A Case Study on Trianon

The work of quiet diplomacy was thus not to bear fruit for many months. In the meantime the clash of pro- and counter-evacuation forces continued both nationally and internationally. On December 12, 1920, three days before the Conference of Ambassadors decided to tie up evacuation and coal mines in one package, there was another mass meeting of workers and citizens of Pecs. The assembly noted with satisfaction that most of occupied Baranya was to be returned to Hungary according to the provisions of the peace treaty.

The coal-for-evacuation formula of the Paris experts would prove to be the correct compromise solution for the Baranya problem, but the diplomatic process continued to work very slowly. On July 31, 1920 the Hungarian Foreign Ministry warned Paris that the "Social Democrats in Pecs are planning a coup d'etat at the beginning of August with the assistance of Yugoslav authorities" and threatened to resort to armed intervention should the coup take place.³⁴ Bela Linder's frequent absences from his mayoral office appeared to substantiate such reports. Linder became a diplomat at large for his Yugoslav-protected Pecs regime. It was no secret that he was trying to negotiate with the occupying power autonomous status for Baranya and to gain the assent of the Little Entente as well as the Great Powers for such a diplomatic modus vivendi. Before leaving for Belgrade in November 1920 he did inform the Interallied Military Commission in Pecs that the agenda of his visit to the Yugoslav capital included seeking autonomy for Baranya.³⁵ Early in January he met with Yugoslav Interior Minister Milorad Draskovic in occupied Baja on the Danube, again to discuss Baranya self-rule. Linder was also supported by the ministers of the defunct Karolyi regime who hoped that the establishment of an autonomous Baranya would soon serve as a jumping-off place for a struggle against the Horthy regime.³⁶ On March 2, 1921 Linder addressed identically worded, lengthy anti-Horthy and anti-Habsburg diatribes, to the Foreign Ministers of Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia, pleading for continued Yugoslav occupation of Baranya until Hungary was once more under a democratic form of government.³⁷ He continued this para-diplomatic activity probably in ignorance of the fact that on April 27 and May 3, 1921 the Yugoslav Government received two decisive diplomatic communications from the Conference of Ambassadors

in Paris. The first of these two communications informed Belgrade that, upon completion of the treaty ratification process, it would be expected to evacuate non-treaty Hungarian territory.³⁸ The second communication invited the Yugoslav to start preparations for a Baranya evacuation.³⁹

Lord Curzon, Foreign Secretary, told the Lords on May 5 that "every measure will be put upon them [the Yugoslavs] by His Majesty's Government to terminate the occupation" of non-treaty Baranya.⁴⁰ The British Embassy in Paris suggested to the Conference of Ambassadors in mid-June that (1) the Interallied Military Commission in Pecs supervise and impose an evacuation of all Yugoslav occupied [non-treaty] Hungarian territory; and that (2) the Allied diplomatic representatives in Belgrade inform the Yugoslav Government of the foregoing, simultaneously requesting an immediate reply to the May 3, 1921 note of the Conference of Ambassadors to the Yugoslav Legation in Paris.⁴¹ In this communication, still unanswered, Belgrade had been invited to declare its intention to evacuate the contested Hungarian areas as soon as the Treaty of Trianon entered into force.

The Conference of Ambassadors was also quite familiar with the diplomatic as well as strategic aspects of the Baranya question in its relationship to the overall policy of Soviet containment. The deliberations of the Conference showed concern not only with a military occupation unjustified by international law but also with the possibility that the occupied area could, under a militantly leftist regime, present a forward base for east-to-west Soviet military movements.⁴² The latter assumption was based to a large degree on transmittals of Major Derain's weekly reports from Pecs. These missives left little doubt in policymaking Entente minds about the ideological affinities and alleged strategic potentialities of the Yugoslav-supported and Comintern-affiliated regime in Baranya. As early as October 31, 1920 Derain had reported that the new Pecs Municipal Council just established was "an oppressive regime not mitigated by the Yugoslav authorities."⁴³ In subsequent weekly reports the French Major claimed, however subjectively, that the moving spirit of the Pecs Municipal Council, the Socialist Party in Pecs, "was openly and violently Communist"⁴⁴ and that a Communist organization was being completed in the Baranya county seat possibly for a Soviet Russian westward offensive in the spring of 1921.⁴⁵ The likelihood of such a military operation made it urgent, Derain recommended, "to smash

without delay this Communist regime."⁴⁶ Warnings of such gravity from a trained military observer, supported by Maurice Fouchet, the French High Commissioner in Budapest, could not be taken lightly by the worried and alarmed Allied policymakers on the morrow of the Soviet victory in the Russian Civil War (November 1920), especially in the light of the militantly pro-Soviet sympathies then being demonstrated by British and French labor. In December 1920 the French Charge d'Affaires in Budapest reported to his government that "the existence of a nest of armed Bolsheviks in Pecs would be [in the event of a Soviet westward offensive] a terrible danger for the civilized world."⁴⁷ In February 1921 the Conference of Allied Diplomatic Representatives sitting in Budapest invited Derain to come up from Pecs and to give a general verbal report on the situation in occupied Baranya. A transcript of Derain's report and interrogation was prepared and submitted to the Conference of Ambassadors.

In this lengthy document⁴⁸ Derain stated that the heart of the Baranya problem is that contrary to the pertinent provisions of The Hague Regulations and of the Belgrade Military Convention, the occupying Yugoslav power, having expelled most Hungarian civil servants from the local government, installed civilian administrators of its own nationality. These foreign administrators, illegally employed, proceeded "to abuse power, deny justice, arbitrarily requisition property, unjustifiably levy taxes, establish an impermissible electoral system, support Communists in power, allow schools to be set up for Bolshevik propaganda, foment disorder in the area, and endanger the social order of Middle Europe."⁴⁹ After making this indictment, Derain recommended that either the Yugoslav be invited to undertake an immediate evacuation or, short of such a military measure, they should be prevailed upon to "revert to a regular occupation of a purely military character" by removing their irregular, communist-sponsoring civilian administrators.⁵⁰

Showing understandable annoyance, the Ambassadors in Paris now had the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs telegraphically instruct its representative in Belgrade to deliver a demarche to the Yugoslav Foreign Office.⁵¹ On July 5, still a new demarche was made; July passed; but still there was no movement. Only the treaty ratification process progressed silently and invisibly. Finally, on July 26, 1921 the text of the Treaty of Trianon, bearing its last required ratification, was deposited at the Quai d'Orsay.⁵² The treaty was

now in force. The Yugoslav Army no longer had the right to remain north of the new international frontier.

News of the completed treaty ratification process reached Pecs while the Baranya Left was trying to adjust to new East Central European political realities. Since late 1920 protecting Yugoslavia had gradually been turning anti-Communist at home. During the November parliamentary elections of that year there were indications that the Belgrade government was not favorably inclined toward giving the proletarian Left a share in legislative power. The Belgrade Government promulgated a decree for the maintenance of law and order, the so-called Obznana, which was principally directed against the Communists.⁵³ On June 28, 1921, a bombing attempt was made by a Communist on the life of Prince Regent Alexander.⁵⁴ On July 21 former Minister of Interior Draskovic, who had ex officio signed the Obznana, and then resigned, was assassinated⁵⁵ by a member of a terrorist group called "Red Justice." A mass trial of Communists followed. On August 1, reacting to the flareup of terrorism, the skupshtina enacted a "Law Concerning the Protection of Public Security and Order in the State."⁵⁶ The new statute was used to expel the fifty-eight Communist deputies from the national legislature and to declare the Communist Party illegal in Yugoslavia.⁵⁷

Thus, by the summer of 1921, the Left in Baranya was wedged in between a counterrevolutionary "white" regime in Hungary to the north and an increasingly anti-Communist Yugoslav kingdom to the south. The completion of the treaty ratification process was agitating the Hungarian National Assembly, whose members kept the matter of the delayed evacuation on the parliamentary agenda by frequent interpellations through the spring and summer of 1921.⁵⁸ Replying to one such interpolation, Foreign Minister Dr. Gusztav Gratz promised complete amnesty and no reprisals for acts committed in Baranya during the Yugoslav occupation.⁵⁹ The Yugoslavs, in their turn, in order to counteract the adverse reaction among their Baranya proteges of their anti-Communist measures at home, began appealing to the landless peasants of the occupied country with promises of the land distribution in the event of annexation to Yugoslavia.⁶⁰

The Left began to split apart. Three principal leftist factions emerged. A moderate right wing arose, under the leadership of the attorney Gyula Hajdu (who had already played a moderating role at the time of the mutiny in 1918), speaking through the daily Munkas

(Worker). This faction considered the Yugoslav occupation as a necessary evil to be endured only as long as the Horthy regime remained in power to the north. An extreme left wing, led by Janos Polacsi and having the Pecsi Ujsag (Pecs News) as its press organ, engaged in propaganda for annexation to Yugoslavia at the "spontaneous request of the Baranya population. In between the two extremes stood the City Hall group of Bela Linder, which was pushing for an autonomous Baranya under the aegis of the League of Nations, protected against external enemies by the Yugoslav Army as a League surrogate.⁶¹ These internal developments strengthened the Linder faction, which sought to reinforce its position by an alliance with the Smallholders Party, representative of the land-hungry but anti-Communist peasants. In an attempt to gain the approval of the Great Powers and the Little Entente, as well as to ward off in advance the possibility of falling victim to Belgrade's incipient anti-Communist measures, the Linder group stressed its lack of Communist ideology and affinity.⁶² As proof of their contention, the Linderites pointed to the respect for private property and existence of a multi-party press in Pecs under their rule. They also thought to have solved the foreign political dilemma of whither Baranya. They cast in their lot with Yugoslavia, embracing the already approved formula of a Baranya Republic protected through the Yugoslav Army by the League of Nations.⁶³ Svetozar Rajic, the Yugoslav Prefect in Pecs, pledged his personal support to this proposed solution of the problem,⁶⁴ no doubt because it met with his minimum requirements: an indefinite prolongation of Yugoslav control over most of Baranya.

Action leading to the rise and fall of the Baranya Republic took place on three fronts during the three-week period ending on August 19, 1921: in Pecs itself by the Rajic-manipulated Left; in Belgrade, manifested by Linder's quasi-diplomatic efforts; and in Paris, through regular diplomatic channels between Yugoslavia and the Conference of Ambassadors.

During these three critical weeks the leftist press in Pecs clearly misrepresented Allied intentions by informing its readers that the Allied Supreme Council did not consider a Baranya evacuation timely;⁶⁵ that a military intervention by the Little Entente against Hungary was imminent;⁶⁶ and that a Yugoslav ultimatum had been delivered in Budapest.⁶⁷ Encouraged by such news, the workers of Pecs staged a one-day protest strike on August 12 against evacuation. In a communique, also misleading, issued on the following day,

Prefect Rajic stated that "reports of an impending evacuation are without reliable foundation."⁶⁸

It was in this confident spirit that a scheduled trade union conference assembled in Pecs on August 14 to discuss the rising cost of living and to register its disapproval of an evacuation. According to local leftist sources, 15,000 workers and citizens were present⁶⁹ (according to the Allied observers: "4,000 Communists").⁷⁰ They listened to speeches calling for resistance to Horthy and threatening with destruction of the mines, the factories, and city itself should the Admiral's troops enter it. At least one of the speakers declared that the intent of the mass meeting was "not to set up a dictatorship of the proletariat or to establish communism but merely to maintain an honest democracy."⁷¹ At this point the painter Peter Dobrovits mounted the rostrum unexpectedly. Dobrovits was a Hungarian citizen of Serbian descent who had spent some time in prison for alleged complicity in the mutiny in the spring of 1918, but was set free after the October (Karolyi) revolution of that year. Now he faced the crowd and told them:

... the moment has come to declare to the world that we want to be master of our fate and to proclaim the Hungarian-Serbian Baranya Republic. We will at once inform the Belgrade Government of our decision and will request its approving agreement. Starting with this moment, the fate of Baranya is in the hands of the Executive Committee of the Hungarian-Serbian Baranya Republic ... Long live the Hungarian-Serbian Baranya Republic⁷²

Thunderous approval and a reportedly unanimous show of hands greeted Dobrovits's proclamation. The text of an oath was then read and repeated by the people in the square. Next Dobrovits was chosen by acclamation as President of the new Republic's Executive Committee. Twenty-one members were appointed to this governing body. As the meeting was breaking up, a delegation led by Dobrovits informed Prefect Rajic of what had taken place. The latter noted the information conveyed to him, promised to inform his government at once by courier and, pending instructions from Belgrade, pledged to "support the workers and Dobrovits."⁷³ By nightfall posters in Hungarian, Serbo-Croatian, and German covered the walls of the occupied city, informing the inhabitants that, in accordance with the people's right to self-determination, the Serbian-Hungarian Baranya Republic had been proclaimed, that the Republic

would divide the land among the working peasants, and that it would place itself under the protection of Yugoslavia and the Little Entente.⁷⁴ On August 15 the town of Mohacs and the villages of Szigetvar, Siklos, Barcs, and Baja declared their adherence to the Baranya Republic. The following day, Dobrovits left for Belgrade at the head of a delegation, formally to place the new mini-state under Yugoslav protection and to obtain permission for the recruitment of a republican army.⁷⁵

The Baranya Republic was proclaimed in Bela Linder's absence. Between August 3 and 19 the Mayor was engaged in shuttle diplomacy between Pecs and the Yugoslav capital. Although the Yugoslav Governments did not seem to be overly optimistic about the future of the Baranya Republic, Linder's reports to his constituents back home were cheerfully confident. He did pass on Premier Nikola Pasic's ominous assurance that, in the event of an evacuation, Yugoslavia would provide asylum for all political refugees from Baranya,⁷⁶ but added that "government circles in Belgrade ... do not consider timely an evacuation of the occupied territories."⁷⁷ Both Linder and Rajic saw fit to keep secret the information Linder received in Belgrade on August 9 that there was no way to avoid an evacuation.⁷⁸

Yet, following the events of August 14, the Pecs leftwing press attributed to Linder the statement that "Belgrade government circles have favorably reacted to the proclamation of the Baranya Republic."⁷⁹ The press also reported an alleged statement by Pasic to Linder to the effect that "there is no question now of a Baranya evacuation and there will be none possibly for months yet."⁸⁰ On August 18 Linder telephoned from Belgrade to say that not only had Pasic' assured him that a Baranya evacuation was not on the agenda, but also that the Yugoslav Premier "had agreed to equip and arm republican battalions."⁸¹ On August 19-the day before the Yugoslavs started leaving Pecs-Linder briefly returned to the city and from the balcony of City Hall told a crowd that, although he had brought no orders with him which would assure the maintenance of the occupation, he could state that such orders would not be long delayed.⁸²

The French diplomatic sources now available reveal that up to August 15 the Yugoslav Government had not come to a firm determination to withdraw its troops to the new Trianon frontier and that, indeed, between August 16 and 18 it mounted a last-minute diplomatic offensive to prolong the presence of its armed forces in

Baranya. Secret diplomacy succeeded only in postponing the entry of Hungarian troops into the occupied parts by two days (August 18 to August 20) but failed in its larger aspect to prolong the occupation indefinitely, so to save the Baranya Republic.

The Interallied Military Commission (IMC) in Pecs had been designated to oversee the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from occupied Baranya. When British Colonel F. W. Gosset arrived in Pecs on August 11 to take up his post as Chairman of the IMC, it was assumed both in Paris and in Budapest that the evacuation would start on August 18. However, the Yugoslav Government had still not replied to the Allied demarche of June 25. There were other disturbing developments. Belgrade had also ignored an invitation from Paris to appoint a sole military commander for the entire Yugoslav occupied Hungarian area⁸³ for a simplified and easily workable liaison with the IMC in Pecs under Colonel Gosset. A new diplomatic roadblock was thrown up on August 16 by Milan Milojevic the Yugoslav diplomatic agent in Budapest, who informed the Allied Diplomatic Representatives in the Hungarian capital that his government "feared complications" should Hungarian troops enter occupied Baranya and that consequently Yugoslav evacuation should be postponed until a later date.⁸⁴ Milojevic also asked for guarantees for his country, including continued use for coal shipments of the main railroad line from Pecs to the Yugoslav frontier via the town of Villany.⁸⁵ Then came, on August 18-instead of a Yugoslav reply to the Allied demarche-a note from the Yugoslav Legation in Paris to the Conference of Ambassadors, requesting that the evacuation of Baranya be delayed "in view of the events now taking place there."⁸⁶ This was an obvious reference to the proclamation of the Baranya Republic on August 14 and a Yugoslav diplomatic follow up to Linder's entreaties as well as to Dobrovits's request of August 16 for a Yugoslav protectorate.

The Allied supervisory apparatus was thrown into disarray by these Yugoslav diplomatic moves. In Budapest the Allied Diplomatic Representatives handed Miloyevitch "an energetic note" rejecting his request for a delay in evacuation beyond August 18 and dismissing his demand for guarantees.⁸⁷ The note added, apprehensively, that owing to Yugoslav dilatoriness in Baranya, Hungarian evacuation of the Burgenland, awarded to Austria by the Treaty of Trianon, had to be postponed from August 21 to August 23,⁸⁸ The Conference of Ambassadors was even more stern. In a note dated August 19 and

addressed to the Yugoslav Legation in Paris, the previous Allied diplomatic demarche to Yugoslavia over Baranya was repeated "in the most pressing manner" and a warning note was added: in the event of Yugoslav non-compliance with the demarche, the Conference of Ambassadors envisaged "the most serious complications. "⁸⁹

Still the Yugoslav were not completely subdued; in fact they were heartened, because the evacuation target date of August 18 had passed and their troops were still in Baranya. The Baranya Republic was getting a reprieve, although it would prove to be only of two days' duration. But the rank-and-file of the Pecs Left was still unaware of how close they were to the end. The Yugoslav military, however, knew. On the evening of August 18 Colonel Gosset in Pecs called on the Yugoslav Commanding Officer, a Colonel Djoka Gjorgjevic, and officially informed him that the Allied authorities had postponed the beginning of the evacuation from August 18 to August 20.⁹⁰

A long weekend was in the offing. Saturday, August 20 was St. Stephen's Feast, a traditional Hungarian national holiday, which this year would be prolonged till Sunday evening. Munkas (Worker) published its last number Saturday morning. The final issue announced the end of the occupation, advised against resistance, and recommended "quick flight" from Yugoslav-occupied territory.⁹¹ An exodus of the Left high command and its more immediate followers began at once. According to a report of Gyula Hajdu the refugees included about 700 miners, approximately 1500 industrial workers, 500 additional manual workers from the rural areas; all told about 2700 men with families. Most of these people stayed in Yugoslavia. Only 70 Leaders of the Baranya Left continued to Vienna to join the Hungarian emigres of 1919.⁹²

Yugoslav troop withdrawal from the line of demarcation began early Saturday morning, August 20. It took five days for the Yugoslav Army to complete the evacuation of all occupied Hungarian territory north of the international boundary.

Thus, fifty years after the Paris Commune, the microcosmic Baranya Republic passed into history unnoticed by the world, yielding without resistance or bloodshed to the forces of a conservative restoration. As Paris in 1870-1871, so Baranya in 1918-1921 provides an opportunity for the study of subsurface national divisiveness along ideological and class lines, rising to dynamic crisis level as a result of military defeat awaiting diplomatic treatment.

Notes

Abbreviations: In citing the major sources the following abbreviations will be used in footnotes: FFAA (French Foreign Affairs Archives) for the unpublished archival materials microfilmed in the Archives of the Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris; FRH (Foreign Relations of Hungary) for the documents published in Hungary, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Papers and Documents Relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary, edited by Francis Deak and Dezso Ujvary, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1939 and 1946); EK (Emlekkonyv) for the documents, abstracts, and studies appearing in A Magyar Tanacskoztarsasag Pecsi-Baranyai Emlekkonyve [The Pecs-Baranya Book of Memories of the Hungarian Soviet Republic] (Pecs, Municipal Council 1960); and Hajdu for the memoirs and documents published in Gyula Hajdu, Harcban Elnyomok es Megszallok Ellen [Fighting Oppressors and Occupiers] (Pecs, 1957). Less frequently used sources will be cited in full the first time they appear. Diplomatic documents will be cited with names of sending and receiving persons or agencies stated, date given, and place of origin mentioned whenever significant.

1. "Yugoslavia" did not become an official country name until 1929. Between 1918 and 1929 the country now referred to as Yugoslavia was known as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (abbreviated SHS). Before 1918 the central part of the SHS Kingdom had existed as Serbia. During 1918-1921 the occupying forces and authorities were commonly referred to as Serbs in Baranya. In this article the terms Yugoslav and Yugoslavia will be used as most capable of carrying meaning at this writing.

2. The place name Baranya (pronounced Ba'ranya) first occurs in writing in 1141. It is probably derived from Slavic brana, gate, gateway. See Zoltan Gombocz and Janos Melich, Lexicon critico-etymologicum linguae Hungaricae (Budapest. 1914-1930), Vol. I, columns 282-284. Imre Danko, Pecs kepekben [Pecs in Pictures] (Pecs, 1957), p. 36 derives the word from a personal name, that of the first is pen (province chief) of this region.

3. Revai Nagy Lexikona [Revai's Great Lexicon] Vol. II (Budapest, 1911), pp. 586-588 (henceforth Revai); Bolshaya Sovietskaya Encyclopedia, (Moscow, 1952), IV, p. 228.

4. Revai, II, pp. 586-588.

5. The place name Pecs (pronounced Paytch) first occurs in writing in 1093 and is open to etymological speculation. The most likely origin of the word is old Slavic pest, kiln, oven. See Danko, p. 33 and Janos Kolta, Pecs (Budapest, 1967), pp. 16-22.

6. Revai, II, pp. 586-588.

7. Revai, XV (Budapest, 1922), "Pecs."

8. Hajdu (see Abbreviations), p. 20.

9. EK (see Abbreviations), p. 34.

10. On the Hague Regulations (referred to as the Second Hague Convention in the French archival materials) see H. Lauterpacht (ed.) Oppenheim's International Law (London and New York, 1944), pp. 335-349. (Henceforth Lauterpacht).

11. FFAA, Derain in Pecs to Allied Diplomatic Representatives in Budapest, February 7, 1921.

12. Hajdu, pp. 219-220.

13. Tibor Hajdu, Az 1918-as magyarorszagi demokratikus foradalom [The 1918 Democratic Revolution in Hungary] (Budapest 1968), p. 248.

14. Mme. Mihaly Karolyi, Egyutt a forradalomban [Together during the Revolution] (Budapest, 1967), p. 299.

15. Ibid., pp. 301, 301, n.

16. Hajdu, p. 277.

17. Ibid., p. 277.

18. Ibid., p. 286.

19. EK, p. 53.

20. Hajdu, p. 274.

21. EK, p. 63.

22. EK, p. 61, FFAA, Conference of Allied Diplomatic Representatives, Budapest, Derain, Proces Verbal, February 26, 1921.

23. EK, p. 72.

24. FFAA, Fouchet in Budapest to Conference of Ambassadors, February 20,1921.

25. EK, p. 191: FFAA, Conference of Allied Diplomatic Representatives, Budapest, Derain, Proces Verbal, February 26, 1921.

26. EK, p. 72.

27. Hajdu, pp. 390, 4280439; L.C. Tihany, The Baranya Dispute, 1918-1921 (New York, 1978), pp. 83-94.

28. FFAA, Derain in Pecs to Allied Diplomatic Representatives, Budapest, February 7, 1921; EK, p. 68.

29. Magyar Eletrajzi Lexikon [Hungarian Biographical Lexicon] Vol. II: "Linder, Bela" (Budapest, 1969).

30. FFAA, Young in Belgrade to Curzon in London, May 16, 19fl.

31. Ibid., French Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Conference of Ambassadors to Belgrade and Budapest, December 20, 1920.

32. FFAA, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for Conference of Ambassadors, to Belgrade and Budapest, December 20, 1920.

33. FRH, II, pp. 587,667.

34. FRH, I. p. 530.

35. FFAA. Robien in Budapest to Leygues in Paris, Dec.12, 1920.

36. Great Britain, Public Records Office, C 2341/21; Young in Belgrade to Curzon in London, Jan.29, 1921; FRH, I, p. 530.

37. FFAA, Transmittal from War Ministry (Deuxieme Bureau) to President, Council of Ministers, March 17, 1921.

38. Ibid., Conference of Ambassadors to SHS Legation, Paris, April 27, 1921.

39. Ibid., May 3,1921.

40. Great Britain, Parliament, House of Lords: The Parliamentary Debates (Official Report), Fifth series, Vol. XLV-2, Column 250.

41. FFAA, Note from British Embassy, Paris, to Conference of Ambassadors, June 13, 1921.

42. See footnotes 45-47.

43. FFAA, Derain in Pecs to Allied Diplomatic Representatives in Budapest. October 31, 1920.

44. Ibid., February 7, 1921.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., Conference of Allied Diplomatic Representatives, Budapest: Derain, Proces Verbal, February 26, 1921.

47. Ibid., Robien in Budapest to Leygues in Paris, December 12, 1920.

48. Full translation in Tihany, Baranya Dispute (New York, 1978), pp. 75-82,

49. Loc. cit.

50. Loc. cit.

51. FFAA. Berthelot in Paris for Conference of Ambassadors, to Belgrade, Budapest, Rome, and London, June 25, 1921,

52. For a detailed report on the exchange of ratifications deposition ceremony see FRH, II, pp. 55-58.

53. Alex N. Dragnich, Serbia, Nikola Pasic and Yugoslavia (New Brunswick, 1974), p. 155.

54. Stephen Graham, Alexander of Yugoslavia (New Haven, 1939) pp. 121-122.

55. Ibid., p. 164.

56. 56. Dragnich, p. 164.

57. 57, EK, pp. 80-81.

58. Hungary. Nemzetgyules, Naplo (Budapest, 1921-1926) (National Assembly, Parliamentary Record) X, pp. 328-330, 352; XI, pp. 4, 7, 19-37, 44-46, 116, 368-371; XII, pp. 84-88, 126, 130, 335-338, 476-477, 480-481, 626

59. FFAA, Fouchet in Budapest to Brand in Paris, March 21, 1921.

60. EK, p. 78.

61. EK, p. 73.

62. EK, pp. 78,80.

63. EK, p. 70.

64. Gyula Hajdu, p. 383.

65. Ibid. p. 401.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid., p. 402.

69. Ibid., pp. 407, 410.

70. FFAA, Fouchet in Budapest to Briand in Paris, Aug.23, 1921.

71. Hajdu, p. 408.

72. Ibid., p. 410

73. Ibid., pp. 410, 411.

74. For a text of the proclamation of the Baranya Republic see Gyula Hajdu, pp. 412-413.

75. Ibid., p. 415.

76. Ibid., 401.

77.

78. EK, p. 86; Gyula Hajdu, p. 404.

79. Hajdu, p. 416,

80. Ibid., p. 417

81. Ibid., pp. 417, 418.

82. Ibid., p. 420.

83. FFAA. Fouchet in Budapest to Briand in Paris, Aug.23, 1921.

84. Ibid.

85. Ibid.

86. FFAA, SHS Legation in Paris to Conference of Ambassadors, August 18, 1921.

87. Ibid., Fouchet in Budapest to Briand in Paris, Aug.23, 1921.

88. Ibid.

89. Ibid., Conference of Ambassadors to SHS Legation, Paris August 19, 1921.

90. Ibid.

91. Gyula Hajdu, pp. 42-421

92. Full English translation in L.C. Tihany, The Baranya Dispute, 1918-1921, pp. 99-102.

93. For a more detailed treatment of the rise and fall of the Baranya Republic see Tihany, op. cit.

A Case Study on Trianon