.

A Case Study on Trianon