A Case Study on Trianon

Huddled in rented rooms in Berlin's Kaiserdamm, the emigre writer Gyula Hay spoke often to his wife about their homeland's "unfitness for survival as crippled by the Treaty of Trianon-a subject to which every Hungarian inevitably found himself returning over and over again at various levels during those [interwar] years."¹ For Hay and other Hungarian intellectuals living in exile, Trianon presented a dilemma. Although they despised the Horthy government and feared that its obsession with revanche might reignite the flames of war, they could not accept with equanimity the terms of the dictated peace. How might treaty revision be effected without having to make common cause with the leaders of "Christian-National" Hungary? That was the question with which emigre's of every left-wing political persuasion had to wrestle. Refusing to be impaled on either horn of the dilemma, they reformulated the question within a broader East Central European context. What manner of general settlement, they preferred to ask, would satisfy the legitimate claims of all the peoples concerned? With few exceptions, they proposed a Danubian Confederation that would disarm Trianon and necessitate a change of government in Budapest.

Hungary's redoubtable pre-war leader, Jaszi initially placed his hopes in the successor states, especially Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. He adopted, that is, a "Little Entente orientation."

This decision entailed great personal risks, for it exposed Jaszi to the charge of treasonable disloyalty to his country. Even some of his friends were uneasy; whatever the regime in Hungary, Janos Hock preferred its leaders to those who had not scrupled to appropriate Hungarian territory. And in reaction to Jaszi's efforts to persuade the Yugoslavs not to return Pecs-Baranya to Horthy's Hungary,² Arnold Daniel wrote to his old friend: "On first impression, I regard the entire undertaking as a calamitous idea. One cannot conduct Hungarian politics supported by the greatest enemies of Hungarian concerns."³ Only recently, Gyula Illyes, one of Hungary's most distinguished men of letters, has taken Jaszi to task for allowing himself to be deceived and used by the Little Entente.⁴

Although these criticisms are not without some foundation, Jaszi could not envision a viable alternative to a Little Entente orientation. It is true that neither Romania nor Yugoslavia had evinced much interest in a Danubian Confederation, but Jaszi knew that the territories lost to Yugoslavia were not for the new state matters of life or death. He knew too that the Serbian intelligentsia tended to be pro-Hungarian if only because it was anti-Croatian.⁵ More important, Jaszi, Karolyi, and Pal Szende were convinced that Hungary's neighbors, especially the Czechs, would be unwilling to reach a modus vivendi with a right-wing, revisionist Hungarian regime.⁶ All the more so because Czechoslovak President Tomas Masaryk shared many of their sympathies and ideas with respect to social and national questions. In conversations with Karolyi, Masaryk had even expressed interest in the idea of a Danubian Confederation.⁷

The Little Entente orientation was given literary expression by the emigre journal Tuz (Fire or Fervor). Edited by Jeno Gomori, Tuz was published first in Pozsony (Bratislava) and later in Vienna. In an effort to enlist the journal in the service of Hungarian-Czechoslovak rapprochement, Gomori published numerous translations of the work of Czech and Slovak writers.⁸ In his programmatic essay,⁹ he denied that peace was or even could have been concluded at St. Germain, Trianon, or Neuilly; true peace could be won only with the aid of culture. Tuz's purpose, therefore, was to lay the cultural basis for a "United States of Central Europe." This was to be accomplished by building a cultural community first with the Czechs and Slovaks,

and later with the Romanians, Serbs, and Croats. Having taken a first step, Gomori called upon the Czechs and Slovaks to respond in the same spirit of reconciliation.

Despite or perhaps because of the emigres' expectations, disillusion was not long in coming. The efforts of Bela Linder, mayor of Pecs notwithstanding, the Yugoslav government, under pressure from the Allies, ordered the evacuation of Baranya in August 1921. The preceding fall, Karolyi had been expelled from Czechoslovakia "in friendly fashion," apparently because of Eduard Benes's suspicions concerning his contacts with the far left, especially with the Czech socialist leader Bohumir Smeral, who preferred a "United Socialist Europe" to an independent Czechoslovakia.¹⁰ In a letter of 21 March 1922, Jaszi told Karolyi that Benes did not see any "essential difference between Horthy's and the emigration's foreign policy, because he believes that if the emigration returns home, it will not be able to pursue any but a policy of [territorial] integrity."¹¹ In the same sober mood, Pal Szende observed in 1922 that there were in the successor states politicians and economic groups who sympathized with the Horthy government's methods, particularly vis-a-vis the working class. "One could say that the Horthy regime owes its existence to the open sympathy of the Entente and the secret sympathy of influential politicians in the successor states."¹²

Finally, and perhaps most important, Jaszi could not but observe that the Little Entente countries had failed to keep their promises with regard to the Hungarian minorities living within their frontiers. Already in a 1920 issue of the Becsi Magyar Ujsag (Hungarian News of Vienna), he had put himself on public record:

The Hungarian democracy can renounce revanche, but under no circumstances can it renounce demanding for its separated brethren all of those rights and freedoms that it demanded for the national minorities during the time of Hungarian hegemony.¹³

A year later, he thought it necessary to publish an open letter to General Alexandru Averescu, Minister President of Romania, asking that he ensure the free development of Romania's national minorities.¹⁴

But although Jaszi and his friends came to expect less and less of the Little Entente countries, they continued to believe that the emigration had no choice but to maintain a Western, democratic

orientation.¹⁵ With the regularization of the government in Hungary under Istvan Bethlen's able leadership and the failure of the Little Entente orientation, the only avenue left open to Jaszi and others of a democratic persuasion was that of informing public opinion in the West concerning Hungary. "In the eyes of Jaszi and Co.," the historian Elemer Malyusz wrote in his often scurrilous attack on the emigration, "Western public opinion became a panacea for all ills and the source from which a favorable change of fortune was to come."¹⁶

Influencing Western opinion was, however, a large order, because few Westerners knew anything about East Central Europe in general, much less about Hungary in particular. The first task, then, was to set contemporary events in historical perspective, to offer Westerners a short course in Hungarian history-political, social, and intellectual. In this effort, Jaszi also led the way, publishing German and English translations of his book on the revolutions of 1918-19-Magyar kalvaria magyar feltamadas (Hungarian Calvary-Hungarian Resurrection).

In his Preface to the English edition, published in 1924 under the less apocalyptic title Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary, Jaszi identified Great Britain as the only European power to which Hungarian democrats could turn for help in reconstructing their country. They were therefore particularly alarmed to discover that British opinion was "curiously uninformed as to Central European problems."¹⁷ Only such ignorance could explain British support for the Horthy government. By examining the genesis of the Hungarian catastrophe, he hoped to demonstrate that the creation of a stable Mitteleuropa depended upon a recognition of Hungary's pivotal importance. At the same time, he emphasized that he would accept no Danubian settlement, however advantageous to Hungary, that ignored the just claims of the successor states.

Jaszi's book-part history, part autobiography, part political tract-remains an indispensable source for the study of the democratic and soviet republics. It constitutes, moreover, a forceful indictment of the White Terror that even men of decency seemed willing to tolerate. But in the end, Jaszi was more concerned with the future than with the past; in the final chapter, "The Future of Hungary,"¹⁸ he returned to his favorite theme-a Danubian Confederation. He pointed out that war and revanche settled nothing; the dismemberment of Hungary only created new irredenta. "In

round numbers, 5,500,000 souls were liberated from the old irredenta, at the price of plunging 4,500,000 into a new one." He concluded, therefore, that the Central European question did not admit of a territorial solution. What was required was the establishment of cultural autonomy within the various political territories; only then would national frontiers lose all significance.¹⁹

In one of his footnotes, Jaszi wrote disapprovingly of the political-historical sections of Lajos Hatvany's book Das verwundete Land (1921). And yet if Hatvany-a liberal and a man of means-was less articulate politically than Jaszi, he was every bit as eager to educate and reawaken the conscience of the Allies, in particular the French. He dedicated his book not to Wilson ("the betrayer of his peace program"), to Clemenceau ("the evil spirit"), or to Lloyd George ("the cynical mediator and political broker"), but to the pacifist writer Romain Rolland.²⁰ In essence, the book is a lament that the pacifist intentions of the Karolyi regime were cynically exploited in order to destroy Hungary. Out of the slough of disillusionment, Hatvany appealed to Rolland to restore his pacifist faith. After providing readers with a sympathetic portrait of modern Hungarian culture, Hatvany bitterly attacked the insensitivity and lack of discrimination shown by the French military authorities in Hungary. When, for example, Karolyi spoke of "Hungary" as a Frenchman might speak of "France," General Franchet d'Esperey objected: "Say the land of the Magyars!" With this remark, Hatvany wrote, Hungary's millennial unity was destroyed.²¹

Praising Jaszi's wartime plan to grant complete cultural autonomy to the non-Hungarian nationalities, Hatvany appealed to Rolland and his countrymen for treaty revision. He cited with admiration a proclamation issued by German officers that renounced revanche but pleaded for peaceful revision of the Treaty of Versailles.²² It required little imagination for Hatvany's readers to read "Trianon" for "Versailles."

After Jaszi's and Hatvany's books, the most important emigre appeal to the West was Joseph Diner-Denes's La Hongrie: Oligarchie, Nation, Peuple (1927). Written in the aftermath of a bizarre attempt by Hungarian civilian and military leaders to circulate 1.5 billion bogus French francs and thereby disrupt France's economy,²³ the book expressed the views of the Paris Vilagossag (Clarity) group of socialists. Headed by Diner-Denes, this group included Bela Menczer and Pal Szende, who made regular trips to Paris from Vienna in

order to lecture to the College libre des sciences sociales. The members of this group hoped to see Istvan Bethlen's regime replaced by a more responsible conservative government capable of opening negotiations with the successor states. Convinced that Hungary's desire for revision was justified, they enlisted Leon Blum in their cause. In his introduction to La Hongrie, Blum pointed out that although Budapest was scarcely more distant from Paris than either Rome or Berlin, Hungary remained an enigma for Frenchmen. Proximate in space, it was yet far distant in time, an anachronism in the modern world.²⁴

For his part, Diner-Denes believed the Treaty of Trianon to have been a grievous wrong, but he insisted that one wrong should not be redressed by another. Rather, he recommended a series of ad hoc treaties that would link the neighboring states of Central Europe in a common bond. Ultimately, a pan-Europe might be organized on the basis of a further series of treaties.²⁵

Convinced that the Hungarian nobility had failed to take advantage of "the psychological moment [1848] to make of Hungary a Switzerland of the East,"²⁶ Diner-Denes deplored the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich of 1867 because he believed that it had given currency to the idea that Central Europe would have to choose between the Hungarians and the Slavs. In place of this false dichotomy, he proposed "a formula of friendship: Magyarism and Slavism "²⁷ to be inspired and promoted by France. For the Hungarian people, he concluded, "rapprochement with France has always signified liberty, antipathy for France has always signified servitude."²⁸

The Western orientation that Diner-Denes, Jaszi, and Hatvany espoused was not, however, accepted by every emigre group. Indeed, the communists regarded these non-communist emigre's as little better than agents of the Little Entente.²⁹ Much to Jaszi's chagrin, Karolyi himself inclined more and more toward an Eastern (Soviet) orientation. As early as the spring of 1920, the ex-President had informed Jaszi that he believed an orientation that was exclusively Western to be impossible, in part because he considered the Western governments to be reactionary, in part because he did not want to rely too much on the Czechs.³⁰ Even more important, however, was Karolyi's growing conviction that the Central European question-indeed the European question in general-could not be resolved without reference to the emerging great powers-the United States and the Soviet Union. Europe, in his view, would have to

align itself with one or the other and because Wilson had sorely disappointed him, he was psychologically disposed to cooperate with Lenin. Hence, despite Jaszi's warning that in the end he would have to choose between dictatorship and democracy,³¹ Karolyi continued to maintain his contacts with the Hungarian communists in exile.³²

If, however, the Eastern orientation began to disturb the Jaszi-Karolyi friendship, it too had as its object a Danubian Confederation, or at least a "Danubian Soviet Republic."³³ Laszlo Wessely, a young communist intellectual who lived in France during the 1920s, later recalled that the communists rejected territorial revisions as futile exercises. A Balkan Federation that would include the Central European states was the only proper solution to the nationality question.³⁴ The question of treaty revision was never, however, answered by the communists with any finality. This was because they were obliged to react to every change in the Comintern line, no matter how inexplicable. In an article entitled "The Hungarian Working Class and Revision" (1929), for example, Jozsef Revai denounced the idea of treaty revision as a cynical ruse designed to divert the proletariat from its true, revolutionary mission. A few months later, he published a "self-criticism" entitled "Should the Hungarian Communist Party Fight Against Trianon?" There he argued that it was indeed possible to be both against the "imperialistic" revisionism espoused by the Horthy regime and against Trianon.³⁵ Having begun his career as a nihilist poet of the avant-garde, Revai-like Bertolt Brecht-was able to take such sudden and dramatic reversals in stride.

The vast majority of the emigres, then, whether they looked to the West or to the East, favored some form of Confederation in East Central Europe. But to say this is to tell only part of the story, for the emigre's did not view the problem of Trianon in isolation. For them, Danubian Confederation was inextricably intertwined with the replacement of the Horthy government by one that was democratic or communist.

intimate relations between this democratized Hungary and the new States, can create such an atmosphere in Central Europe as can cure the gravest evils of the present situation and clear the way for a democratic confederation of all the small nations which are now tormented by the rigid dogma of national sovereignty."³⁶

In La Hongrie, Diner-Denes asked Frenchmen to distinguish between the Hungarian oligarchy (the magnates and gentry) and the Hungarian people; the oligarchy, he maintained, pursued but one goal-the maintenance of its power. In his whirlwind tour of a thousand years of Hungarian history, Diner-Denes emphasized the oligarchy's domination of Hungarian life, denouncing even Lajos Kossuth as a cynical defender of noble privilege. Fearing revolution, Kossuth and the nobility were willing to reform; the true revolutionaries were those who, like the poet Sandor Petofi, advocated social revolution.³⁷ The Ausgleich of 1867, Diner-Denes's bete noire, constituted a self-serving agreement between the Habsburgs and the Hungarian nobility at the expense of the people. By setting Hungarian against Slav in the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy, it became an obstacle to Central European peace. Between the Hungarian and Slavic peoples, no opposition existed; but between the Hungarian nobility and the Slavs there was indeed an unbridgeable gulf.³⁸ If, therefore, Hungary was to take its rightful place in the comity of nations, democratization was necessary. "Authoritarian capitalism," the product of an alliance between modern economic forces and a feudal social structure, would have to give way first to "democratic capitalism" and eventually to "democratic socialism."³⁹ These views were repeated by members of the Paris Vilagossag group of socialists in such publications as Leon Blum's Le Populaire, Quotidien, and Le Soir.⁴⁰

In Vienna, the principal leader of the Vilagossag group was Zsigmond Kunfi. A member of both the Karolyi and the Kun governments, Kunfi was a friend of the Austro-Marxists and a regular contributor to Der Kampf. For him, social revolution was far more important than treaty revision. In an essay published in 1928,⁴¹ he argued that Hungary had made a mistake in taking up arms after the war; the Kun regime should have accepted the peace terms in order to obtain the breathing space necessary to save the revolution. The conviction that Trianon was an unprecedented disaster was in Kunfi's judgment merely self-deception. The only difference between Trianon, Versailles, St. Germain, and Brest-Litovsk was that

Germany, Austria, and Russia had accepted the treaties in order to gain time to effect and consolidate domestic revolutions. Had Hungary followed suit, Horthy would never have had the opportunity to establish a counter-revolutionary government.

For the communists too, of course, the overturning of the "imperialistic" peace was but a moment in the larger struggle for a world transformed; confederation was possible only among proletarian states. Hence, in their judgment, the principal enemies resided within Hungary's borders, not within those of the successor states. As a party leaflet of 1929 put it: "Down with revisionist humbug! Long live the class struggle! Long live the proletarian revolution!"⁴²

What is perhaps worse, they were as homesick as their legendary countryman-Zoltan Kodaly's Hary Janos. "An emigre," the communist writer Jozsef Lengyel later wrote of his life in Vienna, "is that person who, living in a foreign country, neither can nor wishes to think of anything but his homeland."⁴⁴ This was true of even the most cosmopolitan emigres, such as the poet-dramatist Bela Balazs: "It is true," Balazs confided to his diary, "that I proclaimed the synthesis of the nations, the European man. ... It is true that I always felt my deepest metaphysical roots to be beyond every race and nation and I knew myself to be a wanderer, solitary. ... It is true that according to my biological lineage, I am a Jew; thus, there is no more Turanian blood in me than there was in Sandor Petofi. ... And yet, what hurts? Why do I feel myself to be an exile?"⁴⁵

These restless wanderers passed much of their time in coffee houses, where they critically dissected the Horthy regime and prepared polemical essays. As we have seen, they were in general agreement about the virtues of a Danubian Confederation and about the need for social-political change. As to the precise nature of a new

East Central Europe and the means of creating it, however, they were hopelessly divided. Indeed, if anything, the battles within the emigration were more bitter than those waged against the Horthy government and its apologists. When "bourgeois radicals" (Jaszi and his followers), social democrats, and avant-gardists were not exchanging barbs, they were accusing the communists of having made their exile necessary. Lajos Kassak, editor of the avant-garde journal Ma (Today), held Bela Kun and Gyorgy Lukacs "responsible for the fact that the revolution came to the bourgeois dead end."⁴⁶ In a devastating attack, Pal Szende wrote that "the soviet system had already collapsed internally when Romanian bayonets brought it to an end in July 1919." Communism was, he charged, "a mixture of the messianism and simplicity of primitive Christianity and the intolerance and orthodoxy of Catholicism. "⁴⁷

The communists were certainly a match for their opponents, attacking what they regarded as the pusillanimity of the Radicals and social democrats and the nihilistic decadence of the avant-gardists. Yet, they were weakened by a falling-out among themselves. "The Hungarian emigration was deeply split," the Russian revolutionary Victor Serge remembered. "To the opposition within his Party, Bela Run was a remarkably odious figure. He was the incarnation of intellectual inadequacy, uncertainty of will, and authoritarian corruption."⁴⁸ Almost immediately, Lukacs and Jeno Landler organized an anti-Kun faction.

The emigration, then, was not merely divided, it was subdivided. And yet, as one reads the various books and journals that propagated emigre points of view, one senses a common spirit-that of Endre Ady. The greatest member of a remarkable generation of Hungarian poets, Ady had summoned his countrymen to national regeneration in the years from 1906, when he published his Uj versek (New Verses), to his death in 1919.⁴⁹ He succeeded, moreover, in forging a spiritual unity out of those who would never have been able to unite on the basis of economic interest, class affinity, or political conviction.⁵⁰

By the mid-1920s, it had become evident that the collapse of the Horthy government was not imminent and the emigres began to scatter to the far corners of the world. Unable to return to their homeland and increasingly separated from each other, they clung all the more to Ady's memory. Some of the most important studies of Ady's life and work were written by emigre's: Lajos Hatvany's Ady

vilaga (Ady's World) (Vienna, 1924); Gyula Foldessy's Ujabb Ady tanulmanyok (Newer Ady Studies) (Berlin, 1927); and Gyorgy Boloni's Az igazi Ady (The Real Ady) (Paris, 1934). Literally hundreds of Ady's poems were republished in emigre journals of every political stripe and almost every book contained citations from his work. Articles on the poet were legion and German, French, and Russian translations were rushed into print in an effort to suggest something of Ady's poetic vision to a world ignorant of Hungarian.⁵¹

For the emigres, the spirit of Ady represented the spirit of peace among the peoples of Danubia. The poet had been born in Ermindszent, a town of Hungarians and Romanians situated at the gateway to Transylvania. He was therefore introduced to Hungary's nationalities problem very early in life. Although his identification with the Hungarians was to be complete, Ady was a friend of the non-Hungarian peoples and a great admirer of Jaszi's pioneering study, A nemzeti allamok kialakulasa es a nemzetisegi kerdes (The Evolution of the National States and the Nationality Question) (1912).⁵² Even before Jaszi had written that the nationalities problem was "democracy's Archimedian point and, as such, the central problem of our existence as a state,"⁵³ Ady had composed his "Song of the Hungarian Jacobin".

Why out of a thousand stiffened desires

Doesn't there arise a solid will?

Yet Magyar, Wallach, and Slav sorrow

Remains always the same sorrow. ...

Yet our disgrace, our grief and pain

Are since a thousand years akin

Why do we not meet, roaring,

On the barricades of the Spirit?⁵⁴

To be sure, Ady would have been appalled by the Treaty of Trianon, particularly because of the loss of his beloved Transylvania.⁵⁵ But only the spirit of mutual respect that Ady urged could lead, as Jaszi put it in 1929, to "the kind of confederation of peoples without which the Danubian Basin will remain the battlefield of eternally plundered peoples."⁵⁶ In the same year, Jaszi wrote to the Romanian leader Iuliu Maniu, reminding him that he had once promised to protect the political and cultural freedoms of the Hungarian minority. He asked that Maniu be guided "by the

spirit of my immortal friend Endre Ady," who recognized more clearly than anyone else that the fundamental interests of the Romanians and the Hungarians were identical.⁵⁷

However, it was not only Ady's dedication to the reconciliation of the Danubian peoples that made him a symbol for the emigre's. His democratic, socialist sympathies and apocalyptic visions of a regenerated Hungary resembled, or rather inspired, those of the emigration. For Jaszi and the adherents of a Western orientation, Ady was the poet of the October (Karolyi) Revolution, the democratic socialist who received his political education in Paris and who admired Jean Jaures. For the communists who advocated an Eastern orientation, Ady was the poet of the Soviet (Kun) Revolution,⁵⁸ the authentic voice of the armed proletariat. "Ady recognized the decisive significance of the proletariat," Gyorgy Lukacs wrote in 1928, "in the reshaping of Hungary for which he fought throughout his life."⁵⁹ Together with Revai, it was Lukacs who pioneered the communist co-optation of Ady's legacy.

Just as Ady had forged a spiritual unity out of the disparate members of the "second reform generation"⁶⁰ when he was alive, so his spirit united Hungary's emigre intellectuals after his death. As hopes for an imminent return home faded, the emigres came to rely more and more on the symbolic importance of the poet's life and work. His spirit alone seemed to serve as the guarantor of historical continuity, the bond that would unite their generation of radicals with that which would one day enter the promised land of a new Hungary and a new East Central Europe. "If there is ever a future for Hungary," Jaszi could say for all the emigres, "it can only proceed from the soul of Andrew [Endre] Ady, the truest of Hungarians and the truest of internationalists."⁶¹

his lieutenants alone stood in the path of a revolutionary transformation in Mitteleuropa. So great was their hatred of the counterrevolutionary leaders, that they often shut their eyes to the self-serving machinations of the leaders of other European states. For that reason, the communists became little more than Soviet agents, while those who favored a Western orientation were either ignored or shamelessly exploited. In a letter he wrote to his ex-wife Anna Lesznai in 1945, Jaszi conceded as much. He too, he confessed, had joined the chorus that praised the Czechs extravagantly in the hope that they would act as allies in the struggle for democracy and national autonomy. Too late, he had recognized his mistake; "mea maxima culpa."⁶²

A penchant for abstractions was also characteristic of emigre thought. Bold in conception and noble in intent, the idea of a Danubian Confederation was, as Gyorgy Litvan has written, "untimely."⁶³ Easy to defend in abstract argument, it ignored the historical realities and possibilities of the interwar period. And yet, the Hungarian emigres were undeterred. Alarmed by the advancing shadow of fascism, Pal Szende made an eleventh-hour appeal to East Central Europeans in 1932. Time was running out, he warned; for Hungary and the successor states the formation of an alliance had become an urgent necessity.⁶⁴ The tragedy that was soon to overtake East Central Europe testified to the circumstance that nations, like individuals, do not always act in response to a rational calculation of their own interests, much less to the Cassandra cries of intellectuals.

Still, I should not like to conclude on a critical note. Despite their capacity for self-delusion and their commitment to abstract sociopolitical models, the emigres were certainly right to keep alive the spirit of Endre Ady. Hungarian to the core of his being, the great poet was also a "European" in the tradition of Nietzsche, Ortega, Camus, Croce, Thomas Mann, and Bela Bartok. If East Central Europeans are ever to effect a reconciliation and to achieve a significant measure of cooperation, they will have to make that tradition their own.

Notes

I am indebted to Fulbright-Hays and the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) for the generous grants that made possible my research.

1. Julius Hay, Born 1900: Memoirs, trans. by J. A. Underwood (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1975), p. 95.

2. On the Pecs-Baranya question, see Leslie Charles Tihany, The Baranya Dispute, 1918-1921 (Boulder: East European Quarterly, 1978).

3. The views of Hock and Daniel are cited in Gyorgy Litvan, "Magyar gondolat-szabad gondolat" (Budapest: Magveto Kiado, 1978), pp. 150-51.

4. Gyula Illyes, "Beatrice aprodjai," Kortars, XXI, 9(1977), 1339-64. See also Gyorgy Szaraz, "Valasz Litvan Gyorgynek," Elet es Irodalom, (May 3, 1980), pp. 5-6.

5. In this regard, see Bela Menczer's thoughtful remarks in "Menczer Bela Parizsban: Fodor Ilona interjuja," Valosag, XVIII, 10 (1975), pp. 43-44.

6. Zsuzsa L. Nagy, "Jaszi es a hazai polgar radikalisok kapcsolata a ket vilaghaboru kozott," Tortenelmi Szemle, XVII, 4 (1974), 631.

7. Catherine Karolyi, A Life Together: Memoirs (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1966), p. 208.

8. Ilona Illes, "Gomori Jeno folyoirata, a Tuz" in Tuz (1921-1923), Diogenes (1923-1927): Repertoriumok (Budapest: Petofi Irodalmi Muzeum, 1977), p. 6.

9. Jeno Gomori, "Indulo" in Kalman Vargha et al (eds.), Program es hivatas (Budapest: Gondolat Kiado, 1978), pp. 464-70.

10. Tibor Hajdu, "Karolyi Mihaly Pragaban," Valosag, XV, 9 (1972), 51-57: Josef Korbel, Twentieth-Century Czechoslovakia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 73.

11. Cited in Litvan, "Magyar gondolat-szabad gondolat", p. 152.

12. Cited in Ferenc Boros, Magyar-csehszlovak kapcsolatok 1918-1921-ben (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1970), p. 289.

13. Cited in Litvan, "Magyar gondolat-szabad gondolat", p. 153.

14. Gyorgy Litvan, " 'Tragikai vetseg'-avagy idoszerutlen program? Jaszi Oszkar es a 'Kisantant-orientacio'," Elet es Irodalom (May 3, 1980), p. 5.

15. Gyorgy Litvan, "Documents of a Friendship: From the Correspondence of Michael Karolyi and Oscar Jaszi," East Central Europe, IV, 2 (1977), 125.

16. Elemer Malyusz, The Fugitive Bolsheviks (London: Grant Richards, 1931), p. 170.

17. Oscar Jaszi, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Hungary (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969), p. vii.

18. Ibid., pp. 231-36.

19. C.A. Macartney, no admirer of Jaszi's, advanced a similar view. See his Hungary and Her Successors (London: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 496.

20. Ludwig Hatvany, Das verwundete Land (Leipzig and Wien: E. P. Tal & Co., Verlag, 1921), p. vii.

21. Ibid., p. 428.

22. Ibid., pp. 489-91. Hatvany's views reflected those of the editors of the

Vienna-based emigre journal Jovo (Future): the liberal Marton Lovaszy and the moderate socialist Erno Garami.

23. On this affaire see Andor Klay, "Hungarian Counterfeit Francs: A Case of Post-World War I Political Sabotage," Slavic Review, XXXIII, I (1974), 107-13.

24. Leon Blum, "Preface" to Joseph Diner-Denes, La Hongrie: Oligarchie, Nation, Peuple (Paris: Marcel Riviere, Editeur, 1927), pp. II-III.

25. Diner-Denes, La Hongrie, pp. 165-67.

26. Ibid., pp. 122-23. Diner-Denes praised (p. 124) Kossuth's-and by implication, Jaszi's-plan for a Danubian Confederation.

27. Ibid., pp. 118-19.

28. Ibid., p. 170.

29. See for example R., "A Becsi Magyar Ujsag es a Jaszi-legenda," Proletar, (August 25, 1921), p. 13.

30. See Litvan, "Documents of a Friendship," 126.

31. Ibid., 127.

32. Tibor Hajdu, "Karolyi Mihaly es a KMP kapcsolatarol a huszas evekben," Parttorteneti Kozlemenyek, XXI, 2 (1975), 142-58.

33. See the theses of the Hungarian Communist Party (Moscow, 1924) in Laszlo Kovago, "A magyar kommunista part nemzetisegpolitikaja a Tanacskoztarsasag megdontesetol a felszabadulasig." Parttorteneti Kozlemenyek, XXIII, 2 (1977), 78-79.

34. "Menczer Bela Parizsban," 40-41.

35. Kovago, "A magyar kommunista part nemzetisegpolitikaja," 82-84.

36. Jaszi, Revolution and Counter-Revolution, p. ix.

37. Diner-Denes, La Hongrie, pp. 95-98.

38. Ibid., pp. 126-27.

39. Ibid., pp. 163-64.

40. "Menczer Bela Parizsban," 46.

41. Siegmund Kunfi, Die Neugestaltung der Welt (Wien: Verlag der Wiener Volksbuchhandlung, 1930), pp. 86-98.

42. Cited in Kovago, "A magyar kommunista part nemzetisegpolitikaja." 82-83.

43. Peter F. Drucker remembers having Christmas dinner with the Hungarian emigre Karl Polanyi and his family in 1927. Then editor of the distinguished Osterreichische Volkswirt, Polanyi could offer his guest only old, half-raw potatoes. Mrs. Polanyi (Ilona Duczynska) explained: "Vienna is full of Hungarian refugees ... and a good many cannot earn an adequate living. Karl has proven his capacity to earn. Therefore it is obviously only logical for him to turn his paycheck over to other Hungarians and then go out and earn what we need." Adventures of a Bystander (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1978), pp. 125-26.

44. Jozsef Lengyel, Becsi portyak (Budapest: Magveto Kiado, 1970), p. 135.

45. "Balazs Bela naploja," ed. by Istvan Gal, Kritika, no.11 (1975), p. 22. Perhaps the most celebrated of all Hungarian national poets. Petofi was of Slovak descent.

46. Andor Nemeth, A szelen behajtva: Valogatott irasok (Budapest: Magveto Konyvkiado. 1973), p. 598.

47. Paul Szende, "Die Krise der mitteleuropaischen Revolution," Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, 47 (1920/1921), 365, 367.

48. Victor Serge, Memoirs of a Revolutionary, 1901-1941, trans. and ed. by Peter Sedgwick (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 187.

49. On Ady, see my "Endre Ady's Summons to National Regeneration in Hungary, 1900-1919," Slavic Review, XXXIII, 2 (1974), 302-22.

50. Oszkar Jaszi, "Ady es a magyar jovo." Huszadik Szazad (August 1919), p. 2.

51. See Gorgyi Markovits, "Az 'emigrans' Ady," Irodalomtortenet, IX, 4 (1977), 1013-24 and Jozsef M. Pasztor, "Adalekok az Ady-eletmu tovabbeleserol a magyar munkasmozgalomban (1919-1944)," Parttorteneti Kozlemenyek. XXIII, 4 (1977), 126-28. Lajos Hatvany pointed out that Ady's closest friends were all living in exile. With them, his spirit would return home. Ady (Budapest: Szepirodalmi Konyvkiado, 1977), pp. 610-11.

52. See Ady's review of the book in Endre Ady, Kolteszet es forradalom, ed. by Jozsef Varga (Budapest: Kossuth Konyvkiado, 1969), pp. 287-90.

53. Oszkar Jaszi, A nemzeti allamok kialakulasa es a nemzetisegi kerdes (Budapest: Grill Karoly Konyvkiadovallalata, 1912), p. vii.

54. Jaszi made this translation for his study of The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, Phoenix Books (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 342. He had used the same lines, in the original, as the motto for A nemzeti allamok.

55. See Endre Ady, "S ha Erdelyt elveszik?," Huszadik Szazad, XIII (1912), 737-38.

56. Cited in Markovits, "Az 'emigrans' Ady," 1017.

57. Cited in Litvan, "'Tragikai vetseg'," p. 5.

58. Ady tutored Kun when both were college students; moreover, Kun had acknowledged the poet's influence in his pre-war journalistic articles.

59. Sandor Vajda [Gyorgy Lukacs]. "Ady mint program" in Aladar Tamas (ed.), A 100% (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1977), p. 191. Lukacs often used this pseudonym; his authorship is not, however, certain.

60. On this generation, see Zoltan Horvath's pioneering study Magyar szazadfordulo: A masodik reformnemzedek tortenete (1896-1914) (Budapest: Gondolat, 1961).

61. Jaszi, Revolution and Counter-Revolution, p. 27.

62. Cited in Litvan, "'Tragikai vetseg'," p. 5.

63. Ibid.

64. Paul Szende, "Die Donaufoderation," Der Kampf, 25, 8/9(1932), 347.

A Case Study on Trianon