A Case Study on Trianon

Slovaks living in Upper Hungary, as Slovakia was usually called before World War One, had long-standing grievances against those who held political and economic power in Hungary. The Slovak schools-almost all church-run-were few in number, the administrative language was Hungarian, the economy was controlled by Hungarians and Jews, and the Slovaks were under-represented in the Hungarian parliament.¹ Indeed, the nationality problems and injustices existing in the Habsburg Empire were much more severe in the Hungarian part of the Dual Monarchy. Yet, very few Slovaks expected the dissolution of the Empire when the war started; the most they hoped for was an autonomous existence for their nation that had been a part of Hungary for almost one thousand years.

At the outbreak of the war the Slovak representation in the Hungarian parliament shrunk to one deputy, Ferdis Juriga; another deputy, Pavel Blaho, was called to military service and the third resigned his mandate.² Although Juriga affirmed the loyalty of the Slovaks to the Hungarian government, toward the war's end he and other Slovak leaders began to voice disapproval of the existing conditions in Hungary. Several Slovak leaders living abroad, most notably Milan R. Stefanik, Stefan Osusky and Gustav Kosik, cooperated with the Czechs whose aim was the establishment of an independent Czecho-Slovakia.³

The Peace of Brest-Litovsk, concluded in March 1918, had some unforeseen consequences. In Austria-Hungary the returning prisoners of war helped to foster popular discontent that was already under way during the last year of the war, and some Czech and Slovak leaders went public rejecting the established political order. In Prague, Karel Kramar, the pre-war leader of the Young Czech party, who was imprisoned in 1915, sentenced to death in 1916 and pardoned by the new Emperor Charles in 1917, became in July 1918 the chairman of the Czech National Committee, promoting the idea of Czechoslovak independence. The May 1918 demonstration in Liptovsky Sv. Mikulas (Slovakia) produced a pro-Czech resolution that

had been inspired by Vavro Srobar, a pre-war student and follower of Tomas G. Masaryk, and the leading Slovak advocate of the Czechoslovak orientation.⁴

It may be pointed out that from the beginning those who worked for Czechoslovak independence included Slovakia in the state to be created on the ruins of Austria-Hungary. For Kramar, the leader of the independence movement at home, Slovaks were the closest Slavic kin of the Czechs; he believed that Slovakia was the necessary link between the Czech lands and Russia. The leader of the independence movement abroad, Tomas G. Masaryk, felt that the Czechs and Slovaks were one nation and that they ought to live in one state.⁵

While the Slovak masses were largely apolitical, the leaders of the Slovak National party and the Slovak People's party did not hold the same view on the future of the Slovaks. Some favored Slovak autonomy within Hungary, while others advocated union with the Czech lands. But when, toward the end of May 1918, the leaders of the Slovak National party met at Turciansky Sv. Martin (henceforth merely Martin), Father Andrej Hlinka emerged as a spokesman for cooperation with the Czechs. He declared: "We have to state definitely whether we will continue to live with the Hungarians or with the Czechs. We cannot avoid this question; let us say publicly that we are for a Czechoslovak orientation. The thousand-year marriage with the Magyars has not succeeded. We must dissolve it."⁶ Yet, for the next few months the political situation in Slovakia remained dormant and only in October did the Slovak leaders formally establish their National Committee.

There were signs of the approaching end of the war and the Habsburg Empire when late in September the Bulgarian front collapsed and on October 2, 1918, the armistice with Bulgaria was concluded. Shortly afterwards the chairman of the Union of Czech deputies in the Vienna parliament announced that the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Paris with Masaryk at its helm, as it was the highest organ of the Czechoslovak armies, was competent to represent the Czechoslovak nation at the Peace Conference. On October 9, 1918, another Czech deputy belonging to the Union declared that the Czechs were leaving the Vienna parliament for good and were severing ties with Austria-Hungary.⁷ Then on October 16, Emperor Charles published his manifest announcing federalization of the Cisleithanian part of the Habsburg Empire. The manifest

provoked strong negative reaction in Hungary and speeded up the collapse of the Empire from within.⁸

On October 19 the only Slovak representative in the Hungarian parliament, Juriga, read a declaration demanding for the Slovaks the right to decide their own destinies. In particular the declaration denied the right of the Hungarian parliament and the government to speak for the Slovaks. It pointed out that instead of forty Slovak deputies there were only two Slovaks in parliament (in fact, the other deputy was not even present at that time); that the Slovak representatives at the peace conference would have to be selected by their own national assembly or its organ, the Slovak National Council, and that no other person had the right to negotiate and decide on behalf of the Slovak nation. The Slovaks, the declaration said, demand for themselves the right of self-determination, just as they recognize the right to self-determination of the other nationalities in Hungary.⁹ The Juriga declaration was the last Slovak word in the Hungarian parliament, indicating that the Slovak leaders decided to part their ways with Hungary.

Juriga's reference to the Slovak National Council reflected the intent of the Slovak leaders to form such a body. Already in mid-September the first steps toward the formation of a Slovak National Council were taken; its purpose was to seek unification of all political segments of the nation in one representative body. On October 30, 1918, in Turciansky Sv. Martin the Slovak National Council was formally established. Its chairman was Matus Dula and its secretary Karol A. Medvecky. The Slovak National party, the Slovak People's party and the Slovak Social Democratic party were represented in the Council.¹⁰

The Slovak leaders who assembled in Martin on October 30 did not know that two days earlier the Czech National Committee in Prague proclaimed Czecho-Slovak independence. They knew, however, that the new Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria-Hungary, Gyula Andrassy, accepted the Wilsonian peace conditions and recognized the right of the nationalities in Austria-Hungary, more specifically, the right of the Czechs, Slovaks and Southern Slavs, to decide their future destinies.¹¹ The Slovak National Council, therefore, issued a declaration breaking off the one thousand years' ties with Hungary, proclaiming that "the Slovak nation is a part of the Czechoslovak nation, one with it in language and in the history of its civilization. ... We also claim for this, the

Czechoslovak nation, the absolute right of self-determination on a basis of complete independence."¹²

The "Martin Declaration," as the document is usually referred to, was a statement of intent: it was neither legally binding nor self-enforcing and it was subject to several interpretations.¹³ It was brought to Prague by the Slovak National Council's delegates on November 1, and submitted to the Czech National Committee which was acting now as the provisional government in the Czech lands. In the exile government, proclaimed by Masaryk on October 18, the Slovaks were represented by General Milan R. Stefanik who was Minister of War; he was at this time on his way to the Czechoslovak army in Siberia.¹⁴ Vavro Srobar became a member of the Prague National Committee; the members of this committee, together with other exile politicians, became the government of Czecho-Slovakia. However, neither the latter nor the Slovak National Council had effective control over Slovakia whose territory had not even been clearly defined. Upper Hungary was under Hungarian administration and the Hungarian government was not prepared to give it up.

As long as the Hungarian authorities had an effective control of Slovakia, the question of jurisdiction of the several revolutionary bodies-the Slovak National Council, the Czech National Committee and the so-called temporary Slovak government consisting of four members led by Vavro Srobar dispatched from Prague to Slovakia with the task of securing the latter for the new state on November 4-was of little consequence. At the outset of the struggle for Slovakia, the new Hungarian government of Mihaly Karolyi had the upper hand; it controlled the administration, police and the armed force present in Slovakia. As early as November 7, 1918, the Hungarian government's delegate came to Prague and notified the Czech National Committee of his government's intention to solve the Slovak issue peacefully, while insisting on the preservation of the integrity of the Hungarian state.¹⁵ Karolyi also sent a telegram to the Slovak National Council in Martin, emphasizing the right of the Slovaks to self-determination and stressing his belief that his government would be able to reach an agreement with the Council. The overtures to both the Czechs and the Slovaks by Karolyi, however, produced negative responses from both.¹⁶ The Czechs notified the Hungarians that "violence of the Hungarians and Jews" will not be tolerated and that Czech military force will be dispatched to Slovakia to protect the Slovaks.¹⁷

The efforts of the revolutionary government of Karolyi was supported by the highest representative of the Catholic Church in Hungary, Cardinal Janos Csernoch, archbishop of Ostrihom (Esztergom), who was of Slovak origin and who tried, together with the other Hungarian bishops, to save for Hungary what could be saved. In his instructions to the Slovak clergy, Cardinal Csernoch pointed to the danger for the Slovak people in being attached to the Czechs whom he saw as anti-Church and who, he claimed, would pursue policies of Czechization of the Slovaks. He gave himself as an example of a Slovak who could attain the highest Church position in Hungary and instructed his subordinate clergymen to work for the preservation of the country's integrity.¹⁸ On behalf of the Slovak clergy Father Hlinka responded that they would comply with the decisions of the Slovak National Council. In addition, Father Hlinka stated that he welcomed the establishment of Czecho-Slovakia, since he saw in the latter a new dawn, the fulfillment of the Slovak age-old desires and the shield and protection against the one thousand years of wrongs and injustices.¹⁹

In a communication of November 5, 1918, the Protestant bishop Sandor Raffay, appealed to the Protestant clergy in Slovakia in a way similar to that of Cardinal Csernoch. Raffay's announcement contained provisions for the preservation of the unity of the Hungarian Protestant church. It promised constitutional protection of religious equality and reciprocity, the maintenance of church-related schools, the increase of subsidies to clergymen, making language concessions and the reestablishment of the Slovak higher gymnasium, among others.²⁰

In the early days of November 1918, the Hungarian government did not resist the small Czech armed units entering Slovakia from Moravia. However, the conclusion of the armistice on November 13, 1918, with the French General Louis Felix Franchet d'Esperey, the commander of the Balkan front, prompted Karolyi to issue a protest against Czech attempts to occupy Slovakia, and he announced his intention to protect Slovakia with armed might.²¹ Immediately, Hungarian troops began to attack the Czech military units which were forced to retreat in haste to Moravia. In mid-November the Hungarians placed under arrest the chairman of the Slovak National Council. Matus Dula and another member of that council, Upon receiving instructions from Budapest, the authority released both the same day.²²

While the Karolyi government tried to keep the Slovaks within Hungary, the Kramar government in Prague launched its struggle for Slovakia on the diplomatic front with the help of Eduard Benes, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Paris, and on the military front by dispatching armed units to that territory. The immediate basis for the Czech claim was the declaration made by representatives of all Slovak parties in Martin on October 30 who wanted their country to become a part of Czechoslovakia. Yet the new liberal government of Count Karolyi secured an armistice agreement with the Allies, signed in Belgrade on November 13, Article 17 of which stated explicitly that all Hungarian territory, with the exception of Croatia and Slavonia, would remain under Hungarian administration and that the Allies would not interfere with the internal administration of the country.²³ Since no provision in the agreement was made for the evacuation of the Slovak-inhabited districts, the Karolyi government understood this to mean that the latter remained part of Hungary. But the Prague government held a different view and sent its representative, Vavro Srobar, to Slovakia to enforce its authority. Attempting to avoid an open conflict with the Czechs, the Karolyi government proposed the establishment of a Slovak National Council on the condition that the latter recognized Hungarian sovereignty over the disputed area. While the Hungarian government based its claim to Slovakia on Article 17 of the Belgrade armistice, the Czecho-Slovak government contested it on the grounds of Article 3 of the armistice, according to which the Allied powers had the right to occupy all places considered important for the preservation of order.²⁴

The principal Czech negotiator in Paris, Benes, did not like the prospect of having the territorial questions of the new state decided by the Peace Conference. He, therefore, initiated a policy of faits accomplis in order to secure the territories claimed by Czecho-Slovakia. This required military occupation of the German-inhabited districts in the borderlands of the historical Czech lands, as well as the whole of Slovakia. In order to accomplish his objectives, Benes turned to France for help and he received it.

As early as November 9, 1918, Benes, in his letter to the National Committee in Prague, asked for approval of his plan to bring a French military mission to Prague and "derive from it unusually great political, diplomatic and economic benefits."²⁵ Upon receiving approval of his proposal to orient the new state on France, Benes

proceeded with the details. The Czecho-Slovak army, formally a part of the French army,²⁶ was subordinated to the French military command, and the French military officers, dispatched to Czechoslovakia, helped to build the country's armed forces. This was a mutually beneficial arrangement for both countries: the French sought the weakening of Germany and advancing their influence in Central Europe; and the Czechs were able to obtain French consent and assistance in their efforts to occupy the territories claimed by Czecho-Slovakia even before the peace conference would discuss the boundary issues.

In his memorandum to the Allies of November 3, Benes emphasized that while Czecho-Slovakia was an island of peace and order, there was a "danger of Bolshevism in Vienna," and that "the Czechs must occupy militarily Slovakia, because bolshevism threatens Hungary most ... and it could spread also to Yugoslavia and Italian territories."²⁷ In the letter of December 16 to the French Prime Minister Clemenceau, requesting the subordination of the Czecho-Slovak army to the Supreme Commander of the French Forces, Marshal Foch. Benes wrote that the Czech military forces could be used, "should it be necessary, for the maintenance of order and stopping the tide of Bolshevism in the neighbouring countries."²⁸

Since the Czech army was built under the supervision of a French mission and was, technically, under the command of Marshal Foch, it was an Allied force and it could participate in carrying out the terms of the armistice which included the right to occupy strategic positions within the Austro-Hungarian territories.²⁹ Therefore, the occupation of the German-inhabited borderlands of the Czech lands was accomplished during the months of November and December 1918. Yet the annexation of Slovakia was equally important to the Prague government.

Since Slovakia was under Hungarian control, the Slovak leaders who went to Prague to take part in the new government asked the Czechs for help against the Hungarians. On November 15 Prime Minister Kramar tried to pacify the Slovak deputies in the newly established Czecho-Slovak Revolutionary National Assembly in Prague by promising that within two weeks three divisions of Czech troops would be dispatched to Slovakia.³⁰ It was not practical to implement the promise, for the troops were needed in the Czech lands. The German inhabitants of the borderlands of Bohemia, Moravia and Austrian Silesia proclaimed their own governments and refused

to accept the Czech rule; therefore, it was necessary to occupy the borderlands before the convening of the peace conference so that the latter would be confronted with a fait accompli.³¹ A similar fait accompli in the case of Slovakia was much more difficult to accomplish for at least two reasons. First, in contrast to the Czech lands there were no "historical boundaries" in Slovakia. The Slovaks lived largely in mountainous regions of Upper Hungary, an integral part of the old Kingdom. Although it would be relatively easy to determine the northern boundary of Slovakia along the Carpathian mountain ranges, it was difficult to arrive at a border in the south where the Slovaks intermingled with Hungarians and where there was no "natural boundary" between the two nationalities. Second, since occupying of the borderlands of the historical lands had a priority, there were few troops to spare for Slovakia. The first volunteers who entered Slovakia early in November, and the Slovak national guards formed in the revolutionary excitement, were no match for the trained, disciplined, and in some instances combat-experienced Hungarian troops. Czech and Slovak volunteers were easily dispersed by the Hungarian units as soon as the latter received instructions to do so from the Karolyi government. Thus the occupation of Slovakia was a problem that was not resolved by rhetorics in Prague and Budapest, but by the victorious Allied powers, more specifically France.

France had made commitments to Czecho-Slovakia even before the war's end for reasons that cannot be discussed at any length in this essay.³² In addition, there was a coincidence of interests of the two countries, as mentioned above, and, therefore, the French government gave its Czech ally complete diplomatic support. Benes, indeed, was able to achieve the change in the terms of the Belgrade armistice when he took up the matter with Marshal Foch, the Supreme Allied Commander. Furthermore, while recognizing and helping Czecho-Slovakia, the French refused to recognize or negotiate with Austria and Hungary.

In contrast to the French government's pursuit of a policy of non-recognition, the Czecho-Slovak government had its representatives and negotiators in both Vienna and Budapest. In the latter city, the Czecho-Slovak representative was Dr. Milan Hodza, who from 1906 to 1910 had been a Slovak deputy in the Hungarian parliament and who knew many Hungarian politicians. He discussed the Slovak situation with the Hungarian Minister of Nationalities, Dr. Oszkar Jaszi.³³

A Case Study on Trianon