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A similar outcome occurred in the Territorial Commission on Yugoslav and Romanian Affairs. Here the two British delegates, Crowe and Leeper, made no pretense of agreeing with the American position. Crowe stated the British point of view quite clearly when he suggested that when the commission was confronted with difficult frontier decisions in which it was impossible to do justice to both parties, "it was only natural to favor our ally Romania over our enemy Hungary."40 Leeper exemplified this attitude when, in justifying the awarding of Hungarian territory near Szatmar Nemeti to Romania, he recognized the possible danger to Romania of incorporating a large Hungarian population, but insisted that considerations of economics and transportation "ought to prevail over this inconvenience."41 Again. the decisions of the Commission resulted in almost all of Seton-Watson's "grey zones" being assigned to Romania and Yugoslavia.

The reports of the two territorial commissions were completed by early April and submitted separately to the Council of Foreign Ministers and Council of Four in May. The examination of these reports was rather perfunctory, and at no time were the cumulative effects of these decisions on Hungary directly addressed. Robert Lansing, the American Secretary of State, did express some concerns about the large number of Hungarians to be transferred to the new states, but his arguments were successfully met by Arthur Balfour, who pointed out that the trusted Eastern European experts of the four Great Powers had come to unanimous agreement on the justice of the proposed frontiers.42

So hasty was the approval of the Hungarian frontiers by the Council of Four that David Lloyd George would later claim that he could not recall having passed judgment on the territorial provisions of Trianon. Of course, the minds of Lloyd George and his colleagues were preoccupied with weightier matters at that time, including the most difficult task of fashioning an Allied policy toward the Soviet regime of Bela Kun, the establishment of which in late March had

sent political tremors across Europe. Yet despite the furor caused by the appearance of a Communist government in East Central Europe, the Treaty of Trianon was not affected. The territorial provisions approved in May, 1919, were to appear virtually unchanged in the treaty signed and ratified in 1920.

Thus, the British Foreign Office in late spring of 1919 considered the task of drawing the new frontiers of Danubian Europe to be completed. The British Prime Minister, however, did not concur in this judgment. Quite early in the Paris deliberations Lloyd George had become uneasy about what he regarded as unduly severe peace terms that the Allies wished to inflict on Germany. In an important memorandum that he drew up at Fontainebleau on March 25, 1919, he argued that a harsh and humiliating peace would create serious instability in Central Europe and facilitate the spread of Bolshevism. To buttress his arguments, Lloyd George referred also to Hungary:

What I have said about the Germans is equally true of the Magyars. There will never be peace in South Eastern Europe if every little state now coming into being is to have a large Magyar Irredenta within its borders, I would therefore take as a guiding principle of the peace that as far as is humanly possible the different races should be allocated to their motherlands, and that this human criterion should have precedence over considerations of strategy or economics or communications which can usually be adjusted by other means.43

It is difficult to determine what specifically sparked Lloyd George's interest in the Hungarian problem.44 During the war he had paid little attention to Hungary,45 and in the swirl of events in the post-war period many other critical issues were accorded a higher priority. Moreover, the "New Europe" group in the Foreign Office, perhaps sensing that the prime minister might not fully approve the policy they were pursuing in East Central Europe, tried to ensure that no reports on Hungarian conditions that might be misinterpreted would reach Lloyd George. Thus, when William Beveridge, the British member of an economic mission sent to Budapest early in 1919, returned with increased sympathy for Hungary and a proposal for establishment of political ties between Britain and Hungary and for positive help in reconstruction, Nicolson and his colleagues tried to discredit him in Lloyd George's eyes.46

It is quite possible that Beveridge's proposals strengthened a growing suspicion in Lloyd George's mind that something was amiss in

Britain's policies in Danubian Europe. Though the "New Europe" group had erected a barrier that nearly eliminated communication between the Hungarian and British governments, one important appeal stating the Hungarian case did manage to reach the prime minister: a letter from Archduke Joseph of Hungary to his distant cousin, King George V.47 Similar to numerous other messages that prominent Hungarians were trying to send to influential British intermediaries, Archduke Joseph's letter desperately implored Great Britain to give a hearing to Hungary and not just to the Successor States, the "ruthless conquerors who-naturally enough-have explained everything to the Entente from the point of view of their own interests." The archduke asked King George to raise his "mighty voice to demand that the invaders ... shall be ordered to retire beyond the sacred frontiers of our land." The letter concluded with the suggestion of a political and economic alliance between Hungary and Great Britain, since "every serious minded man in this country today rests his every hope in Great Britain.

This letter, which evoked no interest when a copy reached the Foreign Office,48 seems to have touched Lloyd George quite deeply. At a session of the Council of Four in Paris he described it as a "moving document,"49 and from this point on Lloyd George began to emerge as a spokesman, albeit not an uncritical one, for the Hungarians at the peace conference. At a meeting of the Council of Ten on March 11, 1919, when reports of the tentative proposals of the territorial commissions may have reached the Allied leaders, Lloyd George thought it timely to re-emphasize a point that had been strongly stressed in the Foreign Office pre-conference memoranda. Great care should be taken, he asserted, "to show fairness to all parties. The new map of Europe must not be so drawn as to leave cause for disputation which would eventually drag Europe into a new war."50 Later he was to urge that the Allies try to establish relations with the Hungarians, just as they had done with the Croats and Slovenes. "The Magyars have never been enemies of France or England," he asserted. They are a "proud people with a great military tradition," and should be treated on the same basis as their neighbors.51

The appearance of a Soviet Republic in Hungary in late March confirmed Lloyd George's suspicion that Bolshevism would thrive in political instability and national discontent. Bela Run had succeeded, he believed, because his countrymen feared that "large

numbers of Magyars are to be handed over to the control of others."52 When in early summer Czechoslovakia and Romania, citing the Bolshevik menace in Hungary, began military advances further into Hungarian territory, Lloyd George defended the Hungarians and launched a tirade against the new states. The latter he called "little robber nations" who were out to steal more territory whenever they could.53 Thus the Hungarians, even though under Communist leaders, were justified in driving "the invader out of what is acknowledged even by him to be Magyar territory."54

The most remarkable thing about Lloyd George's forceful intervention on the side of the Hungarians is that it provoked no change whatsoever in British policy in Danubian Europe. His warnings about the creation of large Hungarian irredentas and his similar utterances on the Supreme Council seemed to make no impression in the Foreign Office. Indeed, a historian can sift through the voluminous Foreign Office files of the period and never suspect that the prime minister did not approve of Britain's policies toward Hungary and her neighbors. The explanation of this apparent lack of coordination seems to lie in the uneasy, often strained relationship between Lloyd George and the Foreign Office. Distrusting professional diplomats, Lloyd George often preferred to deal personally with major foreign policy questions. At the same time, he was apparently reluctant to set policy guidelines to which the Foreign Office could refer.55 Thus, as the peace conference opened, Harold Nicolson and his colleagues were surprised that no instructions about British peace aims and their implementation were received from the prime minister or the Cabinet. They thus assumed they were on their own.

In light of Lloyd George's tendencies in this regard, it appears that in the spring of 1919 he failed to make it clear to Balfour and others in the Foreign Office that he wanted peace terms toward Hungary to be mitigated. This negligence could perhaps be explained by the prime minister's preoccupation with a myriad of other crucial matters, including a successful effort to refashion the report of the Commission on Polish Affairs to make the Polish-German frontier line more palatable to the Germans. Whatever the reason, Nicolson and Leeper (apparently with Balfour's support) made no effort to modify the Treaty of Trianon to meet the objections of Lloyd George.

The territorial provisions of the treaty were thus unchanged when they were finally presented to the Hungarian delegation in January, 1920. By this time, however, the number of British officials who

shared Lloyd George's concerns about the peace settlement with Hungary had greatly increased. The British were very well represented on the various Allied commissions sent to Hungary after the fall of Bela Run in August, 1919. Admiral E. T. Troubridge was commander of the Allied flotilla on the Danube; Sir William Goode was Director of Relief Missions; and Sir George Clerk headed a special Allied political mission sent to facilitate the establishment of a stable government in Hungary. Each of these men became sympathetic to the Hungarians and drew similar conclusions about the situation in Danubian Europe: Hungary had been treated unfairly and her new neighbors, especially Romania, had acted in an uncivilized, despicable manner. In his final report to the Supreme Council, Clerk was sharp in his condemnation of the Successor States. Their "abuses and outrage" on Hungarian territory he characterized as an example of "a higher civilization hopelessly manhandled by those who are still learners in the art of Government."56

Similar sentiments were expressed by the first British diplomatic representative in Hungary after the war, Sir Thomas Hohler, in a dispatch sent to London on 1 February, 1920. Hohler directly raised the question of a revision of the territorial terms of the Trianon Treaty. Claiming that his conclusions were shared unanimously by the "various representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers" stationed in Hungary, he argued that the proposed peace terms appeared to be "faulty and incapable of standing the test of time." The treaty violated the principles of nationality and national self-determination, and as a consequence was "an immediate menace to the peace of Europe, and therefore to the interests of His Majesty's Government."57

When a flurry of pro-Hungarian activity developed in Parliament at about the same time,58 the Foreign Office felt constrained to make some response in defense of the Treaty of Trianon. Arthur Balfour, now Lord President of the Council, officially responded to the questions raised in the House of Lords and Commons. His reply, succinctly stated, was that the critics of the Trianon Treaty were "wholly wrong" in their facts. The frontiers of Danubian Europe had been drawn by the finest experts available and were doubtless the best that could be found.59

The main burden of mounting the counterattack against the critics of the Trianon Treaty was placed on Allen Leeper, who remained

steadfast in his commitment to the peace settlement he had done so much to shape. Leeper composed a memorandum that was intended to rebut specifically the points that Sir Thomas Hohler had made in his dispatch from Budapest.60 In the memorandum, which was skillfully but also somewhat tendentiously written, Leeper suggested that the Territorial Commissions at Paris had drawn the new frontiers "mainly, if not entirely on ethnic considerations," and had even used Hungarian census figures as their bases. Violations of the strict ethnic line had been approved only when "absolutely demanded in order to make it possible for Czecho-Slovakia and Transylvania to live (not in comfort, but at all)."61 In any case, Leeper concluded, what the Hungarian government was really after was reannexation of Slovakia and Transylvania and a restoration of the Kingdom of Hungary. This, of course, the Great Powers would not tolerate, for the new frontiers of Hungary had been approved unanimously by the Allied heads of state on the Supreme Council.

Characteristically, Leeper made no mention of the strong reservations that Lloyd George had expressed about the Treaty of Trianon. Perhaps he thought that the prime minister had lost interest in the matter, but such was not the case. The last opportunity for the Supreme Council to consider the treaty with Hungary came in late February and March of 1920, when the Council met in London to consider the response the Hungarians had made to the proposed treaty. The French representatives were of the firm opinion that territorial changes could not be made in the treaty at that late date, since such modifications would involve "endless difficulties" with Hungary's neighbors. But Lloyd George, with the support of Francesco Nitti, Italy's premier, insisted that the Council was bound to consider the Hungarian arguments "fairly and impartially," just as they had done in the case of the Versailles Treaty. Moreover, just as certain concessions had been made to Germany on the Polish frontiers, so, too, such concessions could not in fairness be excluded in the case of the treaty with Hungary.62

The most important session of the Supreme Council dealing with the Hungarian treaty occurred on 3 March. The Allied leaders had had time to marshal their evidence, and Lloyd George, who again received vigorous support from Nitti, dominated the discussion with an impassioned plea for a revision of the proposed territorial clauses. The ethnographic information on hand, he suggested, showed that a total of 2,750,000 Magyars were to be transferred to other countries.

Such a proposal would "not be easy to defend," and he urged that if, after additional study, some of the Hungarian claims were found to be justified, the appropriate concessions should be made, even if this upset Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Could there ever be peace in Central Europe, he asked, "if it were discovered afterwards that the claims of Hungary were sound, and that a whole community of Magyars had been handed over like cattle" to the Successor States? Referring specifically to Czechoslovakia, Lloyd George warned that with so many minorities that state "would (as it were) suffer from violent appendicitis, and sooner or later an operation would become necessary, under which Czechoslovakia might very well collapse."63

Despite objections from the French to Lloyd George's proposal, it was decided to submit the matter to the foreign ministers of the three Council members for a "fair and conscientious examination," with the understanding that territorial revisions not be excluded from consideration. When the Council reconvened on 8 March, however, it was clear that Lloyd George had finally abandoned what perhaps had been a chimerical struggle for change in the Trianon Treaty.64 The British prime minister was not even present at the meeting, though he had attended a session of the Council earlier in the day. Instead, Britain was represented by Lord Curzon, who did not share Lloyd George's views on Hungary and the peace settlement in Danubian Europe. Armed with another comprehensive memorandum by Leeper,65 Curzon now proposed that the treaty not be tampered with. As an apparent concession to Lloyd George, however, and as a reflection of the "general feeling that in certain areas of the frontier districts injustice might have been committed," Curzon suggested that if the boundary commissions in the course of their work on the spot were to discover that injustices had indeed been done, they could report their conclusions to the League of Nations. This compromise the French accepted with alacrity, for they correctly inferred that this process would result in only minor, if any, frontier modifications.66

What prompted Lloyd George to lose interest in this issue? There is no evidence to document his thinking, but it seems likely that strong opposition to his policy from the Foreign Office (in the form of Leeper's memorandum and perhaps Curzon's recommendation) convinced him that a further effort on his part would be fruitless.67 Thus, he made no further comment on the issue, and the Treaty of Trianon was duly signed and ratified later in 1920.

In an analysis of Britain's role in the making of the Treaty of

Trianon, the words of an eminent Hungarian historian, Henrik Marczali, writing in 1919, are instructive: "From England we [the Hungarians] have always been able to count on platonic sympathy, but effective support only when it corresponded to her interests."68 Even after a terrible war, there was, indeed, great sympathy for Hungary in British society, particularly among the aristocrats, financial experts, and professional diplomats in the field. Because these individuals believed that common sense and traditional standards of "fair play" were violated by the treaty with Hungary, their concern was often expressed in passionate terms. Nonetheless, this sympathy did remain platonic, for no action was taken on it by the British government, despite the promptings of David Lloyd George.

The reason for this, as has been seen, was that British national interests, as defined by those individuals in the Foreign Office who fashioned British policy in Danubian Europe, were regarded as best served by creating new national states that had to be given strategic and economic security, even if this meant the creation of large Hungarian irredentas. Clearly, however, the triumph of the ideas of the "New Europe" group was not a reflection of overwhelming support by British policy makers for such a policy. It was instead a byproduct of a relative lack of British interest in East Central Europe. When the critical issue arose of dispatching British military units to occupy Budapest, the War Cabinet was opposed, citing the higher priority to be given to other parts of the globe. When Lloyd George raised objections to the proposed treaty with Hungary, the Foreign Office simply ignored him, correctly assuming that the prime minister would be so occupied with other matters that his advocacy of Hungary would be abandoned.

In light of these observations, perhaps the most revealing contemporary comment was that of William Beveridge, who told Mihaly Karoly early in 1919 that "the Entente Governments had many more important things to worry about than the fate of ten million people in Hungary."69 Indeed, the only people in Britain who had the time to concern themselves with the fate of Hungary were Allen Leeper and his colleagues, and the imprint of their Hungarophobia was to be found on the Treaty of Trianon.


1. Unsigned Foreign Office memo Dec. 13, 1918, Public Record Office (hereafter cited as PRO), Cab 29/2, no.52.

2. Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, first series, Vol. 7, no. 46, edited by F. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, (Cited hereafter as DBFP.)
3. On this see the perceptive essay of Victor S. Mamatey, "Legalizing the Collapse of Austria-Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference," Austrian History Yearbook, Vol. 3, pt. 3 (1967), pp.206-37.
4. V. H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy. 1914-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp.76-77.
5. Harry Hanak, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary during the First World War. A Study in the Formation of Public Opinion (London: Oxford U.P., 1962), p.2.
6. Kenneth J. Calder, Britain and the Origin of the New Europe. 1914-1918 (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1976). pp. 18-19.
7. Hanak, p.22. One of Seton-Watson's most influential books was entitled, Racial Problems in Hungary.
8. Robert Seton-Watson et al., The War and Democracy (London: Macmillan, 1915), p.274.
9. Wilfried Fest, Peace or Partition, The Habsburg Monarchy and British Policy, 1914-1918 (New York: St. Martin's 1978). p.16; and Arthur J. May. The Passing of the Habsburg Monarchy, 1914-1918, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966), Vol. l, p.243.
10. Fest, p.37.
11. Nicolson's minute of 25 April, 1915, PRO. F0371/2244/49484.
12. Nicolson's minute of 2 May. 1915, PRO, P0371/2244/53126. See also Nagy Zsuzsa, "Magyar hatarvitak a bekekonferencian 1919-ben" (Debate over Hungarian Frontiers at the Peace Conference of 1919), Tortenelmi Szemle. Vol. 21, no.3-4 (1978), pp.442-43.
13. Foreign Office memo of Oct., 1916, PRO. Cab 29/1/5.
14. Rothwell, pp. V9-87.
15. Fest, p. 10.
16. Unsigned Foreign Office memo of 13 Dec., 1918, on "Europe," Committee of Imperial Defense, Peace Series, Cab 29/2, no.52. In a similar vein another Foreign Office memo described Britain's overall goal as the attainment of "a just and permanent settlement based on the principles of nationality, self-determination, security, and free economic opportunity." Unsigned memo on "South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans," Cab 29/2, no.66.
17. Lord Curzon's minute on PRO, F0371/3136/177223.
18. Fest, p. 247. An excellent analysis of the haphazard debate in the Foreign Office over future British policy in Danubian Europe is found in Marie-Luise Recker, England und der Donauraum 1919-1929. Probleme einer europaischen Nachkriegsordnung (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1976), pp. 13-14, 35-36.
19. Cab 29/2, no.66; Cab 29/2, no.52.
20. Cab 29/2. no.52.

21. Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (Boston: Grosset & Dunlap, 1965), p, 34.
22. Nicolson, p. 33.
23. Nicolson, p. 33.
24. Cab 29/2, no, 66. This attitude was reflected in the treatment of Czechoslovakia in the same memo, Since the Czechs "had been throughout the war our most devoted and most efficient Allies" in Eastern Europe and "have proved themselves a nation capable of carrying on an orderly government," we must provide "necessary conditions for organizing a national State of their own." Thus, no plebiscites should be held, for "the Czechs might lose districts essential to their national existence."
25. "Hungary," Cab 29/2, no.66. This memo is undated, but it seems to have been drafted in late November or early December, 1918.
26. Thinking along similar lines, Lewis Namier proposed the dispatch of a commission of experts to Danubian Europe "to supervise the movement of our minor Allies in the districts where zeal may obscure their judgment," Minute (Nov.11, 1918), PRO, P0371/31341/188553.
27. The Grosse Schutt was an island formed by two channels of the Danube just east of Pozsony (Bratislava). Its population was overwhelmingly Magyar.
28. This map is found as MPI 397 in the PRO map room.
29. War Cabinet meeting (Nov.22, 1918), CAB 23/8/506. See also Lajos Arday, "Angol-magyar viszony a polgari demokratikus forradalom idejen az angol leveltari forrasok tukreben (1918 oktober- 1919 marcius) (English-Hungarian Relations in the Time of the Bourgeois Democratic Revolution as Reflected in English Archival Sources), Tortenelmi Szemle, no.2-3 (1975), pp.246-47.
30. For this see the valuable study of Peter Pastor, Hungary between Wilson and Lenin: The Hungarian Revolution of 1918-1919 and the Big Three (Boulder: East European Quarterly, 1976), pp. 88-89, 148.
31. D.[agmar] Perman, The Shaping of the Czechoslovak State: Diplomatic History of the Boundaries of Czechoslovakia, 1914-1920 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1962), p.70.
32. Arday, pp. 249-54.
33. A characteristic statement was that of Sir Eyre Crowe in February, 1919: "We should have no truck with the Hungarians. Count Karolyi has, as it is, no reputation to lose." PRO, F0608/12/2969.
34. Namier did concede, however, that it would be useful to warn the Successor States "that forcible seizure does not establish a valid title, and that all these territorial questions will be considered at the Peace Congress." Namier's minute (Nov.11, 1918), PRO, F0371/3134/188553.
35. Nicolson, pp.106-07. See also PRO, P0608/5/1645,
36. For the American map, see Francis Deak, Hungary at the Paris Peace Conference, The Diplomatic History of the Treaty of Trianon (New

York: Columbia U.P., 1942), appendix, map 2. The final Foreign Office memo stating the British position on territorial matters was drawn up by Crowe, Nicolson, and Leeper on February 8. It was substantially similar to Seton-Watson's map, and specifically called For assignment of the Grosse Schutt to Hungary. PRO. F0608/5/1645.

37. Piotr S. Wandycz, France and her Eastern Allies, 1919-1926 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962), p. 54; Perman, pp. 04-96.
38. Cook argued that the Grosse Schutt in Hungarian hands would be a "strategic menace to Czechoslovakia. Minutes of the Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs (in French), PRO, F0374/6, p. 6. See also Charles Seymour, "Czechoslovak Frontiers," Yale Review, Vol. 28 (1938-39), p.277.
39. Nicolson apparently professed concern privately about the assignment of too many Magyars and Germans to the new Czechoslovak state (Nicolson, p. 279), but the minutes of the Commission on Czechoslovak Affairs reveal that he did not take a stand before the Commission.
40. Meeting (Feb.13, 1919), Commission on Romanian and Yugoslav Affairs (in French), PRO, F0374/9.
41. Ibid.
42. Deak, pp. 67-71.
43. The Fontainebleau memorandum is found in Martin Gilbert, The Roots of Appeasement (New York: New American Library, 1966), appendix 1, p. 190.
44. In the Lloyd George papers (House of Lords Archives, London) there is no pertinent evidence on his attitude and policy toward Hungary in this period.
45. Before 1918 Lloyd George had only a hazy conception of the geography of Eastern Europe, and in fact could not identify the Slovaks or Ruthenians. Calder, p. 101.
46. Nicolson's diary entry for 16 January: "He [William Beveridge] is very pro-Magyar and ignorant of actualities, which is a pity as he is going to see Lloyd George." Nicolson, p. 240. See also Pastor, pp. 98-100.
47. The letter, dated 21 December, 1918, was transmitted by the War Office to the king, who sent a copy to Lloyd George. PRO, F0371/3514/36995.
48. It was filed away without the usual minutes that items of importance attracted.
49. Paul Mantoux, Paris Peace Conference. 1919. Proceedings of the Council of Four (March 24-April 18) (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1964), p.72.
50. United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference, 1919,13 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942-47), Vol. 4, p. 317. (Cited hereafter as PPC).
51. Mantoux, p.55. Also Paul Mantoux, Les deliberations du Conseil des Quatre. 24 mars-28 juin 1919.2 vols. (Paris: Editions du Centre National de

la Recherche Scientifique, 1955), Vol. 2, p.351.

52. Gilbert, p.192.
54. Memo of Lloyd George to Balfour (July13, 1919), PRO, Cab 21/130.
55. Gordon A. Craig, "The British Foreign Office from Grey to Austen Chamberlain," in The Diplomats, 1919-1939, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1953), Vol. 1, pp.25-32; and Kenneth O, Morgan, Consensus and Unity. The Lloyd George Coalition Government, 1918-1922 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p.112.
56. Clerk's report to Supreme Council, 29 Nov., 1919, DBFP, first series, Vol. 2, no' 33, appendix A.
57. DBFP, first series, Vol. 13, no.78, pp. 106-09,
58. Among the members of parliament who called for a tempering of the terms of the treaty with Hungary and excoriated the Successor States were Lord Bryce, Lord Newton, Sir Samuel Hoare, and Lord Montagu. For details of the debates, see Deak, pp.242-45. In a minute (March 7), William Tyrrell remarked on the "complete ignorance of Hungarian history and policy" of people like Lord Newton, which made them "easy dupes" of the "Hungarian gospel according to Magyar magnates." PRO, F0371/3519/180251,
59. Deak, p. 243.
60. Leeper's minute (Feb.11), 1920, PRO, F0371/35181176995. A summary is given in DBFP, first series, Vol. 12, p. 108, fn. 5.
61. Leeper proceeded to make a thorough survey of the specific territorial problems encountered in drawing Hungary's borders, though for some reason he failed to mention the most controversial issue, the Grosse Schutt.
62. DBFP, first series, Vol. 7, no, 23.
63. DBFP, first series, Vol. 7, no, 46.
64. Minutes of this meeting are in DBFP, first series, Vol. 7, no.54,
65. DBFP, first series, Vol. 7, pp. 440-44. Leeper's arguments here paralleled those in his earlier memo, and his strong recommendation was that none of the Hungarian requests for territorial concessions be granted.
66. This is the origin of the so-called "covering letter" of the Treaty of Trianon, which became known later as the "Millerand letter," though it is now clear that the impetus came from Lord Curzon.
67. In his memoirs Lloyd George passes quickly over this episode, suggesting only that the Hungarians might have been more persuasive if they had focused on "specific instances of injustice." David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, 2 vols. (London: Victor Gollanz Ltd., 1938), Vol. 2, p.970.
68. Henrik Marczali, "Az angol-magyar erdekkozdssegrol a multban" (The English-Hungarian Community of Interest in the Past), Szazadok, Vol. 53, no.3-10(1919), p.123.
69. Lord Beveridge, Power and Influence (New York: Beechhurst Press, 1955), p.156.

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