|A Case Study on Trianon|
First, the matter of responsibility for the war. The war guilt of Hungary is mentioned even in the famous Millerand letter of which only a portion is usually quoted. This letter states:
The belated measures of the Hungarian government with which it intended to satisfy the nationalities yearning for autonomy, will not delude anyone; they do not alter in any way the historical fact that during long years Hungary dedicated all its efforts to repress the voice of the minorities.29
It is worth noting, in this connection, that the Committee in charge of war responsibility of the Paris Peace Conference, in its report of March 29, 1919 to the Peace Conference, does not include the above-mentioned statement of responsibility.30 Even the Serbian government did not accuse Hungary of responsibility for the war in its report to the Committee. On the other hand, Benes, in one of his works published in London in 191731 wrote: "The war against Serbia was brought about more by Hungary, with over four million Serbo-Croats, than by Austria, who commanded only one million." As if these statistics were the criteria for determining guilt!
The question of war guilt has its own historiography. We selected some data characteristic of the Hungarian aspect of the issue.
The declaration of Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, on August 9, 1918, signals the clear victory of the policy aimed at the
dissolution of the Monarchy. Balfour stated that the United Kingdom considered the Czechoslovak nation as an ally, the Czechoslovak legions as an allied army, and the Czechoslovak National Council as the trustee of the future Czechoslovak government. This declaration was followed by that of the American Secretary of State, Lansing, on September 3, 1918, which recognized the Czechoslovak National Council as a de facto government. Finally Wilson's statement of October 19, which included a reply to Austria-Hungary's peace proposal, spells out clearly that the United States has changed its concept regarding Austria-Hungary and its relationship to the United States; the United States can no longer be satisfied with the autonomy of the nations constituting the Monarchy and such autonomy cannot form the basis of a peace treaty.32 Thus, the dissolution of Austria-Hungary was already decided in theory before the Peace Conference set upon determining the new boundaries at the beginning of 1919, under the chairmanship of Wilson.
The records of the Council of the Ambassadors have not been made public, in accordance with an international agreement to that effect. Thus our picture of the debates among the allies regarding the Hungarian peace treaty is not complete to this day. Maria Ormos succeeded in giving us a clearer picture through her research in the French archives. Thus she observes, in the manuscript of her dissertation, that "the possibility of the meaningful modification of the original text was considered."33
At the London conference of the Supreme Council the Hungarian peace treaty was discussed on March 8, 1920. Speaking for the absent Italian Prime Minister Nitti, Foreign Minister Scioloja demanded a thorough investigation and modification of the treaty which was opposed by British Foreign Secretary Curzon, as well as the French delegation. Decision was in the hands of Lloyd George; if he were to speak against his own Foreign Secretary and for the Italian side, the treaty project would go down in defeat. He said that in his heart, he agreed with Nitti. Having studied the documents, however, he noted that the frontiers had been accepted in Paris and he came to conclusion that the only solution was compliance.34
The American observations were conveyed by the American ambassador in Paris, Wallace, post facto, avoiding the publicity of the Conference in the course of diplomatic contacts. His stand was transmitted to London on March 30 by the new French secretary, Maurice Paleologue. According to Wallace, says the telegram by
Paleologue, "the American government accepts, against its better judgment, the decision not to announce a plebiscite in the matter of the final drafting of frontiers. He believes that in many respects the frontiers do not correspond to the ethnic requisite, nor to economic necessity, and that significant modifications would be in order, particularly in the Ruthenian area." Later on Wallace submitted for the consideration of the Great Powers proposals with regard to a restoration of the economic unity of the Danubian states. The American initiative, however, came too late ... The only thing left was the Millerand cover letter, which did not oblige anyone to do anything!
The Hungarian peace delegation signed the peace treaty consisting of 14 points at the so-called Great Trianon palace, near Paris, on June 4, 1920. Hungary's fate was determined for an unforeseeable future by the second part of the treaty which defined the new borders. According to this section Hungary's area (without Croatia) would be reduced from 282,000 km2 to 93,000 km2, whereas its population decreased from 18 million to 7.6 million. This meant that Hungary lost two thirds of its territory, whereas Germany lost but 10 percent and Bulgaria but 8 percent to the benefit of their victorious neighbors.
As regards population, Hungary lost more than 60 percent of its inhabitants as opposed to the 10 percent lost by Germany. In the lands taken away from Hungary there lived approximately 10 million persons. Persons of Hungarian nationality constituted 3,424,000 in the areas taken away from Hungary. Of these 1,084,000 were attached to Czechoslovakia, 1,705,000 to Romania, 564,000 to Yugoslavia, and 65,000 to Austria. Thus 33.5 percent of all Hungarians came under foreign rule, i.e., every third Hungarian. For the sake of comparison. while the treaties of Versailles and Neuilly placed only one German or one Bulgarian out of every twenty under foreign rule, the Trianon treaty placed seven out of twenty Hungarians in the same position.
Furthermore about one half of the Hungarian minority attached to the neighboring states was ethnically directly next to the main body of Hungarians on the other side of the borders. Had the peace treaties signed in the Paris suburbs really tried to bring about, however incidentally, nation-states, then it would have had to leave at least 11/4 to 2 million more Hungarians inside Hungary. In contrast the 42 million inhabitants of the successor states there
were about 16 million minorities, as a consequence of which Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia became multinational states much like the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had been. What is more, according to the census of 1910 the percentage of Hungarians in Hungary had reached 54.4 percent, whereas in the nations that came about as a result of the peace treaties, in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the leading Czech and Serbian elements constituted but a minority as compared to the other ethnic groups.
The Treaty of Trianon was a great blow to Hungary in economic terms as well. Hungary was deprived of 62.2 percent of its railroad network, 73.8 percent of its public roads, 64.6 percent of its canals, 88 percent of its forests, 83 percent of its iron ore mines and of all its salt mines.
At the Peace Conference the Entente powers, in order to satisfy the imperialist greed of their allies in central Europe, cut across roads, canals, railroad lines, split cities and villages in two, deprived mines of their entrances, etc.
There was but one modification of the frontier: thanks to Italian intercession and the stand taken by patriotic forces in Western Hungary, a plebiscite was obtained in Sopron and its environs. At the plebiscite of December 4, 1921, 65 percent of the population opted for Hungary.35
The perceived injustices of the Treaty of Trianon gave rise to a special body of literature. Statesmen, diplomats, journalists, and the crown witnesses at Versailles, Neuilly, and Trianon spoke out in the period between the wars, and often revealed the behind-the-scenes secrets about the preparation of the treaties.
French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, for example, openly admitted to his critics during the July 11, 1921, session of the National Assembly:
It was impossible to draw those just boundary lines which you demanded a moment ago, hence the decisions were necessarily prejudicial to someone or other. Between Hungary and Romania I prefer that it not be Romania that should suffer injustice.36
At the same session, the socialist labor leader Paul-Boncour evaluated the Treaty of Trianon in the following terms:
A glance at the map which indicates what the treaties of Trianon and Saint Germain have done to the territories of Austria and Hungary
would probably reveal that none of the countries born of this partition could exist solely within its own borders. Hungary did exist independently and its economic organization was in accordance with this situation. And now she has been carved to pieces, dissolved.
To which Briand responded: "This is the terrible contradiction between the principle of nationality and economic interest!"37
One of the curious aspects of the Treaty of Trianon is that it was signed neither by the United States, nor by the young Soviet Union. The American delegation took its leave from the allies in Paris as early as December 9, 1919, since Congress had definitely rejected the ratification of the peace achievements.38 Washington signed a separate peace with the defeated states. Thus peace was concluded between the United States and Hungary on August 29, 1921, a treaty written in the books of the League of Nations (1921, XLVIII). The text of the treaty makes no mention of the boundaries designated at Trianon.39
The Millerand cover letter constituted the legal basis of the Hungarian revisionist propaganda between the wars. Millerand, the Chairman of the Conference of Ambassadors, attached a letter to the peace treaty which stated, in order to preempt any further discussion regarding territory, that the eventual modification of the designated boundaries would be referred to the boundary committees "in accordance with the same conditions." The Hungarian governments between the wars tried to use this letter to arouse false hopes regarding revision of the treaty. The truth is that this document did not place any obligation whatever on the victors.
The successor states, supported by their western allies, did not even want to hear of any restitution of territory. The only exception was Czechoslovakia whose leaders, Masaryk and Benes, felt that with certain modification of the boundary line they might achieve peace and stability along their southern borders. The Hungarian-Czechoslovak negotiations took place in March of 1921 at Bruckander-Leitha. The participants included, on the Hungarian side, Prime Minister Count Pal Teleki and Foreign Minister Gusztav Gratz, on the Czechoslovak side Foreign Minister Benes. The Hungarians engaged in the negotiations on the condition that territorial matters would also be discussed. Benes, inasmuch as the Czechoslovak government was indeed interested in normalizing relations, was not adamant. But the Czechoslovak delegation relegated
territorial issues to the background. The Hungarian consul at Prague, Laszlo Tahy, reported that Benes "would not preclude the discussion of territorial questions." In spite of this, no agreement could be reached in this matter because the negotiations were interrupted by the first coup engineered by Charles Habsburg. They were adjourned until June, but no significant agreement was ever reached even in other areas (financial, economic, transportation).40 Information leaked out that the Hungarian delegation insisted on the restitution of southern Slovakia before agreeing to any economic or financial settlement. Since Benes rejected this claim the meeting ended in complete failure.41
Hungary became less isolated and her international position improved somewhat when she was admitted to the League of Nations on September 18, 1923. Yet she had to wait for years longer for any significant diplomatic achievement. It was only in 1927, with the signing of the Italian-Hungarian treaty of "eternal friendship," that the Bethlen government could claim that Hungary overcame its isolation imposed by Trianon.
By the same token, this new treaty meant the beginnings of revisionist propaganda, promoted to a large extent by the so-called Rothermere initiative. Not long after signing the treaty, Mussolini met with Lord Rothermere, the conservative magnate of the press, and the owner of the British Daily Mail; the latter agreed to launch a campaign, in his paper, on behalf of the revision of the Treaty of Trianon. Rothermere even met with Bethlen and, as a consequence, on June 21, 1927, published his controversial article, "Hungary's Place under the Sun." In this article he emphasized that security in Central Europe can only be achieved by changing the Trianon boundaries, and took a stand in favor of restituting an area inhabited by about two million Hungarians. These areas lay along the Trianon frontiers in Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia.42
The Rothermere initiative had wide international repercussions and elicited an intensive counter propaganda in the countries of the Little Entente as well as in France. Nor did the British government look favorably upon the initiative, and dissociated itself from it. Nevertheless, the Revision League was founded that same year, on the initiative of Rothermere, under the chairmanship of the writer Ferenc Herczeg. Its objective was to influence international public opinion to support revision by propaganda and other means.43 It soon became clear, however. that there was no adequate interna-
tional support for Hungarian revisionist claims. Even the Rothermere initiative proved to be but an ephemeral will-o'-the-wisp. While the Hungarian governments strived to keep the cause of revision of the peace treaties on the agendas of the League of Nations and of other international bodies, revision did not receive serious consideration until the time of Munich. But the decisions taken in the shadows of Hitlerian aggression could bring no lasting solution to benefit Hungary.
The stand taken by the Hungarian and international Communist movement in the matter of revision, between the wars, is worth discussing, because of its lasting theoretical and practical implications to this day.
The Communist Party of Hungary confronted this issue already at its first reorganizing Congress in Vienna. On August 18, 1925, it formulated the problem in the debate on the international situation as follows: how should Hungarian Communists react to the Trianon Peace Treaty and to the irrredentist propaganda having currency in Hungary at the moment? The Communist International had condemned Versailles and other peace treaties from the beginning, harshly criticizing their imperialist nature. The Hungarian Communist leaders (Alpari, Kun) nevertheless got around the essence of the problem, even though the Hungarian Communists could have expected a clear stand from Bela Kun, who was then at the head of the Agitation and Propaganda Section of the International.
Instead, Kun expressed incredible views, to the effect that the Western powers were disillusioned with the Versailles policy! Talking about the right of self-determination of the Hungarians living in neighboring countries, he declared that it was the duty of the Communist parties in the successor states to fight for it. The participants could not have been satisfied with such general observations. The specialist of the topic, Agnes Szabo, is justified in pointing out:
In theory the Congress did condemn the Versailles peace ... - but it did not provide guidance to the party on how to struggle against the unjust imperialist peace in its daily propaganda work.44
Bela Kun himself felt that his arguments had been weak, explaining that the Communist International had no detailed program concerning this matter. Thus in a letter to the Executive Committee of the International he wrote:
On the basis of our experiences we must state that the Fifth Congress [of the Comintern] and its decision in the matter of nationalities are not specific enough to allow that a specific stand be taken under present circumstances in the matter. We have experienced in the course of our work that the nationalities policy of some of the Communist Parties in Southeastern Europe had created the impression among its conscious masses that this policy is not sufficiently internationalist.45
Jozsef Revai, one of the leading theoreticians of the party, formulated the stand of the Communist movement much more clearly in the review Uj Marcius, the organ of the Hungarian Communist emigration, published in Moscow:
The Trianon peace treaty was the dictate of the imperialist powers which defined the boundaries not on the basis of the self-determination of nations, or that of the 'will' or 'sympathy' of the people, but rather on the basis of the interests of the ruling classes among the Romanians, Czechs, Serbs in alliance with the victorious great powers.
Thus the struggle against Trianon is one of the fronts of the struggle of the international working class against the order established by the Versailles robber peace. The Communist parties in the successor states, especially since the Fifth Congress of the Communist International, have come up with the slogan of the right of self-determination of the oppressed nationalities against the Serbian, Romanian, and Czech bourgeoisie, including the right of secession. The Fifth Congress has particularly stressed that the Communist Parties in the successor states must also struggle for the right of secession of the oppressed Hungarian nationalities.
Revai continues by criticizing the Bethlen government, because "it began to sound the program of 'peaceful coexistence' with the successor states. After establishment of the Little Entente, Bethlen soon surrendered in the matter of the foreign policy directed against Trianon." The article also criticized Bethlen because once Hungary's financial situation became stabilized, the policy that seemed to prevail was one of complete acquiescence, as a way of reaching a rapprochement with France and indirectly the Little Entente countries. We should note, regarding Revai's criticism of the Bethlen regime, that it was entirely without foundation. His evaluation of Bethlen's diplomatic steps towards internal political and economic consolidation was incorrect. As we have seen above, the Bethlen
government did not discard the policy of revision of Trianon. In any case, it is noteworthy that Revai spoke out in favor of revision in such determined, radical terms, referring even to the right of secession of the Hungarian minorities.
Further in the article Revai deals with the contradictions in foreign policy among the Little Entente countries and East Europe in general; he establishes a connection between the liberation of Bessarabia and that of Transylvania.
This fact was noted not only by the boyars of Romania, not only by the Rumanian Communist Party, but the Hungarian bourgeoisie of Transylvania as well. Even the Hungarian bourgeois press of Transylvania considered the Soviet Union as the defender of the right of self-determination for Hungarians. Soviet Russia has officially declared, by way of comrade Rakovsky, its ambassador in London, that it is demanding the right of national self-determination not only for the oppressed of Bessarabia, but for those of Transylvania as well.
In this connection Revai points out that Hungarian foreign policy, instead of recognizing the community of Soviet and Hungarian interests, "has conformed to the campaign against Russia," even though "the only possible national foreign policy for Hungary would lead to an alliance with Soviet Russia."
In connection with the parallel between Bessarabia and Transylvania we must refer to the year 1940, when Soviet and Hungarian interests once again found a common ground, and the Soviet government even made a gesture towards Hungary proposing that they make their claims good against Romania jointly. At that time the Hungarian government would not hear of it, and preferred to accept the consequences of the Second Vienna Decision.
The final conclusion of Revai's article was:
The solution of the Hungarian national question, the shattering of Trianon, can only be accomplished by the Hungarian proletarian revolution in conjunction with the working-class of the successor states, under the banner of the Communist International.46
Even if we do find many doctrinal aspects to Revai's arguments, it remains a fact that in the mid-twenties, in the matter of the peace treaties, including Trianon, the Communist movement had adopted a completely internationalist stand. At the same time the bourgeois
and Social Democratic exiles, in their struggle against Horthyite reaction, and because of the weakness and errors of the bourgeois democratic forces at home, placed their hopes increasingly in the democratic forces in the successor states and the policies of their governments directed against official Hungary. The concept of Jaszi and his circle, and the hope of Social Democrat Hungarian exiles, could not be realized because of the consolidation under Bethlen.47
Between February 27, 1930, and March 15, 1930, the Hungarian Communist exiles, at their second Congress held in the Soviet Union, also dealt with the matter of the revision of Trianon. The newly elected secretary of the party, Sandor Serenyi, who became a member of the Politburo of the ruling party in Hungary only after 1956, in an article signed with his name in the movement, "Sas" (eagle), appraised the meaning of the Congress and criticized those left-wing manifestations which came up with the slogan "down with revision." The party Congress itself disapproved of this stand, which would have meant for all practical purposes "a surrender of the struggle against the imperialist peace treaties." His article summarizes the stand of the Party in the following terms: "The Congress declared that since such views might isolate the party from the broad masses we must carry on an intense struggle against them and specify that the Party is indeed determined to struggle against the imperialist peace of Trianon for the sake of the right of self-determination of the Hungarian nation," alongside the "Soviet Union, the international proletariat, first of all with the working class of the successor states."48
An important theoretical article which appeared in the paper of the Hungarian Communist Party that same year confirms the stand taken by the Party Congress with regard to revision. In its lead article titled "The United Block for Revision" it contrasts the diplomatic alliance of the Bethlen regime with the block of the revolutionary workers. It stresses that the program of the Party "cannot be complete without the revolutionary struggle against the Trianon peace treaty." Then it continues: "The Communist Party must combine the domestic program of the proletarian revolution with the revolutionary struggle against the imperialist peace treaties. Following the example of our German brother party we must let the Hungarian workers know about the program of the Communists against the Trianon peace of plunder." The lead article ends with the following rather illusionary conclusion: "We intend to shatter the imperialist
chains of Trianon with the help of the workers of Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia."40
It seems that even after the takeover by Hitler and the aggressive National Socialist regime the Hungarian Communist Party did not change its own revisionist line. During the debate of the so-called Blum theses in Moscow (this was the title Gyorgy Lukacs used for his presentation of ideological matters pertaining to the movement, which was rejected) the Party issued its slogan regarding the "democratic revision of Trianon."50 The term "democratic" is quite important here because, in contrast to the stand taken in the twenties, this implied that the concept of revision within the framework of the counter-revolutionary Horthy regime was unacceptable.
The Party's approach to Trianon was further modified at the time of the Munich Pact. While Hitler forced the revision of the Versailles Treaty but was jeopardizing peace in Europe in so doing, the Communist parties, including the Hungarian Party, advocated the preservation of the status quo and urged, within the framework of the Popular Front, the alliance of all democratic forces on an international scale against the Fascist prospect of war. By the same token this meant that from 1938 the Party was definitely opposed to the revision of Trianon which could only come about with Hitler's help.
The series of articles published by Jozsef Revai in the Szabad Szo of Paris in the fall of 1938 accurately reflect the views of the Hungarian Communists. This important statement begins with the following theoretical observation:
The specific execution, form, method, means, aspects, and timing of revision has to be subordinated to the higher requirements of Hungarian national independence and the universal interests of the nation. Today, however, the situation is that the territorial revisions carried out thanks to Hitler in the long run makes Hungary into his vassal state-both nationally and internationally.
Further, on the article contrasts the Hungarian Soviet Republic with counterrevolutionary Hungary: the Soviets waged a war of liberation for the return of lands belonging to Hungary and the nationalities, as well as for the social liberation of nations; in contrast, the Trianon treaty signed by the Horthy regime gave up lands inhabited exclusively by Magyars to the benefit of Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. He continues:
Trianon, like all imperialist peace treaties, was unjust. It replaced old injustices by new ones. Everyone had the right to raise this issue except the Hungarian ruling class which shares with the victorious and defeated imperialist powers the responsibility for this national calamity which struck primarily the people, those who remained in the fatherland, and those who were torn away against their will.
In a later article in the series Revai continues to advocate the need for the revision of the treaty, but ties it to certain conditions:
Yes, there should be revision, if the revision outside is accompanied by revision inside; if the returning Hungarians can not only avoid deprivation of rights but can find, beyond that, a country where conditions are freer, more democratic economically and politically. Today the situation is just the opposite.
Then he compares conditions under the bourgeois democratic regime in Czechoslovakia with the Hungary of the three million beggars, where the large landholders and the aristocracy have maintained power through the local overseers (ispans) and judges already notorious from the period of the Dualism.
The program of the Party in the matter of revision at the time of the aggression against Yugoslavia in April 1941 changed to the extent that it tied the defense of independence to the rejection of territorial revision. It pointed out that revision would signify not only the continued fascization of the country, its drift into the war, the surrender of its independence, but would also be a stab in the back of the international anti-Fascist forces.52
Hungary's entry into the Second World War, its complicity in the aggression against Yugoslavia, its acceptance of the role of satellite on the side of Hitlerian Germany in the campaign against the Soviet Union, then the declaration of war against Great Britain and the United States did not merely constitute a crude mockery of the revision of the peace of Trianon, but also jeopardized Hungary's fate and future.
The Hungarian political opposition, from the legitimists all the way to the Communists, did not prove sufficiently strong to divert the establishment, and Hungary, from their fateful path. In the critical years of the war a few outstanding representatives of the democratic opposition attempted, in several written works, to answer the big question: how did Hungary once again find itself
among the losers, on the side of the German imperialists? Among them Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, the foreign policy spokesman and martyr of the largest opposition party, the Independent Smallholders, felt that it was about mid-way into the Dualist period (i.e., the time of the turn of the century) that the Hungarian nation strayed from the "ancestral road" giving up completely its concept of independence. He gave this part of his work the title "The Lost Rider" sowing his historic political views deep into the furrows of the symbolist poetry of Endre Ady, the great Hungarian poet-prophet.53 Another prestigious figure of the democratic opposition in Hungary, the history professor Gyula Szekfu sought the answer to this problem in a series of articles titled "We lost our way somewhere."54 Reaching back into the first half of 19th century, into the Reform period, he analyzes in detail the program of the centralists such as Antal Csengery, Moric Lukacs, Laszlo Szalay, Jozsef Eotvos. In his opinion it was a great tragedy in Hungarian history that it was not this centralist group within the reform generation that prevailed in 1848; the Kossuth road led first to the dethronement of the Habsburgs, then to the surrender at Vilagos, then, in 1867, thanks to the triumph of the Deak wing, to the compromise with the Habsburgs, that is to say, the surrender of independent Hungarian policy. The Hungarian nation and the historical state were not able to sail between Scylla and Charybdis.
Nevertheless during the war it seemed that Hungary's position in Central Europe was better than that of Romania, where an openly Fascist regime came to power under the leadership of General Antonescu, or in Slovakia, where Fascism had also triumphed with German help. It was only in the southern region that the developments were unfavorable to Hungary-in spite of the Croatian puppet state-because of the unfortunate incident at Novi Sad.
The fate of Hungary was sealed, however, by the German occupation on March 19, 1944, which met with no resistance, the Fascist measures having been carried out by the Sztojay puppet government. The cruel deportation to Auschwitz of the provincial Jewry followed, as well as the unsuccessful attempt to bail out on October 15, 1944, and finally the Fascist takeover by Szalasi with all its monstrous consequences.
One part of the peace treaties concluding the Second World War, Including the Hungarian one, was once again worded in Paris. Knowing the precedents, democratic Hungary did not have much to
look forward to in signing the treaty. Twenty-seven years after the dictate of Trianon, in February of 1947, not only were the Trianon boundaries restored at Paris, but three additional Hungarian villages (Oroszvar, Horvatujfalu, Dunacsun) in the vicinity of Bratislava were attached to Czechoslovakia.
Neither at the United Nations nor at the peace negotiations were the rights of minorities guaranteed in any way. The view which regarded the nationalities as the so-called fifth column of Fascist attempts at revenge, as the casus belli, actually confused the true reason for aggression with the propaganda gimmick resorted to as a justification.56 The representatives of the Allies at the Paris peace negotiations curtly rejected the claims of the minorities which the Hungarian delegation, among others, brought up. As Walter Bedell Smith stated in 1946: "It is difficult for a citizen of the United States to understand the desire to perpetuate racial minorities rather than absorb them." This view was confirmed by his British colleague, Lord Hood: "Our aim should be to assimilate racial minorities in the countries where they live rather than perpetuate them."57
It was only in the 1970's that the U.N. began to notice that some 600 million people in the world live without any minority rights. Thus, at Ohrid in 1974 at the Seminar on Minorities of one of the special agencies of the United Nations, a unanimous decision was taken regarding the defense and support of minority rights.58 This decision, however, had no force of legal compulsion, hence the U.N. still does not provide for the legal defense of the minorities. Professor Imre Szabo, condemning this shortcoming of the United Nations, notes: ... the problem of the minorities cannot be solved by
the guarantee of human rights. The positive counterpart of this negative thesis is that the international defense of minorities requires special international provisions and guarantees."59 Even among the socialist countries of Europe the rights of minorities is mentioned only in one international document: the Polish-Czechoslovakian friendship and assistance treaty of 1947.
In the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, not counting the Soviet Union, there are ten nations (German, Polish, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Romanian, Bulgarian, Serbian, Croatian, Slovene) with close to 50 national minorities. The Hungarians constitute but 2 percent of the population of Europe (not counting the Soviet Union), and 10 percent of its 40 million minorities! After the Albanians the Hungarians provide the largest numbers of minorities in Europe. About two thirds of them live along the Hungarian borders in the five neighboring countries.
The recent historical events including the defeated revolutions, lost wars, humiliating peace treaties, various retaliatory measures, the negative, harmful or spontaneous assimilating factors in economic, social, and cultural areas, have all decimated the Hungarian minorities living in neighboring lands. A historical balance sheet on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the Trianon peace treaty, therefore must also come to grips with the phenomena threatening the future-the survival of that part of the nation which lives in neighboring states.
1. The English language sources of this process are analyzed by Geza Jeszenszky's doctoral dissertation, "Magyarorszag megitelese Nagybrittanniaban" [Hungary's appraisal in Great Britain] (Budapest, 1979), 129-31.
2. Ibid., 143-45.
3. The Times, September 23, 1897.
4. The Times, May 31, 1898.
5. The Quarterly Review, October 1901, 389.
6. Jeszenszky, 190-94.
7. Ibid., 206.
8. Scottish Review, March 12, 1906, quoted in Jeszenszky, 109.
9. Scotus Viator, The Future of Austria-Hungary and the Attitude of the Great Powers (London, 1907).
10. Jeszenszky, 237.
12. Sir Campbell Sturt, Secrets of Crewe House (London, 1920); V. H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 1914-1918 (Oxford, 1971), 207-208,216.
13. Peter Hanak, Magyarorszag a Monarchiaban [Hungary within the Monarchy] (Budapest, 1975), 445.
14. Frantisek Palacky, Oesterreichs Staatsidee (Prague, 1866).
15. Aurel Popovici, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Gross Osterreich (Leipzig, 1906).
16. Oszkar Jaszi, A nemzetisegi kerdes es Magyarorszag jovoje [The nationalities problem and Hungary's future] (Budapest, 1911); Magyarorszag jovoje es a Dunai Egyesult Allamok [Hungary's future and the United States of the Danube] (Budapest, 1918).
17. Papers, Vol. I (Washington, 1933), 15.
18. Ibid., 270, 319; Papers PPC, I (Washington, 1942), 359; III, 333 ff.
19. Nepszava, October 26,1918.
20. Mihaly Karolyi's speech at the December 30,1918, meeting of the Independence and 1948 Party, Pesti Hirlap, December 31,1918.
21. Papers PPC, XII, 413-416; Tibor Hajdu, Marcius huszonegyedike [The twenty-first of March] (Budapest); Akademiai Kiado (1959), 51 ff.
22. Zsuzsa L. Nagy, "Smuts tabornok Budapesti kuldetese 1919 aprilisaban" [The Budapest mission of General Smuts in April 1919], Tortenelmi Szemle (1963), no. 6, 195-214 and her A parizsi bekekonferencia es Magyarorszag. 1918-1919 [The Paris Peace Conference and Hungary] (Budapest, 1965), 101-115.
23. Papers PPC, XI, 134-135.
24. L. Nagy. A parizsi bekekonferencia. 95.
25. Papers PPC, VI, 246-247.
26. H. Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919 (London, 1934), 358.
27. L. Nagy, A parizsi bekekonferencia. 158-159.
28. L. Nagy and Maria Ormos, "Saint-Germain es Trianon. Franciaorszag politikaja Ausztriaval es Magyarorszaggal szemben, 1918-1920" [The policy of France towards Austria and Hungary]. Dissertation draft.
29. Jeno Horvath, Felelosseg a vilaghaboruert es a bekeszerzodesert [Responsibility for the world war and for the Peace Treaty].
30. Horvath, Ibid., 4-5.
31. E. Benesch, Bohemia's Case for Independence (London, 1917), p. 43.
32. Gusztav Gratz, A forradalmak kora [The age of revolutions] (Budapest. 1935). 287-288.
33. Maria Ormos, 600.
34. Ibid., 604.
35. Yves de Daruvar, A feldarabolt Magyarorszag [Carved up Hungary] (Luzern. 1976), 286.
36. Antal Ullein-Revitzky, A trianoni szerzodes teruleti rendelkezeseinek jogi termeszete [The legal nature of the territorial provisions of the Treaty of Trianon] (Pecs, 1043), 174.
37. Ibid., 175.
38. PPC, IX, 547.
39. Jeno Horvath, 230.
40. Ferenc Boros, Magyar-csehszlovak kapcsolatok 1918-1921 [Hungarian-Czechoslovakian relations in 1918-1921] (Budapest, 1970), 284-285; Benes, Problemy nove Evropy a zahranicny politika ceskoslovenska (Prague, 1956), 287.
41. Istvan Borsody, Magyar-szlovak kiegyezes [Hungarian Slovakian agreement] (Budapest, no date), 71.
42. Regarding the Rothermere initiative see Dezso Nemes, A Bethlen kormany kulpolitikaja 1927-1931 ben [The foreign policy of the Bethlen regime in 1927-31] (Budapest, 1964), 167-182.
43. Gyula Juhasz, Magyarorszag kulpolitikaja, 1919-1945 [Hungary's foreign policy] (Budapest, 1969), 115.
44. Gyorgy Borsanyi, Kun Bela (Budapest, 1979), 286-287; Agnes Szabo, A KMP ujjaszervezese [The reorganization of the Hungarian Communist Party] 1919-1925 (1970), 197.
45. Borsanyi. 287.
46. Jozsef Revai, "Trianon-Genf-Moszkva" [Trianon-Geneva-Moscow], Uj Marcius (1925), nos. 1-2, 31-36. In one of his notes Revai remarks "The Fifth Congress issued the slogan of Transylvanian autonomy as a new approach to resolving the Hungarian national issue."
47. The members of the Kiraly circle in exile, the so-called Octobrists, wrote mainly for the Magyar Ujsag in Vienna and the Reggel published in Bratislava.
48. Uj Marcius (1930), nos. 1-3.
49. "Revizios blokk" [The revisionist block], Uj Marcius (October-November 1930), 427.
50. Intervention by Dezso Nemes in the debate of the so-called Blum theses which took place between June 20 and 30, 1956. Parttorteneti Kozlemenyek (1956), no.3.
51. Endre Rozgonyi, "A trianoni revizio kerdese" [The issue of the revision of Trianon], Szabad Szo (Paris), November 5.12, 19, and 26, 1938.
52. Istvan Pinter, A magyar antifasiszta Hitler-ellenes ellenallas tortenetehez [Contribution to the history of the anti-Hitlerian anti-Fascist resistance in Hungary] (Budapest. 1976). 117.
53. Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, Helyunk es sorsunk Europaban [Our place and fate in Europe] (Budapest. 1941), 5.
54. Magyar Nemzet, December 1943 to January 1944.
55. Lajos Fur, "Kisebbseg, nemzetiseg, tudomany" [Minority nationality, and science] (Budapest 1980). 7, typescript.
56. Rudolf Joo, "Az Egyesult Nemzetek tervezete es a nemzeti kisebbsegek vedelme" [The projected United Nations and the defense of the minorities], Kulpolitika (1976), no.4, 61.
57. Inis L. Claude, National Minorities: An International Problem (Cambridge, 1955), 141.
58. Laszlo Kovago, Kisebbseg-nemzetiseg [Minorities and ethnic groups] (Budapest, 1977), 198.
59. Imre Szabo, A kisebbsegek es az ember jogok [Minorities and human rights], Valosag (1979), no.1, 7.
|A Case Study on Trianon|