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Italy also played a role in the Hungarian-French estrangement. From the outset Rome was persistently engaged in thwarting France's plans relating to Hungary. It is understandable, therefore, that it did not look kindly on a Franco-Hungarian rapprochement. It did not wish France to lay hands on Hungary, and attempted to block this at all costs. After it became obvious that it could not do this by itself, it joined forces with England, and supported the latter's action. The alignment was therefore the same as at the peace conference: Anglo-Italian collaboration against France.

On June 28 Cerruti protested in the name of his government against the Hungarian-French rapprochement. He reiterated this on July 3. The Italian high commissioner emphasized that Franco-Hungarian collaboration had created bad feeling in both England and Italy. He reminded Kanya that Prime Minister Huszar and

Foreign Minister Count Somssich had personally declared to him in February that Hungary wished to base its foreign policy on cooperation with Italy, inasmuch as it was necessary for Hungarians and Italians to defend themselves jointly against the pan-Slav danger. Beyond this first initiative the Hungarian side had done nothing at all really to further a Budapest-Rome rapprochement. Kanya, the Foreign Minister's trusted permanent deputy, pinned the blame for the standstill in Italian-Hungarian relations on the Italian government. He argued that Italy's policy concerning Romania, which disregarded Hungarian interests, was thwarting the Hungarian government's implementation of its original plan. Cerruti pointed out Romania's importance for the planned Central European stabilizing bloc. In order to achieve this stabilization, Hungary had to normalize its relations with the Romanian government, even at the cost of temporarily accepting the Romanian conditions, that is, of acknowledging the extant situation in this area. This did not mean that later on this situation would not be modified. He trusted that Transylvanian autonomy could now be effectuated.99

France's "advice" concerning Romania, as we have seen, did not impede a Franco-Hungarian rapprochement. Here therefore is another factor to be considered: namely that Italy's potential for carrying through a revision was insignificant. Budapest wished to give preference to the power that was capable of securing alternate compensations for certain concessions. In the period under consideration it regarded France as such a power. In the present study we will not touch on the behavior of the United States in connection with the Hungarian-French rapprochement as its attitude in the matter was quite indifferent.100

The policy of England and Italy, sketched out above, had an effect not only on Hungary but on her neighbors as well. As we have seen, it induced the former to retreat, and provoked the latter to attack, and take decisive measures. Benes stood in the forefront of the struggle. The Czechoslovak Foreign minister wished to make the most of the possibilities offered by the situation: he wanted to put into execution his old plan concerning a Little Entente. Until the Paris peace conference, collaboration among the three states had been occasional and bi-lateral. Unified action was first taken at the Trianon peace conference. Following this they again went on their separate ways. Both Yugoslavia and Romania rejected Benes' alliance proposal, and they adhered to their position until the summer of 1920.101

The Franco-Hungarian secret agreement, however, nudged the three states toward each other, and played a catalytic role, as it were, in the configuration of their relationship. The director of Czechoslovak diplomacy immediately recognized the possibilities offered by the given atmosphere. Yugoslavia and Romania were in a panic; they were aware that Hungarian revisionist aspirations, along with France's support, represented a potential danger, and that Benes' present message-"Hungary is no longer our enemy, but our rival"102 summed up the actual situation. From the end of July communications between Belgrade, Bucharest, and Prague grew more lively. Nincic traveled to Prague and discussed the new situation with Benes, and the two foreign ministers agreed on the signing of a treaty. Benes prepared for the signing of the agreement in Belgrade. Before his departure he informed Renner that the Hungarian revisionist efforts, supported by the French, had made the formation of the Little Entente necessary.103

The French government followed Benes' every move closely-and with great dissatisfaction.

The directors of French diplomacy opposed most vigorously the organization of the Little Entente, and even tried to block it with the means at their disposal. It was obvious to them that this alliance would thwart their plan for a Danubian confederation, whose aim was to obtain the cooperation of every Danubian state, first economically, and then politically. The Little Entente would divide this area into victors and vanquished, and inevitably drive the latter among them into the arms of Germany. Their position found precise expression in Millerand's August 24 circular telegram, addressed to 11 embassies. In the telegram the prime minister mentioned those negotiations that aimed at the creation of an alliance whose member states would be Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania, and perhaps Poland and Greece. He referred to the already-extant Czechoslovak-Yugoslav agreement, and then continued thus:

Such a policy may be accompanied by the serious problem of the isolation of the Hungarian government which then may inevitably attempt to side with Germany, and find support there. Our daily concern, however-quite to the contrary-is to avoid conflicts, and to seek the elements of rapprochement and understanding among the different states of Central Europe, In order to achieve this goal more effectively, I also fostered an economic rapprochement between French and Hungarian enterprises. The strengthening of French influence in

Budapest, therefore, seemed suitable for serving the cause of peace, for this would offer to each of our Central European allies a sure guarantee that will prevent a renewal of Hungary's policy of conquest. Under such conditions the affiliation of Poland or Greece with the planned combination may bring with it the threat that it will promote the break-up of Central Europe into two camps, which would increase the danger of conflict. It is not in our interest, therefore, that the government to which you are accredited enter into a grouping with such an orientation. I request that you, using your judgment and discretion, call the attention of the government to the grave consequences of this policy, which masks the danger of a conjunction of Hungarian and German interests, and makes difficult the development of natural relations among the Central European states.104

This, therefore, was the official position of France regarding the formation of the Little Entente. This serious document, possessing the value of a source, gives witness in itself to the fact that Paris not only did not promote the formation of the alliance, but also condemned the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav agreement, and even tried to keep the other states from joining. Under France's determined intervention the Romanian government began to waver, and at the time of Benes' Romanian negotiations the French Marshall Joffre arrived in Bucharest unexpectedly. Diplomatic circles followed developments with rapt attention, and waited to see who would be the victor, Benes or Joffre.

The victor turned out to be Joffre. Romania did not adhere to the Little Entente; it was only prepared to make a verbal agreement. It signed the Little Entente agreement only a year later, when the Hungarian danger-as a result of ex-King Charles IV's attempted putsch-again became acute, when a new turnabout occurred in France's Danube basin policy, and when despite its wishes it sided with the established Little Entente. By the fall of 1920 Paleologue's Hungarian-oriented policy had fallen through. After the establishment of the Czechoslovak-Yugoslav agreement the French opposition intensified its attack against the Millerand-Paleologue foreign policy line. In Paris they suddenly realized that the building of a new order in Central Europe had started not only without them, but expressly against them. Consequently, Millerand found it better to repudiate his plans concerning Hungary, and to appease his critics, he made Paleologue, the man who had openly taken up Hungary's cause, the scapegoat.

Notes

1. For a long time historiography evinced considerable vagueness on this question. The documentary material now available from the Quai d'Orsay makes possible a fuller and more accurate description of events.
2. It can be observed in the case of all three Great Powers that private enterprises, supported by the government, got their hands on economic assets of the Danubian states.
3. On this point see France, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Archives Diplomatiques, Serie Europe 1918-1929 (hereafter AD); Hongrie (hereafter H), Vol. 58, f. 4-9, "the Hungarian opening and French interests."
4. Czechoslovakia, Austria, and Yugoslavia declared neutrality in the Polish-Soviet war. Romania, although it did not make a declaration of neutrality, was still not willing to send its army to the Polish front. It wished to utilize it to guard the Hungarian border.
5. AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 197.
6. Another memorandum of the French foreign ministry contains the following line: "La puissance qui dominera la Hongrie possedera la clef vente de l'Europe Centrale." Fouchet, Memorandum, December 11, 1920, AD. Europe 1918-20, H, Vol. 60, f. 140-49.
7. The Hungarian government sent the peace delegation to Paris only after repeated invitations.
8. Before this Hungary had no definite foreign policy. It leaned toward several countries: England, Austria, and Romania, though Great Britain stood in first place.
9. Francis Deak and Dezso Ujvary, Papers and Documents Relating to the Foreign Relations of Hungary, Vol. I (Budapest, 1939) (hereafter PDH); Memorandum on the conversation of Paleologue and Halmos (April 13, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 78-79.
10. PDH, pp.243-44; doc. 236.
11. This was signified by the acceptance of Halmos's April 23 memorandum as a basis for discussion.
12. Telegram from Fouchet to Millerand (April 1920), AD., Europe 1918-20; H, Vol. 58, f. 61-62.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.; Report from Fouchet to Millerand (April 28,1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 67-71. Having a pro-Hungarian reputation, Fouchet regarded an agreement with Hungary as important, even at the cost of significant concessions. Already at the end of April he reported to Millerand with satisfaction on the decrease in the anti-French mood. Report from Fouchet to Millerand (April 23,1920), AD, Europe 1018-29, f. 101-06.
15. In contrast to the official position of France, Fouchet supported Archduke Joseph in the multi-directional activity in which he was engaged to


obtain the Hungarian throne. Archduke Joseph wished, with French help, to forestall his cousin, Charles IV, and occupy the throne as soon as possible. He discussed this with French contacts on several occasions. Report from Fouchet to Millerand (November 6, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 60, f. 90-97.
16. Telegram from Fouchet to Millerand (April 23, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 101-06; Telegram from Fouchet to Millerand (April 10, 1920), ibid., f. 72-73.
17. Report from Fouchet to Millerand (April 28, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 67-71; Telegram from Fouchet to Millerand (April 10, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29: H, Vol. 58, f. 72-73.
18. Ibid.
19. The article appeared on April 20, 1920, and produced great surprise. However, as a result of governmental intervention, it did not precipitate a press debate.
20. Telegram from Fouchet to Millerand (April 10, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f, 72-73. The government formed in June conformed to French ideas. Pal Teleki became prime minister, Imre Csaky foreign minister.
21. Note of the conversation between Paleologue and Halmos (April 13, 1920), AD. Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 178-79.
22. Ibid.
23. PDH. doc. 218, p.230. Halmos reported on this as follows: "Conversation with Paleologue took place in a cordial and encouraging atmosphere. I outlined the political and economic situation. He seemed satisfied and stated that we can count on the goodwill of the French." Halmos met with Paleologue again on April 17; see PDH, doc. 236, pp. 243-44.
24. PDH. doc. 224. p. 234.
25. PDH, doc. 227, p. 238.
26. PDH. doc. 239, p. 249; doc. 249, p. 238.
27. PDH. doc. 242, 242/a, pp. 250-54.
28. Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, Vol. 11 (London, 1938), p. 172.
29. Saint-Sauveur called a conference for April 28 to clarify anew the questions already decided upon. PDH. doc. 225, pp. 268-75.
30. PDH, doc. 255/b, pp. 273-74; ibid., doc. 259, pp. 270-84
31. Having arrived in Paris, Bethlen and Csaky endeavored to curb Halmos's activity. They did not regard it as consonant with Hungarian objectives or with radical revision. They did not agree with his April 23 memorandum.
32. PDH. doc. 259, pp. 279-84
33. Lettre d'envoi from Millerand (May 6,1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58. f. 112-13.
34. On this point see: Telegram from Millerand to the French ambassador

in London (June 26. 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 59, f. 61; Memorandum from the French foreign ministry (December 25, 1920), Vol. 58, f. 245; Documents on British Foreign Policy (hereafter DBFP), First Series, Vol. XII, doc. 244, pp. 286-89; Vol. VII, doc. 54, p. 449.
35. The representatives of the Allied Powers spoke openly about this among themselves.
36. The peace terms remained unchanged. They referred to eventual concessions only as possibilities. "To counter our arguments, the prior treaty obligations of the Allied Powers are repeatedly invoked and eventual concessions are mentioned only as possibilities," Praznovszky reported on May 6. PDH, doc. 264, pp. 286-87; Lettre d'envoi from Millerand (May 6, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 112-13.
37. Telegram from Fouchet to Millerand (May 8, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 118-21; Report from Fouchet to Millerand (May 1920), ibid., f. 138-42. Millerand's instructions to the French high commissioner in Budapest read as follows: "Vous devez ne rien negliger pour accepter ces conditions et a lui assurer l'execution." Communique from Millerand to Doulcet (March 6,1920), AD, Europe 1918-20; H. Vol. 58, f. 14-17.
38. Although Teleki informed Praznovszky on May 7 that favorable comment on the "lettre d'envoi" in the Hungarian press did not seem feasible (PDH., doc. 268, pp. 292-93), measures by the Hungarian government in this direction were successful, Fouchet reported on this with satisfaction to Millerand. Report from Fouchet to Millerand (May 23, 1920). AD, Europe 1918-29' H, Vol. 59, f. 128.
39. Teleki had Fouchet informed of the above. He communicated to him that with this his political career was in fact over. Telegram from Fouchet to Millerand (May 23, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-20; H, Vol. 58, f. 202.
40. The Trianon peace was signed on June 4, 1920, by Agoston Benard, Minister of Labor and Welfare, and Alfred Drasche-Lazar, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.
41. PDH, doc. 266, p. 201; doc. 292, pp. 296-07; doc. 276, pp. 299-301; Note from Halmos to Paleologue (May 12,1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 122-24. After Paleologue indicated to Csaky that he would not acknowledge the latest demands [PDH. doc. 283, p. 304], the newly-delivered memorandum laid down the Hungarian desiderata only in general terms.
42. PDH, doc. 250, pp. 279-84; see also: Letter from Halmos to Paleologue (April 23, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29, H, Vol. 58, f. 95-100.
43. Telegram from Paleologue to Fouchet (May 13, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-20; H, Vol. 58, f. 123.
44. Report from Fouchet to Millerand (May 23, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 138-42. Fouchet reported as follows: "Le Comte Teleki m'a temoigne sa tres vive satisfaction la politique francophile qu'il a

cru devoir adopter au profit de son pays etait trop bien, service par la texte que j'etais autorise a lui communiquer verbalement, pour que son impression puit etre differente."
45. Telegram from Fouchet to Millerand (June 10, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 59, f. 203-12; Telegram from Millerand to Fouchet (June 12, 1920), ibid., Vol. 58, f. 239-41; Telegram from Paleologue to Fouchet (May 13, 1920), ibid.,; PDH, doc. 292, pp. 310-11.
46. The supposition, however, is that Fouchet, who generally adapted the received instructions to the ideas of the Hungarian government, altered the text of the Paleologue declaration. The text verbally delivered by him-which the Hungarian foreign ministry published in 1939-held out the prospect of France's support for the correction of economic and ethnic injustices in the peace treaty, and for the revision and amplification of the minority decisions. Telegram from Paleologue to Fouchet (May 13, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 128-29. There are still other-not substantial-stylistic variations between the two declarations. The declaration delivered in writing on June 22 went through further modifications at the hands of Paleologue himself. We will refer to this later.
47. Telegram from Fouchet to Millerand (June 19, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 59, f. 18-20.
48. Letter from the Hungarian government to the Schneider-Creusot firm (June 1, 1920). AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 233-37; Telegram from Fouchet to Millerand (June 10, 1920), ibid., f. 208-11.
49. PDH, doc. 323, pp. 335-36.
50. PDH. doc. 323, pp. 335-36; doc. 325, p. 337; doc. 341, p. 348; doc. 358, pp. 362-63.
51. Serious competition was under way among Hungarian firms supported by the English and French governments for the acquisition of the key economic assets in Hungary. On this point see: Memorandum from the French foreign ministry (June 9,1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 204-5.
52. Lord Furness was the president of the English capitalist group that wanted to penetrate the economic life of Hungary.
53. Halmos's memorandum read: "Ces Monsieurs [Barons Adolf and Gyorgy Ullmann-M.A.] ont recu l'instruction de ne faire que des declarations dilatoires et de ne prendre aucun engagement meme morale." Halmos recommended to the French permanent secretary for foreign affairs that he arrange for the Ullmanns to stop in Paris on their way home from London. This in fact took place. Memorandum from Halmos to Paleologue (April 13, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 76.
54. Report from Fouchet to Millerand (June 10. 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 208.

55. Telegram from Fouchet to Millerand (June 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 208. Ullmann made clear that public opinion was against the leasing of the railways, regarding this as anti-national. The railway and Credit Bank options were interrelated, and as a result the hostile mood also turned against the Credit Bank.
56. Teleki's communique to Csaky read: "C'est grace a une forte pression du gouvernement hongrois que la direction de la Kreditbank, qui a attache une grande importance au maintien de ses rapports etablis depuis longtemps avec d'autres groupes etrangeres, donna son consentement a la remise de l'option." PDH, doc. 361, pp. 366-68. Teleki to Fouchet: "Le Gouvernement hongrois a enfin reussi a vaincre la resistance du baron Ullmann." PDH, doc. 366, pp. 370-71. "He conditioned his approval on a written guarantee to this effect. This was given in the form of a letter to him from the Prime Minister stating that the granting of the Credit Bank option is in the interest of the Hungarian government and not of the Bank. Count Apponyi, Count Bethlen and Popovics have made similar statements in another letter written to Ullmann." PDH, doc., 361, pp. 366-68.
57. PDH, doc. 301, pp. 318-19.
58. Ibid.; Letter from Horthy to Teleki (June 9, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 59, f. 21; PDH, doc. 351, p. 355.
59. "Paleologue mentioned today Regent's letter to Your Excellency and remarked that this official document referred, among other things, to the memorandum which Count Bethlen gave him some time ago and which he accepted a titre prive and only as matter of information." PDH, doc. 351, p.355.
60. PDH, doc. 349, pp.353-54.
61. Ibid.
62. Csaky reported on this as follows: " ... he [Montielle-M. A.] said we may rest assured that we could tear this treaty to pieces whenever we felt sufficiently strong to do so and that when that time came, we could rely on the wholehearted support of France." PDH, doc. 368, pp. 371-72.
63. PDH, doc. 374, p. 375.
64. Les Commissions de delimitation ont pour mission de fixer sur le terrain: (a) D'abord les frontieres decrites dans les Traites de paix; (b) Ulterieurement les frontieres qui seron fixees apres l'execution des divers plebiscites prescrites par les dits Traite's. League of Nations, Archives de a Societe des Nations (Geneva), Instructions relatives aux Commissions de delimitation, 19902/19584. I obtained the document from French historian H. Bagdan, for which I owe him my thanks.
65. "En principe, la frontiere devra etre tracee sur le terrain telle qu'eIle est definie dans le Traite de paix. En aucun cas, les modifications de frontiere envisagees plus loin ne devront etre de nature a remettre en question les bases memes de ligne decrite dans IC Traite." Ibid.


66. Report from Fouchet to Millerand (June 17, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-20; H, Vol. 59, f. 5-9 PDH, doc. 361, pp. 365-68; doc. 324, pp. 336-37.
67. Report from Fouchet to Millerand (June 1920), AD, Europe 1918-20; H, Vol. 58, f. 208.
68. After being informed of the attack directed against Millerand, Csaky pointed out that the Hungarian government's remaining in power depended on the Hungarian question. PDH, doc. 300, pp. 323-24; ibid., doc. 578, pp. 576-77.
69. A long discussion ensued over who should sign the declaration. (Horthy, citing the constitution, refused.) Should it be published, and where? To whom should a copy of the declaration be sent? PDH, doc. 331, p.340; doc. 344, p.350; doc. 353, p. 357; doc. 346, p. 346; doc. 324, pp. 336-37.
70. PDH, doc. 384, p. 384; doc. 386, p. 385; Communication from Paleologue to the Hungarian delegation (June 21, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 50, f. 31-32; PDH, doc. 384, p. 384.
71. Telegram from Millerand to Fouchet (June 22, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 59, f. 37 PDH, doc. 386, p. 385; doc. 303, pp. 381-82. At the time of the delivery of the declaration Paleologue emphasized its significance;" ... cet declaration tien grand compte des considerations politiques et economiques dont vous vous etes faits les interpretes aupres de moi: elle atteste que le Gouvernement francais est vivement desireux de voir l'Europe Centrale renaitre a l'ordre, au travail et a la prosperite." Letter from Paleologue to Csaky and Halmos (June 21,1020), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 59, f. 31.
72. PDH, doc. 378, p. 378.
73. Circular telegram from Paleologue to the French embassy (June 22, 1920). AD, Europe 1918-20; H, Vol. 50, f. 35. It was planned that the Schneider-Rothschild combine come in for a share of 250 million crowns. Memorandum from the commercial department of the French foreign ministry to Paleologue (June22, 1920), ibid., f. 40-43.
74. PDH, doc. 378, p. 378.
75. Paleologue, who did not know that this sentence did not figure even in the verbal declaration of May 18 [we have noted that Fouchet did not read this sentence of the declaration to Horthy], informed Csaky on June 20, in other words two days before the signing of the agreement, that compared to the old declaration there was a change favorable to the Hungarians in the present one: it left out the sentence in question. This meant, continued the permanent foreign secretary, that the French wanted to review the basic structure of the peace in favor of Hungary. PDH., doc. 378, p. 378. Paleologue was not speaking of that modification-i.e., of the insertion of that half-sentence-which to a certain degree compensated for the sentence left out. The new declaration, therefore, emphasized only that revision, under conditions established in the covering letter-"dans les conditions

indiquees par la dite lettre d'envoi"-could be carried out. PDH, doc. 393, pp. 391-92. Yet a further significant variation between the two declarations is that while the first, verbal declaration promised support for the redress of ethnic and economic injustices, the second, written, one supported negotiations between Hungary and her neighbors, the aim of which was the elimination of conflicts. The June 22 declaration reads as follows: " ... [the French government] est dispose a preter ses bons offices a toute tentative d'accord a l'aimables entre la Hongrie et ses voisins en vue de faire disparaitre toute cause d'hostilite entre les parties interessees qui receviaient une satisfaction commun." Circular telegram from Paleologue (June 22, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 59, f. 37; PDH, doc. 393, pp. 391-92.
76. Circular telegram from Paleologue (June 22, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29, H, Vol. 39, f. 37.
77. Ibid.
78. Memorandum from the French foreign ministry (June 9, 1920); this viewpoint is vigorously stressed in AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 205-6.
79. Memorandum from Csaky and Halmos to Paleologue (June 23, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 59, f. 44-45; PDH, doc. 405, pp. 404-8.
80. PDH, doc. 405, pp. 404-B.
81. Telegram from Millerand to Fouchet (June 26, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 59, f. 63-65; Memorandum from Laroche on the conversation he held with Csaky and Halmos (June 24, 1920), ibid., f. 50-132. According to Laroche's memorandum, Paleologue agreed to the observations connected with the memorandum. Ibid.
82. The Hungarian government requested France to further the revision of the military clauses of the Trianon peace, and the establishment of a conscript army in place of the prescribed mercenary army, because they maintained that the latter was unsuitable in the case of Hungary for the maintenance of public order and public security, as it made the economic reconstruction of the country impossible. Ibid.; PDH, doc. 405a, p. 408; Memorandum from Csaky and Halmos to Paleologue (June 23, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 59, f. 44-45.
83. The proposal was that the French government support Hungary in the retention of the Western Hungarian territories. In this way it could solidify its French political orientation, and prevent Austria, which sooner or later would join Germany anyway, from increasing its territory. Ibid. The Hungarian government's idea was-and Csaky informed Paleologue of this-that Teleki would report in parliament in response to an interpolation that Hungary did not intend to withdraw its troops from the Western territories, and Millerand would acknowledge this in some sort of declaration. PDH, doc. 361, pp. 365-68.
84. The request concerning the Hungarian minority was that the French government instruct the military missions in the neighboring states to

represent the interests of the Hungarians there. Memorandum from Csaky and Halmos to Paleologue (June 23, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H. Vol. 59, f. 44-45.
85. AD, Europe 1918-29, H, Vol. 59.
86. "Montielle informed me today that both Vesnic and Benes were enthusiastic about the idea of direct negotiations with Hungary under French auspices." PDH, doc. 418, p. 426. Montielle informed Praznovszky that " ... the Rumanians were also pleased with the suggestion of French mediation, though their attitude was more reserved than that of the other. The Rumanians emphasized their hope that France will not take part in the negotiations as an ally of Hungary." PDH, doc. 455, pp. 458-59.
87. Memorandum From Praznovszky to the French foreign ministry (August 4, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; Roumanie (hereafter R.), Vol. 50, f. 97-98; Report from Saint-Aulaire to Millerand (August 12, 1920), ibid., f. 109; Circular telegram from Paleologue (August 17, 1920). ibid., f. 118.
88. Telegram from Praznovszky to Teleki (August 23, 1920), Hungary, Orszagos Leveltar, Kulugyminiszterium (hereafter O. K. KUM), K. 74-1920, Paris, incoming cipher telegrams.
89. " ... la situation est tres grave. La Hongrie dans ses nouvelles frontieres et sans accords economiques avec ses voisins ne peut vivre." Report of Count Saint-Sauveur (August 4, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 55, f. 169-77.
90. Saint-Sauveur's signature also figures on the document. The count arrived in Budapest on July 24. The agreement, however, was supposedly signed on the night of the 19th.
91. The Franco-Hungarian secret agreement, AD, Europe 1918-29, H, Vol. 59, f, 181-92. This agreement does not figure among the documents published by the Hungarian foreign ministry. If one had existed, then the Hungarian government would have made it public in 1939. Today we know more about the true story of the Franco-Hungarian negotiations and see their background and aim more clearly; we see that, beyond promises and assurances, how far the directors of French diplomacy wanted to go on the question of revision, and we also have more precise information on the conditions they set. France concluded neither a political nor a military agreement with Hungary, but gave only a declaration of a political character, which implicitly included the possibility of territorial revision. Further, we know that Millerand stood essentially on the basis of the given status quo, and considered only minor border corrections, Paleologue, on the other hand, went further than this in the revision of the peace treaty he regarded even more far-reaching border adjustments as permissible. He even expressed this verbally on several occasions to the members of the Hungarian delegation. Thus, he informed Csaky on June 20, 1920, why he had left out of the written declaration the earlier phrase protecting the basic structure of

the peace. Csaky's report reads: "Paleologue intimated that the omission of the phrase signifies the willingness of the French Government to overlook in our favor, if necessary, the general structure of the treaty." PDH, doc. 378, p.378. This is also demonstrated by Paleologue's acceptance of Halmos's April 23 memorandum as basis for discussion. After Paleologue's fall they often spoke openly in the house of representatives about the efforts of the former permanent secretary of foreign affairs in this direction; see Paul-Boncour's remarks: Chambre des deputes, 1-re seance du mardi, 7. juin, 1921.
92. On this point see; Report of the French ambassador to Prague (August 9, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 59, f. 180; Report of the French ambassador to Prague (August 11, 1920), ibid., f. 1931; Telegram from Pontalis, French ambassador to Vienna (August 13, 1920), ibid., f. 196; Telegram from Charles Roux, French ambassador to Romania (August 30, 1920), ibid., f. 208-9; Telegram from Fouchet, French high commissioner in Budapest (August 18, 1920). ibid., f. 200; Telegram from Marcilly, France's representative in Berlin, to Millerand (June 4 and June 6, 1920), ibid., Vol. 58, f. 175-76, 189; Italy, ASMAE, Seria politica 1920-30, Ungheria 1920, pacco 1741, Telegrammi i portenza.
93. Report from Fouchet to Millerand (May 12, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29, H, Vol. 58, f. 154-62.
94. "La situation est tres emouvante depuis le commencement de la se-maine a cause des demarches et parait-it de l'arrogance de mon collegue anglais, qui a porte avant hier matin au Regent des offres de Londres." Report from Fouchet to Millerand (May 27, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 146.
95. Telegram from Fouchet to Millerand (June 8, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 198; PDH, doc. 315, p. 328. According to this paragraph of the peace treaty it would impound the state property of the country as security for reparations. The French government was aware that in reality the planned option conflicted with the decisions of the peace treaty concerning reparations. This is witnessed by a note to be found in the French foreign ministry, which contains the position of the legal expert. Note of June 9, 1920, ibid., f. 204-'.
96. PDH, doc. 327, p.328; Memorandum on Halmos's visit (June 9, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 204; PDH, doc. 342, p. 349.
97. Telegram from Paleologue to Fouchet, AD, Europe 1918-29, H, Vol. 58, f.
98. Note of June 8, 1920, AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 58, f. 205.
99. PDH, doc. 415, pp. 421-23; Telegram from Martin to Sforza, July 14, 1920, Italy, ASMAF, Serie politica, Roumania 1920, pacco 1520, fasc. 6670.
100. The diplomats ot the United States followed events closely, and filed reports on the negotiations. They did not protest officially against the

Franco-Hungarian combination. The American press, however, giving credence to the rumors of a secret agreement, attacked the French government, against which the Millerand faction protested.
101. Report of Joung, English ambassador to Belgrade, to Curzon (March 2, 1920), DBFP, doc. 120, pp.149-54. We do not touch here on events connected with the formation of the Little Entente; on this see: Magda Adam, Magyarorszag es a kisantant (Budapest, 1968), pp. 9-40.
102. Telegram from Benes (July 30, 1020), Czechoslovakia, AMZV, PZ, teleg. odesle.
103. Telegram from Torretta, Italian ambassador to Vienna (August 15, 1920), Italy, ASMAE, Serie Politica 1920-30, Cecoslovachia 1920, pacco 034, fasc.
104. Circular telegram from Millerand (August 24, 1920), AD, Europe 1918-29; H, Vol. 47, f. 71-72. Osusky, Czechoslovak ambassador to Paris, gave an account in his reports of the attacks directed against Paleologue. The French permanent secretary for foreign affairs warned him that his government was following a dangerous path. Report of Osusky' to Benes, PZ., Paris 1920, Aug.20. In the Prague archives may be found several reports from the Czechoslovak ambassador to Paris, which reflect the French position concerning the developing Little Entente; see: Report From Osusky to Benes (September 1, 5, 6, 7, 10,1920), Czechoslovakia, AMZV., PZ., Paris, 1920.

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